In Re the Marriage of Ronald Eugene Parker and Jennifer Louisa Parker Upon the Petition of Ronald Eugene Parker, and Concerning Jennifer Louisa Parker ( 2015 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 14-0544
Filed June 10, 2015
IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF RONALD EUGENE PARKER
AND JENNIFER LOUISA PARKER
Upon the Petition of
RONALD EUGENE PARKER,
Petitioner-Appellant,
And Concerning
JENNIFER LOUISA PARKER,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Wapello County, Lucy J. Gamon,
Judge.
Appeal from denial of application for contempt citation/rule to show cause.
AFFIRMED.
Michael O. Carpenter of Gaumer, Emanuel, Carpenter & Goldsmith, P.C.,
Ottumwa, for appellant.
Cynthia D. Hucks of Box & Box Attorneys, Ottumwa, for appellee.
Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Doyle and McDonald, JJ.
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MCDONALD, J.
Ronald and Jennifer Parker’s twenty-eight year marriage came to an
acrimonious end in 2012. In September 2013, Ronald filed an application for
contempt citation/rule to show cause, alleging Jennifer failed to sell the parties’
marital home and divide the net equity in the home in violation of the 2012
decree of dissolution of marriage. The district court denied the application,
finding Jennifer was not in willful violation of the decree when Jennifer was
unable to sell the parties’ marital home for more than the total encumbrance on
the property and the transactional costs associated with a sale. Ronald timely
filed this appeal.1
The following facts and procedural history are relevant to this appeal. The
parties purchased the marital home in 2010. The home appraised for $47,500 at
the time of purchase, and the county assessor valued the property at $45,000 at
the time of purchase. The property, note, and mortgage were in Jennifer’s name
because Ronald had no credit and had outstanding tax liabilities. Although there
was objective evidence of the value of the property, the decretal court
determined it was unable to determine the fair market value of the property for
property division purposes. The court ordered the property “shall be sold to
determine its fair-market value and to manage the equitable allocation of any net
equity realized.” Specifically, the court decreed:
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“No appeal lies from an order to punish for a contempt, but the proceedings may, in
proper cases, be taken to a higher court for revision by certiorari.” Iowa Code § 665.11
(2013). “It is clear section 665.11 proscribes appeal only when a defendant is found in
contempt.” State v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 231 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Iowa 1975). Where, as here, “the
application to punish for contempt is dismissed, a direct appeal is permitted.” Id.
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B. Disposition of Real Estate
1 ) The real estate at 226 Marianna Avenue in Ottumwa shall
be sold at public auction to ascertain a fair-market value and
to provide orderly and timely conversion of the house equity
into marital debt relief:
a. As sole titleholder, Jennifer shall arrange
reasonable terms of sale that include use of an
experienced real-estate auction service that employs
marketing customary in the Wapello County
community to obtain fair-market value. The auction
shall be conducted by October 1, 2012.
b. From gross sale proceeds, Jennifer shall pay all
reasonable and customary expenses of sale
(including proration of real-estate taxes and legal fees
connected with the sale, and legal fees for title
clearance and document preparation), shall satisfy
mortgage indebtedness, and shall reimburse the
parties $2,500 first-homebuyer credit (if necessary).
After the parties engaged in a flurry of motion practice related to the
interpretation and enforcement of this provision of the decree, Jennifer began the
process of selling the property. A reserve-price auction was held on March 16,
2013, but the home failed to sell for the minimum price necessary to satisfy the
liens on the property and to pay the transactional costs related to the sale. The
reserve price at the auction was $53,000.
In September 2013, Ronald filed an application for contempt citation/rule
to show cause, alleging the “failure to pay” was willful because Jennifer “actively
engaged in conduct to ensure that the house would not sell at auction, including”
(1) destroying or failing to maintain the home, causing it to deteriorate and lower
any expectation of a sale; (2) approaching persons at the auction and actively
discouraging them from bidding; and (3) setting a reserve price that ensured the
home would not sell in its present condition. Following an evidentiary hearing,
the court issued its ruling on the application to show cause, finding Ronald failed
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to prove any of his allegations of contempt. The court found (1) Jennifer kept the
home well-maintained and in a saleable condition, (2) she cooperated with the
auctioneer “in all ways” to obtain the highest bid and there was “no credible
evidence” she discouraged bidders, refused to show the home, or that she
impeded the auction process in any way; and (3) Jennifer had “legitimate
expenses of sale which justified a minimum reserve price in the low $50,000
range, including the mortgage payoff, first time homeowner reimbursement,
auctioneer’s expenses, and other expenses of sale.” The court also interpreted
the dissolution decree to mean that Jennifer had no further obligation to sell the
marital home. Instead, the district court reasoned, Jennifer was obligated to sell
the home for the purpose of determining the value and distributing the net equity,
if any. The attempted sale established the fair market value. Once it was
determined the property had negative equity, the district court reasoned, there
was no net equity to distribute for the purposes of property distribution.
We first address the standard of review. Ronald asserts that this is an
appeal from a declaratory ruling and that the standard of review is de novo. The
assertion is puzzling and without merit. Ronald filed an application for contempt
citation. The order appealed from is the ruling denying his application for
contempt citation. Iowa Code section 598.23 provides that “If a person against
whom a . . . final decree has been entered willfully disobeys the order or decree,
the person may be cited and punished by the court for contempt.” The contempt
statute provides only that a person “may” be cited and punished for contempt.
Iowa Code § 598.23. Thus, “a trial court is not required to hold a party in
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contempt even though the elements of contempt may exist.” In re Marriage of
Swan, 526 N.W.2d 320, 326–27 (Iowa 1995). Because the statute provides for
the exercise of trial court discretion in citing and punishing a person for contempt,
our review of the district court’s denial of the application is for an abuse of
discretion. See id. Further, we will affirm the judgment of the district court unless
it is demonstrated the district court grossly abused its discretion in denying the
application. See id.
Ronald’s misunderstanding of the posture of this case and the applicable
standard of review undermines his arguments. Ronald first contends the district
court erred in interpreting the decree to allow Jennifer to set a reserve price at
the public auction. He contends that “[]in order for Jennifer to prevail in this
matter, she must justify her decision to place a $53,000 reserve on the Home.”
Ronald next contends the district court erred in interpreting the decree to mean
Jennifer had no ongoing obligation to sell the home. He argues that even though
the home has negative equity, awarding the home to her and holding her solely
responsible for the associated debt results in an “inequitable windfall” to her. He
does not explain why or how this is so. Regardless, neither of these issues, as
framed by Ronald, are before this court. The only question properly before this
court is whether the district court grossly abused its discretion in refusing to hold
Jennifer in contempt. We answer that question in the negative.
A contempt proceeding is quasi-criminal in nature, and each element must
be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. See In re Marriage of Ruden, 509
N.W.2d 494, 496 (Iowa Ct. App. 1993). “A party alleging contempt has the
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burden to prove the contemnor had a duty to obey a court order and willfully
failed to perform that duty.” Ary v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 735 N.W.2d 621, 624 (Iowa
2007). “If the party alleging contempt can show a violation of a court order, the
burden shifts to the alleged contemnor to produce evidence suggesting the
violation was not willful.” Id. There are at least two ways a contemnor may show
that a failure to comply was not willful: (1) by showing that the order was
indefinite on the issue; or (2) by showing that the contemnor was unable to
perform the act ordered. See Christensen v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 578 N.W.2d 675, 678
(Iowa 1998). “However, the person alleging contempt retains the burden of proof
to establish willfulness beyond a reasonable doubt because of the quasi-criminal
nature of the proceeding.” Ary, 735 N.W.2d at 624. “[A] finding of disobedience
pursued ‘willfully’ requires evidence of conduct that is intentional and deliberate
with a bad or evil purpose, or wanton and in disregard of the rights of others, or
contrary to a known duty, or unauthorized, coupled with an unconcern whether
the contemnor had the right or not.” Id.
Ronald failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Jennifer willfully
disobeyed the decree in the particulars alleged in the application for contempt
citation. Jennifer cooperated with the auctioneer “in all ways” to obtain the
highest bid. There was “no credible evidence” she discouraged bidders, refused
to show the home, or impeded the auction in any way. The decree gave Jennifer
the authority to arrange “reasonable terms of sale.” Jennifer had legitimate
expenses that had to be paid from the proceeds of the sale, including satisfaction
of the note and mortgage, payment of taxes on the property, and transactional
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costs of the sale. The decree was indefinite with respect to Jennifer and
Ronald’s obligations in the event the property could not be sold for value
sufficient to satisfy the encumbrances on the property and the transactional costs
incurred in the sale. See Christensen, 578 N.W.2d at 678. Given the
indefiniteness of the decree and the inability of Jennifer to sell the property for
more than the associated expenses, the district court interpreted the decree to
allow Jennifer to set a reasonable reserve price and not to require her to continue
to market the property once the auction established there was no net equity to
distribute to Ronald:
The purpose of the Court's provisions in the Decree regarding the
disposition of the real estate is thus fulfilled to the extent possible.
No further legitimate purpose is served by requiring Respondent to
arrange for additional auction(s), when such arrangements are time
consuming, expensive, and cannot be expected to produce any
appreciable home equity to be divided between the parties.
The Court concludes that Respondent is not in contempt of
court for failing to sell the subject real estate at public auction, and
that she has no obligation under the Decree to make further
attempts at sale. Contrary to Petitioner's assertion, the Court's
conclusion does not represent a "windfall" for Respondent or an
"injustice" to Petitioner. Petitioner has presented no credible
evidence that there is any equity in the real estate which could be
of benefit to him.
On this record, we cannot conclude the district court grossly abused its
discretion in denying Ronald’s application for contempt/rule to show cause. See
In re Marriage of Anderson, 451 N.W.2d 187, 191 (Iowa Ct. App. 1989) (“The
failure to adhere to an unclear or ambiguous decree may defeat a finding of
contempt.”); In re Marriage of Patzner, No. 08-1648, 2009 WL 3775133, at *2
(Iowa Ct. App. Nov. 12, 2009) (affirming denial of rule to show cause where
former husband’s “actions were contrary to the decree” but were motivated to
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avoid greater economic harm to the parties). To the contrary, the district court’s
findings are supported by the evidence and its conclusions are well reasoned.
Jennifer requests an award of appellate attorney fees. We decline to
award appellate attorney fees.
AFFIRMED.