State of Iowa v. Kory Michael Wallace ( 2016 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 15-1448
Filed November 9, 2016
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
KORY MICHAEL WALLACE,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Warren County, Susan Choate
Cox, District Associate Judge.
Kory Wallace appeals the district court’s denial of his application to modify
his sex offender registration obligation. AFFIRMED.
Nicholas A. Sarcone of Stowers & Sarcone P.L.C., West Des Moines, for
appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Linda J. Hines, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee.
Heard by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Potterfield and Bower, JJ.
2
VAITHESWARAN, Presiding Judge.
Kory Wallace appeals the district court’s denial of his application to modify
his sex offender registration obligation. He contends the district court’s findings
are not supported by substantial evidence.
I. Background Proceedings
Wallace pled guilty to assault with intent to commit sexual abuse. See
Iowa Code § 709.11 (2001). The district court granted him a deferred judgment,
placed him on probation for two years, ordered him to “successfully complete the
Sexual Offender Treatment Program,” and required him “to comply with the
Sexual Abuse Registry.” At the time Wallace was sentenced, the registration
period was ten years. See id. § 692A.2(1). The law was subsequently amended
to require lifetime registration for this offense. See id. §§ 692A.101(1)(a)(5)
(2009) (defining “[a]ssault with intent to commit sexual abuse in violation of
section 709.11” as an aggravated offense); 692A.106(5) (increasing the
registration duration for a sex offender convicted of an aggravated offense from
ten years to life); 692A.125(2) (applying the lifetime registration requirement
retroactively to “[a]ny sex offender including a juvenile offender who is required to
be on the sex offender registry as of June 30, 2009”).
Wallace violated the terms of his probation by using marijuana and
methamphetamine. Abstinence from illegal drug use was part of successful
completion of the sex offender program. The district court revoked his deferred
judgment, sentenced him to a prison term not exceeding two years, suspended
the sentence, and placed him on probation for two years.
3
Wallace again violated the terms of his probation, by appearing at a group
therapy session “looking and acting high, or under the influence of something.” A
urine test was positive for methamphetamine. The district court found Wallace in
contempt of court, ordered him placed at a halfway house for drug treatment, and
required him to participate in a “certified sex offender treatment program and . . .
successfully complete sex offender treatment through such certified program.”
In time, Wallace’s counselor sent the department of correctional services a
“discharge summary” stating Wallace had “done a pretty good job of continuing
to address his issues related to his abusive sexual behavior” and opining that if
he remained “active in his recovery program which enables him to remain sober
from methamphetamine use he poses a small risk to reoffend in a sexual
manner.” The counselor further opined that Wallace had “successfully
internalized the lessons of his sex offender program,” which he completed while
on extended probation.
Wallace was discharged from probation. The probation officer’s discharge
report noted Wallace had “done a poor job with treatment and supervision” but
“[h]is time on probation” was “up.”
Twelve years after his sentence was imposed, Wallace filed an application
to modify the sex offender registration requirements pursuant to Iowa Code
section 692A.128 (2013). Following a hearing at which the State offered no
resistance, a district court judge determined that Wallace had “successfully
completed all sex offender treatment programs that [were] required of him” but
had not obtained a risk assessment from the department of correctional services.
The court held the matter in abeyance until he obtained the assessment.
4
After the assessment was completed, a different district court judge held a
hearing at which the assessment preparer testified. The court determined
Wallace failed to complete “all sex offender treatment programs that ha[d] been
required” and, according to the risk assessment, was not “classified as a low risk
to reoffend.” The court denied Wallace’s application for modification of the
lifetime registration requirement as well as a subsequent motion to enlarge the
ruling. Wallace appealed.
II. Analysis
A. Standard of Review
As a preliminary matter, Wallace and the State disagree on our standard
of review. Wallace argues our review is for correction of legal error, with fact-
findings binding us if supported by substantial evidence. The State asks us to
examine the ruling for an abuse of discretion. We believe both standards apply.
Iowa Code section 692A.128 “grants the district court authority to modify
[sex offender] registration obligations if certain conditions are met.” State v. Iowa
Dist. Court ex rel. Story Cty., 843 N.W.2d 76, 77 (Iowa 2014). Iowa Code section
692A.128(2) sets forth those conditions. In pertinent part, the provision states:
An application [for modification] shall not be granted unless all of
the following apply:
....
(b) The sex offender has successfully completed all sex
offender treatment programs that have been required.
(c) A risk assessment has been completed and the sex
offender was classified as a low risk to reoffend. The risk
assessment used to assess an offender as a low risk to reoffend
shall be a validated risk assessment approved by the department of
corrections.[1]
1
Section 692A.128(6) also applies to this case. It states,
5
Iowa Code § 692A.128(2). These prerequisites to modification of the registration
requirements are mandatory. Accordingly, we will review a court’s conclusion on
whether an applicant has satisfied the prerequisites for errors of law and the
underlying fact findings for substantial evidence.
Assuming an applicant has satisfied these conditions, the court “may
modify the registration requirements.” See id. § 692A.128(5). The authority
conferred by this provision is clearly discretionary. Accordingly, we will review
the district court’s ultimate conclusion granting or denying a modification
application for an abuse of discretion.
B. Conditions
Wallace takes issue with the district court’s findings and conclusions on
two conditions: (1) successful completion of sex offender treatment and (2) an
assessment finding a low risk to reoffend.
1. Successful Completion of Sex Offender Treatment
The district court determined Wallace failed to successfully complete sex
offender treatment. In part, the court relied on probation reports stating Wallace
(a) did not perform well with “treatment and supervision” and (b) was “unable to
successfully complete sex offender treatment and probation.” These reports
constitute substantial evidence in support of the district court’s determination.
While the final discharge report stated Wallace “had . . . satisfactorily complied
A sex offender may be granted a modification if the offender is required to
be on the sex offender registry as a result of an adjudication for a sex
offense, the offender is not under the supervision of . . . a judicial district
judicial department of correctional services, and the department of
corrections agrees to perform a risk assessment on the sex offender.
Iowa Code § 692A.128(6).
6
with the terms and conditions of supervision,” the district court as fact-finder
could determine what weight to assign each portion of the probation officer’s
report. See State v. Shanahan, 712 N.W.2d 121, 135 (Iowa 2006) (“The function
of the [fact finder] is to weigh the evidence and ‘place credibility where it
belongs.’”) (citation omitted).
We recognize the reports were hearsay evidence. But Wallace concedes
he stipulated to consideration of the entire court file, including the reports, and he
simply argues “better evidence exists in the record[].” Again, it was up to the
district court to weigh the evidence. See id. Because drug use was
contraindicated for individuals participating in the sex offender treatment
program, the court reasonably could have discounted the testimony of Wallace’s
expert—a former clinical director of the sex offender treatment program—that
“the [probation] violation . . . certainly was not a violation that would constitute a
concern with regard to sexual misconduct.” See id.
Similarly, the court acted within its authority in ascribing less weight to the
letter of Wallace’s counselor than to the probation violation reports. The
counselor essentially found that Wallace had addressed the concerns underlying
the reports. But the preparer of the department of correctional services risk
assessment disagreed, finding the conduct reflected in the reports were
emblematic of a person who was simply “going through the motions.” The
preparer reached the following conclusion:
Based on information obtained in his probation records, it is
apparent that [Wallace] routinely violated treatment and probation
rules, was charged with new crimes on two separate occasions,
absconded from probation at one point, and was seen by his
probation officer as doing quite poorly throughout his probation. He
7
was subsequently placed in individual treatment . . . as opposed to
group sex offender treatment. Therefore, I would conclude, based
on this information, that, although there is no information available
stating that he failed treatment, there is compelling evidence that he
did not “. . . successfully complete all sex offender treatment
programs that have been required.”
The court found the preparer’s “testing and conclusions to be credible,” albeit in a
different context. This was the district court’s prerogative. See Mercy Hosp. v.
Hansen, Lind & Meyer, P.C., 456 N.W.2d 666, 672 (Iowa 1990) (stating it was for
the fact finder “to decide which of the experts was more credible, which used the
more reliable data, and whose opinion—if any—the [fact-finder] would accept”).
This brings us to the following appealing construct: successful completion
of the sex offender treatment program was a prerequisite to discharge of
Wallace’s probation, Wallace discharged his probation, so he must have
successfully completed sex offender treatment. While the district court could
have adopted this construct, the court was not required to do so, given the
equivocal statements in the probation violation reports and the risk assessment,
which we will discuss next.
The probation violation reports and the report and testimony of the risk
assessment preparer constitute substantial evidence in support of the
determination that Wallace failed to successfully complete the sex offender
treatment program. We affirm the district court’s determination that section
692A.128(2)(b) was not satisfied.
2. Risk Assessment
The preparer of the department of correctional services risk assessment
report concluded: “Actuarial risk assessments place [Wallace] at a Low-Medium
8
to Moderate risk level. . . . Based on the accumulated information obtained from
this evaluation [Wallace] is not determined to be a Low risk offender at this time.”
At the hearing, the preparer acknowledged errors in his scoring on certain
tests. At the same time, he stood by his conclusion that Wallace was not a low-
risk offender. He reasoned as follows:
[Wallace] came to the Department of Correctional Services with
many issues, concerns, drug use, acting out, criminal thinking, and
there is not enough evidence to persuade me that anything has
changed. There isn’t that stability that we would be looking for.
There’s still marijuana use on a monthly basis, criminal behavior.
And so there’s just enough going on that I don’t believe his risk has
modified in the downward way that some offenders have with time
off of supervision.
The district court found his testimony credible. While the court could have made
a contrary finding based on the testing errors, credibility findings are within the
purview of the district court. See Shanahan, 712 N.W.2d at 135.
We are left with the court’s attempt to address the testing errors by
rescoring Wallace. The court stated “if [Wallace’s] risk scores were recomputed
on either or both . . . validated risk assessments, then the risk scores would be
increased and establish[] the defendant at an increased risk to sexually reoffend.”
In our view, it was up to the department of correctional services to perform the
risk assessment; the court’s role was simply to determine whether the risk
assessment supported a determination of a low risk to reoffend. See Iowa Code
§ 692A.128(2)(c), (6). Accordingly, we decline to consider the discussion of
rescoring or the evidence garnered in support of rescoring.
The preparer’s risk assessment report and testimony constitutes
substantial evidence in support of the district court’s determination that Wallace
9
was not at low risk to reoffend. We affirm the district court’s determination that
section 692A.128(2)(c) was not satisfied.
C. Modification Decision
The district court declined to modify Wallace’s sex offender registration
requirements. Because the court’s key fact findings were supported by
substantial evidence, the decision was not clearly untenable or clearly
unreasonable. See In re B.A., 737 N.W.2d 665, 667-68 (Iowa Ct. App. 2007).
We conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the
application to remove Wallace from the sex offender registry.
AFFIRMED.