In the Interest of T.M., Minor Child, E.H., Mother, M.M., Father ( 2016 )


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  •                     IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
    No. 16-1609
    Filed December 21, 2016
    IN THE INTEREST OF T.M.,
    Minor child,
    E.H., Mother,
    Appellant,
    M.M., Father,
    Appellant.
    ________________________________________________________________
    Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Pottawattamie County, Charles D.
    Fagan, District Associate Judge.
    A mother and a father separately appeal termination of their parental
    rights to their child. AFFIRMED ON BOTH APPEALS.
    Roberta J. Megel, State Public Defender, Council Bluffs, for appellant
    mother.
    Scott D. Strait, Council Bluffs, for appellant father.
    Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Kathrine S. Miller-Todd, Assistant
    Attorney General, for appellee State.
    Phil Caniglia, Council Bluffs, guardian ad litem for minor child.
    Considered by Danilson, C.J., and Doyle and McDonald, JJ.
    2
    DOYLE, Judge.
    The mother and the father separately appeal the termination of their
    parental rights to their child, T.M.   They claim the State failed to prove the
    statutory grounds for termination, and termination is not in the child’s best
    interests because of their bonds with the child.
    We review termination-of-parental-rights proceedings de novo. See In re
    A.M., 
    843 N.W.2d 100
    , 110 (Iowa 2014). The three-step statutory framework
    governing the termination of parental rights is well established and need not be
    repeated here. See In re P.L., 
    778 N.W.2d 33
    , 40-41 (Iowa 2010).
    The child was born in 2012. The family came to the attention of the Iowa
    Department of Human Services (DHS) in May 2015 after the DHS received a
    report indicating that the father was using methamphetamine while caring for the
    child, and both parents were reported to be homeless. The child was removed
    from the parents’ custody and placed with the paternal grandparents, where the
    child has resided ever since.
    By the time of the September 2016 termination-of-parental-rights hearing,
    the parents were living in an efficiency apartment and the mother was employed
    at a McDonald’s restaurant. In its order terminating parental rights, the juvenile
    court found:
    The family has been ordered to do various services, and the
    parents have not complied with the services offered. The [child in
    need of assistance (CINA)] case for this child has proceeded for an
    extended period of time considering [the child’s] young age with
    little improvement towards reunification between the child and the
    family. The child has been out of the parents’ care for sixteen of
    the last twenty-two months. [Since birth, the child] has waited for
    the parents to engage in services. This child needs and deserves
    permanency . . . .
    3
    At the time of the termination-of-parental-rights hearing the
    father . . . argues to the court that the efficiency apartment that they
    have is adequate and the child can be returned to the home. The
    apartment, which had a bed bug infestation, now has little if any
    furniture and no beds. The family repeatedly indicated they would
    be moving into a large residence but have not done so, which they
    now blame as a failure by the DHS. [The father] also blames the
    DHS for his failure to follow through with his drug screens,
    substance abuse and mental health evaluations. [The father] failed
    to complete any drug testing, not even offering a reason why he
    failed to give the requested sample. He denies drug use but
    continually fails to sign releases or provide the court any proof to
    take this issue off the table. He is unemployed and would be
    homeless but for the job [the mother] has managed to hold during
    their involvement with the court and the DHS. [The father] refuses
    to discuss any issues regarding his incarceration for a probation
    violation or any other topic that he deems is irrelevant.
    [The mother] also argues to the court that the efficiency
    apartment that they have is adequate and the child can be returned
    to the home. [The mother] has failed to complete any drug testing.
    She flat out states that she does not have a drug problem and has
    made a decision not to provide any drug screens or follow through
    with any recommendations of her substance abuse evaluation.
    She started therapy but was discharged for lack of compliance. If
    she is not using she still fails to recognize the danger [the father]
    presents when allowed to care for this child as it is almost certain
    that he is still an active user. She has not followed through with the
    recommendations of her psychological evaluation arguing they
    were suggestions only and that she could choose to do them or not.
    She does all of this knowing that to provide even a modicum of
    proof and compliance would likely have resulted in the DHS and the
    court continuing the efforts towards reunification with her.
    Both parents have missed over half of the visits scheduled
    with their child and the visits they made often ended early. [The
    mother] initially said [the father] was using drugs and then later
    recanted.       [The mother] admitted to domestic violence and
    controlling behavior by [the father] and again recanted. If [the
    father] did any evaluations he refused to sign any releases and
    then blamed the DHS for not having them. Time and time again
    [the father] has been caught in lie after lie to the court and the DHS.
    Both parents have attempted to obfuscate, delay and run out
    the clock on this case in the irrational belief or hope that they would
    gain custody of [the child] by default. The court offered services to
    both parents during the entirety of the CINA case. Both parents
    have failed to participate in services to correct the conditions which
    led to the removal of the child and have been outright indifferent to
    the court and DHS recommendations.
    4
    [The DHS] offered, or the court ordered, the following
    services to assist the family with reunification: chemical
    dependency evaluations and treatment, random drug screens,
    mental health evaluations and treatment, psychological evaluations,
    family, safety, risk and permanency services, relative care, family
    team meetings, visitations, and social work/case management.
    The parents have had sixteen months since the child was
    removed to establish themselves as trustworthy, stable, and
    capable of caring for their child. They have failed to do so, despite
    the repeated offer and receipt of many services. There is no reason
    to keep the child from having a secure, adoptive relationship with
    parents who are able to meet these minimum requirements.
    To return the child to the parents’ custody would subject [the
    child] to adjudicatory harms of abuse or neglect. The same
    problems that precipitated the child’s removal from the parents’
    care—untreated chemical dependency, untreated mental health
    problems, lack of appropriate housing and employment, minimal
    compliance, criminal activity, incarceration, and lack of verification
    or commitment—exist after over sixteen months of services. The
    parents have shown that they are not prepared to care for their
    child. There was no evidence that giving them additional time to
    address their problems would be fruitful in the near future. There is
    no bond between this child and the parents that would warrant the
    court allowing for more time to reunify.
    Reasonable, but unsuccessful, efforts were made to reunify
    the child with the parents. The child cannot be returned to either
    parent as of today’s hearing nor in the foreseeable future.
    The court terminated the mother’s and the father’s parental rights pursuant
    to Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(e), (f), (i), and (l) (2015), and concluded
    termination of parental rights was in the best interest of the child. When the
    juvenile court terminates parental rights on more than one ground, we may affirm
    the order on any ground we find supported by clear and convincing evidence in
    the record. See In re D.W., 
    791 N.W.2d 703
    , 707 (Iowa 2010). We choose to
    address the ground for termination under section 232.116(1)(f).
    To terminate parental rights under section 232.116(1)(f), the State must
    show the child is four years of age or older, has been adjudicated a CINA, has
    been removed from the home for a requisite period of time, and the juvenile court
    5
    could not return the child to the parent’s custody at the present time pursuant to
    section 232.102. See Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(f). T.M. is of the requisite age,
    has been adjudicated CINA, and has been removed from the parents’ home for
    at least twelve of the last eighteen months.       At issue is whether the State
    presented clear and convincing evidence T.M. could not be returned to the
    parents’ care pursuant to section 232.102. See 
    id. § 232.116(1)(f)(4).
    We agree with the juvenile court that the father’s unresolved substance-
    abuse issues place the child at risk for the adjudicatory harms of abuse or
    neglect. The record contains clear and convincing evidence that T.M. cannot be
    safely returned to the father’s care at the present time. Throughout this case, the
    mother has chosen to maintain her relationship with the father, and they were
    living together at the time of the termination hearing. She believed the father
    could care for the child while she was working. She has put her own interests
    ahead of the safety of the child. We agree with the juvenile court’s finding that if
    the mother is not using illicit drugs, “she still fails to recognize the danger [the
    father] presents when allowed to care for this child as it is most certain that he is
    still an active user.” The record contains clear and convincing evidence that T.M.
    cannot be safely returned to the mother’s care at the present time.
    The parents also argue that termination is not in the best interests of the
    child due to the bond between the child and the parents.          While the record
    discloses a bond between the child and the parents, the record indicates
    termination is in the child’s best interests. The child is in need of a permanent
    placement and parents who can provide for the child’s health, safety, and welfare
    6
    as the child grows to adulthood. These parents have not demonstrated an ability
    to provide that.
    The father argues the State failed to provide sufficient evidence necessary
    to establish the DHS provided reasonable reunification efforts.            See 
    id. § 232.102(7)
    (stating the DHS “shall make every reasonable effort to return the
    child to the child’s home as quickly as possible consistent with the best interests
    of the child.”). The father did not preserve error for appeal on this issue. When a
    parent alleging inadequate services fails to demand services other than those
    provided, the issue of whether services were adequate is not preserved for
    review. See In re C.H., 
    652 N.W.2d 144
    , 148 (Iowa 2002). He made no demand
    for services prior to the termination of parental rights hearing.     Furthermore,
    when a parent alleges inadequate services, the parent should specify which
    services should have been provided and what effect receipt of those services
    would have had on the proceedings. Cf. Dunbar v. State, 
    515 N.W.2d 12
    , 15
    (Iowa 1994) (noting a defendant claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must
    state specific ways in which counsel’s performance was inadequate and identify
    how competent representation probably would have changed the outcome). The
    father has not specified which services should have been provided.              His
    argument is too general to address. Cf. 
    id. (finding claim
    of ineffective assistance
    of counsel too general to address where defendant did not explain how
    competent representation would have changed the result).          In any event, a
    plethora of services were offered to the father. He simply chose to not participate
    in such services. We reject his argument.
    7
    The father also argues the juvenile court erroneously admitted “numerous”
    exhibits, but he does not specify which exhibits he refers to.            The father’s
    attorney had no objection to the juvenile court taking judicial notice of the CINA
    court file,1 but claimed “numerous” objections were made to the exhibits
    contained in that file, and he renewed those objections at the termination of
    parental rights hearing. As to the CINA exhibits, the father’s claim is barred by
    res judicata. See In re J.D.B., 
    584 N.W.2d 577
    , 582 (Iowa Ct. App. 1998). The
    father also objected to two of the State’s exhibits offered at the termination of
    parental rights hearing: exhibit 2, a list of offered/attended visits, and exhibit 3, an
    August 26, 2016 DHS report to the court.           The father objected on hearsay,
    foundation, and reliability grounds. Reports and other writings by the DHS are
    admissible in termination-of-parental-rights proceedings, notwithstanding hearsay
    contained within them. See In re N.N., 
    692 N.W.2d 51
    , 54 (Iowa Ct. App. 2004).
    We conclude the court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the exhibits.
    After reviewing all the evidence, we agree with the juvenile court that the
    State proved by clear and convincing evidence that grounds for termination exist
    under section 232.116(1)(f) and termination of the parents’ parental rights is in
    the child’s best interests.     Accordingly, we affirm the juvenile court’s order
    terminating both the mother’s and the father’s parental rights.
    AFFIRMED ON BOTH APPEALS.
    1
    The juvenile court is authorized to judicially notice the pleadings and exhibits from
    previous CINA proceedings. See In re T.C., 
    492 N.W.2d 425
    , 429 (Iowa 1992).
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 16-1609

Filed Date: 12/21/2016

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/17/2021