Michael Young v. Iowa Department of Transportation ( 2015 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 14-0744
Filed February 11, 2015
MICHAEL YOUNG,
Petitioner-Appellant,
vs.
IOWA DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Tama County, Fae Hoover-Grinde,
Judge.
Michael Young appeals the suspension of his driving privileges.
AFFIRMED.
Michael Young, Tama, appellant pro se.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Michelle R. Linkvis, Ames, for
appellee.
Considered by Mullins, P.J., and Bower and McDonald, JJ.
2
BOWER, J.
Michael Young appeals the district court order affirming the Iowa
Department of Transportation’s (IDOT) decision to suspend his driving privileges.
He claims he was prejudiced as the IDOT acted too quickly1 in suspending his
driving privileges prior to the sixty-day deadline required by Iowa Code section
321.210A(1) (2013). We affirm on appeal by memorandum opinion pursuant to
Iowa Court Rule 21.26(1)(a).
We incorporate the district court’s statement of the facts:
On August 20, 2012 Mr. Young received citations for:
improper registration, no car insurance, and driving while
suspended (ticket number 53401881208201543272). The court
convicted Mr. Young of the offenses on January 28, 2013. The
court ordered Mr. Young to pay a fine of $397.50. When the fine
remained unpaid on March 31, 2013 the Marshall County Clerk of
Court sent Mr. Young a notice informing him that if the fine
remained unpaid within 60 days of the date of the notice, the
Department of Transportation would suspend his driver’s license.
On April 2, 2013 the department issued an Official Notice to
inform Mr. Young that effective May 7, 2013 his driving privileges
would be suspended indefinitely so long as ticket number
53401881208201543272 remained unpaid. Mr. Young filed a
timely appeal of the Department’s intent to suspend his privileges to
operate motor vehicles. The Department stayed the suspension of
Mr. Young’s privileges pending the outcome of the appeal. The
Department’s May 2, 2013 acknowledgement of Mr. Young’s
appeal request informed him the suspension stemming from
nonpayment of ticket number 53401881208201543272 would be
stayed, but that he would not be permitted to drive because his
privilege to drive was “withdrawn” due to other actions. On May 6,
2013 an informal appeal decision upheld the suspension for
nonpayment of the fine. Mr. Young filed an appeal from that
decision. The stay of the suspension continued pending further
review of the May 6, 2013 decision.
1
On appeal, and for the first time, Young raises a claim concerning jurisdiction. Since
this claim was not raised below, we will not consider it on appeal. Brewbaker v. State
Bd. of Regents, 843 N.W.2d 466, 471 (Iowa Ct. App. 2013) (“To preserve an issue on
appeal, the party must first argue the issue before the agency.”).
3
On July 15, 2013 ALJ David Lindgren held a telephone
conference on the appeal filed by Mr. Young. On July 25, 2013 the
ALJ affirmed the suspension, and also remanded the case to the
Department to issue a different notice of suspension to afford Mr.
Young an additional 23 days to pay the fine. The Department
issued an Amended Notice of Suspension pursuant to ALJ
Lindgren’s order, on July 26, 2013.
On September 12, 2013, director designee Mike Raab
upheld the ALJ’s decision sustaining the suspension pursuant to
Iowa Code section 321.210(A). At the hearing on the appeal Mr.
Young put forth the argument that the Department acted too quickly
in suspending his privilege to operate motor vehicles. He relied
upon the clerk’s notice stating that the district court would report the
unpaid debt after May 30, 2013, when in fact the court reported the
unpaid debt to the Department on April 2, 20 13 and the
suspension was to begin on May 7, 2013. Mr. Young requested
additional time, described in the statute to, pay the fine. There is
no suspension stemming from nonpayment of citation
53401881208201543272. The stay, or stopping of the suspension,
in this matter has remained in effect pending the appeals and
remains in effect today.
The district court reviews for errors at law. Ludtke v. Iowa Dep’t of
Transp., 646 N.W.2d 62, 64 (Iowa 2002). On appeal, we apply the standards of
chapter 17A to determine whether we reach the same conclusions as the district
court. Id. at 65. If we reach the same conclusions, we affirm; otherwise we may
reverse. Lee v. Iowa Dep’t of Transp., 693 N.W.2d 342, 344 (Iowa 2005). We
will uphold the IDOT’s factual findings if, after reviewing the record as a whole,
we determine substantial evidence supports the findings. Iowa Code
§ 17A.19(10)(f).
Iowa Code section 321.210A(1) provides:
1. The department shall suspend the driver’s license of a person
who, upon conviction of violating a law regulating the operation of a
motor vehicle, has failed to pay the criminal fine or penalty,
surcharge, or court costs, as follows:
a. Upon the failure of a person to timely pay
the fine, penalty, surcharge, or court costs the clerk of
4
the district court shall notify the person by regular mail
that if the fine, penalty, surcharge, or court costs
remain unpaid after sixty days from the date of
mailing, the clerk will notify the department of the
failure for purposes of instituting suspension
procedures.
b. Upon the failure of a person to pay the fine,
penalty, surcharge, or court costs within sixty days’
notice by the clerk of the district court as provided in
paragraph “b”, the clerk shall report the failure to the
department.
c. Upon receipt of a report of a failure to pay
the fine, penalty, surcharge, or court costs from the
clerk of the district court, the department shall in
accordance with its rules, suspend the person’s
driver’s license until the fine, penalty, surcharge, or
court costs are paid.
On March 21, 2013, Young received a notice from the IDOT informing him
his driving privileges would be suspended if he did not pay his outstanding fines
by May 30, 2013. Young then received a notice stating his driving privileges
would be suspended effective May 7—twenty-three days before the sixty-day
deadline. Upon Young’s appeal, the ALJ granted him twenty-three more days to
pay off the past-due debt.2 Young has failed to show the actions of the IDOT
caused prejudice. We determine any prejudice was cured when the ALJ granted
Young additional time to pay the debt. We find substantial evidence supports the
ALJ’s decision and affirm the district court.
AFFIRMED.
2
Because of processing delays, Young actually received more than the statutory
minimum of sixty days.