Edward J. Kovarik v. Iowa Department of Revenue ( 2018 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 18-0001
Filed December 5, 2018
EDWARD J. KOVARIK,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
IOWA DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Howard County, Margaret L.
Lingreen, Judge.
A taxpayer challenges orders by the Iowa Department of Revenue denying
him relief under the Iowa Tax Amnesty Act of 2007 and disallowing business losses
claimed in four tax years. AFFIRMED.
Kevin E. Schoeberl of Story Schoeberl & Seebach, LLP, Cresco, for
appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Hristo Chaprazov, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.
Heard by Tabor, P.J., and Mullins and Bower, JJ.
2
TABOR, Presiding Judge.
Seeking tax amnesty was a costly move for Edward Kovarik. He petitioned
under the Iowa Tax Amnesty Act of 2007 and attached his state returns for 2003
through 2006. The Iowa Department of Revenue (the department) not only denied
amnesty but disallowed deductions claimed for business expenses on the attached
returns. Kovarik unsuccessfully pursued an administrative remedy and judicial
review. He continues to challenge the revenue department decisions in this
appeal.
Like the district court, we conclude the department correctly denied
amnesty, finding Kovarik failed to file his 2002 return and owed outstanding
obligations from the four following years. We also agree Kovarik must repay
amounts he improperly deducted as “hobby losses” in those tax years.
I. Facts and Prior Proceedings
Kovarik grew up on an eighty-acre farm near Elma, Iowa. In his youth,
Kovarik helped out on the acreage and joined clubs such as 4-H and Future
Farmers of America. But after high school he left rural Iowa. He attended college
in Washington, D.C. and served in the United States Navy from 1956 to 1960.
He spent his career in the railway industry. Because his work involved
transfers around the country, Kovarik ended up owning two condominiums—one
in Forest Park, Georgia, and one in Roanoke, Virginia. Kovarik retired in 1990 and
returned to Iowa. In his retirement, Kovarik continued to do consulting as a freight
car inspector. At first, he lived with his sister and her husband in Marion. When
his brother who stayed on the farm died in 2003, Kovarik stepped in to manage the
family’s land. Kovarik moved back to Howard County in 2006.
3
One year later, our legislature enacted the Iowa Tax Amnesty Act of 2007.
2007 Iowa Acts ch. 177. The program opened a narrow window for taxpayers to
meet delinquent liabilities with fifty-percent less interest and no penalties.1 The
program was available to taxpayers who had “tax liabilities delinquent as of
December 31, 2006, including tax due on returns not filed, tax liabilities owed to
the department as of December 31, 2006, or tax liabilities not reported nor
established but delinquent as of December 31, 2006.” Id. § 3. Taxpayers could
apply for amnesty from September 4 through October 31, 2007. Id.
Kovarik applied on the last day. In his October 31 application, he checked
a box stating: “Return has not been filed.” Kovarik attached his unfiled return for
tax year 2006 and the amount due of $299.15 (including $293 in taxes and $6.15
representing “one-half interest”). He also attached copies of his filed tax returns
for 2003, 2004, and 2005—stating he owed no additional tax for those years.
On November 9, the revenue department notified Kovarik his amnesty
request was under review. For its review, the department needed information
about his failure to file a 2002 Iowa tax return.2 The department also sought
documentation to verify the expenses Kovarik claimed on his filed tax returns. The
department set a fifteen-day deadline for Kovarik to respond.
As the department awaited Kovarik’s response to its inquiry about the
unfiled 2002 return, it began scrutinizing his 2003 through 2006 filed returns.
1
According to Dennis Schutt, a forty-year veteran of the Iowa Department of Revenue,
the Act’s purpose was to “encourage people to file correct returns” and “pay the tax and
half the interest.” Schutt testified the 2007 Act required taxpayers to file all missing returns
with the department to qualify for amnesty.
2
The department’s query of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) showed no federal 2002
return on file for Kovarik.
4
There, the department “discovered a pattern of substantial losses and little or no
income being reported on them,” according to investigator Schutt. Kovarik had
reported losses for his railway consulting business, condominium rentals, and the
farming operation.
After some back and forth with Kovarik, the department denied his request
for tax amnesty in late November 2007. The department reasoned Kovarik did not
qualify for amnesty because he did not file a 2002 Iowa individual income tax
return. The department also disallowed Kovarik’s claimed business losses for
2003 through 2006. As a result, the department assessed Kovarik additional
income tax, penalty, and interest for those four years totaling $13,182.98.
Kovarik filed an unsuccessful protest. An administrative law judge (ALJ)
affirmed the denial of amnesty and found the additional assessment to be
“essentially correct.” The ALJ noted the “unpaid tax liability” from 2003 through
2007 provided the department “an additional basis for denial of Kovarik’s
application for amnesty.” The ALJ’s proposed order directed the department to
revise the assessment to allow Kovarik to deduct expenses related to his rental of
the tillable farmland. The department’s director affirmed the ALJ’s proposed order.
Kovarik sought judicial review. The district court affirmed the director’s final order.
Kovarik now appeals the judicial review.
II. Scope and Standards of Review
The Iowa Administrative Procedure Act governs our review. Iowa Code
§ 17A.19(10) (2017); Nance v. Iowa Dep’t of Revenue, 908 N.W.2d 261, 267 (Iowa
2018) (citing Lange v. Iowa Dep’t of Revenue, 710 N.W.2d 242, 246 (Iowa 2006)).
In reviewing the judicial review order, we act in the same appellate capacity as the
5
district court. Nance, 908 N.W.2d at 267. If we reach the same conclusions as
the district court did about the agency action under the administrative standards,
we affirm. Id. Otherwise we reverse. Id.
Several different standards are at play here. The first question is whether
substantial evidence supported the department’s action. See Iowa Code
§ 17A.19(10)(f). Evidence is substantial if its quantity and quality “would be
deemed sufficient by a neutral, detached, and reasonable person, to establish the
fact at issue when the consequences resulting from the establishment of that fact
are understood to be serious and of great importance.” Id. § 17A.19(10)(f)(1).
When we assess the evidentiary support for the agency’s fact findings, we consider
proof detracting from those findings, as well as evidence in support of them.
Nance, 908 N.W.2d at 267 (citing Lange, 710 N.W.2d at 247). We defer to
credibility determinations by the “presiding officer” who had an opportunity to
observe the demeanor of the witnesses. Id. (citing Lange, 710 N.W.2d at 247);
see also Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)(f)(3).
The second question is whether the department properly applied the law to
the facts—an application vested in the department’s discretion. See Nance, 908
N.W.2d at 267. So we only reverse the department’s application of the law to the
facts if we determine the application was “irrational, illogical, or wholly
unjustifiable.” See id. (citing Iowa Ag Constr. Co. v. Iowa State Bd. of Tax Review,
723 N.W.2d 167, 174 (Iowa 2006)); see also Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)(m).
The third question involves a constitutional challenge. We review de novo
the taxpayer’s claim the department violated his right to due process by not
6
allowing him enough time to show he was eligible for tax amnesty. See ABC
Disposal Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Nat. Res., 681 N.W.2d 596, 605 (Iowa 2004).
III. Discussion
A. Amnesty
Kovarik first contests the denial of his application for tax amnesty. Before
addressing his points of contention, we pause to consider the purpose of offering
amnesty to delinquent taxpayers.
In May 2007, Iowa joined a growing number of states implementing tax
amnesty programs. See Jason A. Bremer & Belinda S. Morgan, States Adopt A
Profitable “Carrot and Stick” Approach to Tax Amnesty, J. Multistate Tax’n, July
2004, at 6, 8 (observing “state legislatures are increasingly turning to tax amnesty
programs as a means of immediately pumping much-needed cash into their state
treasuries”). “Generally speaking, tax amnesty programs raise short-term revenue
by inducing taxpayers to come forward and pay outstanding tax liabilities.” Id. at 8.
Iowa’s amnesty program followed that norm. In the words of investigator Schutt,
Iowa taxpayers were “given a chance to wipe their slate clean” if they filed all the
required returns.
Under the Iowa Act, delinquent taxpayers could apply for amnesty subject
to some restrictions:
The tax amnesty program shall provide that upon written
application by a taxpayer and payment in full by the taxpayer of
amounts due from the taxpayer to this state for a tax covered by the
tax amnesty program plus interest equal to fifty percent of the interest
that is due, the department shall not seek to collect any other interest
or penalties which may be applicable. The department shall not seek
civil or criminal prosecution for a taxpayer for the period of time for
which amnesty has been granted to the taxpayer. Failure to pay all
tax liabilities due the state and delinquent as of December 31, 2006,
7
shall invalidate the amnesty. Amnesty shall be granted for only the
periods specified in the application and only if all amnesty conditions
are satisfied by the taxpayer.
2007 Iowa Acts ch. 177, § 3 (emphasis added).
Here, the department determined Kovarik did not qualify for amnesty
because he failed to file his 2002 Iowa individual income tax return. On appeal,
he attacks that determination on both factual and legal fronts.3
Starting with the factual argument, Kovarik asserts he filed his 2002 Iowa
return “with no tax due.” But he blames trouble with records retention as the reason
he cannot produce proof of that filing.4 He also asserts IRS publications suggested
he need only retain records for three years. He alleges these circumstances
constituted “good cause” for not filing his 2002 return.5 From this premise, he
asserts the department should have granted amnesty.
As noted above, the ALJ’s credibility findings command deference under
our substantial-evidence review. See Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)(f)(3). Noting
Kovarik did not produce a copy of a 2002 return and the department and the IRS
had not record of receiving a return, the ALJ decided “the preponderance of
evidence in the record supports the department’s finding that Kovarik did not file
an Iowa tax return for the 2002 tax year.” See Broadlawns Med. Ctr. v. Sanders,
792 N.W.2d 302, 306 (Iowa 2010) (noting we give deference to credibility
3
Additionally, Kovarik asserts the ALJ “never affirmed the department’s denial” of his tax
amnesty application. The record disproves this assertion. In her conclusions of law, the
ALJ wrote: “the [d]epartment acted correctly in denying his amnesty application based
upon his failure to file an Iowa return for the 2002 tax year.”
4
Kovarik alleges he could not recreate his 2002 tax return because he lost his records in
a 2012 burglary at the farmstead. But the department first asked for more information
from Kovarik in November 2007.
5
As the department points out in its appellee’s brief, the 2007 Amnesty Act does not
mention “good cause” as an excuse for not filing a state tax return.
8
determinations of the “presiding officer”). Giving due deference, we find
substantial evidence supports the finding Kovarik did not file a 2002 return.
Next we turn to the application of law to that fact. See Iowa Code
§ 17A.19(10)(m). Kovarik argues the 2007 Act “does not specifically state that
unfiled tax returns will result in the denial of the application for tax amnesty.”
Rather, he reads the Act’s “amnesty conditions” as including: (1) filing an
application; (2) paying taxes that are due; and (3) filing those returns that are
required.6 Kovarik maintains he complied with these conditions.
In response, the State highlights this amnesty restriction: “Failure to pay all
tax liabilities due the state and delinquent as of December 31, 2006 shall invalidate
the amnesty.” 2007 Iowa Acts Ch. 177, § 3. Based on that restriction, the State
believes Kovarik’s failure to file his 2002 Iowa return “proved fatal to his tax
amnesty application because the only way for [him] to prove that he did not have
a delinquent tax liability as of December 31, 2006 related to tax year 2002 was to
file his 2002 Iowa return.” In addition to the failure to file his 2002 return, both the
ALJ and district court cited Kovarik’s unpaid tax liabilities for 2003 through 2006 as
another ground for denying his amnesty application.
Like the district court, we conclude the director properly upheld the denial
of Kovarik’s tax amnesty application. The department’s decision was not
“irrational, illogical, or wholly unjustifiable.” See Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)(m). The
2007 Act required taxpayers to pay all outstanding tax liabilities as of December
6
The ALJ reasoned: “Given Kovarik’s ongoing income, he would have been required to
file an income tax return in 2002.”
9
31, 2006, to qualify for amnesty. Because Kovarik owed additional amounts on
his state tax bill, the department could deny his application.
Finally, Kovarik raises a procedural due process challenge.7 See generally
Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)(a). Specifically, Kovarik complains the department gave
him only fifteen days to secure a copy of his missing 2002 return. But Kovarik
notified the department within eleven days he no longer had the paperwork to
recreate his 2002 return. He did not ask for an extension or otherwise challenge
the reasonableness of the department’s deadline. He also fails to establish how
more time would have helped him. The department held a hearing and considered
his position. On this record, Kovarik cannot show the department’s deadline
violated his right to procedural due process. See Behm v. City of Cedar Rapids,
___ N.W.2d ___, ___, 2018 WL 4178517, at *33 (Iowa 2018) (explaining
procedural due process claim cannot focus on only part of the process afforded,
“but must consider the entire panoply of available procedures”).
Because Kovarik fails to prove he is entitled to relief under any subdivision
of section 17A.19(10), we affirm the director’s denial of tax amnesty.
B. Business Losses for Railroad Consulting And Condominium Rental
Kovarik next argues the director wrongly decided he could not deduct
business losses related to his railroad consulting activities and condominium
rentals. In challenging the tax assessments resulting from the department
7
Procedural due process requires notice and opportunity to be heard in a proceeding
adequate to safeguard the constitutional protection invoked. See State v. Seering, 701
N.W.2d 655, 666 (Iowa 2005) (quoting Bowers v. Polk Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 638 N.W.2d
682, 691 (Iowa 2002)), superseded by statute on other grounds, 2009 Iowa Acts ch. 119,
as recognized in In re T.H., 913 N.W.2d 578, 587–88 (Iowa 2018).
10
disallowing his claimed expenses, Kovarik bears the burden of proof. See
Camacho v. Iowa Dep’t of Revenue & Fin., 666 N.W.2d 537, 542 (Iowa 2003).
But before we address the particulars of his argument, we look first to the
law on “hobby losses.” See 26 U.S.C. §§ 162, 183(a) (2006).8 Under our state
statutes, the starting point for calculating taxable income is the adjusted gross
income “as properly computed for federal income tax purposes under the Internal
Revenue Code.” Iowa Code § 422.7. The Internal Revenue Code allows
taxpayers to deduct their ordinary and necessary business expenses. See 26
U.S.C. § 162(a). Deductibility depends on whether the taxpayer engaged in the
activity for profit. Comm’r v. Groetzinger, 480 U.S. 23, 35 (1987). Taxpayers don’t
need to have “a reasonable expectation of a profit.” Meinhardt v. Comm’r, 766
F.3d 917, 919 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting DKD Enters. v. Comm’r, 685 F.3d 730, 735
(8th Cir. 2012)). But they must have “a good faith intention of making a profit or of
producing income.” Id. (quoting DKD Enters., 685 F.3d at 735). When deciding if
the taxpayer was operating with “a genuine profit motive,” the factfinder is not
bound by the taxpayer’s stated intention. Id. (quoting DKD Enters., 685 F.3d at
735).
To help apply the profit-motive standard, the IRS drafted a list of nine factors
based on a body of case law. Portland Golf Club v. Comm’r, 497 U.S. 154, 175
(1990). The factors include: (1) how the taxpayer carries on the activity; (2) the
8
In passing section 183, Congress wanted to prevent taxpayers from taking deductions
for activities carried on as hobbies rather than businesses. Thomas J. Gallagher, 10 Am.
Jur. 2d Proof of Facts § 165 (1976 & Supp. Sept. 2018). This “hobby loss” provision aimed
to ensure that taxpayers did not aggregate their personal activities of taxpayers with their
income-producing activities. Id. Subject to exceptions, section 183 allows deductions for
activities only if they are engaged in for profit. Id.
11
taxpayer’s expertise; (3) time and effort expended by the taxpayer in carrying on
the activity; (4) the expectation assets used in the activity may appreciate in value;
(5) the success of the taxpayer in conducting similar or dissimilar activities; (6)
history of taxpayer income and losses from the activity; (7) the amount of
occasional profits earned, if any; (8) the taxpayer’s financial status; and (9)
personal pleasure or recreation derived from the activity. Id. (citing 26 C.F.R.
§§ 1.183–2(b)(1)–(9)). As discussed below, the department properly applied this
test in determining Kovarik was not operating with a sincere profit motive when he
claimed business losses for his consulting and condominium-rental activities.
1. Railroad Consulting
After retiring in 1990 from his long-held railroad job, Kovarik did consulting
as a freight car inspector. He worked through a firm that put him in touch with
manufacturers who needed inspections. The first few years of consulting were
busy ones, according to Kovarik. But then demand dwindled. Kovarik attended a
rail association trade show each year in an attempt to cultivate contacts but was
unsuccessful in drumming up much business. In information he provided to the
department in 2009, Kovarik acknowledged he had not realized a profit from
consulting for any of the seventeen years he had been conducting the activity.
On his Schedule C, Kovarik reported $7380 in income from rail car
inspections in 2004 but no income from this activity in 2003, 2005, or 2006. At the
same time, he reported business expenses for his consulting efforts totaling
$45,021.59 for those four years. The expenses included travel, lodging, meals,
and work clothing. Given the claimed expenses, his net losses—disallowed by the
department—totaled $37,641.59.
12
The ALJ’s decision, affirmed by the director, carefully stepped through each
of the nine factors listed by the IRS in determining if Kovarik undertook the
consulting activity with a true profit motive. An abbreviated version of that analysis
follows:
(1) Kovarik’s manner of carrying out the activity weighed heavily against
finding he aimed to make a profit. His recordkeeping was unprofessional. He did
not plan the logistics well. Kovarik made little effort to reduce overhead. And he
did not adapt to a changing market.
(2) Kovarik’s expertise likewise did not support a profit motive. Kovarik
brought substantive knowledge of rail inspections to the endeavor but had no
background in operating a profitable consulting business.
(3) The time and effort Kovarik expended did not reveal an intent to derive
a profit from the consulting business. He worked an estimated 300 hours in 2004
but had no income from inspections in the other three tax years at issue. Still, he
incurred the expense of monthly visits to the Forest Park condominium.
(4) Because Kovarik purchased no assets for the consulting business,
appreciation of asset value was not relevant.
(5) Kovarik offered no evidence of other relevant business ventures.
(6)–(7) Kovarik experienced a history of losses with no occasion for profit,
despite his testimony that business boomed in the early years. These factors tilted
against finding he intended to turn a profit in consulting.
(8) Kovarik’s financial status neither bolstered nor undermined his intent to
profit from consulting. As the ALJ found, “Kovarik does not appear to be a rich
13
man.” That said, his income from his railroad pension and other retirement funds
were enough to provide him with “a comfortable living in rural Iowa.”
(9) Whether Kovarik engaged in consulting for personal pleasure or
recreation rather than profit was hard to gauge. The ALJ believed he likely enjoyed
attending the conventions and maintaining contact with others in the rail industry.
All told, these factors supported the ALJ’s conclusion Kovarik lacked a good
faith intention to profit from his consulting business—at least during the tax years
at issue. The conclusion was logical and based on largely undisputed facts. See
Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)(m). It was not unreasonable, capricious, or an abuse of
discretion. See § 17A.19(10)(n). As a result, we must affirm on this issue. Next
up is the second category of disallowed expenses.
2. Condominium Rental
While working out of Atlanta early in his career, Kovarik purchased a
condominium in the suburb of Forest Park, Georgia. It served as his primary
residence from 1974 through 1984, when his company transferred him to Virginia.
He then purchased a second condominium in Roanoke, where he lived until his
retirement in 1990. He did not sell either condominium when he moved back to
Iowa. And he still owned both condominiums during the tax years at issue.
Kovarik said he kept the Roanoke condominium as rental property. He
considered the Forest Park condominium as “potential” rental property but also
used it as the headquarters for his consulting business.9 He did little to market the
properties. As a result, Kovarik was unsuccessful in leasing either condominium
9
Kovarik reported utility costs and mileage for trips to the Georgia property for his rail car
inspections.
14
during the tax years at issue. Yet Kovarik made regular trips to Virginia and
Georgia to inspect the condominiums. On his Schedule E, Kovarik reported travel
expenses for these inspections, as well as expenses for mortgage interest,
property insurance, management fees, utility costs, depreciation, and furniture
storage. For the Roanoke property, Kovarik reported total expenses and net
losses of $68,241.40 for 2003 through 2006.
Like the analysis of the consulting business—but in an even more
pronounced fashion—the ALJ found the nine-factor test tipped away from a true
profit motive behind Kovarik’s real estate holdings. For instance, the ALJ
observed: “Kovarik offered no evidence to support a finding that he approached
rental of the Roanoke condominium in a businesslike manner.” He had no
experience in renting residential real estate and sought no professional expertise.
He traveled quarterly to inspect the property but stayed no longer than a day or
two. The modest appreciation of the property did not speak to Kovarik’s intent to
profit from its rental. In fact, the properties showed a history of uninterrupted
losses. And while he did not use the property for vacations, he also did not secure
rental income. The ALJ’s conclusions, adopted by the director, were reasonable,
justified, and within the department’s broad discretion. We affirm on this issue.
C. Business Losses for Farmland Rental
In his final issue, Kovarik alleges the director made a mistake in disallowing
certain farm-rental losses. Kovarik took over as the farm manager when his
brother James died in March 2003.10
10
In his will, Kovarik’s brother named Kovarik and his sister as beneficiaries of the
farmland. His estate remained open until 2008. Neither Kovarik nor the department
15
Kovarik reported personal expenses associated with the farming operation
on his Schedule F totaling $92,836.84 for tax years 2003 through 2006.11 For the
same time period, he reported farm-rental income of $17,340—for a net loss of
$75,496.84.
The department disallowed his entire reported loss. To a small degree, the
ALJ disagreed. The ALJ summed up her disagreement: “Cash rental of the tillable
land on a farm was a business pursuit engaged in for profit and a deduction of
ordinary and necessary expenses related to this activity should have been
allowed.” The ALJ directed the department to reduce the tax assessments based
on adjustments to the net losses related to the tillable land. The ALJ’s proposed
order specified two-thirds of Kovarik’s expenses for travel to the farm and the entire
amount of reported expenses for rental of vehicle or equipment, repairs, storage,
and utilities be disallowed. The ALJ reasoned Kovarik was unable to explain how
many of his claimed expenses “related to the rental of the farmland in any way.”
On appeal, Kovarik claims the ALJ allowed the department to pursue a new
issue after the administrative hearing. The new issue, in his estimation, centered
on the “excessive” nature of the farm-related expenses claimed on his Schedule F.
He maintains this procedure violated his right to due process. See Wedergren v.
Bd. of Dirs., 307 N.W.2d 12, 16 (Iowa 1981) (“To comport with due process, a
offered evidence showing when the estate transferred the land to the beneficiaries. The
ALJ noted: “Even though the farmland was part of the James Kovarik estate for at least a
portion of the assessment period, [Edward] Kovarik treated it as property that he owned.”
But at oral arguments, the department conceded the ALJ did not consider that
circumstance when analyzing the validity of the farm-related deductions.
11
As the district court noted, Kovarik’s claimed expenses included “mileage for travel to
inspect the property; the cost of insurance, taxes, and utilities (2003 only); storage and
warehousing; the cost of constructing the building (2003-2004 only); vehicle and
machinery rental fees; repairs and maintenance.”
16
person must ordinarily be informed somehow of the issues involved in order to
prevent surprise at the hearing and allow an opportunity to prepare.”).
The department disputes Kovarik suffered any surprise from the inquiry into
the deductibility of his claimed expenses at the contested case hearing. As the
ALJ noted, Kovarik had notice before the hearing that the department doubted the
deductibility of his farm-related expenses. At the hearing, Kovarik fielded
questions about his travel—two or three times per week from Marion to Howard
County (a roundtrip of 240 miles)—to check on the farmhouse and storage. For
instance, the department’s attorney asked: “But that wasn’t really related to your
business of renting out the farmland was it?” Kovarik answered: “Check on
conditions of the farm. I don’t know what the conditions of the fences were, or
maybe if somebody else was in there.” The attorney followed up: “And that didn’t
strike you as excessive?” Kovarik answered: “No because other people were
doing it.” Kovarik’s counsel did not object to this line of questioning.
In our de novo review of his constitutional claim, we conclude Kovarik has
not shown the department deprived him of notice or an opportunity to be heard on
the claimed farm-related expenses. Kovarik had ample warning and an
opportunity to respond to the department’s questions about the frequency of his
travels to the farm, as well as the storage, warehousing, and machinery expenses.
In the alternative, Kovarik argues we should reverse the director’s decision
under subsections (a), (b), (d), (f), (m), and (n) of section 17A.19(10). But Kovarik
fails to flesh out his argument under any of these provisions. Our supreme court
has determined the “widely varying standards of review” for different mistakes
alleged under 17A.19(10) make it “essential for counsel to search for and pinpoint
17
the precise claim of error on appeal.” Jacobson Transp. Co. v. Harris, 778 N.W.2d
192, 196 (Iowa 2010). Absent that precision, we cannot entertain Kovarik’s
request to upend the director’s determination of allowable farm-related expenses.
And even if we could process Kovarik’s general complaint, no basis for
reversal appears. The ALJ carefully analyzed whether expenses were ordinary
and reasonable in carrying out the farm-rental business. The ALJ treated the
farmhouse and non-income-producing portions of the farmstead separately from
the leased, tillable acres. This separate treatment was justified under persuasive
precedent examining comparable facts. See Meinhardt, 766 F.3d at 921 (rejecting
taxpayers’ argument leasing farm land and personal use of the farmhouse were
one activity).
When examining the cash-rental activities, the ALJ recognized responsible
land owners would routinely monitor the activity of a tenant, ensuring maintenance
such as weed control and timely planting and harvest. But the ALJ found “no
logical reason” to inspect the farm several times per week. The ALJ noted Kovarik
offered no measure for discerning how much travel related to business purposes.
The department conceded one-third of Kovarik’s travel expenses related to
supervision of the cash-rental tenant. The ALJ accepted that concession as a
“generous view” of the allowable deductions.
The ALJ also concluded the expenses claimed for maintaining the
homestead and storing personal property, such as vintage tractors, were unrelated
to the cash-rental farm business. Because the ALJ’s order, adopted by the
director, was rational and logical, we decline to reverse.
AFFIRMED.