In the Interest of K.C., Minor Child ( 2018 )


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  •                     IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
    No. 18-0025
    Filed September 12, 2018
    IN THE INTEREST OF K.C.,
    Minor Child,
    K.C., Minor Child,
    Appellant.
    ________________________________________________________________
    Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, Mark R. Fowler and
    Cheryl E. Traum, District Associate Judges.
    K.C. appeals from the district court’s adjudication of him as delinquent for
    lascivious acts with a child. AFFIRMED.
    Lauren M. Phelps, Davenport, for appellant.
    Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Mary A. Triick, Assistant Attorney
    General, for appellee State.
    Considered by Danilson, C.J., and Vogel and Tabor, JJ.
    2
    VOGEL, Judge.
    K.C. appeals his adjudication as a delinquent for lascivious acts with a child
    under Iowa Code section 709.8 (2016).         He argues that the district court’s
    determination was not supported by sufficient evidence because the alleged victim,
    A.A., was not a credible witness and K.C. lacked the requisite specific intent. We
    find the district court had sufficient evidence for the adjudication because the
    record support’s A.A.’s credibility and K.C. had the specific intent to commit the
    act.
    I.     Background Facts and Proceedings
    On August 9, 2016, K.C. assisted his brother with babysitting A.A.—then
    age four and one-half—and her brother. A.A.’s mother left the residence around
    nine o’clock at night and returned around midnight. Upon arriving home, A.A.’s
    mother found K.C. and A.A. asleep in the same bed and both were fully clothed.
    A.A.’s mother woke A.A. and took her to the bathroom before returning her to the
    bed.
    The following morning, A.A.’s mother left for work around seven, and then
    A.A.’s father arrived at the residence to pick up A.A. and her brother. At the time,
    A.A.’s father did not ask K.C. why he was in the bed with A.A.; however, he
    questioned A.A.’s mother about the situation later. A.A.’s mother spoke with A.A.,
    who indicated that K.C. had touched her on her “coochie” and her “butt.” A.A.’s
    mother testified that A.A. was very upset and cried while discussing the incident.
    A.A.’s mother and father accompanied her to the hospital for an examination.
    On August 11, 2016, at the examination, A.A. met with a Sexual Assault
    Nurse Examiner (SANE). A.A. told the SANE nurse that K.C. touched both her
    3
    vaginal area and her buttock with the purpose of determining if A.A. had urinated
    in the bed, and that K.C. continued to touch her even after she became upset and
    started to cry. Although doubtful that a “touch DNA” would produce a result, the
    SANE nurse prepared a sexual assault evidence kit for law enforcement to collect
    the next day.
    Law enforcement interviewed K.C. on August 30, 2016.                   K.C. told law
    enforcement that the covers smelled of urine and he decided to check if A.A. had
    urinated in the bed. He initially stated he touched A.A.’s thighs on the outside of
    her clothes. Later in the interview, K.C. admitted to reaching inside A.A.’s clothes
    to touch her in order to see if urination occurred. He also stated that he opened
    the back of her pants and accidentally touched her buttock. Additionally, K.C. told
    law enforcement he has had sexual thoughts about an ex-girlfriend but denied
    having had any sexual thoughts regarding A.A. specifically.
    On September 21, 2016, a petition was filed alleging K.C. committed a
    delinquent act, lascivious acts with a child. At a hearing, held on December 7,
    2017, K.C. was found to be a delinquent child and was adjudicated on the charge
    of lascivious acts with a child. The court ordered K.C. to be placed at the Iowa
    State Training School in Eldora.
    K.C. now appeals his adjudication. He claims the district court erred in
    adjudicating him, asserting A.A. was not a credible witness and he lacked the
    specific intent required as an element of the delinquent act.1
    1
    K.C. asserts that we should find he lacked the ability to form the requisite specific intent,
    based on a pre-hearing physiological evaluation. However, the order finding K.C.
    competent to proceed with the adjudicatory hearing was not appealed and the evaluation
    was not made part of the adjudicatory record.
    4
    II.     Standard of Review
    “We review delinquency proceedings de novo.” In re A.K., 
    825 N.W.2d 46
    ,
    49 (Iowa 2013) (citing In re J.A.L., 
    694 N.W.2d 748
    , 751 (Iowa 2005)). “Although
    we give weight to the factual findings of the juvenile court, especially regarding the
    credibility of witnesses, we are not bound by them.” A.K., 649 N.W.2d at 49 (citing
    In re J.D.F., 
    553 N.W.2d 585
    , 587 (Iowa 1996)). “We presume the child is innocent
    of the charges, and the State has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt
    that the juvenile committed the delinquent acts.” 
    Iowa Code § 232.47
    (10) (2011);
    A.K., 649 N.W.2d at 49. Furthermore, “[w]e review the sufficiency of the evidence
    for juvenile adjudications de novo.” In re D.S., 
    856 N.W.2d 348
    , 351 (Iowa 2014);
    see A.K., 649 N.W.2d at 49.
    III.    Sufficiency of the Evidence
    K.C. contends the district court lacked sufficient evidence to adjudicate him
    delinquent having committed a lascivious act.2 Specifically, he argues that A.A.
    was not a credible witness and that he lacked the requisite specific intent to commit
    the act.
    A. Credibility
    First, K.C. asserts A.A. was not a credible witness. The reasons presented
    include A.A. could not remember K.C.’s nickname and she was unable to say the
    appropriate terminology for her body part that was touched upon initial questioning
    2
    It is unlawful for any person sixteen years of age or older to perform any of
    the following acts with a child with or without the child’s consent unless
    married to each other, for the purpose of arousing or satisfying the sexual
    desires of either of them:
    a. Fondle or touch the pubes or genitals of a child.
    
    Iowa Code § 709.8
    (1)(a).
    5
    at trial. However, the record shows A.A. used a variety of terms across numerous
    occasions to indicate K.C. touched her genitals. A.A. informed both her mother
    and the SANE nurse that K.C. touched her vaginal area as well as her buttock. In
    addition, A.A.’s mother testified that during the conversation with her daughter,
    A.A. was very upset upon disclosing the touching.
    After considering the information, A.A.’s parents took her to the hospital
    where she met with a SANE nurse. During this meeting, A.A. told the SANE nurse
    that K.C. touched both her vaginal area and her buttock for the stated purpose of
    determining if A.A. had urinated in the bed. At the hearing, A.A. testified about the
    incident. During direct examination, A.A. could not recall K.C.’s nickname, but she
    was able to recognize it when told and was able to identify K.C. in the courtroom
    as the person who had touched her. A.A. also had trouble initially recalling the
    word for her body part that was touched, but she was able to indicate the area
    touched on a drawing of a female child.
    Because the district court had a “superior vantage point to make credibility
    determinations due to its ability to consider firsthand the demeanor and
    appearance of the parties,” we give deference to the district court’s findings.
    Neimann v. Butterfield, 
    551 N.W.2d 652
    , 654 (Iowa 1996); see also State v.
    O’Shea, 
    634 N.W.2d 150
    , 156 (Iowa Ct. App. 2001) (“[A] witness’s composure and
    demeanor—things critical to credibility assessments—are beyond our power to
    review.”). The district court found
    the testimony of [A.A.] to be extremely influential. She testified that
    [K.C.] put his hands inside her pants and touched her vagina. She
    even testified that she told him to stop. She testified that she told
    him to stop because it hurt. In addition, during the questioning by the
    6
    police [K.C.] admitted that he placed his hand inside [A.A.’s]
    underwear.
    Although we are not bound by the credibility assessment of the district court, we,
    like the district court, conclude that the record supports A.A.’s credibility.
    B. Specific Intent
    K.C.’s second assertion is that that he did not have the requisite specific
    intent “to arouse or satisfy the sexual desires” of the accused. The district court
    stated:
    The idea that the juvenile was just checking to see if [A.A.] was wet
    does not make sense. If that were the case, he would not need to
    put his hands inside the child’s pants. The court finds that the only
    reason for him to place his hands inside her pants was for his own
    arousal.
    K.C. asserts the district court erred in finding that his purpose for putting his hands
    inside A.A.’s pants was for sexual arousal. K.C. asserts this determination was in
    error because he lacked sexual education and his purpose of checking for urination
    justifies his actions.
    Cases involving lascivious acts typically hold that “intent may be inferred
    from the nature of the act itself and that proof of separate and distinct acts of a
    similar nature is unnecessary.” State v. Kinkade, 
    43 N.W.2d 736
    , 738 (Iowa 1950).
    Moreover, “a specific purpose in mind or intent to commit sexual abuse may be
    similarly inferred from the facts and circumstances surrounding [the] actions.”
    State v. Most, 
    578 N.W.2d 250
    , 254 (Iowa Ct. App. 1998). “Evidence sufficient to
    prove necessary specific intent includes sexual comment, touching in a sexual
    manner, attempt to remove clothing, or an act in any other way which would
    indicate a plan to engage in sexual activity.” 
    Id.
    7
    The detective who interviewed K.C. testified that K.C. initially stated the
    covers on the bed smelled of urine and, for this reason, he touched A.A.’s thighs
    to determine if she had urinated herself. The detective then informed K.C. that
    A.A. claimed K.C. touched her vaginal area and buttock underneath her clothing.
    K.C. admitted he did in fact check under the clothes in the vaginal area to
    determine if urination had occurred. When the detective asked about A.A.’s claim
    that K.C. also touched her buttock, he stated that he opened the back of her pants
    and accidentally touched her buttock. In addition, K.C. informed the detective he
    has had sexual thoughts involving an ex-girlfriend, but he denied having similar
    thoughts about A.A. specifically.
    On our de novo review, we find sufficient evidence to support the
    adjudication. The evidence presented showed K.C. touched A.A. in a sexual
    manner when he put his hands inside her clothes and touched her vaginal area as
    well as her buttock. If K.C. had only touched A.A. for the purpose of checking if
    she had urinated herself, he would have been able to do so by touching the outer
    clothing or even touching the covers that he claimed to smell of urine. Moreover,
    while K.C. did not remove any clothing, he admittedly placed his hand inside A.A.’s
    clothes and opened the back of her pants. This evidence is sufficient to prove K.C.
    had specific intent to commit the delinquent act of lascivious acts with a child. See
    
    id.
    IV.    Conclusion
    We conclude the district court’s adjudication of K.C. for the delinquent act
    of lascivious acts with a child is supported with sufficient evidence.
    AFFIRMED.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 18-0025

Filed Date: 9/12/2018

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/17/2021