Michael Haut v. Terry J. Frazer ( 2014 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 14-0537
Filed November 26, 2014
MICHAEL HAUT,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
TERRY J. FRAZER,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, Mark J. Smith,
Judge.
Michael Haut appeals from the district court’s summary judgment ruling in
favor of Terry Frazer, concluding Haut’s common law contribution claim was
abrogated by Iowa Code section 668.5 (2011). AFFIRMED.
Rand S. Wonio of Lane & Waterman L.L.P., Davenport, for appellant.
Clark I. Mitchell of Grefe & Sidney, P.L.C., Des Moines, and Jeffrey D.
Bert of Brooks Law Firm, P.C., Rock Island, Illinois, for appellee.
Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Vaitheswaran and Potterfield, JJ.
2
POTTERFIELD, J.
Michael Haut appeals from the district court’s summary judgment ruling in
favor of Terry Frazer, concluding Haut’s common law contribution claim was
abrogated by Iowa Code section 668.5 (2011).
On April 20, 2011, Pamela Poll was working at Terry Frazer’s RV Center,
Inc., of which Frazer was the president and Haut was the sales manager. Poll
was injured when Haut allowed his dog to play with Frazer’s dog in the
showroom—the dogs ran into Poll, who fell and broke her leg. Poll filed a
workers’ compensation claim and was awarded benefits.
Poll then filed a personal injury action against Haut. Frazer was not a
party to this action. Haut’s attempt to establish immunity from suit under workers’
compensation provisions was unsuccessful. Thereafter, Haut entered into a
settlement agreement with Poll, which did not extinguish or remove any liability of
Frazer.
Haut filed this action for contribution against Frazer, alleging Frazer was
negligent in permitting the dogs to play on the premises. Frazer filed a motion for
summary judgment, asserting Haut was not entitled to contribution because Haut
had failed to discharge the liability of Frazer, or in the alternative, there is no
common liability to Poll. Haut resisted, claiming his common law right to
contribution was unaffected by the comparative fault act. The district court
rejected that claim, as do we.
“Contribution is an equitable remedy requiring joint tortfeasors liable to an
injured third party to share the burden of damages.” Schreier v. Sonderleiter,
420 N.W.2d 821, 823 (Iowa 1988). “Iowa first recognized the cause of action,
3
premised on common liability for nonintentional acts, in Best v. Yerkes, 77
N.W.2d 23, 29 (1956). The remedy is now codified in Iowa’s comparative fault
act.” Id. (emphasis added); see also Allied Mutual Ins. Co. v. State, 473 N.W.2d
24, 27 (Iowa 1991) (“It is not our role to alter this legislative determination of the
grounds for a contribution claim.”).
Iowa Code section 668.5 provides in pertinent part:
1. A right of contribution exists between or among two or
more persons who are liable upon the same indivisible claim for the
same injury, death, or harm, whether or not judgment has been
recovered against all or any of them. It may be enforced either in
the original action or by a separate action brought for that purpose.
The basis for contribution is each person’s equitable share of the
obligations, including the share of fault of a claimant, as determined
in accordance with section 668.3.
2. Contribution is available to a person who enters into a
settlement with the claimant only if the liability of the person against
whom contribution is sought has been extinguished and only to the
extent that the amount paid in settlement was reasonable.
(Emphasis added.)
Our supreme court has addressed the plain language of the provision:
Our comparative fault statutes provide guidelines for
contribution between tortfeasors. Contribution is permitted between
two persons who are liable upon the same indivisible claim for the
same harm. Iowa Code § 668.5(1). The right of contribution is
available to a person who settles with a claimant “only if the liability
of the person against whom contribution is sought has been
extinguished and only to the extent that the amount paid in
settlement was reasonable.” Id. § 668.5(2). Percentages of fault
may be established by a separate action. Id. § 668.6(2). If
contribution is sought in a case where judgment has not been
rendered, it is enforceable upon the condition that “the person
bringing the action for contribution must have discharged the
liability of the person from whom contribution is sought by payment
made within the period of the statute of limitations applicable to the
claimant’s right of action . . . .” Id. § 668.6(3).
In applying these statutes, it is clear that the plaintiff seeking
contribution must establish that the defendant’s liability to the
injured parties has been discharged.
4
Aid Ins. Co. v. Davis Cnty., 426 N.W.2d 631, 632 (Iowa 1988) (emphasis added).
The summary judgment record clearly establishes that Haut contends
Frazer has liability as a joint tortfeasor. Because Haut seeks contribution he
“must establish that [Frazer’s] liability to [Poll] has been discharged.” See id.Haut has not established that Frazer’s liability to Poll has been discharged or
extinguished by Haut’s settlement with Poll, and Haut’s attempts to evade the
statutory provision are unavailing. The district court did not err in granting
summary judgment to Frazer because Haut was not entitled to contribution.
AFFIRMED.