In the Interest of M.P., Minor Child, L.P., Mother, M.P., Father ( 2017 )


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  •                     IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
    No. 16-1843
    Filed January 25, 2017
    IN THE INTEREST OF M.P.,
    Minor child,
    L.P., Mother,
    Appellant,
    M.P., Father,
    Appellant.
    ________________________________________________________________
    Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Johnson County, Deborah Farmer
    Minot, District Associate Judge.
    A mother and a father separately appeal the termination of their parental
    rights to their child. AFFIRMED ON BOTH APPEALS.
    Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Kathryn K. Lang, Assistant
    Attorney General, for appellant State.
    Shawn C. McCullough of the Law Office of Jeffrey L. Powell, P.L.C.,
    Washington, for appellant mother.
    Christine E. Boyer, Iowa City, for appellant father.
    Anthony A. Haughton of Linn County Advocate, Inc., Cedar Rapids,
    guardian ad litem for minor child.
    Considered by Danilson, C.J., and Doyle and McDonald, JJ.
    2
    DANILSON, Chief Judge.
    The mother and the father separately appeal the termination of their
    parental rights to their child, M.P., born in January 2016.
    The mother and the father of the child at issue here are married. They
    arrived in Iowa by bus in August 2015; the mother was six months pregnant and
    the couple had no money, no housing, and no plan. Both parents are mentally
    low functioning and receive Social Security disability income. The mother has “a
    history of childhood trauma, placement in foster care, delinquent behaviors,
    school problems, and criminal convictions.” She has given birth to ten other
    children (birth dates range from October 1999 to October 2013), none of whom
    are in her care as her parental rights have been terminated. The father has a
    history of mental health diagnoses and criminal charges, did not complete school
    because of learning and behavioral issues, and has no employment history.
    The mother gave birth to M.P. in January 2016. By court order, the child
    was removed from the parents when the child was about one week old due to
    concerns of medical personnel about the child’s low weight and the parents’
    questionable ability to provide adequate care.         Moreover, the parents had
    outstanding criminal warrants for their arrest. The child was adjudicated a child
    in need of assistance (CINA) on March 8 and has remained in foster care since
    removal.
    On October 19, 2016, the juvenile court terminated each parent’s parental
    rights.     In the court’s detailed and well-supported ruling, the juvenile court
    terminated the mother’s parental rights pursuant to Iowa Code section
    232.116(1)(g) and (h) (2016), terminated the father’s pursuant to section
    3
    232.116(1)(h), and concluded termination of parental rights was in the best
    interests of the child.
    On appeal, the mother challenges one of two statutory grounds for
    termination, claims termination is not in the child’s best interests, and argues she
    should have been granted a six-month extension to seek reunification.                    The
    father argues the State did not make reasonable efforts to reunite the parent and
    child, and that a six-month extension with better coordination of services and on-
    going support should have been granted. He also contends termination was
    improper because he did not stipulate that the child was in need of assistance
    under Iowa Code section 232.2(6)(c)(2).
    We review termination-of-parental-rights proceedings de novo. See In re
    A.M., 
    843 N.W.2d 100
    , 110 (Iowa 2014). The three-step statutory framework
    governing the termination of parental rights is well established and need not be
    repeated here. See In re P.L., 
    778 N.W.2d 33
    , 40-41 (Iowa 2010). When the
    juvenile court terminates parental rights on more than one ground, we may affirm
    the order on any ground we find supported by clear and convincing evidence in
    the record. See In re A.B., 
    815 N.W.2d 764
    , 774 (Iowa 2012).
    The mother does not dispute the finding that termination of parental rights
    was proper under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(h).1                The father tangentially
    disputes termination is proper under section 232.116(1)(h), arguing he did not
    stipulate the child was in need of assistance upon removal and additional time
    1
    Section 232.116(1)(h) allows the juvenile court to terminate parental rights if the child is
    three years of age or younger, has been adjudicated CINA, has been removed from the
    physical custody of the child’s parents for at least six of the last twelve months, and
    cannot be returned to the custody of the parents at the present time.
    4
    should have been granted. First, contrary to the statements in the father’s brief, 2
    the only mention of a stipulation in the termination order is that all parties
    stipulated at the dispositional hearing the child should remain in the custody of
    the department of human services.
    In any event, the CINA adjudication became final when the dispositional
    order was entered. We have held that a parent must appeal the dispositional
    order to challenge deficiencies from any of the CINA proceedings to preserve the
    alleged errors for our review. See In re J.D.B., 
    584 N.W.2d 577
    , 581 (Iowa Ct.
    App. 1998) (stating where a mother did not appeal from any of the CINA
    proceedings, the time for appeal had passed and she could not challenge
    deficiencies in the CINA proceedings in the current appeal regarding the
    termination of her parental rights).          The father did not appeal the CINA
    adjudication and disposition, and issues about the adjudication can no longer be
    reviewed. See In re D.S., 
    563 N.W.2d 12
    , 15 (Iowa Ct. App. 1997) (finding the
    principles of res judicata barred a father’s claim of error where the order was not
    appealed).
    The juvenile court noted the mother and father have been provided or
    offered “a stunning array of resources that were designed to address their basic
    and special needs, including their intellectual limitations” beginning “literally
    within hours of their arrival in the State of Iowa.” We are not able to agree with
    the father that the efforts made were not adequately geared toward his parenting
    deficits. Upon our de novo review of the record, we confirm the finding the State
    2
    The father states: “The father did not stipulate to a finding that the child was in need of
    assistance under 232.2(6)(c)(2). The Court indicated in its termination order that all
    parties stipulated, but the position of the father was that an order could be entered.”
    5
    made reasonable efforts at reunification. We also conclude there is clear and
    convincing evidence to support termination of each parent’s parental rights under
    Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(h).
    “It is well-settled law that we cannot deprive a child of permanency after
    the State has proved a ground for termination under section 232.116(1) by
    hoping someday a parent will learn to be a parent and be able to provide a stable
    home for the child.”      P.L., 
    778 N.W.2d at 41
    .        Moreover, “[i]nsight for the
    determination of the child’s long-range best interests can be gleaned from
    ‘evidence of the parent’s past performance for that performance may be
    indicative of the quality of the future care that parent is capable of providing.’”
    A.B., 815 N.W.2d at 778 (citations omitted). Here, despite the offer of numerous
    and extensive services, at the time of the termination trial in September 2016, the
    parents were homeless, unemployed, and unable to care for the child safely.
    The father had several recent arrests for public intoxication, and a substance-
    abuse evaluation indicated a need for treatment not known until shortly before
    the termination hearing.      Moreover, in light of the mother’s many years of
    involvement with service agencies and the parents’ lifelong impairments an
    additional six months is unlikely to result in reunification.
    The child is less than a year old and has been doing well in the care of the
    foster parents, with whom the child is bonded. The child needs permanency and
    a safe and stable place to grow up. We agree with the juvenile court termination
    is in the child’s best interests. Accordingly, we affirm the juvenile court’s order
    terminating both the mother’s and the father’s parental rights.
    AFFIRMED ON BOTH APPEALS.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 16-1843

Filed Date: 1/25/2017

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/17/2021