State of Iowa v. Ryan Dale Dunn ( 2019 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 18-0132
Filed March 6, 2019
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
RYAN DALE DUNN,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Story County, Steven P. Van Marel,
District Associate Judge.
The defendant appeals from the district court’s denial of his motion to
suppress. AFFIRMED.
Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Theresa R. Wilson, Assistant
Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Darrel Mullins, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee.
Considered by Potterfield, P.J., Doyle, J., and Carr, S.J.*
*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 (2019).
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POTTERFIELD, Presiding Judge.
Ryan Dunn appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress.
Dunn concedes that he initially engaged in a consensual interaction with police
officers but argues actions taken by officers during the encounter resulted in the
unconstitutional seizure of his person. He also argues his vehicle was
unconstitutionally searched without a warrant and without an applicable exception
to the warrant requirement. Finally, Dunn argues, in the alternative, that he was
subject to custodial interrogation without receiving a Miranda warning.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
On March 10, 2017, at approximately 1:25 a.m., two police officers—in two
separate marked police cars—pulled into an area with freestanding gas pumps but
no store or building nearby. The officers pulled in behind a vehicle they noticed
had been parked there for several minutes with the driver’s door open. According
to their testimony, the officers intended to check on the driver and make sure there
was nothing wrong with him or the vehicle.
Officer Andrej Klaric exited his vehicle at about the same time Dunn exited
the vehicle parked at the gas pump; they met in the space between the two
vehicles. Officer Klaric told Dunn he saw his driver’s door was open and was “[j]ust
making sure everything’s okay.” Dunn reported he stopped at the gas pump after
work and then realized he did not have his debit or credit card with him; he was
waiting at the pump until his friend arrived with the card. Dunn and Officer Klaric
engaged in a conversation: Dunn told Klaric he remembered him from another time
he was stopped and Klaric asked Dunn if he was still working at the same job he
had been before. At some point during the conversation, Officer Klaric asked Dunn
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for his driver’s license; Dunn gave it to him, and Officer Klaric handed it to the
second officer, Officer Dilok Phanchantraurai, who checked the license by radioing
to dispatch.
While Officer Phanchantraurai had Dunn’s license, Officer Klaric asked
Dunn if he had any weapons on him. According to Klaric, he did not have any
suspicions of illegal activity but always asks about weapons when he makes
“contact with somebody out in the field . . . for [his] own safety and their own safety.”
Dunn responded that he had a pistol in an ankle holster, and Officer Klaric asked
Dunn to show him his permit to carry the firearm. Dunn handed Officer Klaric his
permit, which had expired more than two months earlier. Officer Klaric then
informed Dunn his permit was expired, patted Dunn down, and removed the loaded
gun from Dunn’s ankle holster.
Officer Klaric asked Dunn if he had any more firearms in the vehicle. Dunn
stated there were magazines for a firearm in the vehicle. When asked, Dunn
denied consent to search the vehicle. Klaric then handcuffed Dunn and placed
him in the back of his squad car. Klaric searched the vehicle and found a second
gun and the magazines. He placed Dunn under arrest for carrying a weapon.
Before transporting him to the station for booking, Officer Klaric got Dunn’s consent
to move his car—rather than have it towed. During the booking process,
methamphetamine was located in Dunn’s wallet.
Dunn was charged by trial information with carrying weapons and
possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine). He filed a motion to
suppress, claiming the officers had seized him “after the purpose of the stop had
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been resolved,” he should have been advised of his Miranda rights before being
questioned, and the search of his vehicle was unconstitutional.
The district court denied Dunn’s motion to suppress. The court found that
the initial encounter between Dunn and the officers “was consensual. There was
no stop. The officers didn’t use their red lights. They didn’t pull the defendant
over. They just—the defendant was parked, and they just pulled up to him and
everybody got out of their car and talked.” The court distinguished the facts from
the recent State v. Coleman, 890 N.W.2d 284, 300–01 (Iowa 2017), in which our
supreme court held that an officer could not extend a stop to ask for the driver’s
identification after the purpose of the stop had been resolved. Here, the district
court noted, “[U]nlike Coleman this wasn’t a stop situation. They didn’t stop
anybody. They just went up and talked to Mr. Dunn, and then I think we do move
into the cases that talk about consensual encounters.” Additionally, the district
court found:
It was about as minimally intrusive as a conversation between law
enforcement and a citizen can get. The officer’s just concerned
about his safety, and just asks while we’re waiting here talking,
making sure the defendant’s not armed.
So I don’t think that the question about having a weapon
was—was inducing cooperation to answer that question by coercive
means. I think it was just a consensual meeting between the officer
and the defendant, and I don’t think a reasonable person in the
position of the defendant would have believed he wasn’t free to leave
if he hadn’t responded. I don’t think the officer raised his voice. I
don’t think he used coercive methods.
Dunn waived his right to a jury trial and agreed to a trial on the stipulated
minutes of evidence. At the trial, the State orally moved to dismiss the count for
possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine); the court granted the
motion.
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The court found Dunn guilty of carrying weapons, in violation of Iowa Code
section 724.4(1) (2017). Dunn appeals.
II. Standard of Review.
We review de novo a ruling on a motion to suppress raised on constitutional
grounds. See State v. Pals, 805 N.W.2d 767, 771 (Iowa 2011). “This review
requires ‘an independent evaluation of the totality of the circumstances as shown
by the entire record.’” Id. (citation omitted). We give “deference to the factual
findings of the district court due to its opportunity to evaluate the credibility of the
witnesses,” but we are not bound by the district court’s findings. Id.III. Discussion.
Dunn raises a number of alternative arguments regarding alleged
constitutional violations he believes should result in the suppression of evidence.
A. Seizure.
Dunn concedes that his initial encounter with Officer Klaric—when Dunn
exited his vehicle, walked up and met the officer, and began conversing—was a
consensual encounter. However, he maintains he was seized either when Officer
Klaric obtained Dunn’s license and handed it to Officer Phanchantraurai or when
Officer Klaric asked Dunn if he had any weapons on him.
An officer is allowed to “approach[] individuals on the street or in other public
places and put[] questions to them if they are willing to listen.” State v. Reinders,
690 N.W.2d 78, 82 (Iowa 2004) (quoting United State v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194,
200 (2002)). “Even when law enforcement officers have no basis for suspecting a
particular individual, they may pose questions, [and] ask for identification . . .
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provided they do not induce cooperation by coercive means.” Id. (quoting Drayton,
536 U.S. at 201).
In Reinders, our supreme court was asked to determine whether the
defendant was “in effect, detained when [officers] asked him for identification
because under the totality of the circumstances ‘no reasonable person would have
felt free to simply walk away and refuse to answer the officer’s questions.’” 690
N.W.2d at 83. The court held that “no seizure occurs when an officer merely asks
for identification.” Id. (citing State v. Smith, 683 N.W.2d 542, 543 (Iowa 2004)). In
reaching this conclusion, the court noted, “there was no show of authority, no
intimidation, and no use of physical force by the officers in their encounter with [the
defendant].” Id. Additionally, the court “found no basis to distinguish the
protections afforded by the Iowa Constitution from those afforded by the federal
constitution under the facts of this case,” and its “discussion of the merits of the
defendant’s motion to suppress applies equally to the state and federal grounds.”
Id. at 82.
Dunn argues the supreme court’s ruling in Coleman changes our analysis
and requires us to consider whether the initial reason for the police officers’
involvement with Dunn was completed before he was asked to provide his
identification. We disagree. Coleman contemplated the extension of a traffic stop
beyond the time it was reasonably necessary to complete the stop. 890 N.W.2d
at 300–01. But, as the district court noted and Dunn conceded, this encounter
between the officers and Dunn did not begin as a traffic stop. We agree that
Coleman—and Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1612–17 (2015)—
stand for the proposition that officers are only allowed to detain a person so long
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as they have a reasonable suspicion or probable cause to support doing so. But
the point of a consensual encounter is that the person is not being detained by law
enforcement—they are participating at their own choice, without being coerced to
do so. See Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991) (noting a seizure does not
occur if a reasonable person would feel free to disregard the police and go about
their business); State v. Wilkes, 756 N.W.2d 838, 843 (Iowa 2008) (“It . . . appears
that objective indices of police coercion must be present to convert an encounter
between police and citizens into a seizure.”). Thus, we agree with the State that
the appropriate question is whether the actions of the officers converted the
encounter from one of a consensual nature to a seizure. See Wilkes, 756 N.W.2d
at 843.
The district court credited the officers’ testimony that Officer Klaric and Dunn
“just talked” without any coercive actions taken on the part of Officer Klaric. There
was no indication Dunn ever indicated he did not want to provide Klaric with his
identification or answer the question about whether Dunn was armed. See
Reinders, 690 N.W.2d at 82 (“Clearly, though, when a citizen exercises his right to
refuse to answer questions and the authorities take additional steps to elicit the
requested information, a seizure or detention has occurred.”). Although Dunn was
not told he was free to leave or to refuse to participate in the conversation, an
individual’s response to questions can be consensual “even though the person has
not been advised that he is free to refuse to respond.” Id. The officers made no
show of authority, other than wearing their uniforms and arriving in marked police
cars. See id.; see also Wilkes, 756 N.W.2d at 843 (noting “coercion is not
established by ordinary indicia of police authority”; merely showing a badge,
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wearing the uniform, or being visibly armed should have little weight in the
analysis). Dunn argues the fact that Officer Klaric handed his license to Officer
Phanchantraurai effectively meant Dunn could not leave, but our supreme court
was faced with similar facts in Reinders—where the officer took identification from
the defendant and then walked away to his squad car to check the information—
and found that no seizure had taken place, as “[t]he defendant willingly answered
the officers’ questions and provided identifying information.” 690 N.W.2d at 83.
Based on the testimony the district court found credible, nothing in the
record convinces us Dunn was seized by the officers during the time Dunn and
Officer Klaric spoke. See id. at 82 (“A seizure occurs when an officer by means of
physical force or show of authority in some way restrains the liberty of a citizen.”
(quoting State v. Pickett, 573 N.W.2d 245, 247 (Iowa 1997))).
B. Search of Automobile.
Dunn maintains the search of his automobile violated his constitutional
rights and evidence should be suppressed as result. We agree with the State that
even if Dunn’s car should not have been searched, the admission of any evidence
found in the car—the second gun and the magazines—was harmless error. See
State v. Turner, 630 N.W.2d 601, 609 (Iowa 2001) (“In order for constitutional error
to be harmless, the court must be able to declare it harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt.” (citation omitted)). There were three alternatives the State could establish
in order to obtain a conviction for carrying weapons: “that [Dunn] did go armed with
a dangerous weapon concealed on or about the person; or that he was armed with
a loaded firearm within the city limits of Ames, Iowa; or that he did knowingly carry
a loaded pistol in a vehicle.” See Iowa Code § 724.4(1). Here, the court concluded
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the State met its burden as to all three alternatives. But only one alternative was
necessary for a guilty verdict, and even if the evidence of the second gun was
suppressed, there is no reason to believe it would change the court’s ruling as to
the first two alternatives.
We do not consider this argument further.
C. Custodial Interrogation.
Dunn maintains he was in police custody and subjected to interrogation
“once Klaric requested and retained his driver’s license and then conducted a
weapons inquiry.” See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478–79 (1966) (requiring
a person to be advised of certain constitutional rights so long as the person is both
in custody and subjected to interrogation). Although the State does not contest
error preservation, Dunn recognizes error may not have been preserved on this
argument and asks, in the alternative, that we consider this claim under the
framework of ineffective assistance of counsel. See State v. Lucas, 323 N.W.2d
228, 232 (Iowa 1982) (recognizing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is
an exception to the general rule of error preservation). The district court denied
Dunn’s motion to suppress, but we have not found any indication the court
considered and ruled upon Dunn’s argument regarding custodial interrogation and
the lack of a Miranda warning. Thus, we consider Dunn’s claim under the
ineffective-assistance framework.
To succeed on his claim, Dunn has the burden to “show by a preponderance
of the evidence that his trial counsel failed to perform an essential duty and
prejudice resulted.” State v. Ondayog, 722 N.W.2d 778, 784 (Iowa 2006). Here,
Dunn’s claim fails because “counsel has no duty to raise issues that have no merit.”
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State v. Dudley, 766 N.W.2d 606, 620 (Iowa 2009). As we have already
determined, Dunn was not seized by the police officers during the time he chose
to engage in conversation with Officer Klaric. And Dunn cannot be in police
custody when he was not even seized. See, e.g., Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S.
420, 440 (1984) (“The similarly noncoercive aspect of ordinary traffic stops
prompts us to hold that persons temporarily detained pursuant to such stops are
not ‘in custody’ for the purposes of Miranda.”); State v. Scott, 518 N.W.2d 347, 350
(Iowa 1994) (“The right to interrogate during a ‘stop’ is the essence of Terry and
its progeny.” (citation omitted)).
IV. Conclusion.
We affirm the district court’s denial of Dunn’s motion to suppress.
AFFIRMED.