State of Iowa v. Adriana Hanson ( 2015 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 14-0721
Filed March 25, 2015
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
ADRIANA HANSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, Todd A. Geer,
Judge.
Adriana Hanson appeals from the judgment and sentence imposed
following her Alford plea to possession of marijuana with intent to deliver,
asserting the district court abused its sentencing discretion in declining to grant
her a deferred judgment. AFFIRMED.
Judith O’Donohoe of Elwood, O’Donohoe, Braun, White, LLP, Charles
City, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Heather Ann Mapes, Assistant
Attorney General, Thomas J. Ferguson, County Attorney, and Brad Walz,
Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Doyle and McDonald, JJ.
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DOYLE, J.
Adriana Hanson appeals the suspended prison sentence imposed
following her Alford plea1 to possession of marijuana with intent to deliver. She
asserts the district court abused its sentencing discretion in declining to grant her
a deferred judgment. Finding no abuse of discretion on the part of the district
court, we affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
Hanson’s vehicle was stopped by a Waterloo police officer when he
observed a brake light was not working. Hanson was driving and her then
boyfriend, Demetrice Tompkins, was sitting in the front passenger seat.
Tompkins’s three-year-old child was in the back seat sitting next to a large
laundry basket full of clothing. Officers detected “a very strong odor of fresh or
‘green’ marijuana emitting from inside the vehicle.” In a search of the vehicle,
officers found a shoebox on top of the laundry basket. The shoebox contained a
large quantity of marijuana, a digital scale with marijuana residue, a .45 caliber
Taurus semiautomatic handgun with magazine, ammunition, several loaded
magazines, and a large quantity of prescription drugs. Officers also found a .22
caliber rifle, designed like an assault rifle, wrapped in a shirt in the laundry
basket. The firearms were loaded. All these items were located directly next to
where the young child had been sitting and were within the child’s reach.
The State originally charged Hanson with five counts: possession of a
controlled substance (marijuana) with intent to deliver while in possession or
1
An Alford plea allows a defendant to consent to the imposition of a sentence without
admitting to participating in the crime. North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37 (1970).
3
control of a firearm, in violation of Iowa Code section 124.401(1)(d) and
124.401(1)(e) (2013) (Count I); failure to affix a tax stamp, in violation of section
453B.12 (Count II); possession of a controlled substance (alprazolam) with intent
to distribute while in possession or control of a firearm, in violation of section
124.401(1)(d) and 124.401(1)(e) (Count III); child endangerment, in violation of
section 726.6(1)(a) (Count IV); and carrying weapons, in violation of section
724.4(1) (Count V). Hanson ultimately entered an Alford plea to the charges of
possession of marijuana with intent to deliver, in violation of section
124.401(1)(d) and child endangerment, in violation of section 726.6. Under the
plea agreement, the State agreed the remaining counts would be dismissed at
sentencing.
At the sentencing hearing, the State recommended a five-year suspended
sentence with two to five years of probation on the possession count and a
suspended two-year sentence with two years of probation on the child-
endangerment count. This was the same sentence recommendation made in the
presentence investigation report. Hanson argued for a deferred judgment on
both counts. The district court granted Hanson a deferred judgment and placed
her on probation for a period of two to five years on the child-endangerment
charge. The court sentenced Hanson to a suspended term of imprisonment not
to exceed five years and placed on probation for a period of two to five years on
the possession charge. Hanson now appeals arguing the district court abused its
discretion in not granting her a deferred judgment on the possession charge.2
2
In her brief, Hanson states error was preserved by filing a timely notice of appeal.
“While this is a common statement in briefs, it is erroneous, for the notice of appeal has
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II. Scope and Standard of Review
Our review of a district court’s sentence is limited to the correction of legal
error. State v. Rodriguez, 804 N.W.2d 844, 848 (Iowa 2011). Imposition of a
sentence “within the statutory limits is cloaked with a strong presumption in its
favor, and will only be overturned for an abuse of discretion or the consideration
of inappropriate matters.” State v. Formaro, 638 N.W.2d 720, 724 (Iowa 2002).
“An abuse of discretion is found when the court exercises its discretion on
grounds clearly untenable or to an extent clearly unreasonable.” State v. Barnes,
791 N.W.2d 817, 827 (Iowa 2010).
III. Discussion
On appeal, Hanson asserts the sentencing court abused its discretion in
sentencing Hanson because the court “made no statements to indicate that [it]
considered the positive aspects of Ms. Hanson’s life.” “In exercising its
discretion, the district court is to weigh all pertinent matters in determining a
proper sentence, including the nature of the offense, the attending
circumstances, the defendant’s age, character, and propensities or chances for
reform.” State v. Johnson, 513 N.W.2d 717, 719 (Iowa 1994). A sentencing
court must state, on the record, its reason for selecting a particular sentence.
Barnes, 791 N.W.2d at 827 (citing Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.23(3)(d)). “‘A statement
may be sufficient, even if terse and succinct, so long as the brevity of the court’s
nothing to do with error preservation.” Thomas A. Mayes & Anuradha Vaitheswaran,
Error Preservation in Civil Appeals in Iowa: Perspectives on Present Practice, 55 Drake
L. Rev. 39, 48 (Fall 2006) (footnote omitted) (explaining that “[a]s a general rule, the
error preservation rules require a party to raise an issue in the trial court and obtain a
ruling from the trial court”). Nevertheless, error was preserved for our review because
sentencing errors may be challenged on direct appeal absent an objection in the district
court. See State v. Lathrop, 781 N.W.2d 288, 293 (Iowa 2010).
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statement does not prevent review of the exercise of the trial court’s sentencing
discretion.’” State v. Hennings, 791 N.W.2d 828, 838 (Iowa 2010). Although “[a]
sentencing court has a duty to consider all the circumstances of a particular
case,” it is not “required to specifically acknowledge each claim of mitigation
urged by a defendant.” State v. Boltz, 542 N.W.2d 9, 11 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995).
“Furthermore, the failure to acknowledge a particular sentencing circumstance
does not necessarily mean it was not considered.” Id.In rendering the sentence, the court stated:
Ms. Hanson, I have considered your request for deferral of
judgment and regret to say that I’m not going to grant your request
for deferral of judgment. I’m making that decision in large part on
the facts of this case, the nature of the offenses that you have
committed, the danger that you’ve posed to a very young child,
possessing drugs with intent to deliver those drugs, while—I know
that you’re not convicted of the firearm enhancement, but you had
loaded firearms in your vehicle, you had the marijuana in your
vehicle, and you had a child in your vehicle, and you possessed the
marijuana with intent to deliver at that time. That coupled with the
fact that you do bring in this courtroom with you a juvenile criminal
history, and I read through the number of placements and the
number of detentions that you had and the length of time that you
were under juvenile court supervision, and you were under
supervision for quite some time and, obviously, picked up violations
because you were placed in detention a number of times, and that
tells me something about your character. You don’t bring with you
an adult criminal history, and that’s good. This is your first adult
offense, I believe. Yes. It is your first adult offense. But your
juvenile history does tell me something about your character and
your risk on probation supervision.
And so on balance, I’ve determined that in spite of your
young age, in light of the nature of the offenses and your juvenile
history, you’re not a suitable candidate for deferral of judgment.
Imprisonment, however, is not necessary at this time, in my view, to
protect the interests of society and to protect you from yourself. I
do believe that you’re worthy of a suspended sentence, and so I am
going to suspend the prison sentences that will be imposed here
today.
After a colloquy with Hanson, the court further stated:
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With that additional information, Ms. Hanson, I’m going to
defer judgment as to the child endangerment charge. I’m not going
to as to the possession with intent to deliver charge. You were fully
aware of the marijuana dealings. In fact, you had dealt marijuana
yourself while Mr. Tompkins was in jail. The car you were in, the
car you were driving smelled strongly of marijuana. However, I am
convinced that, and I think the most aggravating factor involved in
the child endangerment charge is the fact that the weapons and the
drugs were located right next to a three-year-old girl within that car.
I’m going to accept your statements, even though I have some
questions about their veracity, I’m going to accept your statements
that you didn’t know the weapons and the drugs were in the car at
the time. You were still endangering the child to the extent that
there was any drug dealing going on at all when the child was in
Mr. Tompkins’ care or your care, but I’m going to defer judgment as
to that, and that will, I think, help assist you in the future because
there would be a number of questions you would have to answer
about what it is that you did that endangered a child.
It’s clear that you deserve to show that a possession with
intent to deliver marijuana is on your record. You were engaged in
that activity for some period of time, and you were living with
someone who was actively, very actively engaged in that activity for
some period of time, and that issue is no surprise to you at all. But
the endangerment issue, I can see that if I accept your statements
to me here today, which I’m going to do with some skepticism, but
I’ll accept them and defer judgment on the child endangerment
charge.
Hanson asserts the sentencing court gave her mitigating factors short
shrift because it made no statements to indicate it considered the positive
aspects of Hanson’s life. Specifically, Hanson points out: she was employed full-
time and taking online college classes, she had achieved many positive
milestones in her life despite her chaotic childhood, she had no adult criminal
history until this case, she was twenty-three years of age, she had gotten upset
with Tompkins’ drug activities, and the evidence showed Tompkins was the one
primarily responsible for the drug activity their home. Hanson argues “[a]ll of
these facts mitigate Ms. Hanson’s culpability for the offenses and lead to the
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conclusion that Ms. Hanson should have been . . . given the deferred judgment
her attorney requested.”
The court did specifically mention that this was Hanson’s first adult offense
and her young age. But as stated above, a sentencing court is not required to
specifically acknowledge each claim of mitigation urged by a defendant. Boltz,
542 N.W.2d at 11. And the fact that the court did not acknowledge each and
every claim of mitigation does not mean the court did not consider each claim.
Id. We reject Hanson’s suggestion that the sentencing court’s consideration of
mitigating factors was somehow deficient.
The court clearly, thoroughly, and thoughtfully set out its reasons for
denying Hanson a deferred judgment on the possession charge. A sentencing
court has discretion in choosing statutorily authorized sentencing options,
including deferral of judgment. See Iowa Code § 901.5(1). It is obvious from the
record that the sentencing court selected a sentence it felt would provide
maximum opportunity for rehabilitation of Hanson and for the protection of the
community from further offenses by Hanson and others. See id. Simply because
a more lenient sentence was available but not imposed does not amount to an
abuse of discretion. Based on the record, Hanson has not made the affirmative
showing of abuse necessary to overcome the strong presumption in favor of the
district court’s sentence.
The district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to grant Hanson
a deferred judgment on the possession charge. We therefore affirm.
AFFIRMED.