State of Iowa v. Michele Lee Secory-Monson ( 2015 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 14-1844
Filed August 19, 2015
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
MICHELE LEE SECORY-MONSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Cerro Gordo County, Karen
Kaufman-Salic, District Associate Judge.
Defendant appeals from a possession of marijuana conviction, challenging
the district court’s denial of her motion to suppress evidence obtained by police
during the course of checking in to a hospital for an involuntary commitment.
AFFIRMED.
Joseph R. Lapointe, Mason City, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kevin Cmelik and Kelli Huser,
Assistant Attorneys General, Carlyle Dalen, County Attorney, and Andrew Olson,
Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Potterfield and Mullins, JJ.
2
MULLINS, J.
Secory-Monson was convicted of possession of marijuana. She appeals
the district court’s denial of her motion to suppress evidence obtained by police
during the course of checking in to a hospital for an involuntary commitment. We
affirm.
I. BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
Deputy Cameron Manson transported Michele Lee Secory-Monson to a
hospital pursuant to an order under Iowa Code section 125.81 (2013), providing
for involuntary commitment for treatment of a person with a substance-related
disorder. Deputy Manson located Secory-Monson at a private residence, served
her with a copy of the court order, and drove her to the hospital. At the hospital,
Deputy Manson escorted Secory-Monson to the emergency room and remained
with her until she was admitted to a locked psychiatric unit. When the time came
for Secory-Monson to move from the ER to the secure psychiatric unit, she was
given a hospital gown to change into and allowed to use the restroom alone to
change. Deputy Manson testified patients are made to change into hospital
gowns to enforce the hospital’s policy of forbidding drugs, weapons, and any
other contraband on the psychiatric floor. Deputy Manson asked Secory-Monson
to empty her pockets before going into the restroom to change. As Secory-
Monson emptied her pockets, Deputy Manson saw a leafy substance suspected
to be marijuana.
Secory-Monson was charged with possession of marijuana under Iowa
Code section 124.401(5). She filed a motion to suppress, arguing the discovery
3
of marijuana was the result of an unreasonable search. The district court heard
arguments on the motion to suppress and denied the motion.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Because Secory-Monson asserts the district court violated her
constitutional rights in denying her motion to suppress, we review the claims de
novo. See State v. Lane, 726 N.W.2d 371, 377 (Iowa 2007). We are not bound
by the district court’s factual determinations but can give them deference. State
v. Naujoks, 637 N.W.2d 101, 106 (Iowa 2001).
III. ANALYSIS
Secory-Monson claims Deputy Manson violated her rights by conducting a
warrantless search. The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution
and article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution protect against unreasonable
searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Iowa Const. art. I, § 8.
Warrantless searches are presumed to be unlawful. State v. Bradford, 620
N.W.2d 503, 506 (Iowa 2000). We use a two-step approach to determine
whether there has been a Fourth Amendment violation. State v. Breuer, 577
N.W.2d 41, 45 (Iowa 1998). First, we determine whether the person challenging
the search has a legitimate expectation of privacy. Id. Second, if we find the
person does have a legitimate expectation of privacy, we determine whether the
State has “unreasonably invaded that protected interest.” Id.
A determination of whether a person has a reasonable expectation of
privacy is to be made on a case-by-case basis, considering the unique facts of
the situation. Id. “The correct test of legitimacy is not whether the individual has
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chosen to conceal some private activity but ‘whether the government’s intrusion
infringes upon the personal and societal values protected by the Fourth
Amendment.’” Id. at 46 (internal citations omitted).
We have previously held no reasonable expectation of privacy exists while
in a hospital emergency room. State v. Lomax, 852 N.W.2d 502, 506-07 (Iowa
Ct. App. 2014). In that case, Lomax had been in a car accident and was lying in
the emergency room when an officer entered the area and smelled the odor of
alcohol on Lomax’s body. Id. at 504-05. The court considered that hospital
staff—not the patient—controls the movement of people into the room. Id. at
506. Other states have reached the same conclusion, considering that
placement in an emergency room is temporary (Buchanan v. State, 432 So. 2d
147, 148 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983)); that the patient is not normally in a position
to permit or deny access to the area (People v. Torres, 494 N.E.2d 752, 755 (Ill.
App. Ct. 986); State v. Cromb, 185 P.3d 1120, 1126 (Or. Ct. App. 2008); State v.
Rheaume, 889 A.2d 711, 714 (Vt. 2005)); and that prevailing social norms do not
treat a hospital emergency room, even curtained areas within it, as space in
which privacy rights inhere (Cromb, 185 P.3d at 1126).
Here, Secory-Monson’s civil commitment suggests she was not in a
position to entertain visitors or to deny access to her room by hospital personnel.
She was placed into the room temporarily, while waiting to be admitted to a
secure floor.
In further evaluating whether Secory-Monson had an expectation of
privacy, we ask whether Secory-Monson’s expectation of privacy was one
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society considers reasonable. Breuer, 577 N.W.2d at 46. The Supreme Court
and the Eighth Circuit have both determined involuntarily civilly committed
persons have rights analogous to pretrial detainees. See Youngberg v. Romeo,
457 U.S. 307, 319-20 (1982); Andrews v. Neer, 253 F.3d 1052, 1061 (8th Cir.
2001) (“[C]onfinement in a state institution raise[s] concerns similar to those
raised by the housing of pretrial detainees, such as the legitimate institutional
interest in the safety and security of guards and other individuals in the facility,
order within the facility, and the efficiency of the facility’s operations.”).
The Utah Court of Appeals has concluded a search incident to protective
custody for involuntarily committed persons is permitted under the United States
Constitution. State v. Collins, 53 P.3d 953, 956 (Utah Ct. App. 2002). The court
considered the purpose of the search: to protect peace officers, the mentally ill
individual, and others. The South Dakota Supreme Court came to the same
conclusion: because of the State’s legitimate custodial purposes, protective
custody curtails a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy. Cordell v. Weber,
673 N.W.2d 49, 53-56 (S.D. 2003). “A contrary conclusion would frustrate the
legislative intent of preserving the safety of the public and the individual taken
into protective custody.” Id. at 54.
Secory-Monson was searched in preparation of her move from a
temporary holding area to a secured, state-regulated facility. The State had a
legitimate institutional interest in Secory-Monson’s safety and the safety of others
in the facility. The purpose of Iowa Code chapter 125 is to allow persons with
substance-related disorders to receive treatment in order to no longer present a
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danger to oneself or others. To forbid facilities from taking reasonable steps to
control what items are taken into the facility would frustrate the purpose of the
statute.1
IV. CONCLUSION
Secory-Monson’s physical location, within a hospital’s emergency room,
and her position as a civilly committed person being admitted to a secure
psychiatric unit, both indicate she did not at that time have a reasonable
expectation of privacy. As such, the Fourth Amendment of the United States
Constitution and the Iowa Constitution do not protect her from a search. The
district court properly denied Secory-Monson’s motion to suppress.
AFFIRMED.
1
Secory-Monson’s appeal arguments focus on challenges to the community care-taking
exception to the warrant requirement and a good faith exception. Having determined
there was no expectation of privacy, we need not reach those issues.