Michael Anderson, Applicant-Appellant v. State of Iowa ( 2015 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 14-0092
Filed January 28, 2015
MICHAEL ANDERSON,
Applicant-Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF IOWA,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Marshall County, James A.
McGlynn, Judge.
Michael Anderson appeals from the district court order denying his
application for postconviction relief. AFFIRMED.
Chad R. Frese of Kaplan & Frese, L.L.P., Marshalltown, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kelli Huser, Assistant Attorney
General, Jennifer Miller, County Attorney, and Luke Hansen, Assistant County
Attorney, for appellee State.
Considered by Vogel, P.J., Vaitheswaran, J., and Scott, S.J.*
*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 (2015).
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SCOTT, S.J.
Michael Anderson appeals from the district court order denying his
application for postconviction relief (PCR). He contends his application should
be granted because his trial counsel failed to properly inform him of the
consequences of his guilty plea to sexual exploitation of a minor. He also
contends the prosecutor breached the plea agreement. Because his claims are
constitutional in nature, our review is de novo. See Lado v. State, 804 N.W.2d
248, 250 (Iowa 2011).
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
In 2007, the State charged Anderson with sexual exploitation of a minor.
An agreement was reached whereby Anderson agreed to plead guilty to the
charge and the State agreed to refrain from referring the matter for federal
prosecution or making any comment to the court regarding sex offender
treatment. The parties also agreed the sentencing enhancement for sexually
predatory offenses under Iowa Code chapter 901A (2007) would not apply. The
district court accepted Anderson’s guilty plea and sentenced him to two years in
prison with credit for time served.
After his sentence was served, the State held Anderson pending a civil
commitment hearing under chapter 229A to determine whether he was a sexually
violent predator. Anderson then filed a PCR application, alleging it was his
understanding that the charge of sexual exploitation of a minor would not count
as a sexually violent offense under chapter 229A and that he would not have
pled guilty had he known civil commitment under chapter 229A was a
consequence of his plea. Anderson faulted both his trial counsel and the
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prosecutor with failing to disclose this consequence. He further alleged the State
failed to abide by the plea agreement by pursuing a civil commitment action. The
civil commitment action against Anderson was later dismissed, and his PCR
application was denied.
II. Civil Commitment.
Anderson first contends the court erred in denying his PCR application
because his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to explain that civil commitment
was a possible consequence if he pleaded guilty. In order to succeed on a claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel, Anderson must prove counsel breached an
essential duty and he was prejudiced. See State v. Bearse, 748 N.W.2d 211,
214-15 (Iowa 2008). Anderson cannot show counsel breached an essential duty
because the possibility of civil commitment following a separate civil proceeding
is not a direct consequence of a guilty plea,1 and counsel had no duty to disclose
any indirect or collateral consequences. See State v. Carney, 584 N.W.2d 907,
908 (Iowa 1998) (“[T]he court is not required to inform the defendant of all
1
While our supreme court has not addressed this issue, a number of other jurisdictions
have held the possibility of civil commitment under a sexually violent predator statute is a
collateral consequence of a guilty plea. See Steele v. Murphy, 365 F.3d 14, 17 (1st Cir.
2004) (“We believe that the possibility of commitment for life as a sexually dangerous
person is a collateral consequence of pleading guilty.”); George v. Black, 732 F.2d 108,
111 (8th Cir. 1984) (holding civil commitment for sexually violent offense did not
automatically flow from guilty plea); Bussell v. State, 963 P.2d 1250, 1253 (Kan. Ct. App.
1998) (“[P]otential application of the [sexually violent predator statute] is, at most,
nothing more than a collateral consequence of a plea of guilty to a sex crime.”);
Commonwealth v. Cruz, 818 N.E.2d 610, 619 (Mass. App. Ct. 2004) (holding civil
commitment is a collateral consequence of a criminal conviction that need not be
addressed at the plea hearing); State v. Bellamy, 835 A.2d 1231, 1238 (N.J. 2003)
(“Moreover, commitment pursuant to the Act is not a direct consequence of pleading
guilty to a predicate sexual offense because commitment does not automatically flow
from the conviction.”); Page v. State, 615 S.E.2d 740, 743 (S.C. 2005) (“[A] defendant’s
possible commitment under the Sexually Violent Predator Act is a collateral
consequence of sentencing pursuant to a guilty plea or a conviction.”); State v. Myers,
544 N.W.2d 609, 610 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996) (holding civil commitment was a collateral
consequence of the defendant’s guilty plea).
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indirect and collateral consequences of a guilty plea.”). Furthermore, the issue is
moot because the civil commitment proceedings were dismissed. See Maghee
v. State, 773 N.W.2d 228, 233 (Iowa 2009) (“A case is moot when the contested
issue has become academic or nonexistent and the court’s opinion would be of
no force or effect in the underlying controversy.”). Accordingly, Anderson has
failed to show his trial counsel was ineffective.
III. Prosecutorial Misconduct.
Anderson also contends the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by failing
to comply with the plea agreement. Specifically, he claims the State promised he
would not be civilly committed if he pled guilty. This is a mischaracterization of
the record. While the State agreed Anderson’s conviction would not meet the
definition of a sexually predatory offense under Iowa Code section 901A.1, it
made no promise regarding the possibility of civil commitment for sexually violent
offense under chapter 229A. At the plea hearing, the district court restated the
plea agreement, which did not include any promise regarding civil commitment
under chapter 229A. The court then asked “Have I omitted anything?” Anderson
answered, “No.” Because the record demonstrates Anderson received the
benefit of what he bargained for, Anderson has failed to show the State breached
the plea agreement.
IV. Conclusion.
Because Anderson has failed to prove his counsel was ineffective or the
prosecutor engaged in misconduct, we affirm the denial of his PCR application.
AFFIRMED.