In the Interest of H.J., Minor Child, D.G., Mother, T.J., Father ( 2015 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 15-0764
Filed August 19, 2015
IN THE INTEREST OF H.J.,
Minor Child,
D.G., Mother,
Appellant,
T.J., Father,
Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, William J. Price,
District Associate Judge.
A mother and father separately appeal the termination of their parental
rights to their one-year-old son. AFFIRMED ON BOTH APPEALS.
Tammy Westhoff Gentry of Parrish, Kruidenier, Dunn, Boles, Gribble,
Gentry, Brown & Bergmann, L.L.P., Des Moines, for appellant-mother.
Shane P. O’Toole, Des Moines, for appellant-biological father.
Bruce H. Stoltz Jr. of Stoltz & Updegraff, P.C., Des Moines, for legal
father.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kathrine S. Miller-Todd, Assistant
Attorney General, John P. Sarcone, County Attorney, and Annette M. Taylor,
Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
Michael Bandstra, Des Moines, attorney and guardian ad litem for minor
child.
Considered by Danilson, C.J., and Vogel and Tabor, JJ.
2
TABOR, J.
A father and mother separately appeal the termination of their parental
rights to their one-year-old son, H.J. Both parents challenge the statutory
grounds for the termination and the juvenile court’s denial of an additional six
months to work toward reunification under Iowa Code section 232.104(2)(b)
(2013). The father individually contends the court also erred in not foregoing
termination under sections 232.116(2) and (3). The mother individually contends
the juvenile court erred in failing to order a second home study involving the
maternal grandmother under the Interstate Compact on Placement of Children
(ICPC). After reviewing the record and the parties’ arguments, we reach the
same conclusions as the juvenile court and affirm the termination order.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
H.J.’s mother and father are Dawnielle and Toby. Dawnielle is married to
Justin, with whom she had two older children, but H.J. was conceived while
Justin was incarcerated.1
Dawnielle’s two older children were adjudicated in need of assistance
(CINA) in March 2013 because of their exposure to drugs and violence. In May
2013, Dawnielle began her relationship with H.J.’s father, Toby. The court was
concerned by Toby’s criminal history and directed Dawnielle to prohibit him from
having contact with her children. When an investigator from the Iowa
Department of Human Services (DHS) found drug paraphernalia in Dawnielle’s
1
Justin has been incarcerated for the entirety of these proceedings and is not a party to
this appeal.
3
home and Toby hiding in a closet, the court ordered the two older children to be
placed in the custody of their paternal great-grandmother.
In late 2013, Dawnielle became pregnant with H.J., but tried to keep the
pregnancy a secret from the DHS. While pregnant, Dawnielle tested positive for
marijuana. In January 2014, the juvenile court directed the State to initiate
termination-of-parental-rights proceedings against Dawnielle and Justin
regarding the two older children. But after an April 2014 hearing, the court
elected not to terminate parental rights. Instead, the court gave the parents more
time to reunify with the two older children.
H.J. was born in May 2014. The State filed a CINA petition for H.J. in
June 2014 because his older half siblings were under the juvenile court’s
jurisdiction. The court adjudicated H.J. as a CINA in August 2014, but allowed
him to remain in Dawnielle’s care as part of the plan to transition the two older
children back into her custody. Also in June 2014, a paternity test revealed Toby
was H.J.’s biological father.
Dawnielle made progress in her parenting during the summer of 2014, so
much so that by mid-August, the DHS was ready to return the older children to
her custody. But before the older children could be returned, DHS required
Dawnielle to provide a urinalysis. On August 20, 2014, Dawnielle appeared at
the testing facility but left without providing a sample. She told the Family Safety,
Risk, and Permanency (FSRP) worker she had to travel to Fort Dodge for a
family funeral. The DHS instructed Dawnielle to apply a sweat patch the next
4
day to detect substance use. She claimed she could not do so because she did
not have transportation back to Des Moines.
By August 22, the DHS learned the family member for whom Dawnielle
claimed she was attending a funeral was not dead and had not seen Dawnielle in
some time. That same day, concerned for H.J.’s safety, the court modified his
placement from Dawnielle to DHS custody and set the matter for a hearing. As
H.J.’s whereabouts were unknown, an Amber Alert was issued. Three days
later, the DHS located H.J. at the home of Toby’s parents in Coralville. The DHS
placed H.J. in foster care in Polk County, but his parents remained in Iowa City
for several months after the removal.
At the September 19 dispositional hearing, the court confirmed H.J. as a
CINA and that placement outside the home was necessary because the parents
were not engaging in services or addressing their substance abuse and mental
health issues. Dawnielle requested a home study of H.J.’s maternal
grandmother under the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children (ICPC).
The court denied the request because the grandmother recently had been the
subject of an ICPC study in her home state of Tennessee during the CINA
proceedings involved Dawnielle’s two older children and Tennessee authorities
determined she was not a suitable caretaker.
Throughout the course of these proceedings, both Toby and Dawnielle
struggled with substance abuse. Both tested positive for methamphetamine, and
Toby tested positive for marijuana. Both participated in treatment, but it was
5
sporadic and inconsistent. Dawnielle began mental health therapy in October
2014, but her attendance was also inconsistent.
Following H.J.’s removal, both parents were offered visitation, but it never
progressed beyond supervised sessions. At first, Dawnielle regularly attended
visits, and, for the most part, Toby did as well. But the parents’ commitment
waned. In January 2015, the parents attended only half of the scheduled visits.
On February 5, 2015, the court terminated the parental rights of Dawnielle and
Justin to the two older children. Later in February, the State filed a petition to
terminate the rights of Dawnielle and Toby to their son H.J.
Three days before the termination hearing was scheduled to begin on
March 30, 2015, Dawnielle cancelled the scheduled visit with H.J. because she
was trying to end her relationship with Toby. On the weekend before the
hearing, Toby reportedly injured Dawnielle by pushing her out of a moving car.
The court entered a no-contact order prohibiting Toby from seeing Dawnielle. On
April 4, Toby was arrested for violating that order.
The court held the termination hearing on March 30, March 31, and April
13. During the hearing, Dawnielle made another request for an ICPC home
study of the maternal grandmother. The juvenile court declined to order another
study. Following the hearing, on April 17, the court entered an order terminating
Toby’s parental rights under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(h) and Dawnielle’s
rights under section 232.116(1)(g) and (h). The parents filed timely appeals.
6
II. Standards of Review
We review termination proceedings de novo. In re A.M., 843 N.W.2d 100,
110 (Iowa 2014). We will uphold an order terminating parental rights if the
juvenile court’s findings are supported by clear and convincing evidence. In re
C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 492 (Iowa 2000). Evidence is “clear and convincing”
when a reviewing court has no serious or substantial doubts as to the
correctness of the conclusions of law drawn from the proof. Id.
We review the juvenile court’s denial of a request for an ICPC home study
under Iowa Code section 232.158 for an abuse of discretion. See In re C.E., No.
11-0897, 2011 WL 4953000, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 19, 2011) (citing Donovan
v. State, 445 N.W.2d 763, 766 (Iowa 1989)).
III. Analysis
A. Statutory Ground for Terminating Toby’s Parental Rights
The juvenile court terminated Toby’s rights under section 232.116(1)(h).
He argues on appeal that under paragraph (h), if H.J. could be returned to one of
the parents, the court should not terminate the rights of the other parent. Our
courts have rejected this argument. In re N.M., 491 N.W.2d 153, 155 (Iowa
1992). Toby’s rights would not be affected by the preservation of Dawnielle’s
rights. Because Toby acknowledges he cannot resume H.J.’s care, we affirm the
order terminating his parental rights under section 232.116(1)(h).
B. Permissive Factors Weighing Against Termination
Toby next claims the juvenile court failed to consider potentially mitigating
factors in sections 232.116(2) and (3), but Toby only elaborates on subsection
7
(3)(c). Therefore, we will only consider paragraph (3)(c). See EnviroGas, L.P. v.
Cedar Rapids/Linn Cnty. Solid Waste Auth., 641 N.W.2d 776, 785 (Iowa 2002)
(affirming random mention of an issue, without elaboration or supporting
authority, is insufficient to raise issue).
Terminating the relationship between a parent and child may not be
necessary if the court finds “clear and convincing evidence that the termination
would be detrimental to the child at the time due to the closeness of the parent-
child relationship.” Iowa Code § 232.116(3)(c). This factor weighing against
termination is permissive, not mandatory. See In re D.S., 806 N.W.2d 458, 474-
75 (Iowa Ct. App. 2011). We consider not only whether H.J. will be
disadvantaged by the termination of his relationship with Toby, but whether the
disadvantage overcomes Toby’s inability to provide for H.J.’s developing needs.
See In re D.W., 791 N.W.2d 703, 709 (Iowa 2010).
We acknowledge evidence of a bond between Toby and H.J., as
portrayed by the FSRP worker’s March 12, 2015 report and Dawnielle’s
testimony from the termination hearing. While H.J. will likely suffer heartache
from losing the connection to his father, the record shows that sting does not
loom larger than Toby’s inability to provide for H.J.’s developing needs.
As H.J. continues to grow and develop, his need for physical, mental, and
emotional guidance will only become more challenging. In assessing Toby’s
capacity to manage these new challenges, “we gain insight into the child’s
prospects by reviewing evidence of the parent’s past performance.” Id. Toby
has been involved with DHS over the last two years, but the services have not
8
enabled him to move to semi-supervised or unsupervised visits with H.J. Toby
has committed acts of violence against H.J.’s mother, creating an unhealthy
atmosphere for raising a child. Toby’s limited improvement illustrates that any
disadvantage H.J. suffers from termination does not overcome Toby’s inability to
provide for H.J.’s needs.
In his brief, Toby asserts he is no longer incarcerated or facing criminal
charges, is pursuing drug treatment, and has secured a stable living
environment. This information was not presented at the hearing and cannot be
considered on appeal. “[A]ppellate courts cannot consider materials that were
not before the district court when the court entered its judgment.” In re C.M., No.
10-1627, 2011 WL 1376618, at *2 n. 1 (Iowa Ct. App. April 13, 2011) (quoting
Alvarez v. I.B.P., 696 N.W.2d 1, 3 (Iowa 2005)); see also Iowa R. App. P. 6.801.
If events occurring after the termination order issued are critical to a parent’s
position, the parent has the option of seeking a limited remand to make a record
before the juvenile court. See In re C.C., No. 09-1467, 2010 WL 2089349, at *1
(Iowa Ct. App. May 26, 2010) (ordering limited remand for purpose of
determining whether mother’s criminal charges had been resolved). The
materials added to the record on limited remand would then be available for
appellate consideration. Toby did not pursue that option. On our existing record,
we conclude section 232.116(3)(c) did not require the juvenile court to refrain
from terminating Toby’s rights.
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C. Statutory Ground for Terminating Dawnielle’s Parental Rights
The juvenile court terminated Dawnielle’s parental rights under sections
232.116(1)(g) and (h). To affirm, we are only required to find one ground
supported by clear and convincing evidence. See D.W., 791 N.W.2d at 706.
Because we conclude termination of Dawnielle’s rights under paragraph (h) was
supported by clear and convincing evidence, we do not address her claims
regarding paragraph (g).
Dawnielle contends H.J. can be safely returned to her care at the present
time.2 We disagree. We acknowledge Dawnielle has taken some steps toward
addressing the barriers that prevent her from providing a safe and secure home
for H.J., but her progress was limited.
The first concern remains Dawnielle’s prolonged relationship with Toby
because of his continued perpetration of domestic violence against her. We
recognize it can be very difficult for a domestic violence victim to end an abusive
relationship and Dawnielle’s continued interaction with Toby is more likely a
product of domestic violence dynamics than her conscious disregard of the
inappropriateness of a partner. But our paramount consideration must be H.J.’s
safety and well-being. Throughout this case and the CINA proceedings involving
her older children, the DHS has offered Dawnielle services designed to assist
with overcoming violent relationships, but Dawnielle’s participation in these
services has been inconsistent. While Dawnielle cannot be faulted for the
2
“At the present time” means the time of the termination hearing. A.M., 843 N.W.2d at
111.
10
violence, she has not fully embraced the support she needs to provide a safe
environment for H.J.
The next concern is Dawnielle’s unresolved substance abuse. Dawnielle
tested positive for methamphetamine in January 2015. She did not enroll in
substance abuse treatment until February 20, even though DHS had urged her to
do so for several months. Dawnielle has not taken responsibility for the positive
drug test, instead testified she does not recall taking methamphetamine because
she was at a house party where she blacked out from too much alcohol.
Dawnielle completed several treatment sessions between her February
enrollment and the late March/early April termination hearing. She testified she
was making progress. The juvenile court did not find her testimony credible
because she failed to acknowledge using or having a substance abuse problem.
We defer to the juvenile court’s credibility finding.
In addition, Dawnielle’s mental health issues present an impediment to
reunification. She began weekly individual counseling sessions in October 2014.
But from that start date through March 2015, Dawnielle only attended ten of
eighteen scheduled sessions. Her therapist noted Dawnielle was moving toward
accountability for her decisions, but little progress had been made due to the
infrequency of her attendance.
Finally, we are apprehensive regarding Dawnielle’s ability to provide a
secure residence for H.J. The record indicates she would likely be losing her
residence within days of the conclusion of the termination hearing due to unpaid
bills and rent. She did not have a plan where she would move, and her only
11
solution to the problem was to get things worked out with her landlord. We are
troubled at the prospect of sending a very young child into such an uncertain
living arrangement.
The record shows by clear and convincing evidence that Dawnielle cannot
provide a safe and secure home for H.J. because of her resistance to addressing
her substance abuse, mental health, domestic violence, and housing issues. We
affirm the termination of Dawnielle’s parental rights under section 232.116(1)(h).
D. Additional Time
Both parents contend the juvenile court should have granted them a more
time to work toward reunification with H.J. To afford parents an additional six
months, section 232.104(2)(b) requires the court to determine “the need for
removal of the child from the child’s home will no longer exist at the end of the
additional six-month period.” We do not find that resolution to be likely in this
case.
Neither parent has made sufficient progress toward addressing the many
barriers toward reunification, including substance abuse, mental health problems,
domestic violence, sustaining employment, inconsistent visitations, and
maintaining a stable living situation. The parents’ past behavior indicates giving
them another six months will only delay the permanency to which H.J. is entitled.
See In re A.B., 815 N.W.2d 764, 778 (Iowa 2012) (explaining “e]vidence of the
parent’s past performance may be indicative of the quality of the future care that
parent is capable of providing”). We affirm the juvenile court’s denial of an
additional six months.
12
E. Second ICPC Study for the Maternal Grandmother
In her final brief point, Dawnielle contends the juvenile court erred in its
failure to order a second ICPC home study for H.J.’s maternal grandmother.
Such home studies are governed by Iowa Code section 232.158. The purpose of
the ICPC is for the participating states:
to cooperate with each other in the interstate placement of children
to the end that . . . [inter alia] [t]he appropriate authorities in a state
where a child is to be placed may have full opportunity to ascertain
the circumstances of the proposed placement . . . [and] [t]he proper
authorities of the state from which the placement is made may
obtain the most complete information on the basis of which to
evaluate a projected placement before it is made.
§ 232.158(1)(b), (c). Subsection (3) enumerates the conditions for placement
including subsection (3)(d), which reads:
The child shall not be sent, brought, or caused to be sent or
brought into the receiving state until the appropriate public
authorities in the receiving state shall notify the sending agency, in
writing, to the effect that the proposed placement does not appear
to be contrary to the interests of the child.
To be approved for ICPC placement in Tennessee, the maternal
grandmother’s home state, the potential caretaker must complete a home study.
The Tennessee Department of Child Services (DCS) will conduct interviews with
the potential caretaker, assess the prospective home’s environment for safety
and risk, assess the quality of the potential caretaker’s current and past
relationships, and complete a background, medical, and criminal check on the
potential caretaker. If the home study is unsuccessful, the potential caretaker
13
cannot be considered for placement under the ICPC. See Tennessee ICPC
Practices and Procedures Manual.3
The maternal grandmother had an unsuccessful home study during the
CINA case with the older two children. Dawnielle asked for a second home study
at a dispositional hearing on September 19, 2014, and renewed that request at
the terminating proceedings. On appeal, Dawnielle contends because a relative
placement is preferred under chapter 232, the juvenile court erred in denying her
requests.4
In reviewing the juvenile court’s decision to deny a parent’s request for an
ICPC home study, we examine whether the denial was an appropriate exercise
of discretion. Here, the juvenile court’s denial was reasonable in light of the
evidence in the record.5 The grandmother was not approved by the Tennessee
child services for placement of Dawnielle’s older children. The record does not
indicate the grandmother ever attended proceedings regarding H.J., and she has
only had minimal contact with him. The grandmother did not testify or present
any evidence that she was in a position to care for H.J. We have held that when
the prospective ICPC study candidate has not actively participated in the
3
The manual can be located at http://state.tn.us/youth/dcsguide/manuals.htm, last
visited July 27, 2015.
4
The guardian ad litem and State argue the home study issue was not was not
preserved for appeal because Dawnielle did not file a written request with the juvenile
court or provide the other parties with advance notice of her request. We opt to overlook
any preservation problems and reach the merits of the issue.
5
The record does not provide specific reasoning for the juvenile court’s decision to deny
either the ICPC request made at the September 19, 2014 hearing or the one made at
the termination hearing. The record presented on appeal does not contain the transcript
of the dispositional hearing where the juvenile court expressed its reasons for denying
the first request and the juvenile court does not present a reason for declining to order a
second study in its termination order.
14
proceedings or shown ability to be a suitable caretaker, it would be a waste of
resources to initiate a home study. See In re C.L.P., No. 12-0409, 2012 WL
1454007, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 25, 2012) (citing In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489,
493 (Iowa 2000) (“The requirement of reasonable efforts exists both to protect
rights of parents and children, and provide financial incentive for states”)); In re
C.E., No. 11-0897, 2011 WL 4953000, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 19, 2011).
Accordingly, we find the juvenile court did not err in denying Dawnielle’s request
for an additional home study.
IV. Conclusion
Clear and convincing evidence supports the termination order as to both
parents’ claims. Additionally, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in
declining to order a second ICPC study for the maternal grandmother.
AFFIRMED ON BOTH APPEALS.
Danilson, C.J., concurs; Vogel, J., concurs specially.
15
VOGEL, J. (concurring specially)
While I concur with the court’s decision to affirm the termination of Toby’s
and Dawnielle’s parental rights to their son, I write separately to express my
concern with the reference the majority makes to the failure of Toby to request a
limited remand to show the progress he has made since the record was closed at
the termination hearing. In support of this proclamation, the majority cites the
unpublished case of In re C.C., No. 09-1467, 2010 WL 2089349, at *1 (Iowa Ct.
App. May 26, 2010). In that case, the juvenile court had denied the mother’s
request at the termination hearing for a permanency order granting her additional
time so that the criminal charges against her could be resolved. C.C., 2010 WL
2089349, at *1. Our court determined the request for the permanency order
should have been granted and sua sponte ordered a limited remand so that on
our review we would know whether the mother was convicted or acquitted—as
the resolution would have a profound effect on the placement of the child. In the
remand order, we specifically noted the mother was well on her way to regain
custody of her son at the time she was incarcerated for a serious offense and
that she was innocent until proven guilty. Our court ordered a limited remand so
that the juvenile court could receive into evidence proof of the disposition of
criminal charges. If at the time of the remand the charges had not been
resolved, we directed the juvenile court to enter the requested permanency
order.6
6
This information was obtained from the remand order our court filed in the case and
can be obtained from the Iowa Supreme Court Clerk’s Office.
16
C.C. was a unique case where our court turned to its inherent power to
order a limited remand because the determination of whether the child could be
returned to the mother’s care was highly dependent on whether the mother would
be acquitted and able to resume her efforts to reunite with her son or convicted.
If she was convicted, our court needed to know the terms of her sentence to
know whether the child could or could not be returned to her care. Because of
the pending nature of these critical factors, holding off on making a final
determination of parental rights would have given the district court solid
information as to the mother’s availability to parent the child. See In re M.M., 483
N.W.2d 812, 814 (Iowa 1992) (acknowledging that the “appellate court can, in
limited circumstances, remand to supplement the record” but concluding the
court of appeals should not have supplemented the record in the case at hand
and limiting the further review to only the record made at the juvenile court).
Our appellate courts have severely limited the use of a limited remand as
we have repeatedly voiced the need for children to have permanency without
needless delay. In re R.J., 436 N.W.2d 630, 636 (Iowa 1989) (“The crucial days
of childhood cannot be suspended while parents experiment with ways to face up
to their own problems. Neither will childhood await the wanderings of judicial
process. The child will continue to grow, either in bad or unsettled conditions or
in the improved and permanent shelter which ideally, at least, follows the
conclusion of a juvenile proceeding.”). In 1997 Congress enacted the Adoption
and Safe Families Act, which “dramatically changed the manner in which this
country treats children who have been removed from the care of their parents
17
and placed into foster care.” In re J.E., 723 N.W.2d 793, 801 (Iowa 2006) (Cady,
J., concurring specially) (referencing the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997,
Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
42 U.S.C.)).
Before 1997, child welfare laws—including Iowa’s—focused on
reuniting the family unit. Subsequently, and after Congress’s
enactment of the Adoptions and Safe Families Act of 1997 (ASFA),
national and state child welfare laws emphasized the importance of
timely providing children with appropriate custodial care.
. . . The legislation sets firm deadlines for reunification,
followed by prompt efforts to terminate parental rights if those
deadlines are not met. ASFA’s goals seek to prevent children from
languishing in foster care by requiring parents to assume their
parental responsibility quickly.
....
. . . [O]ur response to ASFA has significantly, and not too
subtly, identified a child’s safety and his or her need for a
permanent home as the defining elements in a child’s best
interests.
Id. at 801–02 (internal citations omitted). We have also enacted expedited rules
of appellate procedure to further the goal of preventing children from languishing
in foster care. In re C.M., 652 N.W.2d 204, 208 (Iowa 2002) (noting the new
appellate rules put into place to expedite appeals in termination cases were
adopted in response to the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 and its
emphasis on timely permanency for children).
Cases since the 1997 ASFA permitting a limited remand are few and far
between.7 See In re R.E.K.F., 698 N.W.2d 147, 149 (Iowa 2005) (granting the
7
We do note there were a few cases prior to the ASFA of 1997 that permitted limited
remands to take additional evidence. See In re T.B.B., 460 N.W.2d 881, 881 (Iowa Ct.
App. 1990) (“We ordered a limited remand of the case in order that the juvenile court
could take additional evidence on several matters.”); In re T.W.W., Jr., 449 N.W.2d 103,
104 (Iowa Ct. App. 1989) (noting with displeasure the amount of time the case had
18
State’s motion to strike exhibits attached to a further review brief that were not a
part of the juvenile court record); In re M.T., 613 N.W.2d 690, 693 (Iowa Ct. App.
2000) (ordering a limited remand so the State could amend its termination
petition to include the correct Iowa Code section where the child turned four
years old between the filing of the petition and the termination hearing).
In citing C.C. in this case and noting Toby failed to request a limited
remand, the majority appears to signal to the bench and the bar that any parent
may seek to reopen the termination record on appeal to make posttrial assertions
of progress on any front, whether it be mental health, drug or alcohol treatment,
housing, employment, or compliance with any of the recommended services.
This would violate the purpose of the timeline in our statutory framework, which
the legislature put in place to adhere to federal regulations, permitting parents a
certain amount of time to address concerns regarding the safety and care of the
child at issue. See In re J.E., 723 N.W.2d at 801–02 (noting that our response to
the AFSA has changed our approach in termination proceedings from focusing
on reuniting a family to focusing on the child’s need for a permanent home). The
timeframes are in the statute in order to ensure the child has stability and
permanency in his life, certainly not to grant parents an opportunity to reopen the
record, in defiance to the statutory time they have already been allowed. See In
re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 495 (Iowa 2000) (“Time is a critical element.”).
languished and stating the children had a lessened chance for a successful adoption the
longer they stayed in the system but ordering a limited remand to the trial court “for the
limited purpose of enabling the trial court to take additional evidence as to the mother’s
current situation.”).
19
While we recognize the law requires a “full measure of
patience with troubled parents who attempt to remedy a lack of
parenting skills,” Iowa has built this patience into the statutory
scheme of Iowa Code chapter 232. . . . The purpose of these
limitations “is to prevent children from being perpetually kept in
foster care and to see that some type of permanent situation is
provided for the children.”
Once the limitation period lapses, termination proceedings
must be viewed with a sense of urgency.
Id. at 494–95 (internal citations omitted); see also In re A.C., 415 N.W.2d 609,
613 (Iowa 1987) (noting that “beyond the parameters of chapter 232, patience
with parents can soon translate into intolerable hardship for their children”).
When the statutory time has passed, the issue of whether the parents are
suitable to have the child returned to their care is ripe for a determination, and we
should not permit the parents to offer evidence of their attempts to fix their
deficiencies after the termination hearing. In re A.B., 815 N.W.2d 764, 777 (Iowa
2012) (“It is well-settled law that we cannot deprive a child of permanency after
the State has proved a ground for termination under section 232.116(1) by
hoping someday a parent will learn to be a parent and be able to provide a stable
home for the child.”). To permit evidentiary additions to the record
posttermination hearing threatens the finality of the order and keeps the children
at issue in limbo.
Therefore, I disagree with the majority that parents should be able to seek
a limited remand in order to offer evidence of their progress posttermination. In
all other respects, I agree with the majority’s decision in this case.