State of Iowa v. Matthew Allen Curtis Davis ( 2015 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 14-0829
Filed August 19, 2015
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
MATTHEW ALLEN CURTIS DAVIS,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Webster County, Thomas J. Bice,
Judge.
Matthew Davis appeals his judgment and sentence for operating a motor
vehicle while “under the influence of an alcoholic beverage or drugs or a
combination of such substances,” third offense. REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Shawn Smith of Shawn Smith, P.L.L.C., Ames, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Darrel Mullins, Assistant Attorney
General, Cori Coleman, County Attorney, and Mary Conroy, Assistant County
Attorney, for appellee State.
Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., Doyle, J., and Sackett, S.J.*
*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 (2015).
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VAITHESWARAN, P.J.
The State charged Matthew Davis with operating a motor vehicle while
“under the influence of an alcoholic beverage or drugs or a combination of such
substances,” third offense, in violation of Iowa Code section 321J.2(1)(a) (2013).
A jury found Davis guilty. On appeal, Davis concedes there is sufficient evidence
of alcohol intoxication but contends the evidence is insufficient “to support the
theory of intoxication by controlled substance.” Absent sufficient evidence under
this theory and the jury’s return of a general verdict, he argues reversal is
required because the reviewing court has no way to determine which theory the
jury accepted.1
A reasonable juror could have found the following facts. A Fort Dodge
police sergeant was on routine patrol when he observed a vehicle stopped at a
red light with its right turn signal on. The vehicle “caught [his] attention” because
it proceeded through the intersection rather than turning right. The sergeant
followed the vehicle and noticed it had no rear license plate. He activated his
emergency lights. The driver, who turned out to be Davis, eventually pulled over
but immediately “took off running.”
Another officer apprehended Davis. A search of the vehicle revealed an
open beer can and two unopened containers but no controlled substances or
drug paraphernalia. A search of Davis similarly uncovered no contraband.
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At the close of the State’s case, Davis moved for judgment of acquittal and objected to
the inclusion of “language [in the jury instruction] regarding any drugs as an option, any
reference or charge regarding illegal or controlled substances, drugs,” arguing the
evidence was insufficient to submit this theory to the jury. The district court denied
Davis’s motion and included the challenged language in the jury instruction.
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Davis declined to speak to officers, refused to perform field sobriety tests, and
did not provide any body specimens for testing.
Davis exhibited classic signs of alcohol intoxication—blood shot and
watery eyes, a “prominent” smell of alcohol, and an unsteady gait. According to
one of the officers, he also avoided eye contact, appeared to have dilated pupils,
fidgeted (particularly in his legs), “twitch[ed]” in his head and hands, and had a
“flushed” face. The officer who observed these mannerisms acknowledged
certain signs could be indicative of nervousness. He also acknowledged that a
video recording of Davis at the police station did a poor job of showing the
fidgeting. Finally, he conceded he lacked the expertise to determine “what
narcotics, aside from alcohol, do to the body and a person’s system.” Without a
drug recognition expert to identify the signs of drug intoxication and without the
discovery of drugs on Davis or in the vehicle, a reasonable juror viewing the
video recording and considering the officers’ testimony would have been required
to engage in speculation to infer he was under the influence of drugs. See State
v. Schories, 827 N.W.2d 659, 666 (Iowa 2013). We conclude there is
insubstantial evidence to support a finding that Davis was “under the influence of
. . . drugs or a combination of such substances.” Iowa Code § 321J.2(1)(a);
State v. Hennings, 791 N.W.2d 828, 832-33 (Iowa 2010) (reviewing sufficiency-
of-the-evidence challenges for substantial evidence).
The only remaining question relates to the disposition. Citing Iowa
opinions, Davis argues reversal is mandated. The State counters that under
federal precedent, specifically Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. 46, 59-60 (1992),
“due process allows general verdicts to stand if one alternative enjoys substantial
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evidence.” In the State’s view, “Iowa precedent has misapplied the rule for
sufficiency challenges to an alternative of a general verdict.”
Misapplied or not, Iowa opinions have repeatedly stated “if the [jury]
instructions allow the jury to consider multiple theories of culpability, only some of
which are supported by the evidence, and a general verdict of guilty is returned,
a reversal is required because ‘we have no way of determining which theory the
jury accepted.’” State v. Williams, 674 N.W.2d 69, 71 (Iowa 2004) (citing State v.
Hogrefe, 557 N.W.2d 871, 880-81 (Iowa 1996)); see also Thorndike v. State, 860
N.W.2d 316, 321 (Iowa 2015) (citing Hogrefe for this proposition); State v.
Nitcher, 720 N.W.2d 547, 557 (Iowa 2006) (same). Based on this principle, we
reverse and remand for a new trial.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.