State of Iowa v. Saul V. Duran-Sierra ( 2023 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 21-1312
Filed February 22, 2023
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
SAUL V. DURAN-SIERRA,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Wright County, Colleen Wieland,
Judge.
A defendant appeals his conviction for sexual abuse in the third degree.
AFFIRMED.
Jane M. White of Gribble Boles Stewart & Witosky, Des Moines, for
appellant.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Louis S. Sloven, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee.
Considered by Tabor, P.J., and Schumacher and Chicchelly, JJ.
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TABOR, Presiding Judge.
Saul Duran-Sierra appeals his conviction for third-degree sexual abuse. He
admits engaging in sex acts with G.S., a woman he was driving home, but asserts
they were consensual. The district court rejected that assertion, crediting G.S.’s
testimony that she told him “no” and begged him to stop. Duran-Sierra now
contests the bench-trial verdict. He also contends a pretrial delay of nearly two
years denied him due process.
On the first claim, we find substantial evidence to support the verdict,
especially given the court’s credibility finding. We decline to reach the second
claim because Duran-Sierra did not preserve his constitutional challenge. We thus
affirm his conviction.
I. Facts and Prior Proceedings
After closing time at Hampton’s Coconut Lounge, G.S. squeezed into the
back seat of Duran-Sierra’s pickup truck with three other people. G.S. thought
they were headed to an after-party. Instead, Duran-Sierra dropped off the other
passengers in Belmond—leaving only G.S. in the truck with him.
She asked to be taken home too. But rather than drive her back to
Hampton, Duran-Sierra pulled the truck over and joined G.S. in the backseat. He
started kissing her. And at first she kissed him back. Soon she asked again to go
home. But Duran-Sierra did not listen; instead he pulled her closer, grabbing the
back of her head as if palming a basketball.
G.S. testified that she could not remember the next events in order because
she was “in and out” of consciousness. But she did recall Duran-Sierra putting his
hand inside her vagina, saying in Spanish: “This is what you wanted.” She replied
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in Spanish: “I just want to go home. You need to stop. You’re hurting me.” G.S.,
who admitted having at least four alcoholic drinks that night, told Duran-Sierra:
“[W]e can do this another time when we’re sober.”
She also recalled slipping off the back seat onto the floor and Duran-Sierra
yanking her neck to pull her back up. G.S. also testified that Duran-Sierra forced
his penis into her vagina, and later into her mouth.1
When G.S. was finally able to push Duran-Sierra off of her, she curled into
a ball on the floor. Only then did he stop assaulting her and return to the front seat.
Once there, he flipped on the interior lights and saw “blood everywhere.” Angry,
he yelled: “Look at what you did.” The blood was from injuries to her vagina.
Afraid, G.S. apologized and said she would clean it up. Duran-Sierra then drove
her home. It was about 5 a.m. on March 24, 2019. Once home, she contacted a
neighbor who called the police and took her to the hospital. Hospital personnel
confirmed injuries to G.S. consistent with her report of the sexual assault.
Two months later, the State charged Duran-Sierra with sexual abuse in the
third degree in violation of Iowa Code section 709.1 and 709.4(1)(a) (2019). He
waived his right to a speedy trial on June 6. Trial was set for August 2019, but it
was continued more than a dozen times. In September 2020 Duran-Sierra waived
his right to a jury trial. A bench trial proceeded in April 2021. The district court
1 In his trial testimony, Duran-Sierra gave a different version of events. He
asserted that he and some friends did attend an after-party at a Hampton
apartment, where they reunited with G.S., who asked to ride with them to Belmond.
According to him, after dropping his friends in Belmond, G.S. climbed into the front
seat and started “touch[ing] his private parts.” He testified that when he stopped
the truck, they moved to the back seat and had consensual sex. The district court
did not believe Duran-Sierra’s testimony.
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found Duran-Sierra guilty as charged and sentenced him to an indeterminate
prison term of ten years. He now appeals.
II. Analysis
A. Substantial Evidence
Duran-Sierra argues the State presented insufficient evidence to support
his conviction for third-degree sexual abuse. He disputes the evidence that the
sex acts were done by force or against G.S.’s will. See Iowa Code § 709.4.
We review this argument for the correction of legal error. See State v.
Mathis, 971 N.W.2d 514, 516 (Iowa 2022). The district court’s finding of guilt is
binding unless the State failed to offer substantial evidence on the disputed
element. See State v. Abbas, 561 N.W.2d 72, 74 (Iowa 1997) (per curiam). We
view evidence in the light most favorable to the State. Id. Evidence is substantial
when it could convince a reasonable factfinder of the defendant’s guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. State v. Howse, 875 N.W.2d 684, 688 (Iowa 2016).
Duran-Sierra devotes most of his briefing to attacking G.S.’s credibility. He
insists her testimony “must be questioned” because she was intoxicated that night
and he and his witnesses offered a different version of events. To explain her
physical injuries, he resurrects his trial theory that they resulted from “rough sex”
rather than the alleged assaults. As a legal crutch, he relies on a single case:
State v. Smith, 508 N.W.2d 101, 103 (Iowa Ct. App. 1993) (reversing conviction
because testimony of sexual abuse victim was “inconsistent, self-contradictory,
lacking in experiential detail, and, at times, border[ed] on the absurd”).
Trouble is, our supreme court has flagged Smith as “an outlier case”
because it flouts the deferential appellate review of verdicts and the factfinder’s
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resolution of disputed factual issues. Mathis, 971 N.W.2d at 518. Following
Mathis, we find Smith does not afford Duran-Sierra any relief from his conviction.
Believed by the district court, G.S.’s testimony alone could be substantial
proof of sexual abuse. See State v. Knox, 536 N.W.2d 735, 742 (Iowa 1995). But
the State had more. It offered evidence of bloodstains in the truck, photographs
of her injuries, and her immediate report of the rape to her neighbor. Substantial
evidence supported the district court’s verdict. See Mathis, 971 N.W.2d at 519
(reiterating that in substantial evidence review it is not our role to resolve conflicting
evidence, pass on witness credibility, or determine the plausibility of defenses).
B. Speedy Trial
Next Duran-Sierra argues that the delay of twenty-three months from the
formal charge to the trial denied him due process under the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, section 10 of the Iowa
Constitution.2 He maintains that he preserved error on this argument by moving
to dismiss at the close of the State’s case in chief. But here’s what defense counsel
argued at trial:
I would point out that this case has been pending for almost two
years. In light of supreme court pronouncements with regard to the
speedy trial provisions, my research indicated that the supreme court
has extended that time. Nonetheless, we would make note and
object to the further proceedings on this speedy trial documents.
2 The federal constitution guarantees a general right to a speedy trial. See U.S.
Const. amend. VI. That right is fundamental and is imposed on the states by the
Fourteenth Amendment. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 515 (1972). Our
state constitution also ensures the right to a speedy trial. Iowa Const. art. I, § 10.
Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.33(2) implements those constitutional rights.
State v. Olson, 528 N.W.2d 651, 653 (Iowa 1995).
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He did not discuss a constitutional violation. And neither did the State in its
resistance. It noted Duran-Sierra’s waiver of speedy trial and the supreme court’s
“supervisory orders with respect to the timing of trials due to the COVID epidemic.”
The State argued, “[T]his case falls squarely within the time frames that are still
allowed; there has been no violation of the defendant’s right to a speedy trial or
time to trial.” In denying the motion to dismiss, the district court expressly
observed: “The defendant has not made a specific constitutional argument under
the United States Constitution or separately under the Iowa Constitution.” And
Duran-Sierra did not correct that observation.
Because Duran-Sierra only argues a constitutional violation on appeal, we
have nothing to review. See State v. Smith, 957 N.W.2d 669, 681 (Iowa 2021)
(analyzing only a rule violation when the defendant did not allege a constitutional
speedy trial violation).
AFFIRMED.