In the Interest of N.L.-s., A.L.-s., I.L.-s., I.L.-s., D.L.-s., and D.L.-t., Minor Children, G.s, Father, D.L., Mother ( 2015 )


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  •                       IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
    No. 14-2045
    Filed February 11, 2015
    IN THE INTEREST OF N.L.-S., A.L.-S., I.L.-S., I.L.-S., D.L.-S., AND D.L.-T.,
    Minor Children,
    G.S, Father,
    Appellant,
    D.L., Mother,
    Appellant.
    ________________________________________________________________
    Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Woodbury County, Julie A.
    Schumacher, District Associate Judge.
    Parents appeal separately the termination of their parental rights.
    AFFIRMED ON BOTH APPEALS.
    Daniel P. Vakulskas of Vaskulkas Law Firm, P.C., Sioux City, for appellant
    father.
    Joseph Flannery of Law Office of Joseph W. Flannery, P.C., Le Mars, for
    appellant mother.
    Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Janet L. Hoffman, Assistant Attorney
    General, Patrick Jennings, County Attorney, and Dewey Sloan, Assistant County
    Attorney, for appellee State.
    Joseph Kertels of the Juvenile Law Center, Sioux City, attorney and
    guardian ad litem for minor children.
    Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Doyle and McDonald, JJ.
    2
    PER CURIAM.
    A mother and father appeal separately the termination of their parental
    rights—the mother to her six biological children and the father to his five, of the
    six, biological children.       The mother argues the court failed to consider her
    positive progress in the case and that she should have been given additional
    time for reunification. The father challenges the grounds for termination and
    asserts termination was not in the children’s best interests. Upon our de novo
    review of the record, we affirm.
    I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
    D.L., born in 1991, is the mother of six children, of which D.L.-T. is the
    oldest, born in 2008, and N.L.-S., born in 2014, is the youngest. G.S. is the
    biological father the five youngest children, but he served as a father to eldest
    child as well.1 Both parents have limited cognitive abilities that have affected
    their parenting skills. The father also has a history of substance abuse, as well
    as unsavory affiliations, including gang involvement.
    The family first came to the attention of the Iowa Department of Human
    Services (Department) in December 2010 after it was reported the father was
    using and selling methamphetamine and marijuana.                    It was also alleged the
    mother had punched the eldest child, then two-years old, in the back. At that
    time, the mother only had two children, and the parents were living with and
    receiving significant support from the father’s parents. The parents denied ever
    hitting the child; no bruises were observed, and the child was too young to be
    interviewed. The abuse report was not confirmed, but the father did test positive
    1
    D.L.-T.’s father’s parental rights are not at issue in this appeal.
    3
    for methamphetamine. The parents agreed to participate in voluntary services,
    and the father attended and ultimately successfully completed substance abuse
    treatment. The case was closed in 2011, when the mother was pregnant with
    her third child.
    The family again came to the Department’s attention in 2013, after the
    school reported the oldest child, then five, came to school with bruising,
    puffiness, and redness in his left eye. The child told a school administrator the
    father had struck him in the eye with a spoon for playing soccer in the house. A
    Department worker went to the house and saw the child had a red, puffy eye.
    The child reported to her the father hit him with a belt. Beyond the red eye, the
    worker did not see any injuries and scheduled an appointment at the hospital for
    ultraviolet photographs to be taken. There were also reports of drug use by the
    parents.
    A few days after the incident, the child told the interviewer at the advocacy
    center that he “got a bruise and felled on [his] head” because he “didn’t get [his]
    socks on.” The child initially stated no one hurt or hit him, but he amended his
    answer to “When I be naughty.” He stated that when he is naughty his paternal
    grandmother spanks him, but he asked the interviewer not to tell his mother. The
    ultraviolet and white-light photographs taken indicated the child had some
    bruising and discoloration of the skin on his face, back, and leg, and the
    reviewing doctor opined the bruised areas were not in areas normal for
    accidental injury. Thereafter, the father admitted that, in disciplining the child, he
    would hold the child down while the paternal grandmother struck the child two or
    three times over clothing. He denied any physical abuse.
    4
    The mother was then interviewed. At that time, she was pregnant with her
    sixth child.   The mother admitted she and the paternal grandmother had
    disciplined the oldest child by spanking, either by hand or belt. She stated the
    father usually held the child down rather than giving the spanking because it was
    believed the father would hit too hard. She denied any physical abuse, including
    the child’s report about his eye injury, at first claiming the child ran into something
    and later that the child got into a fight at school.      The grandmother gave a
    different “accidental” account of the child’s eye injury. All five children were then
    removed from the parents’ care and placed in foster care, where they have since
    remained.
    After the removal, hair-stat tests were performed on four of the children,
    and all four tested positive for methamphetamine. Additionally, one child tested
    positive for ingestion of methamphetamine.         Both parents tested positive for
    methamphetamine. Several of the children were found to have developmental
    and social delays, and two of the children were not receiving regular nebulizer
    treatments for their asthma as directed.          The children were subsequently
    adjudicated children in need of assistance (CINA).             The sixth child was
    adjudicated a CINA after her birth in February 2014.
    The parents continued to live with the father’s family and were completely
    dependent on them for shelter, transportation, and financial management, as well
    as assistance parenting the children. However, there were numerous concerns
    raised about the environment of the family’s home, including drug usage, gang
    activity, and physical abuse in the home.         Additionally, it was reported the
    children lacked developmental opportunities because they were isolated within
    5
    the family home and the family lacked knowledge of age-appropriate discipline.
    There were also ten people living in the home. It was determined the children
    could not be returned to that residence because of safety concerns, and it was
    recommended the parents obtain their own residence.
    Numerous services were offered to the parents, including substance
    abuse and mental health evaluations, and the parents were generally
    cooperative with the recommendations following their evaluations. Following her
    evaluation, the mother’s mental health evaluator opined that, “[c]onsidering [the
    mother’s] intellectual level and personality makeup, the expectation that [she] can
    provide a truly healthy, nurturing environment with responsible parenting seems
    unlikely.   Close supervision and services would likely be needed.”           The
    assessment following the father’s evaluation was similar, concluding his
    “responses often revealed very poor insight into problem situations that might be
    relevant for parenting.”
    The parents were particularly open to services and recommendations
    concerning their visits with and parenting of the children. They attended every
    visit, arrived on time, brought dinner, and provided the basic necessities for the
    children and their foster families.   The parents were motivated to learn new
    parenting skills and techniques, and they attended parenting classes.          The
    parents eventually moved into their own apartment, and visits were held there.
    Yet, despite the continued supervised visits, receipt of parenting
    information, and the parents’ overall motivation and love of the children, the
    parents never progressed to a point that the Department felt the children could
    be transitioned into semi-supervised visits with just the parents without the
    6
    possibility of some adjudicatory harm to the children.        The service provider
    reported the parents lacked follow through on parenting skills, discipline
    techniques, and assignments given to them.        The provider also reported she
    continually worked with the parents on time outs, planned ignoring, staying calm,
    non-violent discipline techniques, and appropriate parenting skills. The parents
    did not believe the children’s safety or welfare were at risk, stating the children
    “are the world to us and [the Department is involved] because of one big mistake
    that we did [and our children] are paying.”
    The provider noted the children’s initial developmental delays, such as the
    older children’s very minimal vocabulary and the oldest child’s inability to follow
    simple directions like putting on or taking it a seat belt off. The provider believed
    all three older children had lacked proper structure or routine, and they continued
    to struggle with following rules or listening. After placement in foster care, the
    children began to thrive. The three boys were initially placed together in one
    home, and the twin girls were placed together in a different home.           All five
    children made developmental gains in the areas of speech, behavior, physical
    health, affect, and personality. The children responded well to the structure and
    consistency provided by the foster parents. The sixth child was placed in the
    foster home with the twins after her birth.
    In July 2014, the State filed a petition for termination of the parents’
    parental rights. At the hearing, the case worker testified the parents loved their
    children very much, but she explained the parents’ progress was stagnant and
    continued services would not aid their parenting ability. She admitted the parents
    had asked the Department to transition a few children to their care at a time, to
    7
    see if the parents could handle it. However, she explained she did not believe
    that was an available option, noting the children were not “guinea pigs,” there
    would be stress on the children as to whom they picked, and ultimately, the
    parents had six children to care for, not just a few. Following the hearing, the
    court entered its order terminating the parents’ parental rights pursuant to Iowa
    Code subsections 232.116(1)(d) and (h) (2013).
    The parents now appeal, separately.
    II. Discussion.
    In determining whether parental rights should be terminated under chapter
    232, the juvenile court “follows a three-step analysis.” In re D.W., 
    791 N.W.2d 703
    , 706 (Iowa 2010). Step one requires the court to “determine if a ground for
    termination under section 232.116(1) has been established” by the State. 
    Id.
     If
    the court finds grounds for termination, the court moves to the second step of the
    analysis: deciding if the grounds for termination should result in a termination of
    parental rights under the best-interest framework set out in section 232.116(2).
    
    Id. at 706-07
    .   Even if the court finds “the statutory best-interest framework
    supports termination of parental rights,” the court must proceed to the third and
    final step: considering “if any statutory exceptions set out in section 232.116(3)
    should serve to preclude termination of parental rights.” 
    Id. at 707
    . We review
    the parents’ claims on appeal de novo. See In re A.M., 
    843 N.W.2d 100
    , 113
    (Iowa 2014).
    8
    A. The Father’s Appeal.
    1. Grounds for Termination.
    The grounds for termination must be proved by clear and convincing
    evidence. 
    Iowa Code § 232.116
    (1) (2013); see also D.W., 791 N.W.2d at 706.
    When the juvenile court terminates parental rights on more than one statutory
    ground, we may affirm on any ground we find supported by the record. D.W.,
    791 N.W.2d at 707; In re R.R.K., 
    544 N.W.2d 274
    , 276 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995). We
    choose to focus on subsection 232.116(1) paragraph (h), which requires the
    State to prove by clear and convincing evidence that (1) the child is three years
    of age or younger, (2) has been adjudicated a CINA, (3) has been removed from
    the physical custody of the child’s parents for at least six months of the last
    twelve months, and (4) there is clear and convincing evidence that the child
    cannot be returned to the custody of the child’s parents at the present time.
    Here, there is no question the first three elements were established: the father’s
    five biological children were age three or under, were adjudicated CINA in 2013,
    and removed from his care for the requisite time period. The only debatable
    issue is the fourth element, and, upon our de novo review, we find the State has
    met its burden on this element as to both parents.
    As we have stated many times, children lack pause buttons. Their crucial
    days of childhood cannot be suspended while waiting for a parent to remedy a
    lack of parenting skills. “At some point, the rights and needs of the child rise
    above the rights and needs of the parents.” In re J.L.W., 
    570 N.W.2d 778
    , 781
    (Iowa Ct. App. 1997), overruled on other grounds by In re P.L., 
    778 N.W.2d 33
    ,
    40 (Iowa 2010); see also P.L., 
    778 N.W.2d at 39-40
    .          At the time of the
    9
    termination hearing, these young children had been out of the father’s care for
    over six months. And, despite the receipt of numerous services, the father was
    unable to progress to a point where he could resume care of his five children
    without exposing the children to the risk of adjudicatory harm.        While lower
    mental functioning alone is not sufficient grounds for termination, it is a relevant
    consideration where it affects the child’s well-being. See A.M., 843 N.W.2d at
    111. Here, the father hit a five-year-old in the eye for playing soccer in the
    house, and he never accepted responsibility for his actions.        These children
    suffered developmental delays for which he and the mother did not seek
    assistance. His children tested positive for methamphetamine—one had even
    ingested it—yet he did not think his children were at risk. Moreover, although the
    father was attending substance abuse treatment, his recent marijuana relapse,
    coupled with his continued unsavory social associations, make his continued
    commitment to sobriety at this time or for the foreseeable future unlikely. While
    the father was making an effort to participate in services, there was simply not
    evidence he understood, internalized, or retained the information necessary to
    parent successfully and keep safe five young children. Upon our de novo review,
    we agree with the juvenile court that the evidence presented at the termination-
    of-parental-rights hearing clearly established the children could not be returned to
    the father’s care at that time.      We therefore agree the State established
    termination of the father’s parental rights was appropriate under Iowa Code
    section 232.116(1)(h).
    10
    2. Best Interests.
    Our legislature has constructed a time frame to balance a parent’s efforts
    against the children’s long-term best interests. In re C.B., 
    611 N.W.2d 489
    , 494
    (Iowa 2000).    We measure best interests by the statutory language, giving
    primary consideration to the children’s safety, and to the best placement for
    promoting their long-term nurturing and growth and their physical, mental, and
    emotional conditions and needs. 
    Iowa Code § 232.116
    (2). “The mental capacity
    of a parent and the existence of a preadoptive foster family in the life of a child”
    are relevant considerations in the statutory best-interest analysis.     D.W., 791
    N.W.2d at 708. Consequently, “the termination analysis considers the ability of
    the parent to properly care for the child and the presence of another family to
    provide the care.” Id. “[W]e cannot deprive [children] of permanency after the
    State has proved a ground for termination under section 232.116(1) by hoping
    someday a parent will learn to be a parent and be able to provide a stable home.”
    A.M., 843 N.W.2d at 113. Termination is the appropriate solution when a parent
    is unable to regain custody within the time frames of chapter 232. See In re C.K.,
    
    558 N.W.2d 170
    , 174 (Iowa 1997) (“An appropriate determination to terminate a
    parent-child relationship is not to be countermanded by the ability and willingness
    of a family relative to take the child.”). Upon our de novo review, we agree with
    the juvenile court that the considerations guiding the decision support
    termination.
    Here, despite ongoing services from the Department, the father failed to
    show the kind of progress during this case while the children have been out of his
    care to merit prolonging the uncertainty. The case progress reports and the case
    11
    worker’s testimony indicate the father has difficulty overcoming his intellectual
    impairment to provide an adequately safe and reliable home for the children
    without relying heavily on service providers or his parents. As his five children
    continue to grow and develop, their need for physical, mental, and emotional
    guidance, as well as financial support, will only become more challenging. The
    children have made significant developmental gains in their preadoptive foster
    homes, and all evidence suggests that they will continue to do so. We are simply
    not convinced that the father has developed the skills necessary to cope with the
    critical needs of five young children in the statutory time frame allotted to him and
    accordingly find the factors of section 232.116(2) support termination.
    B. The Mother’s Appeal.
    The mother makes a passionate argument asserting the juvenile court
    ignored the positive reports and accomplishments the mother made during the
    duration of the case, including her commitment to attending mental health and
    substance abuse treatment. She essentially asserts she deserved, based upon
    her efforts, additional time for reunification and a trial-visitation period with a few
    of her children so she could demonstrate she could safely parent them. While
    we applaud her efforts, we disagree for the same general reasons stated
    addressing the father’s appeal.
    Here, the mother’s mere participation in services was not enough to
    evidence she could safely care for six young children.           Her children tested
    positive for methamphetamine, but she did not believe her children were at risk,
    stating she only believed the Department was involved because of the one
    incident concerning the child’s eye, and she minimized that incident.           These
    12
    children suffered developmental delays in her care. While she went through the
    motions in cooperating with the services provided, she, like the father,
    demonstrated no real progress or follow through to show she understood the
    risks to her children and why the services were necessary. We do not “‘gamble
    with the children’s future’” by asking them to wait continuously for a stable
    biological parent, particularly at such tender ages. In re D.W., 
    385 N.W.2d 570
    ,
    578 (Iowa 1986) (citation omitted). There is no question the mother loves her
    children, but unfortunately, that was not enough to keep them safe prior to the
    Department’s most recent involvement, and it is still not enough now. Upon our
    de novo review, we find the juvenile court appropriately considered the mother’s
    progress and participation in services in the case in its determination that
    termination of her parental rights was in their best interests. We, like the juvenile
    court, find the children’s need for permanency outweigh the mother’s limited
    progress, and the children should not have to wait any longer. The children are
    doing well in their preadoptive placements, and all evidence suggests the
    children will continue to thrive in their foster families’ care. Taking into account
    the relevant factors, we agree with the juvenile court that the children’s best
    interests are served by severing their legal tie with the mother.
    III. Conclusion.
    For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the juvenile court’s order terminating
    the parents’ parental rights.
    AFFIRMED ON BOTH APPEALS.