In the Interest of E.U., C.U. and M.U., Minor children ( 2023 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 22-1982
Filed February 22, 2023
IN THE INTEREST OF E.U., C.U. and M.U.,
Minor Children,
F.B., Mother,
Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Johnson County, Joan M. Black,
District Associate Judge.
A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights. AFFIRMED.
Caleb T. Detweiler of Honohan, Epley, Braddock & Brenneman, LLP, Iowa
City, for appellant mother.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Anagha Dixit, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee State.
Anthony A. Haughton of Linn County Advocate, Inc., Cedar Rapids, attorney
and guardian ad litem for minor children.
Considered by Bower, C.J., and Badding and Buller, JJ.
2
BADDING, Judge.
Six months ago, we affirmed the termination of the mother’s parental rights
to her two youngest children. See In re A.U., No. 22-0949, 2022 WL 3906725,
at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 31, 2022). The mother now appeals the termination of
her parental rights to the three older children—born in 2012, 2013, and 2015—
under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(f) and (g) (2022). She does not challenge
any of the three steps in our termination analysis. See In re L.B., 970
N.W.2d 311, 313 (Iowa 2022). Instead, the mother claims the State failed to make
reasonable efforts at reunification due to its delayed completion of a relative home
study under the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children (ICPC), which
she argues “compromised the best interests of the children.”1
Our opinion in the prior termination proceeding details the onslaught of child
abuse investigations and assessments by the Iowa Department of Health and
Human Services dating back to 2013, all of which involved the mother’s deficient
parenting of her five children. See generally A.U., 2022 WL 3906725, at *1–3.2 To
summarize, a child-in-need-of-assistance proceeding was opened in 2016 and
closed the next year. Id. at *1. But “[d]espite the services provided in the first case
the same issues continued to be reported to the department.” Id. In mid-2019, a
second case was started and the three older children were removed. Id. A trial
1 We review this claim de novo, while keeping in mind that the “primary interest in
termination proceedings is the best interests of the child[ren].” In re C.B., 611
N.W.2d 489, 492 (Iowa 2000).
2 This opinion was admitted as an exhibit at the termination for the three oldest
children. The exhibits also included the transcript from the termination hearing for
the two youngest children and the ensuing juvenile court order.
3
home placement was approved in late 2019, and the children were returned to
parental custody in the spring of 2020 under department supervision. Id. at *2.
The same concerns soon reemerged, and the children were again removed
in June 2021 and placed with a family friend where they have since remained. See
id. at *3. After this second removal, the mother began asking for the children to be
placed with her aunt in Texas if they could not be returned to her. In response to
the mother’s request, the juvenile court “authorize[d] an expedited ICPC home
study” in its order for modification of disposition and temporary removal. The
mother did not respond well to services from then on. See id. By January 2022,
the department recommended termination as to the two youngest children, 3 but
held off on the three oldest children given their shorter period of removal. See id.
at *3 & n.1.
In April, the mother’s counsel emailed caseworker Jill Foens, questioning:
“Have you sent the paperwork for the [ICPC] home study?” Foens replied the
same day that “it is going to get done by the end of the week.” But Foens never
completed the referral while she was on the case. Caseworker Paige Breon was
assigned to the case in May, after Foens was in a “[s]evere car accident.” At the
permanency hearing in July, with the referral still not complete, the mother asked
for “additional time for reunification or placement of the children with an aunt in
Texas.” Although the court denied both requests and directed the State to file
termination petitions, it ordered the department “to follow up with the ICPC process
regarding the aunt in Texas.” The State filed its termination petitions in August.
3 That termination hearing was held in March, and the juvenile court entered its
termination order in May.
4
At the termination hearing in October, Breon testified the delay in making
the referral was because the department had not received information from the
aunt in Texas. The department was also aware the aunt was breaking federal tax
law by claiming the children as dependents, and “she was very vague about where
the children would live and with whom.”
Two weeks after the hearing, but before the juvenile court entered its
termination ruling, the ICPC home study was completed by the Texas Department
of Family and Protective Services. The report from that agency stated the home
study request was closed because the aunt reported that “she is unable to care for
mentioned children at this time and will not proceed with home study.” While the
court’s ruling terminating the mother’s parental rights found the department made
reasonable efforts at reunification, the court did not address her complaints about
the ICPC home study. Yet because the referral was made, the study was
conducted, and it was denied,4 the State argues the mother’s claim on appeal is
moot. We agree.
The only argument the mother makes for reversal is the potential viability of
a statutorily preferred placement with her aunt, which she contends the department
unreasonably ignored by failing to timely initiate the ICPC home study. But the
mother’s standing to challenge placement and the statutory preference for relative
placement does not survive termination. See In re L.R., No. 22-0803, 2022
4 Setting aside whether these documents are part of the record on appeal since
they were filed after the hearing but before the termination ruling, we find they are
properly before us because of the State’s mootness argument. See Clarke Cnty.
Reservoir Comm’n v. Robins, 862 N.W.2d 166, 170 n.3 (Iowa 2015) (“Matters that
are technically outside the record may be submitted in order to establish or counter
a claim of mootness.”).
5
WL 4361855, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Sept. 21, 2022). And the placement she relies
on—the aunt in Texas—is no longer an option, thus making her sole claim for relief
moot.5 See In re D.H., 902 N.W.2d 584, 586 (Iowa Ct. App. 2017) (“Ordinarily, an
appeal is moot if the ‘issue becomes nonexistent or academic and, consequently,
no longer involves a justiciable controversy.’” (citation omitted)). In other words,
agreeing with the mother would have “no practical legal effect” because the
circumstance she relies on is not a possibility. See id.In any event, assuming the mother preserved a proper reasonable efforts
challenge, the department only has to make efforts that are “reasonable under the
circumstances.” In re S.J., 620 N.W.2d 522, 525 (Iowa Ct. App. 2000). In our
view, the department met that standard.
The mother points out she first requested the authorization of the ICPC
referral after re-removal in June 2021. But, at that point, the permanency goal was
reunification, which continued through the permanency hearing more than a year
later. Exploring the option of placing the children with the aunt in Texas would
have only hindered the goal of reunification with the mother in Iowa. Cf. In re J.W.,
No. 19-0372, 2019 WL 1950009, at *4–5 (Iowa Ct. App. May 1, 2019) (finding that
where the permanency goal was reunification when an ICPC study was requested,
completing the “study was not a reasonable effort necessary to return [the child] to
the home”). Once the permanency goal was changed to termination, the
department did look at placement with the aunt, but she was evasive in providing
information and vague as to who the children would be residing with in Texas.
5There are of course exceptions to the mootness doctrine, but those have not
been raised or briefed in this appeal.
6
Based on these circumstances, we conclude the department’s failure to submit the
referral sooner was not unreasonable under the circumstances.
As to the children’s best interests, whether their safety; long term nurturing
and growth; and physical, mental, and emotional condition and needs could be
met in the aunt’s home in Texas was questionable to say the least. See Iowa Code
§ 232.116(2). On the other hand, the children have been placed in the same foster
home that shares their same cultural beliefs and language since the last removal,
where they have thrived during the proceedings. We accordingly reject the
mother’s claim that failing to explore the aunt as a placement option during the
proceedings compromised the children’s best interests.
AFFIRMED.