Mollie Joan Ashton v. Nicholas Allan Brock, Todd Gohlman, Joel Congdon and John Nordyke ( 2015 )


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  •                    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
    No. 14-1257
    Filed June 10, 2015
    MOLLIE JOAN ASHTON,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    vs.
    NICHOLAS ALLAN BROCK,
    TODD GOHLMAN, JOEL
    CONGDON and JOHN NORDYKE,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    ________________________________________________________________
    Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Story County, Michael J. Moon,
    Judge.
    Plaintiff appeals from an adverse grant of summary judgment in favor of
    the defendants. AFFIRMED.
    Tod J. Beavers of Law Offices of Tod J. Beavers, P.C., Des Moines, for
    appellant.
    Jason C. Palmer and Catherine M. Lucas of Bradshaw, Fowler, Proctor
    & Fairgrave, P.C., Des Moines, for appellees.
    Considered by Tabor, P.J., and Bower and McDonald, JJ.
    2
    MCDONALD, J.
    The plaintiff Mollie Ashton f/k/a Brock appeals the district court’s grant of
    summary judgment adverse to her and in favor of three law enforcement officer
    defendants.    This appeal presents the question of whether law enforcement
    officers can be liable for alleged negligence in investigating alleged criminal
    activity and preventing harm to a victim in the absence of a special relationship
    between the law enforcement officers and the alleged victim. The answer is long
    settled in the negative, and we affirm the judgment of the district court.
    We review the district court's order on summary judgment for correction of
    errors at law. See Howard v. Schildberg Constr. Co., Inc., 
    528 N.W.2d 550
    , 552
    (Iowa 1995); Farm & City Ins. Co. v. Anderson, 
    509 N.W.2d 487
    , 489 (Iowa
    1993). We view the facts in a light most favorable to the party opposing the
    summary judgment motion. See Gerst v. Marshall, 
    549 N.W.2d 810
    , 812 (Iowa
    1996). We must decide whether a genuine issue of material fact exists and
    whether the law was correctly applied. See Farm & City Ins. 
    Co., 509 N.W.2d at 489
    .
    We need not repeat Ashton’s allegations in full because they are
    immaterial to the resolution of this matter.        When viewed in the light most
    favorable to the plaintiff, the summary judgment record showed the following. 1
    1
    The defendants contend the judgment of the district court could be affirmed on the
    ground that the plaintiff failed to timely file a resistance to the motion for summary
    judgment and failed to file a motion pursuant to Rule of Civil Procedure 1.981(6) to seek
    additional discovery in support of her resistance. We agree the plaintiff failed to timely
    file a properly supported resistance to the motion and failed to file a motion to seek
    additional discovery. See Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.981(6); see also Bitner v. Ottumwa Comm.
    School Dist., 
    549 N.W.2d 295
    , 299 (Iowa 1996). We need not decide this appeal on that
    3
    Ashton formerly was married to defendant Nicholas Brock. Defendants Todd
    Gohlman, Joel Congdon, and John Nordyke were employed as law enforcement
    officers by the Ames Police Department at all times material to this proceeding.
    In May 2011, the plaintiff and Brock were cohabiting although divorced. The
    Ames Police Department was called to the family’s residence on at least three
    occasions in response to domestic disturbances. After the police department
    responded to the domestic disturbance calls, Ashton contacted the Ames Police
    Department in person and by telephone to lodge further complaints against Brock
    and against the officers involved in the case. Officers Gohlman and Nordyke and
    Detective Congdon are among the law enforcement officers who became
    involved in the investigation and processing of Ashton’s complaints. Ultimately,
    Detective Congdon closed his investigation after the case was referred to the
    assistant county attorney and the assistant county attorney directed the case be
    closed without charges filed. In her amended petition, Ashton contended that
    Brock “physically assaulted, mentally abused,” and “stole property” from the
    plaintiff during the month of May 2011 and then for some undetermined period of
    time after. In her amended petition, plaintiff alleged Gohlman, Nordyke, and
    Congdon were negligent in “their failure to properly and adequately protect the
    Plaintiff from the wrongful actions and conduct of Defendant Brock.”
    To establish negligence, the plaintiff was required to establish, among
    other things, that the defendants owed her a duty. See Donahue v. Washington
    Cnty., 
    641 N.W.2d 848
    , 850 (Iowa Ct. App. 2002). The question of whether a
    ground, however, as we conclude the district court correctly decided the motion on the
    merits.
    4
    duty exists is a question of law for the court. See Thompson v. Kaczinski, 
    774 N.W.2d 829
    , 834 (Iowa 2009). Plaintiff does not contend Thompson changes our
    analysis of the issue.    Iowa law does not recognize a tort for negligent law
    enforcement response and investigation in the absence of a special relationship
    between the plaintiff and law enforcement. See Morris v. Leaf, 
    534 N.W.2d 388
    ,
    390 (Iowa 1995) (“Iowa courts have consistently held that law enforcement
    personnel do not owe a particularized duty to protect individuals; rather, they owe
    a general duty to the public.”); Mastbergen v. City of Sheldon, 
    515 N.W.2d 3
    , 5
    (Iowa 1994) (“Consistent with the common-law principles recognized by those
    sections, we have recognized two exceptions when law enforcement may be
    liable for damages: (1) when the police create the situation that places the
    citizen's life in jeopardy and (2) when the police take a citizen into custody and
    control.”); Smith v. State, 
    324 N.W.2d 299
    , 302 (Iowa 1982) (holding “law
    enforcement officers have no liability for mere negligence in the investigation of
    crime”); Hawkeye Bank & Trust Co. v. Spencer, 
    487 N.W.2d 94
    , 96-97 (Iowa Ct.
    App. 1992) (defining special relationship and holding police promises of extra or
    special watches on citizen's property do not create exception to general rule of
    nonliability for negligence in investigating criminal activity). Although the plaintiff
    asserts there was a special relationship between her and the law enforcement
    defendants, she did not produce evidence of any “special relationship” within the
    meaning of our case law. See 
    Mastbergen, 515 N.W.2d at 5
    ; see also Hawkeye
    Bank & 
    Trust, 487 N.W.2d at 96
    .
    5
    The district court correctly determined that the issue presented was a
    question of duty, that the plaintiff failed to establish the existence of a duty, and
    that the officer defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The
    judgment of the district court is affirmed without further opinion. See Iowa Ct. R.
    21.26(a), (c), (d), and (e).
    AFFIRMED.