State of Iowa v. Alan Scott Lawton ( 2015 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 14-1363
Filed April 8, 2015
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
ALAN SCOTT LAWTON,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Pottawattamie County, James S.
Heckerman, Judge.
Defendant appeals from a sentence imposed following a remand for
resentencing. AFFIRMED.
Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Maria Ruhtenberg,
Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Heather Ann Mapes, Assistant
Attorney General, Matthew D. Wilber, County Attorney, and Amy Zacharias,
Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by Danilson, C.J., and Potterfield and Bower, JJ.
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DANILSON, C.J.
Alan Lawton appeals from a sentence imposed following a remand for
resentencing for theft in the second degree, as a habitual offender. He maintains
the district court mistakenly believed it could not impose a different sentence and
thus failed to exercise its discretion. He also maintains the court failed to
consider any mitigating factors when resentencing. Because we find the district
court properly exercised its discretion during the remand for resentencing, we
affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
Following a jury trial, Lawton was found guilty of theft in the second
degree on March 20, 2013. He waived his right to a jury trial and agreed that the
habitual offender enhancement would be tried to the bench. The court found he
was guilty as a habitual offender. Lawton was sentenced to an indeterminate
term of incarceration not to exceed fifteen years.
Lawton appealed his conviction and sentence, and our supreme court
transferred the case to the court of appeals. On April 30, 2014, we affirmed the
conviction but remanded for resentencing because the trial court failed to
articulate reasons for the sentence on the record. See State v. Lawton,
No. 13-0605, 2014 WL 1715064, at *6 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 30, 2014).
Lawton was resentenced on August 4, 2014. The State recommended the
court impose the same sentence that was previously imposed. Lawton
requested probation with placement at a residential care facility (RCF). Lawton
stated, “I would like—yeah, I would like to go to RCF. I would like probation. I
feel that, you know, yeah, I done everything I can in prison, serving almost two
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years. I can be—you know, functioning, whatever you want to call it, you know,
member of society.” The court responded:
And I note that based upon the record before me here that I
sentenced you to 15 years in prison based upon the enhancement
of that penalty. And the only reason we’re here today, sir, and I
understand what [Lawton’s attorney] has asked for me to
reconsider the sentence or to impose a different sentence, but is for
me to state why I am imposing the 15-year-sentence, and it’s
because you have twice been previously convicted of felonies. And
that’s why the enhancement of the sentence was imposed was
because of your prior record.
....
All right. So the—and I understand that you feel you’ve
received the maximum rehabilitation you’re going to receive
through the Department of Correctional Services by way of
placement at the institution. However, I can’t ignore the fact you
have this prior criminal history. And so for purposes of the record,
the reason that I imposed previously the 15-year sentence and the
reason that I am sentencing you to 15 years today is for the same
reasons, because of your prior record. And I feel that—I felt then
and I feel now that that was the most appropriate way to protect the
public and to impose the punishment that was most appropriate
and to give you an opportunity to rehabilitate yourself in view of the
fact the lesser means have not been adequate previously.
Lawton appeals.
II. Standard of Review.
Where, as here, the defendant does not assert the imposed sentence is
outside the statutory limits, we review for an abuse of discretion. State v.
Thomas, 547 N.W.2d 223, 225 (Iowa 1996). An abuse of discretion is found only
when the sentencing court exercises its discretion on grounds or for reasons
clearly untenable or to an extent clearly unreasonable. Id. We review both the
court’s stated reasons made at the sentencing hearing and its written sentencing
order. See State v. Lumadue, 622 N.W.2d 302, 304 (Iowa 2001).
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III. Discussion.
Lawton maintains the district court mistakenly believed it did not have the
discretion to impose a different sentence at resentencing and thus failed to
exercise its discretion. He also maintains the court failed to consider any
mitigating factors when resentencing him.
When a remand order does not limit the purpose of the remand, the
district court can reconsider all of the discretionary aspects for sentencing based
on the offenses for which the defendant was convicted. State v. Jacob, 644
N.W.2d 695, 697 (Iowa 2001). Moreover, “[w]hen a sentencing court has
discretion, it must exercise that discretion. Failure to exercise that discretion
calls for a vacation of the sentence and a remand for resentencing.” State v.
Ayers, 590 N.W.2d 25, 27 (Iowa 1999).
We do not believe the district court failed to exercise its discretion. The
court acknowledged Lawton had requested a different sentence but then
explained why the same sentence was still warranted. Specifically, the court
referenced Lawton’s two felony convictions as well as the best way to protect the
public, impose punishment, and provide opportunity for rehabilitation.
Lawton also maintains “[t]he court did not consider any mitigating
circumstances or chances at rehabilitation.” We note the court expressly stated
that one of the reasons for the sentence was “to give [Lawton] an opportunity to
rehabilitate [him]self in view of the fact the lesser means have not been adequate
previously.” We view this statement as describing the court’s view of Lawton’s
chances of rehabilitation in a setting other than prison. The court is not “required
to specifically acknowledge each claim of mitigation urged by a defendant.”
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State v. Boltz, 542 N.W.2d 9, 11 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995). Moreover, “the failure to
acknowledge a particular sentencing circumstance does not mean it was not
considered.” Id.Because we find the district court properly exercised its discretion during
the remand for resentencing, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.