Sysco Iowa, Inc. v. University of Iowa , 2016 Iowa App. LEXIS 809 ( 2016 )


Menu:
  •                    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
    No. 15-0999
    Filed August 17, 2016
    SYSCO IOWA, INC.,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    vs.
    UNIVERSITY OF IOWA,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    ________________________________________________________________
    Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Johnson County, Chad A. Kepros,
    Judge.
    A food distribution company appeals the district court’s determination its
    contract with the University of Iowa does not contain trade secrets and is
    therefore subject to disclosure under Iowa’s Open Records Act. REVERSED
    AND REMANDED.
    James R. Swanger, Michael R. Reck, Kelsey J. Knowles, and Emily M.
    Schirmer of Belin McCormick, P.C., Des Moines, for appellant.
    Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and George A. Carroll, Assistant
    Attorney General, for appellee.
    Considered by Vogel, P.J., Potterfield, J., and Blane, S.J.*
    *Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 (2015).
    2
    POTTERFIELD, Judge.
    Sysco Iowa, Inc. appeals the district court’s determination that the Master
    Distribution Agreement (contract) Sysco entered into with the University of Iowa
    Hospitals and Clinics (the University) does not contain trade secrets and is
    therefore subject to disclosure under Iowa’s Open Records Act. Sysco argues
    the contract does contain trade secrets and those trade secrets should be
    protected from disclosure. See Iowa Code § 22.7(3) (2015). Alternatively, Sysco
    argues examination of the contract is not in the public interest and would cause
    substantial and irreparable injury to the company. See 
    id. § 22.8.
    We find the
    relevant portions of the contract—information detailing, among other things,
    Sysco’s pricing, financing, discount, and delivery terms—have independent
    economic value and qualify as trade secrets. Therefore, those portions of the
    contract are confidential records that are exempt from disclosure under the Open
    Records Act. The district court erred in denying Sysco injunctive relief.
    I. Background Facts and Proceedings
    The original contract between Sysco and the University is dated
    September 1, 2008, and provided for Sysco to supply the University with food
    distribution services for the time period beginning September 1, 2008, and
    ending August 30, 2013. Subsequent amendments extended the term of the
    contract twice, first to August 30, 2014, and then to June 30, 2015. The contract
    was the result of a competitive process whereby companies provided sealed bids
    to the University to provide the services needed by the University and included a
    confidentiality provision. The full contract, including ten attached schedules and
    three amendments, is thirty-four pages long.
    3
    A reporter from the Cedar Rapids Gazette filed a request with the
    University, pursuant to Iowa’s Open Records Act, seeking information regarding
    the contract. See 
    id. § 22.2.
    The University believed the contract to be a public
    record it was obligated to disclose and notified Sysco of its intent to do so unless
    Sysco obtained injunctive relief. Sysco filed a petition seeking an injunction on
    September 19, 2014, asserting the contract included trade secrets not subject to
    disclosure and that disclosure would serve no public purpose but would cause
    substantial and irreparable injury to Sysco and give its competitors an advantage.
    See 
    id. §§ 22.7(3),
    22.8(1).
    The district court held a hearing on Sysco’s petition on April 13, 2015.
    The reporter from the Cedar Rapids Gazette attended but did not intervene. The
    University was represented but offered no evidence and took no position on the
    issue of whether portions of the contract constituted trade secrets. Two days
    later, on April 15, 2015, the district court issued an order denying Sysco’s petition
    for injunctive relief. The order, later clarified following Sysco’s motion to enlarge
    or amend under Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.904, found the contract did not
    qualify for a trade secret exemption under Iowa Code section 22.7(3) and Sysco
    failed to establish the elements required to justify an injunction under section
    22.8.   The district court ordered the University to produce the contract for
    examination unless Sysco appealed the order and sought a stay, in which case
    the University was to delay examination of the contract pending resolution of
    Sysco’s request for a stay.
    4
    Sysco filed both a notice of appeal and a motion for stay on June 9, 2015.
    The Iowa Supreme Court granted the motion for stay on July 20, 2015, ordering
    disclosure of the contract be stayed pending resolution of this appeal.
    II. Standard of Review
    Because cases brought under chapter 22 of the Iowa Code are ordinarily
    triable in equity, we review the district court’s ruling on Sysco’s application for
    injunctive relief de novo. See Iowa Film Prod. Servs. v. Iowa Dep’t of Econ.
    Dev., 
    818 N.W.2d 207
    , 217 (Iowa 2012).             “We review the district court’s
    interpretation of chapter 22 for correction of errors at law.” 
    Id. III. Discussion
    Iowa’s Open Records Act, codified in chapter 22 of the Iowa Code, grants
    citizens the right to examine and copy records maintained by the State and other
    local governmental bodies supported by citizens’ property tax revenue. See Iowa
    Code §§ 22.1(1), (3)(a), 22.2(1) (“Every person shall have the right to examine
    and copy a public record and to publish or otherwise disseminate a public record
    or the information contained in a public record.”). The purpose of chapter 22 is
    “to open the doors of government to public scrutiny—to prevent government from
    secreting its decision-making activities from the public, on whose behalf it is its
    duty to act.” Iowa Civil Rights Comm’n v. City of Des Moines, 
    313 N.W.2d 491
    ,
    495 (Iowa 1981).       “Accordingly, there is a presumption of openness and
    disclosure under this chapter.” Gabrilson v. Flynn, 
    554 N.W.2d 267
    , 271 (Iowa
    1996).
    Notwithstanding the presumption of openness, disclosure of public records
    under chapter 22 has explicit limits; the Open Records Act enumerates sixty-
    5
    seven categories of “confidential” records and exempts them from disclosure
    “unless otherwise ordered by a court, by the lawful custodian of the records, or
    by another person duly authorized to release such information.”        Iowa Code
    § 22.7. One such category covers “[t]rade secrets which are recognized and
    protected as such by law.” 
    Id. § 22.7(3).
    In applying section 22.7(3), we use the
    definition for “trade secrets” found in Iowa’s Uniform Trade Secrets Act. Iowa
    Film Prod. 
    Servs., 818 N.W.2d at 219
    . The Uniform Trade Secrets Act defines a
    “trade secret” as follows:
    4. “Trade secret” means information, including but not limited
    to a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method,
    technique, or process that is both of the following:
    a. Derives independent economic value, actual or potential,
    from not being generally known to, and not being readily
    ascertainable by proper means by a person able to obtain
    economic value from its disclosure or use.
    b. Is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the
    circumstances to maintain its secrecy.
    Iowa Code § 550.2(4).
    The definition of a trade secret under section 550.2(4) presents “a mixed
    question of law and fact.”    Econ. Roofing & Insulating Co. v. Zumaris, 
    538 N.W.2d 641
    , 648 (Iowa 1995). The first portion of the definition is the legal
    question, while the elements described in subsections (a) and (b) are questions
    of fact. 
    Id. at 648–49.
    Public records may also be protected from disclosure in other, narrowly-
    drawn circumstances set forth in chapter 22:
    1. The district court may grant an injunction restraining the
    examination, including copying, of a specific public record or a
    narrowly drawn class of public records. A hearing shall be held on
    a request for injunction upon reasonable notice as determined by
    the court to persons requesting access to the record which is the
    6
    subject of the request for injunction. It shall be the duty of the
    lawful custodian and any other person seeking an injunction to
    ensure compliance with the notice requirement. Such an injunction
    may be issued only if the petition supported by affidavit shows and
    if the court finds both of the following:
    a. That the examination would clearly not be in the public
    interest.
    b. That the examination would substantially and irreparably
    injure any person or persons.
    ....
    3. In actions brought under this section the district court shall
    take into account the policy of this chapter that free and open
    examination of public records is generally in the public interest even
    though such examination may cause inconvenience or
    embarrassment to public officials or others. A court may issue an
    injunction restraining examination of a public record or a narrowly
    drawn class of such records, only if the person seeking the
    injunction demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that this
    section authorizes its issuance.
    Iowa Code § 22.8(1), (3).
    Here, the district court determined none of the relevant information in the
    contract qualified for exemption from disclosure as a trade secret because Sysco
    did not prove the information had independent economic value:
    The [contract] in this case includes information on (1) how
    Sysco defines its “cost”; (2) how Sysco calculates “costs”; (3) the
    University’s right to audit its account; (4) a margin schedule for
    categories of products sold to the University; (5) details of the
    marketing programs available to the University of Iowa; and (6)
    agreements to provide special services to the University. It is clear
    to the court that the portions of the [contract] Sysco seeks to protect
    from disclosure qualifies as “information” under Iowa Code section
    550.2(4).
    Having determined that the information in the [contract]
    which Sysco seeks to protect is “information” under Iowa Code
    section 550.2(4), the court must determine, as a factual matter,
    whether such information derives independent economic value and
    is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the
    circumstances to maintain its secrecy. . . . By affidavit, Sysco
    states that, if the terms of its contract with the University of Iowa
    were made public, it would be significantly disadvantaged during
    the next bidding process because other competitors would know
    their cost, how they define cost, the margins charged to the
    7
    University of Iowa, and the special discounts that were provided.
    Sysco further claims that it would be at a disadvantage because it
    would not know similar information regarding its competitors. . . .
    Sysco claims that comparing contracts during the bidding process
    is difficult and that a competitor having Sysco’s contract could
    possibly undercut certain provisions while using other terms or
    provisions to charge a higher price or provide different services.
    ....
    The court finds that the information in the [contract] sought
    by Sysco to be protected from disclosure in this case does not
    qualify for a trade secret exemption under Iowa Code section
    22.7(3) because Sysco fails to prove the independent economic
    value element required by Iowa Code section 550.2(4)(a). The
    affidavit offered by Sysco makes a general claim that it would be
    disadvantaged during the next bidding process if Sysco’s
    competitors knew its cost, margins, and special discounts.
    However, Sysco does not provide any specifics on the food
    distribution industry, Sysco’s place in the industry, the other
    competitors in the industry, or how the release of the information
    contained in the [contract] would specifically advantage competitors
    or disadvantage Sysco beyond the bare assertion it would do
    so. . . .
    ....
    While the court understands that Sysco would prefer to
    keeps its contracts confidential, Sysco fails to provide facts at a
    level necessary to establish the trade secret exemption to
    overcome the strong presumption of disclosure. . . .
    The court does find that Sysco has satisfied the second
    prong of the trade secret test in Iowa Code section 550.2(4)(b)—
    that the information is the subject of efforts that are reasonable
    under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy. . . .
    ....
    Because the court finds that Sysco has not met its burden to
    establish the trade secrets exemption under Iowa Code section
    22.7(3), the court denies the petition for injunctive relief.
    Following Sysco’s motion to enlarge or amend, the district court clarified its
    finding Sysco also failed to prove it was entitled to injunctive relief through
    alternative means under section 22.8, explaining Sysco “did not establish both
    that the examination [of the contract] clearly would not be in the public interest
    and that the examination would substantially and irreparably injur[e] any person
    or persons.”
    8
    On appeal, Sysco challenges the district court’s conclusion regarding the
    first of the two fact questions under section 550.2(4)—that the relevant portions
    of the contract do not have independent economic value and, therefore, do not
    constitute trade secrets exempt from disclosure under the Open Records Act.
    Sysco does not dispute the district court’s findings on either the legal question—
    the initial determination the portions of the contract Sysco seeks to protect qualify
    as “information” within the meaning of section 550.2(4)—or the second of the two
    factual questions—that Sysco took reasonable efforts to maintain the secrecy of
    the contract. As was the case below, the University takes no position on whether
    the contract contains trade secrets and only asks on appeal that we “rule
    appropriately.”
    The district court relied primarily upon two Iowa Supreme Court cases in
    reaching its conclusion the portions of the contract did not have independent
    economic value: US West Communications, Inc. v. Office of Consumer
    Advocate, 
    498 N.W.2d 711
    , 714–15 (Iowa 1993), and Iowa Film Production
    
    Services, 818 N.W.2d at 219
    –25.        Specifically, the district court tracked the
    weaknesses our supreme court found in the proof offered by the company
    seeking injunctive relief in US West and found the same weaknesses applicable
    to Sysco’s proof. We find both cases factually distinguishable.
    In US West, a series of investigative articles suggested a company and its
    subsidiaries were engaged in a pattern of sales and leasebacks of commercial
    real estate 
    properties. 498 N.W.2d at 713
    . According to the articles, the scheme
    involved the company and its subsidiaries paying each other inflated lease rates
    to help drive up the costs of the buildings for sale and avoid losses to
    9
    shareholders; the trumped-up lease payments were then passed along to
    customers by increasing utility costs. 
    Id. The Iowa
    Supreme Court considered
    whether information related to the leases, sales, and purchases should be
    classified as trade secrets but ultimately concluded it did not have independent
    economic value, given the unique circumstances. 
    Id. at 715.
    In an attempt to
    prevent disclosure of the information, US West claimed if sales and lease data
    were disclosed, competitor lessors would undercut its pricing and gain an unfair
    bargaining advantage.      
    Id. at 714.
       However, the affidavits and testimony
    provided did not adequately explain why that was so. 
    Id. at 715.
    Our supreme
    court found the record insufficient to determine whether the company and its
    subsidiaries were major players in the competitive real estate leasing market or if
    most of the leases were between affiliates, noting, “If in fact the sales and leases
    are in-house transactions between parent and subsidiary companies rather than
    arm’s-length transactions, we believe the information would be of little use to
    West’s competitors.” 
    Id. In Iowa
    Film, “certain irregularities” aroused public interest in an Iowa tax
    credit program designed to encourage filmmakers to bring projects into the 
    state. 818 N.W.2d at 213
    .       The Iowa Supreme Court considered whether budget
    expenditure summaries submitted by film production companies qualified for
    protection from disclosure as trade secrets but concluded they did not have
    independent economic value. 
    Id. at 219–25.
    The production companies argued
    they would not be able to sell their films for a profit if distributors knew the true
    cost of making the film and that disclosure of the summaries could potentially
    enable the public to deduce the compensation paid to directors and actors whose
    10
    employment had been conditioned upon the confidentiality of their compensation
    arrangements. 
    Id. at 223.
    Our supreme court found these arguments “more
    theoretical than real.” 
    Id. at 223–24.
    As to the first argument, the court reasoned
    the ability to sell a film was driven not by cost but by bidding within a highly
    competitive distribution market based upon predictions of box-office success, the
    stated cost would not reflect the true cost due to the tax credits involved, and
    most importantly, it was already possible to determine the overall production cost
    of the films by doubling the amount of the publicly-available fifty percent tax
    credits awarded. 
    Id. at 223.
    As to the second argument, the court could not find
    a discernable way to determine confidential compensation amounts from the
    budget expenditure summaries in the record. 
    Id. at 224.
    The district court found US West and Iowa Film to be directly analogous
    and controlling:
    While the court understands that Sysco would prefer to
    keeps its contracts confidential, Sysco fails to provide facts at a
    level necessary to establish the trade secret exemption to
    overcome the strong presumption of disclosure. As was the case in
    US West, the affidavit provided by Sysco merely provides opinions
    concerning the effects disclosure would have, but such evidence is
    self-serving and does not contain hard facts.          The court’s
    conclusion is likewise consistent with Iowa Film . . . in which the
    [Iowa Supreme] Court concluded that the evidence of independent
    economic value was more theoretical than real.
    However, unlike in US West and Iowa Film, Sysco’s claim that disclosure of the
    entire contract will provide an advantage to Sysco’s competitors is a legitimate
    concern—not a theoretical one—and we therefore hold the relevant portions of
    the contract have independent economic value within the meaning of the Uniform
    Trade Secrets Act. The relevant portions of the contract would, if disclosed,
    11
    effectively provide competitors with a blueprint of Sysco’s operating model not
    otherwise available to them.     Among other things, competitors would know
    precisely how Sysco defines cost for pricing purposes, precisely what margins it
    is both willing and able to operate on, and what special discounts it provides.
    Sysco derives independent economic value in keeping that knowledge away from
    its competitors, who would be able to use the information to gain an unfair
    advantage in bids for future contracts.
    Moreover, Sysco’s argument that disclosure of the entire contract would
    provide its competitors with a clear advantage is not susceptible to concerns of
    affiliates bargaining at less than arm’s length.      The sealed-bid competition
    between Sysco and its competitors provides the context for Sysco’s claims. In
    US West, where our supreme court suspected a telecommunications corporation
    and its subsidiaries wanted to prevent disclosure of copies of lease and real
    estate transactions between and among themselves, the court found the record
    insufficient to establish disclosure would, in fact, cause any competitive
    
    disadvantage. 498 N.W.2d at 714
    –15. Our supreme court explained:
    [US] West contends the data involved has economic value.
    It urges that if sale and lease data were disclosed, competitor
    lessors would undercut its pricing; their lessees would gain an
    unfair bargaining advantage; and when [US] West was a potential
    lessee, it would be disadvantaged if lessors knew what it paid
    elsewhere.
    The record made before the trial court is not as clear as
    these contentions. . . . While affidavits and testimony by [US] West
    and its subsidiary employees provide opinions concerning the
    deleterious effects disclosure will have on [US] West or its affiliates,
    such evidence is self-serving and does not contain hard facts.
    [US] West provided no evidence concerning the number of
    tenants in the buildings, the percentage of buildings rented to
    outsiders, the occupancy rates, or [US] West’s own needs
    concerning leasing space. While reference is made to competitors,
    12
    the record is vague concerning the extent of the advantage the
    lease information will provide competitors. We are uncertain
    whether [US] West or its subsidiaries are major players in the
    competitive real-estate leasing market or whether most of its
    leasing is between affiliates. . . . If in fact the sales and leases are
    in-house transactions between parent and subsidiary companies
    rather than arm’s-length transactions, we believe the information
    would be of little use to [US] West’s competitors. The burden was
    on [US] West and its subsidiaries to prove that a disclosure of the
    lease and sales information would put [US] West at an economic
    disadvantage. In our de novo review, we conclude [US] West has
    failed to meet this burden.
    
    Id. In short,
    the US West court was unable to determine whether information
    about the lease and real estate sales had independent economic value because
    no concrete information was provided to establish the context in which the
    information might be used by competitors; it was very possible the information
    would have had no such value because it concerned leases and real estate
    transactions between a parent corporation and its subsidiaries—transactions that
    would not be vulnerable to competitors seeking to undercut prices.
    Here, in contrast, the potential harm to Sysco is straightforward. If the
    entire contract is disclosed, information asymmetry will result. Sysco will stand a
    very real risk of being undercut on future bids because Sysco’s competitors know
    its bid strategy, but Sysco does not know theirs. Given the self-evident nature of
    the advantage Sysco’s competitors would gain by having access to the
    information, we find the affidavits supplied by Sysco in support of its motion for
    injunctive relief provided sufficient proof for the relief requested. Although no
    Iowa case appears to be directly on point, a number of other jurisdictions have
    found this type of information has independent economic value and qualifies as a
    trade secret. See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. NASA, 
    180 F.3d 303
    , 306–
    13
    07 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (dismissing the argument that disclosure of line-item pricing
    would not enable competitors to underbid company in future because price is
    only one of the many factors used in awarding contracts, as “too silly to do other
    than to state it, and pass on”); Cardinal Freight Carriers, Inc. v. J.B. Hunt Transp.
    Servs., Inc., 
    987 S.W.2d 642
    , 645–46 (Ark. 1999) (“[The company]’s chief
    executive officer . . . here similarly testified how [the company]’s trade secrets
    derived economic value by keeping confidential information bearing on price
    modeling, customer profit margins, logistics, future plans, and specific market
    strategies. Obviously, armed with such information, a competitor would have an
    edge in capturing some significant part of [the company]’s customers and
    business. In sum, we harbor no doubts [the company]’s confidential agreements
    . . . cover secrets of the type that are protected by Arkansas’s Trade Secrets
    Act.”); Whyte v. Schlage Lock Co., 
    125 Cal. Rptr. 2d 277
    , 287 (Cal. Ct. App.
    2002) (finding information identifying a company’s pricing, profit margins, costs of
    production, pricing concessions, promotional discounts, advertising allowances,
    volume rebates, marketing concessions, payment terms and rebate incentives
    “has independent economic value because [the company]’s pricing policies
    would be valuable to a competitor to set prices which meet or undercut [the
    company]’s”).
    We find the contract between Sysco and the University contains trade
    secrets as defined in Iowa Code section 550.2(4).         Those trade secrets are
    exempt from disclosure under Iowa’s Open Records Act because they qualify as
    “confidential information” under section 22.7(3). The district court’s findings to
    the contrary were in error. We therefore reverse the district court’s order and
    14
    remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Because we have
    resolved this appeal on Sysco’s first argument, we need not address its second.
    REVERSED AND REMANDED.