In the Interest of T.J., Minor Child, W.Z., Father ( 2016 )


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  •                        IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
    No. 16-1691
    Filed December 21, 2016
    IN THE INTEREST OF T.J.,
    Minor child,
    W.Z., Father,
    Appellant.
    ________________________________________________________________
    Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Susan C. Cox, District
    Associate Judge.
    Father appeals from an order terminating his parental rights pursuant to
    Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(b), (e), and (f) (2015). AFFIRMED.
    Cole J. Mayer of Masterson & Bottenberg, LLP, Waukee, for appellant
    father.
    Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Janet L. Hoffman, Assistant
    Attorney General, for appellee State.
    Congarry D. Williams of Juvenile Public Defender Office, Des Moines
    guardian ad litem for minor child.
    Considered by Danilson, C.J., and Doyle and McDonald, JJ.
    2
    MCDONALD, Judge.
    William appeals from an order terminating his parental rights in his child
    pursuant to Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(b), (e), and (f) (2015). The elements
    of the State’s case and the standard of review applied to the juvenile court’s
    order are both well-established and need not be repeated herein. See In re
    M.W., 
    876 N.W.2d 212
    , 219–20 (Iowa 2016) (stating review is de novo and
    setting forth the applicable “three-step analysis”); In re A.M., 
    843 N.W.2d 100
    ,
    110–11 (Iowa 2014) (same); In re M.S., No. 16-0975, 
    2016 WL 6269904
    , at *2
    (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 26, 2016) (setting forth the elements of the State’s case and
    the burden of production and persuasion).
    We first address whether the State has proved by clear and convincing
    evidence the statutory grounds authorizing the termination of William’s parental
    rights.    See 
    M.W., 876 N.W.2d at 219
    –20; M.S., 
    2016 WL 6269904
    , at *2.
    Where, as here, “the juvenile court terminates parental rights on more than one
    statutory ground, we may affirm the juvenile court’s order on any ground we find
    supported by the record.” In re A.B., 
    815 N.W.2d 764
    , 774 (Iowa 2012). We turn
    our attention to section 232.116(1)(e). As relevant here, the State was required
    to prove the father had “not maintained significant and meaningful contact with
    the child during the previous six consecutive months.”                   Iowa Code
    § 232.116(1)(e)(3). “Significant and meaningful contact”:
    [I]ncludes but is not limited to the affirmative assumption by the
    parents of the duties encompassed by the role of being a parent.
    This affirmative duty, in addition to financial obligations, requires
    continued interest in the child, a genuine effort to complete the
    responsibilities prescribed in the case permanency plan, a genuine
    effort to maintain communication with the child, and requires that
    3
    the parents establish and maintain a place of importance in the
    child’s life.
    Iowa Code § 232.116(e)(3).
    We conclude the State proved by clear and convincing evidence this
    statutory ground authorizing the termination of William’s parental rights. T.J., the
    child at issue, was born in 2004. The father had one contact with the child in
    2009, when she was about five years old. The father was otherwise wholly
    absent from her life until the initiation of child-in-need-of-assistance proceedings
    in 2014. At that time, the child and her maternal half-siblings were removed from
    the care of the mother and placed with their maternal grandfather. The father
    commenced visitation with the child upon the commencement of the assistance
    proceedings. In March 2015, the child and her half-siblings were placed with the
    father and his wife after it was reported the grandfather had sexually abused T.J.
    The placement proved short-lived. The children were removed from the father’s
    care and ultimately placed in foster care after the father was arrested for
    assaulting his wife and his wife’s adult daughter. T.J. was present during the
    assault, in which, it was alleged, the father head-butted his wife and slapped his
    wife and her adult daughter across the face. The father remained in jail until
    approximately September 2015, when he pleaded guilty to domestic abuse
    assault, second offense. Upon his release, the father failed to remain in regular
    contact with the department of human services and failed to comply with the case
    plan. The father did not exercise any visitation with the child between the day of
    his arrest—in August 2015—and the day the juvenile court terminated his
    parental rights—in September 2016. It was thus undisputed the father had not
    4
    had contact with the child for more than six months prior to the termination of his
    parental rights and had not assumed the responsibilities of parenting the child,
    including the expression of         interest in the child.        See Iowa Code
    § 232.116(1)(e)(3); In re L.A., No. 14-1312, 
    2014 WL 5478227
    , at *2 (Iowa Ct.
    App. Oct. 29, 2014) (affirming termination where the mother had minimal contact
    with the child and failed to remain in contact with the department of human
    services).
    William claims responsibility for his lack of visitation with T.J. from the time
    of his release from jail until the time of the termination hearing lies with the
    department of human services. Specifically, William contends the department
    failed to make reasonable efforts to contact him and facilitate visitation with the
    child. As part of its ultimate proof, the State must establish it made reasonable
    efforts to return the child to the child’s home. See Iowa Code § 232.102(7)
    (providing department of human services must make “every reasonable effort to
    return the child to the child’s home as quickly as possible consistent with the best
    interests of the child”); In re C.B., 
    611 N.W.2d 489
    , 493 (Iowa 2000). “[T]he
    reasonable efforts requirement is not viewed as a strict substantive requirement
    of termination. Instead, the scope of the efforts by the [department of human
    services] to reunify parent and child after removal impacts the burden of proving
    those elements of termination which require reunification efforts.”         
    C.B., 611 N.W.2d at 493
    . The nature of the reasonable-efforts mandate is determined by
    the circumstances of each case.         See 
    id. (discussing scope
    of mandate).
    However, “[r]easonable efforts often include visitation.” In re D.M., No. 15-0228,
    
    2015 WL 4160395
    , at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. July 9, 2015).
    5
    We conclude William’s challenge to the reasonable-efforts requirement
    fails. First, William failed to preserve error on the issue. After the time of his
    release from jail, William failed to request the resumption of visitation with the
    child despite numerous opportunities to do so. See In re C.H., 
    652 N.W.2d 144
    ,
    148 (Iowa 2002) (stating a parent must make such a challenge “at the removal,
    when the case permanency plan is entered, or at later review hearings” and
    voicing complaints to a social worker is not sufficient to preserve error); In re
    S.R., 
    600 N.W.2d 63
    , 65 (Iowa Ct. App. 1999) (noting that while the State has an
    obligation to make reasonable efforts to preserve the family, it is a parent’s
    responsibility to demand other, different, or additional services in order to
    preserve error). Second, this is not a case in which the State failed to make
    reasonable efforts to facilitate placement of the child with the father. The record
    reflects the department of human services extended numerous services to the
    family, including substance abuse treatment and therapy services. The father
    knew how to contact the department and his case worker when he wanted to do
    so; he frequently did so at the outset of the case. After being released from jail,
    the father simply failed to avail himself of any further services to try and reunite
    with his daughter. The State satisfied the reasonable efforts requirement. See,
    e.g., In re B.G., No. 15-0732, 
    2015 WL 5996936
    , at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 14,
    2015) (holding the State established reasonable efforts where services were
    provided but the mother did not avail herself of the services); In re B.B., No. 12-
    0807, 
    2012 WL 2408714
    , at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. June 27, 2012) (“Considering the
    number and variety of services offered or provided, the delays in or failure of
    services attributable to the mother, the age of the child, and the length of time the
    6
    child has been removed from the mother’s care, we find the State made
    reasonable efforts to reunite the mother with her daughter.”).
    For his next claim of error William contends the State failed to establish
    termination of his parental rights was in the best interest of the child.          We
    disagree. “The legislature has categorically determined ‘the needs of a child are
    promoted by termination of parental rights’ if the grounds for termination of
    parental rights exist.” In re L.M.F., 
    490 N.W.2d 66
    , 68 (Iowa 1992) (citation
    omitted). However, there is no all-encompassing best-interest standard that can
    resolve any particular case.     The court must look at the particular facts and
    circumstances of each case. See Iowa Code § 232.116(2) (identifying relevant
    considerations); In re J.E., 
    723 N.W.2d 793
    , 798 (Iowa 2006) (stating the court
    must look to immediate and long-term interests). Here, the father was absent for
    the first ten years of this child’s life. The record reflects he has unaddressed
    mental-health conditions, including bipolar disorder and schizophrenia.            His
    housing and employment situations were unstable. He has a long history of
    violent criminal conduct. He assaulted his wife and her daughter in front of the
    child. Finally, we note the father has eleven children from different mothers.
    None of the eleven children reside with the father.            He has little, if any,
    relationship with any of therm. It is self-evident the father lacks the capacity and
    desire to parent any of his children, including the child at issue in this case.
    William next contends the juvenile court should not have terminated his
    parental rights due to the closeness of the parent-child bond.                 Section
    232.116(3)(c) provides the court may avoid termination if “there is clear and
    convincing evidence that the termination would be detrimental to the child at the
    7
    time due to the closeness of the parent-child relationship.” Our consideration is
    not merely whether there is a parent-child bond, “our consideration must center
    on whether the child will be disadvantaged by termination, and whether the
    disadvantage overcomes” the parent’s inability to provide for the children's
    developing needs. In re D.W., 
    791 N.W.2d 703
    , 709 (Iowa 2010); see also Iowa
    Code § 232.116(2) (setting forth the factors in determining the child’s best
    interests). There is no evidence of any bond between William and T.J. He saw
    her on one occasion during the first ten years of her life. After commencing
    visitation with and care of the child, the father quickly absented himself from her
    life again upon being incarcerated for beating his wife and her adult daughter in
    front of the child. After being released from jail, William made no effort to resume
    visitation with the child or even contact the child. The child is now thriving in the
    care of her foster family. She has no desire to reunite with the father. Under the
    circumstances, we decline to preserve the parent-child relationship.
    Finally, William contends the juvenile court erred in finding the child could
    not be returned to his care if granted an additional six months’ time. To defer
    permanency for six months, the juvenile court must “enumerate the specific
    factors, conditions, or expected behavioral changes which comprise the basis for
    the determination that the need for removal of the child[ren] from the child[ren]’s
    home will no longer exist at the end of the additional six-month period.” Iowa
    Code § 232.104(2)(b). We conclude the district court did not err in denying the
    father’s request for more time. Although past conduct is not determinative of
    future conduct, it is probative. See In re K.F., No. 14-0892, 
    2014 WL 4635463
    , at
    *4 (Iowa Ct. App. Sept. 17, 2014) (“What’s past is prologue.”); see also A.B., 
    815 8 N.W.2d at 778
    (noting a parent’s past conduct is instructive in determining future
    behavior); In re C.K., 
    558 N.W.2d 170
    , 172 (Iowa 1997) (concluding we must
    look to a parent’s past behavior as indicative of the quality of care the parent is
    capable of providing in the future).         As noted above, the father has a
    demonstrated history of not being involved in this child’s life or his other
    children’s lives.   He has unaddressed mental-health and substance-abuse
    conditions. He has extensive, violent criminal history. These conditions and this
    conduct have existed for decades. The father refused to avail himself of services
    provided in this case to address these issues. For example, the father did not
    complete a dual diagnosis program.       He refused to attend substance abuse
    classes. There is no reason to believe these issues would be addressed if the
    father were given an additional six months’ time.
    “It is well-settled law that we cannot deprive a child of permanency after
    the State has proved a ground for termination under section 232.116(1) by
    hoping someday a parent will learn to be a parent and be able to provide a stable
    home for the child.” In re P.L., 
    778 N.W.2d 33
    , 41 (Iowa 2010). “It is simply not in
    the best interests of children to continue to keep them in temporary foster homes
    while the natural parents get their lives together.” 
    A.B., 815 N.W.2d at 778
    .
    AFFIRMED.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 16-1691

Filed Date: 12/21/2016

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/17/2021