State of Iowa v. Sammie Tremayne Watters ( 2016 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 16-0062
Filed August 31, 2016
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
SAMMIE TREMAYNE WATTERS,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Cerro Gordo County, Rustin T.
Davenport, Judge.
Defendant appeals following the revocation of his deferred judgment for
delivery of methamphetamine. AFFIRMED.
Julie De Vries of De Vries Law Office, P.L.C., Centerville, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Thomas J. Ogden, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.
Considered by Danilson, C.J., and Mullins and Bower, JJ.
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BOWER, Judge.
Sammie Watters appeals following the revocation of his deferred judgment
for delivery of methamphetamine. We find the district court’s failure to cite to the
sentencing section of the Iowa Code and its failure to specifically list the criminal
offense is not reversible error. Also, Watters has failed to show he received
ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney did not require the State to
prove there had been a probation violation or require the court to follow all
procedural requirements during the revocation hearing. We affirm the revocation
of Watters’s probation.
I. Background Facts & Proceedings
Watters entered a guilty plea to delivery of methamphetamine, in violation
of Iowa Code section 124.401(1)(c)(6) (2015). The district court granted him a
deferred judgment and placed him on probation for a period of three years. As
special conditions of probation, Watters was required to abstain from all
controlled substances, not associate with persons known to have a criminal
record, actively seek and maintain full-time employment, and comply with a plan
of restitution.
Less than two weeks later, on March 26, 2015, the State alleged Watters
had violated his probation by testing positive for methamphetamine and
marijuana and failing to appear for his probation intake meeting. At the
revocation hearing, Watters stipulated he had violated his probation. The district
court sentenced him to sixty days in the county jail for contempt and modified the
terms of his probation to require placement in a residential correctional facility for
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180 days after serving his contempt sentence. The court did not revoke his
deferred judgment.
On September 8, 2015, the State alleged Watters had violated his
probation while at the residential correctional facility (1) by “flipping” another
resident out of a chair, (2) grabbing an officer by the shoulder, and (3) pushing
another resident. Watters testified the first incident involved horseplay, he
denied the second incident, and he admitted the third incident. The district court
determined Watters had once again violated the conditions of his probation by
incidents two and three. The district court found Watters in contempt and
sentenced him to sixty days in jail, to then return to the residential correctional
facility. Again, the court did not revoke his deferred judgment.
On November 18, 2015, the State alleged Watters had violated his
probation by using methamphetamine. At the beginning of the probation
revocation hearing, the district court asked Watters, “[A]re you admitting or
denying the allegations contained in the report of violation?” and Watters replied,
“I am admitting, Your Honor.” The district court revoked the deferred judgment
and sentenced Watters to a term of imprisonment not to exceed ten years,
waiving the mandatory one-third minimum sentence. Watters now appeals.
II. Sentencing Order
Watters claims the district court abused its discretion because the
sentencing order did not cite to the sentencing section of the Iowa Code or
specifically list the offense. Section 901.6 provides, “In every case in which
judgment is entered, the court shall include in the judgment entry the number of
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the particular section of the Code and the name of the offense under which the
defendant is sentenced.” In revoking probation, “[t]he trial court does not have to
file an opinion or make conclusions of law, but due process requires written
findings by the court showing the factual basis for the revocation.” State v.
Lillibridge, 519 N.W.2d 82, 83 (Iowa 1994).
The Iowa Supreme Court has determined section 901.6 is directory only
and “noncompliance [does] not result in prejudice to the defendant.” State v.
Victor, 310 N.W.2d 201, 205 (Iowa 1981); see also State v. Dawson, 63 N.W.2d
917, 918 (Iowa 1954) (“The statute is directory and no prejudice resulted by
reason of the failure to include the code section under which the defendant was
sentenced.”). The omission of a code section number in a judgment does not
render the judgment invalid. Dawson, 63 N.W.2d at 918. Noncompliance with
section 901.6 is not reversible error. See Victor, 310 N.W.2d at 205. Therefore,
we affirm Watters’s sentence.
III. Ineffective Assistance
Watters claims he received ineffective assistance from defense counsel.
We review claims of ineffective assistance of counsel de novo. State v. Straw,
709 N.W.2d 128, 133 (Iowa 2006). A defendant must show (1) defense counsel
failed to perform an essential duty and (2) this failure resulted in prejudice. Id. A
defendant must prove both prongs of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
by a preponderance of evidence. Id.A. Watters claims he received ineffective assistance because defense
counsel did not require the State to prove he violated his probation. At the
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beginning of the probation revocation hearing the court stated, “Mr. Watters, are
you going—are you admitting or denying the allegations contained in the report
of violation?” Watters stated, “I am admitting, Your Honor.” The court pointed
out Watters had the right to require the State to prove the probation violation, and
Watters stated he still wanted to admit to the violation.
It is not clear from the record whether Watters’s admission to the
probation violation was at the recommendation of counsel. Even if defense
counsel recommended admitting the violation, Watters has not shown defense
counsel breached an essential duty. Watters stipulated to the first report of
violation and admitted to one of the incidents in the second report of violation. In
both instances he was able to keep his deferred judgment, and therefore, the
strategy of admitting to the violation in this case seems reasonable. In a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel, “[w]e require more than a showing that trial
strategy backfired or that another attorney would have prepared and tried the
case somewhat differently.” State v. Gines, 844 N.W.2d 437, 440–41 (Iowa
2014). We also find Watters has not shown he was prejudiced by counsel’s
performance; based on the November 18, 2015 report of violation, the State
would have been able to show Watters violated his probation.
B. Watters also claims he received ineffective assistance because
defense counsel did not require the court to follow all procedural requirements
during the revocation hearing. He states there is an insufficient factual basis in
the record to support the revocation of his probation.1
1
Watters refers to his admission of the probation violation as a “guilty plea.” “Because
revocation is not a stage of criminal prosecution, the rules of criminal procedure do not
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The court’s findings revoking probation must show the factual basis for the
revocation. Rheuport v. State, 238 N.W.2d 770, 775 (Iowa 1976). In lieu of
written findings, the court’s oral findings on the record may be sufficient if a
reviewing court can determine the basis for the district court’s decision. State v.
Kirby, 622 N.W.2d 506, 509 (Iowa 2001). At the probation revocation hearing,
the court noted the report of violation, and Watters admitted the allegations
contained in the report. We determine there is a sufficient factual basis in the
record to support the revocation of Watters’s probation. We determine Watters
has failed to show he received ineffective assistance of counsel.
We affirm the revocation of Watters’s probation.
AFFIRMED.
apply and ‘the proceedings can be informal, even summary.’” Lillibridge, 519 N.W.2d at
83. We determine his admission is not equivalent to a guilty plea.