State of Iowa v. Matthew L. Wilson ( 2017 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 16-0555
Filed March 8, 2017
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
MATTHEW L. WILSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Washington County, Myron L.
Gookin, Judge.
Matthew Wilson appeals from the judgment and sentence following a jury
verdict finding him guilty of sexual abuse in the second degree. AFFIRMED.
Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Shellie L. Knipfer, Assistant
Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Linda J. Hines, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee.
Considered by Danilson, C.J., Vaitheswaran, J., and Goodhue, S.J.*
*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 (2017).
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GOODHUE, Senior Judge.
Matthew Levi Wilson appeals from the judgment and sentence following a
jury verdict finding him guilty of sexual abuse in the second degree.
I. Background Facts and Circumstances
Wilson’s daughter, M.W., reported that when she was eight years old and
traveling in Wilson’s van, he asked her, “Do you want to stop somewhere and
have it.” Thereafter, Wilson stopped the van on a side road and told her to get in
the back bench of the van. Wilson followed her, unzipped his shorts, exposed
his penis, had her put her hand on it, and told her to shake it like a bottle. M.W.
observed “white stuff” come from Wilson’s penis. When a black truck drove by
the van, Wilson told M.W. they should leave. Wilson retrieved a sock from the
van, cleaned himself up with it, and threw it out the window. Wilson asked her
not to tell anyone. However, when she was questioned on September 15, 2015,
by Amanda Seymour, a Department of Human Services worker, M.W. gave a
rendition of the above events. Seymour contacted Washington County Deputy
Chad Ellis, and an investigation began.
On October 8, Seymour and Ellis conducted an interview of Wilson at his
father’s home, where Wilson was living. It is the nature of that interview with
Wilson, conducted by Ellis, that is an issue in this appeal. Wilson’s father was
asked to leave the room prior to conducting the interview. Ellis, who was
dressed in street clothes, had a badge on his belt and a firearm on his right side.
Wilson had had prior contact with Ellis as a law enforcement officer.
Ellis and Wilson first discussed Wilson’s family concerns and the extra
burdens that had been placed on him because of his wife’s illness. Ellis falsely
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represented to Wilson a witness who had driven by could identify Wilson. Ellis
questioned Wilson by conveying an attitude of empathy and concern, saying
such things as, “We’re just trying to understand,” and that he and Seymour
wanted “to get help” and “understand why it happened.” Ellis continued by
saying they understood that “[t]hings happen, man. We get it,” and he asked
[Wilson] to “[t]ell us why. Why you stopped.” Wilson insisted there was nothing
to say. Ellis continued expressing empathy and stating the family needed
closure, that he and Seymour were trying to get help for those that needed it, and
that it was for the family’s good. Ellis suggested that counseling and therapy
were available. Ellis stated that he knew Wilson was sad that it happened, that
they could remove the weight off of Wilson’s shoulders, and that what had
happened had to be bugging Wilson. After continuing to go through a narration
of what Ellis thought had happened, Ellis would express empathy by saying, “You
are sad and wished this hadn’t happened.” Ellis then asked Wilson if he left the
driver seat when he parked the van, and after a period of silence, Wilson said
they sat in the third seat of the van. Finally, Wilson said M.W. touched him on
the penis. Ellis asked Wilson if she had been shaking it like a pop bottle, and
Wilson apparently responded affirmatively. Ellis followed by asking, “So you had
an erection?” and asking whether he ejaculated. Wilson again responded
affirmatively. At that point, Ellis believed he had probable cause to make an
arrest and read Wilson his rights.
Wilson filed a motion to suppress the confession made at the interview,
alleging that Ellis induced his confession with promises of leniency. The motion
was overruled, and the denial of the motion is the focus of Wilson’s appeal.
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II. Error Preservation
Adverse rulings on motions to suppress preserve error for appellate
review. State v. Breuer, 577 N.W.2d 41, 44 (Iowa 1998).
III. Standard of Review
Challenges to the admissibility of confessions are reviewed for errors of
law, and when a claim of a promise of leniency is made in challenging a
confession, the common law evidentiary test is applicable when “there is no
dispute as to the words used” or their meaning under the circumstances. State v.
Polk, 812 N.W.2d 670, 674 (Iowa 2012) (citation omitted).
IV. Merits
Wilson maintains Ellis’s interview contained implied promises of leniency
in order to obtain a confession. An accused’s confession is not admissible if
procured by an improper promise of leniency. Id. Wilson maintains the interview
Ellis conducted is precisely like the interview found to have been inadmissible
because of a promise of leniency in State v. Howard, 825 N.W.2d 32, 40-41
(Iowa 2012) (holding Howard’s confession was inadmissible because the
detective created a false impression that if Howard admitted to the sexual abuse,
he would be sent to a treatment facility in lieu of further punishment).
Iowa follows the evidentiary test to determine the status of a confession as
opposed to the totality-of-the-circumstances test. State v. Madsen, 813 N.W.2d
714, 726 (Iowa 2012). Under the evidentiary test, a confession cannot be
received into evidence if the suspect has been influenced by any threat or
promise. Id. at 724. It follows that an admission into evidence of such a
confession is a matter of law to be decided by the court. See State v. Wilson,
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247 N.W.2d 736, 740 (Iowa 1976) (holding that where a defendant objects to the
admissibility of an alleged confession, the trial court must conduct an evidentiary
hearing outside the presence of the jury and make the requisite findings and
determination as to its admissibility). Our supreme court’s retention of the per se
exclusionary rule eliminates the need of determining if, in fact, the defendant
relied on a promise of leniency in confessing. Madsen, 813 N.W.2d at 726. Our
supreme court has stated that the purpose of the evidentiary rule is to provide
clarity. Id. at 725. The confession must be excluded if “any degree of influence
by force or other inducement” has been exerted on the suspect. Id. at 726. The
evidentiary rule focuses on an examination of the language used to determine
whether the investigator’s questions gave even an implicit promise of any reward
as a result of a confession. Howard, 825 N.W.2d at 40. We can conclude from
the sources cited that it is an objective test, dependent on any inference that
could reasonably be drawn from the language of the interviewer used and their
meaning, explicit or implicit, under the circumstances. Madsen, 813 N.W.2d at
726 (“The use of a per se exclusionary rule eliminates the need for the court to
attempt to read the mind of defendant to determine if his confession, in fact, was
induced by or made in reliance upon the promise of leniency.”).
The case under consideration can be easily distinguished from Howard.
In Howard, the investigator asked, “How do we get the help, get you the help you
need?” 825 N.W.2d at 36. Then later the investigator asked, “Do you need
help?” and “Do you think we should help you? There’s people out there that can
help you.” Id. The interviewer stated there are treatment centers with doctors
and nurses that treat sex addiction. Id. at 36-37. He asked, “What kind of help
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do you need?” and later asked, “The first thing is that we get you help, right?” Id.
at 37. Finally, the interviewer stated, “You know that no matter what you tell me
today, I’ll give you a ride home, drop you off, wherever you want to go.” Id. at 38.
Ellis never told Wilson that there was treatment and counseling specifically
available for him. He used the term generally and in relation to the victim and to
the family. He never stated that he would drive Wilson home and drop him off
wherever he wanted to go.
Although Howard is distinguishable, it does not necessarily mean the
language here failed to include a promise of leniency. Ellis expressed sympathy
and mentioned treatment of one kind or another repeatedly. However, to hold
that a promise of leniency was extended under the facts of this case would be
tantamount to restraining an interviewer from expressing empathy and using the
words “therapy,” “counseling,” or “closure” when questioning a suspect, even
though the victim is a family member. Certainly Ellis never specifically offered
Wilson therapy, counselling, or another benefit as an alternative to a criminal
charge or incarceration. We conclude these words do not necessarily imply a
promise of leniency and they did not under the facts of this case. Ellis never
expressly said that counseling would even be available to Wilson, except as he
may have been included as a part of the family, and there was no suggestion that
he would be given a ride home or any other explicit or implicit promise of
leniency. We conclude the court correctly denied the motion to suppress and
admitted the confession.
AFFIRMED.