Richard Alan Debates, Applicant-Appellant v. State of Iowa ( 2016 )


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  •                      IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
    No. 15-1491
    Filed December 21, 2016
    RICHARD ALAN DEBATES,
    Applicant-Appellant,
    vs.
    STATE OF IOWA,
    Respondent-Appellee.
    ________________________________________________________________
    Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, Nancy S. Tabor,
    Judge.
    An applicant appeals the dismissal of his application for postconviction
    relief. AFFIRMED.
    Eric D. Tindal of Nidey Erdahl Tindal & Fisher PLC, Williamsburg, for
    appellant.
    Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Sharon K. Hall, Assistant
    Attorney General, for appellee State.
    Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Vaitheswaran and McDonald, JJ. Tabor,
    J., takes no part.
    2
    VOGEL, Presiding Judge.
    Richard     Debates    appeals     the   dismissal     of   his   application    for
    postconviction relief, asserting the statute of limitations should not have applied
    based on newly discovered evidence that his counsel was ineffective. Because
    we find Debates could have raised his claim within the statutory time frame, we
    affirm.
    I.       Background Facts and Proceedings
    In May 2007, Debates pled guilty to sexual abuse in the third degree, in
    violation of Iowa Code section 709.4 (2005).              Due to an error in his original
    sentencing order, Debates was resentenced on October 4, 2007. Debates did
    not file a direct appeal to his conviction. In March 2011, Debates filed a pro se
    application for postconviction relief, which claimed his counsel was ineffective.
    Specifically, Debates stated that he believed his attorney forged documents that
    were submitted to the court. The application then sat unpursued until July 2015,
    when Debates filed another pro se application for postconviction relief, asserting
    the same grounds.1 An attorney was then appointed to represent Debates. The
    State filed a motion to dismiss Debates’s application based on the applicable
    three-year statute of limitations contained in Iowa Code section 822.2 (2011).
    Debates claimed the limitations period did not apply because his application was
    based on a ground of fact that could not have been raised during the limitations
    period.        On August 7, 2015, the district court issued a ruling that found the
    grounds for Debates’s application could have been discovered through due
    1
    This pro se application is dated March 3, 2009; however, it was not filed until July 2015.
    3
    diligence prior to the expiration of the limitations period and granted the State’s
    motion to dismiss. Debates appeals.
    II.    Standard of Review
    Generally, we review decisions regarding applications for postconviction
    relief for errors at law. Ledezma v. State, 
    626 N.W.2d 134
    , 141 (Iowa 2001).
    This standard applies when we review a statute-of-limitations defense to
    postconviction actions.    Harrington v. State, 
    659 N.W.2d 509
    , 519–20 (Iowa
    2003). “However, when the applicant asserts claims of a constitutional nature,
    our review is de novo.” Ledezma, 
    626 N.W.2d at 141
    .
    III.   Statute of Limitations
    Debates asserts the three-year statute of limitations did not apply to his
    application because it was based on a ground of fact that could not have been
    raised within the limitations period. Specifically, Debates claims he suspects his
    attorney forged documents submitted to the court and that he could not have
    discovered the alleged forgery within the limitations period. The State counters
    that any forgery committed by Debates’s attorney could have been discovered
    within the limitations period.
    Iowa Code section 822.3 provides:
    All other applications must be filed within three years from the date
    the conviction or decision is final or, in the event of an appeal, from
    the date the writ of procedendo is issued. However, this limitation
    does not apply to a ground of fact or law that could not have been
    raised within the applicable time period.
    While section 822.3 does provide a potential exception to the statute of
    limitations, the exception does not apply if the grounds for relief asserted could
    have been raised within the three year time period. 
    Iowa Code § 822.3
    ; see
    
    4 Harrington, 659
     N.W.2d at 521. Therefore, the ground-of-fact exception does not
    apply if the applicant was aware of the fact prior to the expiration of the three-
    year limitations period. See 
    id.
    Debates does not identify what documents were allegedly forged, but the
    district court identified three documents bearing Debates’s signature in the court
    file: (1) the written arraignment, (2) the pretrial conference statement, and (3) the
    plea agreement. The district court then found that Debates’s signature on the
    written arraignment was notarized by someone other than his attorney, that
    Debates was likely present at the pretrial conference, and that he was definitely
    present at the taking of the guilty plea.
    Upon our review of the record, we agree with the district court that
    Debates could have discovered “any ground of fact” relating to his attorney’s
    alleged forgery within three years of his conviction. Any purported forgery should
    have been immediately apparent to Debates at his pretrial conference, plea
    hearing, or sentencing.      These proceedings provided Debates with ample
    opportunity to review his file and raise any concerns to the court.         Further,
    Debates could have discovered any forgery issue upon a cursory review of his
    file, which could have occurred at any time following his plea and sentencing.
    Finally, as the district court noted, concerns about Debates’s attorney’s actions in
    forging documents surfaced in 2008 and became public in 2009. Debates could
    have discovered this information through a variety of sources and been alerted to
    a potential problem with his case. Despite these opportunities to exercise due
    diligence and potentially discover the evidence on which Debates basis his claim,
    5
    he did not file his application for postconviction relief until more than three years
    after his conviction became final.
    IV.        Conclusion
    Because Debates based his application on a ground of fact that could
    have been raised within the limitations period for postconviction actions, his
    application was barred and was correctly dismissed. We therefore affirm the
    district court.
    AFFIRMED.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 15-1491

Filed Date: 12/21/2016

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 12/21/2016