State of Iowa v. James Robert Downey ( 2016 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 15-1585
Filed November 9, 2016
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
JAMES ROBERT DOWNEY,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Johnson County, Douglas S.
Russell, Judge.
James Downey appeals his conviction for making a false statement on an
application to acquire a weapons permit. AFFIRMED.
Robert G. Rehkemper of Gourley, Rehkemper & Lindholm, P.L.C., West
Des Moines, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Genevieve Reinkoester, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.
Considered by Danilson, C.J., Vaitheswaran, J., and Mahan, S.J.*
*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 (2015).
2
VAITHESWARAN, Judge.
James Downey appeals his conviction for making a false statement on an
application to acquire a weapons permit. He challenges the sufficiency of the
evidence underlying the district court’s fact findings.
The district court required the State to prove the following elements of the
crime:
(1) The identification of the Defendant as the person who
committed the offense.
(2) The offense occurred in Johnson County, Iowa.
(3) The offense occurred on January 14, 2015.
(4) The Defendant knowingly made a false statement of
material fact on an application for an annual permit to acquire
pistols or revolvers submitted pursuant to section 724.17,[1] the
Code; or
(5) The Defendant knowingly submitted any materially
falsified or forged document in connection with the application.
The question on which the charge was premised was as follows, “Have
you ever been convicted in any court of a felony, or any other crime involving a
1
Iowa Code section 724.17 (2015) states:
The application for an annual permit to acquire pistols or revolvers
may be made to the sheriff of the county of the applicant’s residence and
shall be on a form prescribed and published by the commissioner of
public safety. The application shall require only the full name of the
applicant, the driver’s license or nonoperator’s identification card number
of the applicant, the residence of the applicant, and the date and place of
birth of the applicant. The applicant shall also display an identification
card that bears a distinguishing number assigned to the cardholder, the
full name, date of birth, sex, residence address, and brief description and
colored photograph of the cardholder, or other identification as specified
by rule of the department of public safety. The sheriff shall conduct a
criminal history check concerning each applicant by obtaining criminal
history data from the department of public safety which shall include an
inquiry of the national instant criminal background check system
maintained by the federal bureau of investigation or any successor
agency. A person who makes what the person knows to be a false
statement of material fact on an application submitted under this section
or who submits what the person knows to be any materially falsified or
forged documentation in connection with such an application commits a
class “D” felony.
3
firearm or explosives for which the court could have sentenced you to
imprisonment for more than one year, even if you received a shorter sentence
including probation?” Downey answered “No.” His answer was inaccurate—he
stipulated that he was previously convicted of operating a motor vehicle while
intoxicated, third offense, a class “D” felony. An application cannot be approved
if the applicant has a prior felony conviction. See Iowa Code §§ 724.15(1)(b),
724.26(1).
Downey contends there was insufficient evidence to establish (A) he was
the same person as the applicant, (B) his answer was statutorily required, (C) his
answer was a false statement of material fact, and (D) he knowingly made a false
statement. The district court’s fact findings bind us if supported by substantial
evidence. State v. Taylor, 689 N.W.2d 116, 130 (Iowa 2004).
A. Identity
The district court found that Downey was one and the same person as the
person identified in the application for a firearms permit. This finding is
supported by substantial evidence. Specifically, a captain with the Johnson
County Sheriff’s Office testified he called Downey after receiving the permit
application and confirmed that Downey was the person who completed the
application. See State v. Kardell, No. 09-1859, 2011 WL 441961, at *8 (Iowa Ct.
App. Feb. 9, 2011) (“While ‘proof of the identity of the person who committed the
offense is essential to a conviction . . . identification may be established and
inferred from all of the facts and circumstances in evidence.’” (quoting Butler v.
United States, 317 F.2d 249, 254 (8th Cir. 1963)).
4
B. Information Required by Iowa Code section 724.17
Downey contends his answer to the question quoted above was not part
of the statutorily-required application. He cites the first part of section 724.17,
which provides, “The application shall require only the full name of the applicant,
the driver’s license or nonoperator’s identification card number of the applicant,
the residence of the applicant, and the date and place of birth of the applicant.”
(Emphasis added.) We need not reach this issue because, as the State points
out, even if the question is not statutorily authorized, section 724.17 criminalizes
the submission of “what the person knows to be a false statement of material fact
on an application.” In keeping with this language, the application required
Downey to make the following certification:
I certify that all information, including supporting
documentation, provided in this application is true and correct, and I
understand that I may be convicted of a class “D” felony pursuant to
Iowa Code section 724.17 if I make what I know to be a false
statement of material fact on this application or if I submit what I
know to be any materially falsified or forged documentation in
connection with this application.
Downey’s signature appeared beneath this certification. We proceed to
Downey’s third challenge.
C. False Statement of Material Fact
Question two asked, in part, whether Downey had “ever been convicted in
any court of a felony.” Downey told the captain he had a felony on his record and
he should have answered “Yes” to the question. He also stipulated to a prior
felony. Accordingly, Downey is hard-pressed to argue his answer was anything
but false.
5
Downey instead focuses on the materiality element, reprising his
contention that the question lacked statutory authorization and, for that reason,
could not be material. He argues the statutorily-required information he provided
was sufficient to complete a background check and the check would have
disclosed his prior felony conviction, rendering the answer to question two
irrelevant. The district court rejected this argument, reasoning as follows, “It is
clearly a material fact whether the applicant was a felon because it is decisive in
disqualifying an applicant for the permit. If he is a convicted felon, the fact the
background check would have disclosed the felony conviction whether Defendant
answered ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ makes no difference.”
We agree. Even if the question was not statutorily authorized, the answer
to the question was essential to approval of the application. See Material Fact,
Black’s Law Dictionary (7th ed. 1999) (defining “material fact” as “[a] fact that is
significant or essential to the issue or matter at hand”). Substantial evidence
supports the district court’s finding of materiality.
D. Knowingly Made a False Statement
Downey contends the evidence was insufficient to establish he knowingly
made a false statement. The district court found otherwise, reasoning that
“before he completed the application the Defendant was aware of his OWI
conviction, was aware it was a felony, and was aware that answering ‘No’ to
question two was a false statement.” The court rejected the testimony of two
experts who opined that question two was ambiguous. The court stated, “The
testimony of Defendant’s experts does not raise a reasonable doubt to the Court
on the issues of knowledge of the Defendant or the materiality of his answer to
6
question two on the application for permit to acquire pistols/revolvers.” It was the
court’s prerogative as fact-finder to weigh the evidence in this fashion. State v.
Jacobs, 607 N.W.2d 679, 685 (Iowa 2000) (“The trial court as trier of fact is not
obligated to accept opinion evidence, even from experts, as conclusive.”).
Substantial evidence supports the finding of knowledge.
In finding substantial evidence, we have considered the recent opinion of
State v. Hoyman, 863 N.W.2d 1, 8-17 (Iowa 2015), in which the court examined
the knowledge element in our fraudulent practices statute. See Iowa Code
§ 714.8(4). That statute criminalizes the making of an entry in a public or
business record “knowing the same to be false.” Id. The court read an intent-to-
deceive requirement into the statute, reasoning that “if we interpreted section
714.8(4) as criminalizing any knowingly incorrect entry in a public record,
regardless of its significance or insignificance and regardless of whether the
maker of the entry intended to deceive anyone, its scope would be breathtakingly
broad.” Hoyman, 863 N.W.2d at 13. Downey suggests we should similarly
construe the term “knowingly” more narrowly. But the legislature did so by
including a materiality element. This element effectively limits the breadth of the
knowledge requirement in section 724.17.
Because substantial evidence supports the district court’s fact findings, we
affirm Downey’s conviction, judgment, and sentence for making a false statement
on a weapons permit application.
AFFIRMED.