Karin Ann Bjorseth v. Iowa Newspaper Association ( 2016 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 15-2121
Filed November 23, 2016
KARIN ANN BJORSETH,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
IOWA NEWSPAPER ASSOCIATION,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Paul D. Scott, Judge.
Karin Bjorseth appeals the district court’s order granting summary
judgment in favor of Iowa Newspaper Association. AFFIRMED.
Eric M. Updegraff of Hopkins & Huebner, P.C., Des Moines, for appellant.
Mitchell R. Kunert of Nyemaster Goode, P.C., Des Moines, for appellee.
Considered by Danilson, C.J., and Vaitheswaran and Tabor, JJ.
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VAITHESWARAN, Judge.
In this employment discrimination appeal, we must decide whether the
district court erred in granting the employer’s summary judgment motion on the
employee’s claim of retaliatory discharge.
The undisputed material facts viewed in a light most favorable to the
employee are as follows. See Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.981(3) (stating summary
judgment is appropriate where there is no genuine issue of material fact and
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law); Ballalatak v. All Iowa
Agric. Ass’n, 781 N.W.2d 272, 275 (Iowa 2010) (“This court reviews the record in
the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.”). Karin Bjorseth worked as an
account executive for the Iowa Newspaper Association (INA). Her earnings were
commission-based, but she was required to work forty hours per week. INA
allowed employees to accrue personal time off based on the hours employees
worked. They could take accrued time with the advance approval of their
supervisors.
After exhausting her personal leave, Bjorseth asked her supervisor if she
could take a day off. She was informed that the equivalent of eight hours of pay
would be subtracted from her paycheck.
Bjorseth contacted someone at the State to determine whether INA could
take this action. She was told the company could not deduct anything from her
paycheck. Bjorseth shared this information with her supervisor. According to the
supervisor, Bjorseth did not take the time off, and no amount was ever deducted
from her wages. INA subsequently terminated Bjorseth’s employment based on
poor work performance.
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Bjorseth sued INA for (1) violation of the Iowa Wage Payment Collection
Act and (2) “wrongful discharge in violation of public policy and the Iowa Wage
Payment Act’s prohibition against retaliation.” The district court granted INA’s
motion for summary judgment.
In ruling on the first count, the court stated, “Both parties . . . agree that
there are no unpaid wages at issue in this case and that Bjorseth was paid all
wages due in full. As there was no failure to pay any wages, INA cannot be
liable under [Iowa Code c]hapter 91A [(2013)] for failure to pay wages and is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
With respect to the second count, the court agreed with Bjorseth that
chapter 91A “prohibits an employer from discharging an employee in response to
the employee filing a complaint or bringing an action under the Iowa Wage
Payment Collection Act.” See Iowa Code § 91A.10(5).1 But, the court explained,
“[F]or an employee to have a cause of action under chapter 91A in the first place,
an employer must have improperly failed to pay all wages due to the employee.
Here, Bjorseth was paid all wages she was owed.”
The court proceeded to answer the question “whether an employee
contesting a proposed reduction to their wages—without any wages actually
being withheld—is afforded protection against retaliatory discharge through
public policy.” After canvassing state and federal case law, the court concluded
“[a] dispute that led to no improper action is not enough to provide chapter 91A
protection to Bjorseth.” The court reasoned as follows,
1
The provision states in pertinent part, “[a]n employer shall not discharge or in any other
manner discriminate against any employee because the employee has filed a complaint,
assigned a claim, or brought an action under this section.”
4
While the Iowa Wage Payment Collection Law is indeed an
express public policy exception to the general at-will employment
approach, it does not clearly identify fully-compensated employees
as being protected from employer retaliation. The statute itself is
designed to facilitate recollection of wages owed to employees.
The purpose of the law would not be furthered by providing
protection in employment disputes that do not result in withheld
wages.
....
Chapter 91A is not a rule prohibiting an employee’s
termination in response to a wage dispute. Instead, it is a rule
prohibiting an employee’s termination in response to a wage
dispute where an employee has not been fully paid. The parties in
this case agree that no wages were withheld at any point. Chapter
91A and the associated public policy thus do not afford Bjorseth
protection.
We discern no error in the court’s ruling. See Tegtmeier v. PJ Iowa, L.C., No.
3:15-cv-00110-JEG, 2016 WL 3265711, at *9 (S.D. Iowa May 18, 2016) (“[T]he
statutory right of an employee to prevent unauthorized wage deductions requires
a deduction to have been made.”); Morris v. Conagra Foods, Inc., 435 F. Supp.
2d 887, 913 n.14 (N.D. Iowa 2005) (“Although the Iowa Supreme Court has
stated ‘Iowa Code chapter 91A plainly articulates a public policy prohibiting the
firing of an employee in response to a demand for wages due,’ the state court
has never extended the public policy to encompass every wage dispute an
employee has with an employer, and this court refuses to do so as well.” (citation
omitted)); Kavanagh v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 566 F. Supp. 242, 245 (N.D.
Ill. 1983) (“Although plaintiff argues that his discharge contravened the public
policy favoring the exercise of rights under the Wage Payment and Collection
Act, it is obvious from his complaint that he has no standing to assert rights under
the Act because [the employer] never made a deduction from his salary, the sine
qua non of a claim under the Act.”); Dorshkind v. Oak Park Place of Dubuque II,
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L.L.C., 835 N.W.2d 293, 303 (Iowa 2013) (“[T]he [public policy exception to the
doctrine of at-will employment] is narrowly circumscribed to only those policies
clearly defined and well-recognized to protect those with a compelling need for
protection from wrongful discharge.”); Tullis v. Merrill, 584 N.W.2d 236, 239 (Iowa
1998) (holding “Iowa Code chapter 91A plainly articulates a public policy
prohibiting the firing of an employee in response to a demand for wages due
under an agreement with the employer” (emphasis added)). Because the
material facts are essentially undisputed and the law supports the district court’s
conclusion, we affirm the summary judgment ruling in favor of INA.
AFFIRMED.