State of Iowa v. Untril D. Overstreet ( 2019 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 18-0606
Filed December 18, 2019
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
UNTRIL D. OVERSTREET,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, Henry W. Latham II
Judge.
Untril Overstreet appeals multiple criminal convictions stemming from a
traffic stop. AFFIRMED.
Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender (until withdrawal), and Ashley
Stewart, Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Louis S. Sloven, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee.
Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Potterfield and Mullins, JJ.
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MULLINS, Judge.
Untril Overstreet appeals multiple criminal convictions stemming from a
traffic stop. He raises two arguments on appeal: (1) the district court abused its
discretion in denying his request to continue trial for the purpose of filing a motion
to suppress and (2) his attorneys rendered ineffective assistance in failing to move
for suppression of evidence obtained following the stop on the basis that the stop
was pretextual and therefore in violation of article I, section 8 of the Iowa
Constitution. We address his arguments in turn.
Motions to suppress must be filed within forty days after arraignment. Iowa
R. Crim. P. 2.11(2)(c), (4). The time for filing may be extended for “for good cause
shown.” Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.11(3). “Absent a showing of good cause, an untimely
motion to suppress constitutes waiver of the grounds forming the basis for the
motion.” State v. Eldridge, 590 N.W.2d 734, 736 (Iowa Ct. App. 1999). We review
good-cause determinations and rulings on motions to continue for an abuse of
discretion. State v. Artzer, 609 N.W.2d 526, 529 (Iowa 2000) (motion to continue);
Eldridge, 590 N.W.2d at 736 (good cause). This is our most deferential standard
of review. State v. Roby, 897 N.W.2d 127, 137 (Iowa 2017). “An abuse of
discretion occurs when the trial court exercises its discretion ‘on grounds of for
reasons clearly untenable or to an extent clearly unreasonable.’” State v. Walker,
___ N.W.2d ___, ___, 2019 WL 6222902, at *2 (Iowa 2019) (quoting State v.
Tipton, 897 N.W.2d 653, 690 (Iowa 2017)).
A hearing was held less than a week before trial, at which Overstreet waived
his right to a jury trial and requested a bench trial. At the hearing, Overstreet
demanded his trial date remain set—he noted he did not want a jury trial but stated
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he would proceed with the scheduled jury trial if waiver would result in his trial
being delayed. The court assured him trial to the bench would proceed on the day
previously scheduled for jury trial. After the court accepted the jury trial waiver,
defense counsel advised the court she had previously told Overstreet she would
be filing a motion to suppress but she ultimately failed to do so. She added she
would not have time to do so with the looming trial date and repeated Overstreet
did not want his trial continued. The court essentially asked Overstreet if he would
like a continuance so he could have more time to file a motion to suppress.
Overstreet responded “All I’m saying is she should have done it. I’m not answering
no more questions as far as that.” Then, the morning of trial, defense counsel
advised the court Overstreet changed his mind. She requested a continuance of
trial and the scheduling of a suppression hearing. The State resisted, noting the
timelines had expired and defense counsel had been appointed to represent
Overstreet several months before trial. Considering the timelines and having
“review[ed] the case in preparation for trial,” the court denied the motion.
Upon our review, we are unable to conclude the court’s discretionary
decision was clearly unreasonable or based on clearly untenable grounds or
reasons. See id. The court was not provided with a concrete reason for the delay
or any indication of what the basis for the motion to suppress would be. We affirm
the district court’s denial of the motion to continue.
In any event, even if the court had abused its discretion in denying the
motion to continue, Overstreet only argues on appeal that one suppression
argument was meritorious. This brings us to his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel
claim. If it lacks merit, then any abuse of discretion in denying the motion to
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continue was harmless. See State v. Reynolds, 765 N.W.2d 283, 288 (Iowa 2009),
overruled on other grounds by Alcala v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 880 N.W.2d 699, 708 &
n.3 (Iowa 2016).
Overstreet claims his attorneys rendered ineffective assistance in failing to
move for suppression of evidence obtained following the traffic stop on the basis
that the stop was pretextual and therefore in violation of article I, section 8 of the
Iowa Constitution. We review both constitutional issues and claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel de novo. State v. Lilly, 930 N.W.2d 293, 298 (Iowa 2019).
Overstreet “must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that ‘(1) his trial
counsel failed to perform an essential duty, and (2) this failure resulted in
prejudice.’” State v. Lopez, 907 N.W.2d 112, 116 (Iowa 2018) (quoting State v.
Harris, 891 N.W.2d 182, 185 (Iowa 2017)); accord Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 687 (1984). We “may consider either the prejudice prong or breach of
duty first, and failure to find either one will preclude relief.” State v. McNeal, 897
N.W.2d 697, 703 (Iowa 2017) (quoting State v. Lopez, 872 N.W.2d 159, 169 (Iowa
2015)). A failure to register meritless arguments or motions does not amount to
ineffective assistance of counsel. See Lilly, 930 N.W.2d at 390; State v. Tompkins,
859 N.W.2d 631, 637 (Iowa 2015).
Our supreme court recently declined to overrule longstanding precedent
holding that pretextual stops are permissible under the Iowa Constitution. See
State v. Brown, 930 N.W.2d 840, 846–54 (Iowa 2019); see also State v. Haas, 930
N.W.22d 699, 702 (Iowa 2019) (describing the Brown decision to be “consistent
with precedent in Iowa”). Had the argument been raised before the district court,
the court would have been required to follow said precedent, which forecloses
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Overstreet’s argument under the facts of his case. We find counsel was under no
duty to pursue the meritless argument and Overstreet was not prejudiced.
We conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying
Overstreet’s motion to continue and Overstreet’s attorneys were not ineffective as
alleged. We affirm Overstreet’s convictions.
AFFIRMED.