In the Interest of S.C., Minor Child, K.O., Mother ( 2015 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 15-0262
Filed May 6, 2015
IN THE INTEREST OF S.C.,
Minor Child,
K.O., Mother,
Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Cerro Gordo County, Annette
Boehlje, District Associate Judge.
The mother appeals the order terminating her parental rights.
AFFIRMED.
Michael J. Moeller of Sorensen Law Office, Clear Lake, for appellant
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kathrine S. Miller-Todd and Janet
Hoffman, Assistant Attorneys General, Carlyle D. Dalen, County Attorney, and
Nichole M. Benes, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
David A. Grooters, Mason City, attorney and guardian ad litem for minor
child.
Considered by Tabor, P.J., and Bower and McDonald, JJ.
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MCDONALD, J.
Kristin appeals from the order terminating her parental rights to her child,
S.C.. She contends (1) the State failed to prove by clear and convincing
evidence the statutory grounds authorizing termination of her parental rights, (2)
termination of her rights is not in the best interest of the child, and (3) the court
should have exercised its discretionary authority to decline termination of her
rights based on the strength of the parent-child bond.
I.
This family came to the attention of the Iowa Department of Human
Services (“IDHS”) in March 2014 due to concerns regarding domestic violence
between Kristin and the father of the child at issue. The parents were living
together at the time of IDHS’s intervention. The domestic violence was mutual,
that is Kristin and the father each acted as the aggressor on occasion. They hit,
kicked, and jumped on each other. They engaged in verbal altercations. They
also destroyed each other’s property or threatened to destroy each other’s
property. On at least one occasion, Kristin and the father left the infant child S.C.
unattended in the house while they left the home and continued their verbal and
physical fight. IDHS initiated an investigation, and additional concerns for the
child’s safety arose, including the parents’ untreated mental health conditions,
the father’s substance use and abuse, and the parents’ lack of parenting skills,
among other concerns.
In April 2014, IDHS filed a founded report for denial of critical care, failure
to provide adequate supervision, and removed S..C. from the parents’ home. At
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that time, S.C. was approximately four months old. On April 24, 2014, the child
was adjudicated in need of assistance pursuant to Iowa Code section
232.2(6)(c)(2) (2013) (defining a child in need of assistance as one who has
suffered or is imminently likely to suffer harmful effect due to the failure to
exercise a reasonable degree of care in supervising the child) and section
232.2(6)(n) (defining child in need of assistance as one not receiving adequate
care due to the parents’ mental capacity or condition, imprisonment, or drug or
alcohol abuse). Kristin was offered services to address the concerns of IDHS.
The family care coordinator testified that Kristin’s participation in services was
“sporadic but typically uncooperative.”
In October 2014, the State petitioned to terminate the parents’ rights to
S.C. The juvenile court terminated Kristin’s rights pursuant to Iowa Code section
232.116(1)(a), (e), and (h).
II.
We review de novo proceedings terminating parental rights. See In re
A.M., 843 N.W.2d 100, 110 (Iowa 2014). We examine both the facts and law,
and we adjudicate anew those issues properly preserved and presented. See In
re L.G., 532 N.W.2d 478, 480 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995). Termination of parental
rights under Iowa Code chapter 232 follows a three-step analysis. See In re P.L.,
778 N.W.2d 33, 40 (Iowa 2010). First, the court must determine if a ground for
termination under section 232.116(1) has been established. See id. Second, if a
ground for termination is established, the court must apply the framework set out
in section 232.116(2) to decide if proceeding with termination is in the best
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interest of the child. See id. Third, if the statutory best-interest framework
supports termination of parental rights, the court must consider if any of the
discretionary exceptions set forth in section 232.116(3) should serve to preclude
termination. See id.The State has the burden of proving the grounds for termination by clear
and convincing evidence. See In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 492 (Iowa 2000).
Evidence is “clear and convincing” when there are no serious or substantial
doubts as to the correctness of the conclusions of law drawn from the evidence.
See id. Because our review is de novo, we must satisfy ourselves the State has
come forth with the quantum and quality of evidence sufficient to prove the
statutory grounds for termination of a parent’s rights, a standard imposed to
balance the parent’s interest in maintaining the parent-child relationship and the
State’s obligation to protect children within the State of Iowa.
III.
A.
Kristin first contends the State failed to prove the statutory grounds for
termination by clear and convincing evidence. It appears that the juvenile court’s
reference in the termination order to Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(a) and (e)
was scrivener’s error; the juvenile court’s findings and conclusions relate only to
termination pursuant to paragraph (h). In and of itself, the scrivener’s error is not
material to the resolution of this appeal. When the court terminates parental
rights on more than one statutory ground, we may affirm on any ground
supported by the record. See In re D.W., 791 N.W.2d 703, 707 (Iowa 2010). We
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will thus limit our analysis to section 232.116(1)(h), which appears to be the only
ground considered by the juvenile court.
To prove this ground for termination of parental rights, the State must
prove by clear and convincing evidence, as relevant here, “the child cannot be
returned to the custody of the child’s parents as provided in section 232.102 at
the present time.” Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(h)(4); In re Chad, 318 N.W.2d 213,
218 (Iowa 1982). A child cannot be returned to the custody of the child’s parent
under section 232.102 if by doing so the child would be exposed to any harm
amounting to a new child in need of assistance adjudication or without remaining
a child in need of assistance. See In re R.R.K., 544 N.W.2d 274, 277 (Iowa Ct.
App. 1995); see also In re M.M., 483 N.W.2d 812, 814 (Iowa 1992). “The threat
of probable harm will justify termination, and the perceived harm need not be the
one that supported the child's initial removal from the home.” M.M., 483 N.W.2d
at 814; see In re C.M.T., 433 N.W.2d 55, 56 (Iowa Ct. App. 1988).
S.C. could not be returned to Kristin at the time of the termination hearing
because she had not yet addressed the domestic violence creating a risk of harm
to the child. See In re S.O., 483 N.W.2d 602, 604 (Iowa 1992) (noting serious
emotional harm to child from violence in the home). After S.C. was removed
from the home, Kristin moved to a shelter and then obtained her own apartment
away from the father. However, Kristin refused to go to Crisis Intervention and
engage in services because she believed both she and the father were at fault.
More important, the evidence showed that Kristin and the father maintained
regular, inappropriate, and harmful contact with each other. They maintained
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contact in person and via Facebook, text message, and telephone. Their contact
with each other continued to be violent and otherwise inappropriate, frequently
involving arguments about whether Kristin and the father were dating other
people. On one occasion, Kristin assaulted the father in a mall parking lot. On
another occasion, immediately prior to the termination hearing, the parents got
into an altercation at the mother’s apartment and the police were called to the
home. On a different occasion, Kristin threatened to break out the windows in
the father’s home. Both parents kept these communications and altercations
hidden from IDHS until there was a significant blow-up between them, usually
involving other paramours. IDHS’s report to the court states that neither parent
understands how their domestic violence incidents affect the welfare of S.C.
We also conclude that Kristin’s untreated mental health conditions create
a risk of harm to the child and support the termination of her rights pursuant to
paragraph (h). See, e.g., In re T.P., 757 N.W.2d 267, 271 (Iowa Ct. App. 2008)
(affirming termination of parental rights where non-compliance with
recommended mental health treatment posed a risk to the child); In re D.B., No
14-1311, 2014 WL 5253077, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 15, 2014) (affirming
termination of parental rights where mother had untreated mental health
condition); In re R.G., No. 14-1134, 2014 WL 6682335, at *2-3 (Iowa Ct. App.
Nov. 26, 2014) (same); In re J.F., No. 13-1956, 2014 WL 667789, at *1-2 (Iowa
Ct. App. Feb. 19, 2014) (affirming termination of parental rights where mother did
not comply with mental health treatment requirements). The mother suffers from
generalized anxiety disorder and major depressive disorder. Kristin attended
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mental health treatment, but she did so only sporadically. The service providers
testified that the mother was not motivated to have the child returned. She was
not invested in services. She was not cooperative. She was not honest with the
service providers. Most important, and perhaps as a result of her lack of
meaningful participation in services, Kristin did not demonstrate improvement in
the real world outside the clinical setting.
We highlight several examples of Kristin’s behaviors. On one occasion,
after meeting with her case workers, Kristin did not like the information presented
to her, and she became visibly enraged and started screaming uncontrollably for
approximately ten minutes after the workers left the home. The case workers
remained outside the home and listened to the screaming. Kristin’s mental
health conditions also cloud her judgment with respect to who she dates. She
dated one man, who possibly could be the father of her unborn child, who had
warrants out for his arrest for drug offenses, thefts, and domestic violence.
Finally, we place great weight on the juvenile court’s direct observation of
Kristin’s behavior during these proceedings. The juvenile court found that Kristin
displayed a lack of self-control that created a risk of harm to the child, describing
Kristin’s emotional responses as “over-the-top.” The juvenile court found that
Kristin threw screaming fits. She cried inconsolably and hysterically. Kristin did
not find these behaviors to be troubling or unusual.
We should note the evidence is not wholly one-sided. Kristin did take
action to address some of the issues presented. She moved out of the home she
shared with the father and into a woman’s shelter. After that, she obtained her
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own housing. She also obtained and maintained employment throughout the
course of these proceedings. Kristin attended her scheduled visitation with S.C.
She did well with those visitations; she was prepared with appropriate items,
including diapers, wipes, and snacks. The visits never progressed beyond semi-
supervised, however, due to Kristin’s behaviors and IDHS’s concerns regarding
people in the home. Ultimately, the record reflects that Kristin did not address
the violence between her and the father or her own mental health needs and that
these two concerns created a risk of harm to the child at issue. IDHS’s
termination report to the court concluded the “parents’ lives remain very chaotic
and unstable and they continue to make choices that are contrary to their child’s
welfare.” “Kristin [has] not been able to gain and/or maintain the skills required to
parent [the] child on a full-time basis.” We thus conclude the State proved this
ground for termination by clear and convincing evidence.
B.
Kristin next contends that termination of her parental rights is not in S.C.’s
best interest. When considering a child's best interest, we “give primary
consideration to the child's safety, to the best placement for furthering the long-
term nurturing and growth of the child, and to the physical, mental, and emotional
condition and needs of the child.” Iowa Code § 232.116(2). We consider both
the long-term and immediate interests of the child. See In re J.E., 723 N.W.2d
793, 798 (Iowa 2006). Insight into what the future likely holds for a child if
returned to a parent is gained from evidence of the parent’s past performance,
because it may be indicative of the quality of future care the parent is capable of
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providing. See In re A.B., 815 N.W.2d 764, 778 (Iowa 2012); J.E., 723 N.W.2d at
798. We give substantial weight to case history records in assessing a parent’s
ability to provide care in the future. See In re S.N., 500 N.W.2d 32, 34 (Iowa
1993).
Kristin argues there is a statutory preference that a child remain in the
care and custody of the parent. She also argues that there is no duplicating the
beneficial effects of the mother-child relationship. We disagree that it is in S.C.’s
best interest to forego termination of Kristin’s parental rights. While the State
must prove termination is in the best interest of the child, as a general rule, when
the statutory grounds for termination of parental rights have been proved,
termination of parental rights is in the best interest of the child. See In re L.M.F.,
490 N.W.2d 66, 68 (Iowa 1992). Further, while Kristin is correct in stating the
mother-child relationship can be beneficial to the health of the child, her
argument presumes a healthy mother-child relationship in which the mother can
care for the child without exposing the child to harm. That is not this case. In
this case, Kristin has demonstrated over a sustained period of time that she
cannot control her own behaviors to prioritize the care of her child.
We “cannot deprive a child of permanency after the State has proved a
ground for termination under section 232.116(1) by hoping someday a parent will
learn to be a parent and be able to provide a stable home for the child.” P.L.,
778 N.W.2d at 41; see also In re A.B., 815 N.W.2d 764, 778 (Iowa 2012) (noting
a parent’s past conduct is instructive in determining the parent's future behavior);
In re C.K., 558 N.W.2d 170, 172 (Iowa 1997) (stating that when considering what
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the future holds if a child is returned to the parent, we must look to the parent’s
past behavior because it may be indicative of the quality of care the parent is
capable of providing in the future). Considering all factors in Iowa Code section
232.116(2), we conclude termination of Kristin’s parental rights to S.C. is in the
child's best interest.
C.
Kristin argues termination of her parental rights would be detrimental to
S.C. because of the closeness of the parent-child relationship. See Iowa Code
§ 232.116(3)(c) (providing the court may avoid termination if “there is clear and
convincing evidence that the termination would be detrimental to the child at the
time due to the closeness of the parent-child relationship”). This provision is
permissive, not mandatory. See In re D.S., 806 N.W.2d 458, 474–75 (Iowa Ct.
App. 2011). In other words, the court has discretion, based on the circumstances
of each case, to apply the factors in section 232.116(3) to save the parent-child
relationship. See A.M., 843 N.W.2d at 113. In exercising that discretion, our
consideration is not merely whether there is a parent-child bond, “our
consideration must center on whether the child would be disadvantaged by
termination, and whether the disadvantage overcomes” the parent's inability to
provide for the child's developing needs. See D.W., 791 N.W.2d at 709.
The family’s service providers testified there is a bond between Kristin and
S.C. As discussed above, Kristin attended visitations with S.C. Kristin was
prepared and brought appropriate items. The record also reflected the child had
a greater bond with his foster family and is thriving. There is nothing unique to
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this case that warrants saving the parent-child relationship. The evidence shows
the mother cannot resume care of the child due to her own behaviors and
unaddressed mental health needs.
IV.
For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the order terminating Kristin’s
parental rights.
AFFIRMED.