State of Iowa v. Kevin Brown ( 2016 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 16-0074
Filed November 23, 2016
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
KEVIN BROWN,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Henry County, Emily S. Dean,
District Associate Judge.
The defendant appeals from his conviction, following a guilty plea.
AFFIRMED.
William R. Monroe of the Law Office of William Monroe, Burlington, for
appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Timothy M. Hau, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.
Considered by Potterfield, P.J., and Doyle and Tabor, JJ.
2
POTTERFIELD, Presiding Judge.
Kevin Brown appeals from his conviction, following a guilty plea, for
operating while intoxicated. Brown maintains his trial counsel was ineffective for
allowing him to plead guilty without the district court making express findings the
plea was knowing and voluntary. Brown has the burden to establish both that his
trial counsel failed to perform an essential duty and that the failure resulted in
prejudice. See State v. Straw, 709 N.W.2d 128, 133 (Iowa 2006). We review his
claim de novo. Id. Counsel does not have a duty to pursue a meritless issue,
see State v. Utter, 803 N.W.2d 647, 652 (Iowa 2011), so we first consider
whether the district court’s acceptance of Brown’s plea violated Iowa Rule of
Criminal Procedure 2.8(2)(b).
Where a defendant is pleading guilty to a serious or aggravated
misdemeanor, as Brown did here,1 the defendant may waive their in-court
appearance and colloquy. See Iowa R. Crim P. 2.8(2)(b). In the plea signed by
Brown, he acknowledged the charge against him as OWI, first offense, and the
possible maximum and minimum sentences. He also acknowledged and waived
his right to appear in court for a colloquy, as well as his rights to a jury trial and to
confront and compel witnesses. Brown’s written plea met the necessary
informational requirements. See State v. Majeres, 722 N.W.2d 179, 183 (Iowa
2006). Because Brown was fully informed of his rights and chose to sign and
submit the guilty plea anyway, “[a]n in-court colloquy is not necessary to ensure
the waiver was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent.” See id. (citing Iowa v. Tovar,
1
Iowa Code section 321J.2(2)(a) (2015) provides that a first offense of operating while
intoxicated is a serious misdemeanor.
3
541 U.S. 77, 80–81 (2004)). Rather, “[a] written guilty plea containing such a
waiver is prima facie evidence the defendant gave the waiver voluntarily,
knowingly, and intelligently.” Id.
Here, the court’s acceptance of Brown’s guilty plea substantially complied
with rule 2.8(2)(b), and any objection by counsel would have been meritless.
See State v. Loye, 670 N.W.2d 141, 150 (Iowa 2003) (stating “we employ a
substantial compliance standard in determining whether a trial court has
discharged its duty” under rule 2.8(2)). Thus, counsel has not breached an
essential duty, and Brown’s claim must fail. See Everett v. State, 789 N.W.2d
151, 159 (Iowa 2010) (holding that a defendant’s ineffective-assistance claim
fails if either element is lacking).
AFFIRMED.