State of Iowa v. Dewayne Patterson ( 2014 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 14-0215
Filed December 24, 2014
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
DEWAYNE PATTERSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Clinton County, Mark R. Lawson,
Judge.
A defendant appeals his conviction following an Alford plea, alleging
ineffective assistance of counsel. AFFIRMED.
Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Shellie L. Knipfer, Assistant
Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Sheryl A. Soich, Assistant Attorney
General, and Michael Wolf, County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Vaitheswaran and Potterfield, JJ.
2
VAITHESWARAN, J.
DeWayne Patterson entered an Alford1 plea to third-degree kidnapping
and other crimes in connection with conduct directed at his girlfriend, Mindi. On
appeal, he contends his attorney was ineffective in failing to challenge the plea
for lack of a factual basis. While we generally preserve ineffective-assistance-of-
counsel claims for postconviction-relief proceedings, our record is adequate to
address the issue. State v. Hallock, 765 N.W.2d 598, 602 (Iowa Ct. App. 2009).
Ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims require proof of a breach of
essential duty and prejudice. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687
(1984). In this context, an attorney breaches an essential duty if the attorney
allows the defendant to enter an Alford plea to an offense for which there is no
factual basis. State v. Schminkey, 597 N.W.2d 785, 788 (Iowa 1999). To
determine whether there is a factual basis, we examine “the entire record before
the district court.” State v. Finney, 834 N.W.2d 46, 62 (Iowa 2013). If the record
does not disclose a factual basis, prejudice is inherent. Schminkey, 597 N.W.2d
at 788.
Had the case gone to trial, the State would have been required to prove
Patterson confined Mindi with the specific intent to inflict serious injury or to
subject her to sexual abuse and with knowledge he lacked consent or authority to
do so. See Iowa Code §§ 710.1(3), 710.4 (2013). The district court was required
to have a factual basis for these elements, albeit, not proof beyond a reasonable
doubt. Finney, 834 N.W.2d at 62.
1
An Alford plea is a variation of a guilty plea where the defendant does not admit
participation in the acts constituting the crime but consents to the imposition of a
sentence. North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37 (1970).
3
Patterson “submits there was no showing that he confined [Mindi] against
her will and with the specific intent to inflict serious injury or to commit sexual
abuse.” To the contrary, the record is replete with evidence of confinement and
intent to inflict both serious injury and sexual abuse.
Mindi spoke to a police officer about her relationship with Patterson and a
summary of the interview is included in the officer’s report attached to the
minutes of testimony. She told him Patterson did not allow her to leave the home
once they started living together.
The most recent series of abusive episodes was triggered by Patterson’s
anger about one of Mindi’s Facebook communications. After learning of the
communication, Patterson awoke Mindi by striking her in the face with closed
fists. He continued to inflict blows and later smashed her cell phone, cutting off
her ability to contact family or 911. See State v. McGrew, 515 N.W.2d 36, 39
(Iowa 1994) (confinement may exist if it “substantially increases the risk of harm
to the victim” or “significantly lessens the risk of detection” (citing State v. Rich,
305 N.W.2d 739, 745 (Iowa 1981))).
The abuse did not end here. Mindi gave police a written statement
describing repeated punches to her head as well as forced sex. She wrote, “I
knew I needed to find a way away from him and get out.” Mindi moved from the
bedroom to the bathroom, only to have Patterson follow her to the bathroom and
“hurr[y]” her back into the bedroom. Later, she told Patterson she intended to go
downstairs to fill a water jug. She hoped he would not follow her and she could
“just run straight out the door of the house . . . and run for help.” Patterson did
follow her and hit and pushed her upstairs. While he watched television, she
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again tried to go downstairs and leave the house. She was intercepted by
Patterson again. She made an excuse for being downstairs, and Patterson
returned to the bedroom.
Mindi took this opportunity to sneak out and go to the neighbor’s house.
The neighbor did not answer the doorbell. See State v. Coen, 382 N.W.2d 703,
713 (Iowa Ct. App. 1985) (finding fact that woman “was adroitly able to abort
Coen’s scheme does not change the nature of the confinement or removal”).
Meanwhile, Mindi heard Patterson exit the back door of the house and
start his car. She darted behind a tree until he left, then returned to the house to
check on her infant son. Patterson came back, thwarting further attempts to
escape with her son. Mindi wrote, “I have no vehicle so couldn’t get very far on
foot with my 9 month old son while trying to be quiet and keep him quiet trying to
get out of the house without waking [Patterson] and having him catch us.”
The next day, Mindi asked Patterson if she could go to the hospital
because she was not feeling well. Patterson gave her permission to go, but
without her son. Mindi wrote, “I couldn’t leave, and wouldn’t leave, without my
son so I stayed at the house and did what he told me.”
That night she called her parents, as she did every night, using
Patterson’s cell phone. She told her father Patterson beat her up and she “was
waiting for the next time he left” to have him come get them. Her father came the
next day of his own volition, but Patterson would not let Mindi answer the door.
She advised the officers he went so far as to hold her down and “put his hand
over her mouth” to prevent her from calling out. See State v. Mott, 759 N.W.2d
140, 150 (Iowa Ct. App. 2008) (finding substantial evidence supported
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kidnapping instruction based on evidence “Mott ordered Floyd to lie still when
people knocked on the door”).
In the afternoon, Mindi convinced Patterson to go to the store for
groceries. While he was gone, she called her father, who came and whisked
mother and child away, just as Patterson returned.
Mindi was sent to a hospital. Professionals diagnosed her with subdural
hematoma or bleeding in the brain.
The record contains a factual basis for confinement with intent to commit
serious injury or sexual abuse. See Iowa Crim. Jury Instructions 1000.5 (stating
a person is “confined” when his or her freedom to move about is substantially
restricted by force, threat, or deception); see also State v. Little, No. 10-1642,
2011 WL 5399202, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. Nov. 9, 2011) (stating jury could have
found confinement based on brutal beating, threats to kill, and removal of means
of communication with the outside world (citing State v. Little, No. 08-1125, 2010
WL 786011 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 10, 2010))); State v. Strongheart, No. 98-2155,
2000 WL 193515, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 26, 2000) (“Strongheart’s
confinement of his wife within their home ensured his horrific treatment of his wife
would not be detected. Finally, the confinement substantially increased the harm
suffered by Becky as every time she attempted to escape she was beaten into
submission. . . . [H]is plea was supported by a factual basis.”). Accordingly,
counsel did not breach an essential duty in allowing Patterson to enter an Alford
plea to third-degree kidnapping.
AFFIRMED.