Eric Earl Houk, Applicant-Appellant v. State of Iowa ( 2017 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 15-1976
Filed February 8, 2017
ERIC EARL HOUK,
Applicant-Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF IOWA,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Taylor County, Dustria A. Relph,
Judge.
Eric Houk appeals the district court’s denial of his postconviction relief
claims. AFFIRMED.
Stephen P. Dowil of Booth Law Firm, Osceola, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Sheryl A. Soich, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee State.
Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Potterfield and Bower, JJ.
2
VAITHESWARAN, Presiding Judge.
A jury found Eric Houk guilty of first-degree kidnapping, second-degree
arson, and three counts of third-degree sexual abuse, in connection with the
confinement, removal, and sexual assault of a young woman, M.F., and the
subsequent destruction of evidence. This court conditionally affirmed his
conviction. State v. Houk, No. 08-2067, 2010 WL 1052085, at *3-4 (Iowa Ct.
App. Mar. 24, 2010) (affirming and remanding for application of correct standard
on review of new trial motion). Houk filed an application for postconviction relief,
which he amended and supplemented.
The State moved for summary judgment. The court granted the motion on
all but one of the claims. Following consideration of written arguments, the court
denied the remaining claim. Houk appealed.
Houk raises his claims under an ineffective-assistance-of counsel rubric.
To succeed, he must show (1) the breach of an essential duty and (2) prejudice.
See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). “If we conclude a
claimant has failed to establish either of these elements, we need not address
the remaining element.” Dempsey v. State, 860 N.W.2d 860, 868 (Iowa 2015).
I. Use of Stun Belt
Houk claims his trial attorney was ineffective in failing to seek a hearing
prior to the State’s placement of a stun belt around his waist. The belt, worn
beneath his clothing, was a security apparatus that allowed officers to shock
Houk with an electrical current and immobilize him if he attempted to flee or if he
or others became disruptive during trial.
3
In resolving this claim, we elect to focus on the Strickland prejudice prong.
This prong requires a postconviction relief applicant to establish a reasonable
probability of a different outcome. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; cf. State v.
Wilson, 406 N.W.2d 442, 448 (Iowa 1987) (“[T]he defendant has the burden to
show the incident prejudicially affected the jury or that his ability to present his
defense was impaired as a result of his being seen in shackles.”); State v.
Blodgett, No. 03-0229, 2003 WL 22900539, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Dec. 10, 2003)
(same). But see Ledezma v. State, 626 N.W.2d 134, 143 (Iowa 2001) (stating “in
Strickland v. Washington, the Supreme Court rejected the claim by the defendant
that prejudice was established when the attorney’s unprofessional errors resulted
in a mere impairment of the presentation of the defense”).
Our de novo review of the record reveals the following facts. A retired
Taylor County sheriff testified that, unlike shackles, the stun belt was not visible
to the jury and, unlike knee braces, the belt did not “lock up,” requiring personnel
to release it within possible eyesight of the jury. The retired sheriff testified the
only problem conveyed to him by personnel inside the courtroom was a need to
readjust the belt, which was done during a break outside the jury’s presence.
Houk did not refute this testimony. There was no indication that any
member of the jury saw the belt or that officers shocked him with it. See State v.
Buchanan, No. 03-0230, 2004 WL 1071896, at *4-5 (Iowa Ct. App. May 14,
2004) (distinguishing cases involving the prejudicial effect of having a defendant
“in the presence of the jury for an extended period of time in prison attire,
restraints, or both”).
4
Houk nonetheless asserts his fear of being shocked made it difficult to
concentrate on the proceedings and this difficulty established Strickland
prejudice. Houk did not express any concerns about the belt during trial.
According to the sheriff, he passed notes to his attorney and was never seen
“sitting rigidly in his chair as though he was afraid to move.”
Nor is there evidentiary support for Houk’s assertion that the stun belt
compelled him to change “his trial strategy” or prevented him from fully
questioning “the credibility of the victim.” Houk’s attorney cross-examined the
complaining witness extensively. The trial record does not reflect that the belt
inhibited Houk from consulting with his attorney during cross-examination or,
indeed, during any part of her testimony.
Finally, the evidence of guilt was overwhelming. See State v. Ambrose,
861 N.W.2d 550, 559 (Iowa 2015). The State meticulously established Houk’s
entry into M.F.’s car shortly before she completed her shift at a local grocery
store, his multiple sexual assaults at various locations, and his decision to
partially destroy the evidence by setting fire to M.F.’s vehicle.
Houk asserted the multiple sex acts were consensual, as was the binding
of her hands and feet with duct tape. Even without the benefit of seeing or
hearing him testify, his defense rings hollow. We conclude Houk failed to
establish a reasonable probability of a different outcome had counsel sought and
obtained a hearing on the use of the belt. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.
II. Challenges to Jury Instructions
In a pro se brief, Houk raises several challenges to the jury instructions
under an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel rubric.
5
A. Confinement Instruction
Houk’s first challenge is to an instruction on the meaning of confinement
for purposes of the kidnapping charge. Houk asks us to consider the view of a
special concurrence in a recent Iowa Supreme Court opinion, State v. Robinson,
859 N.W.2d 464, 488 (Iowa 2015) (Wiggins, J., concurring specially). In
Robinson, as in this case, the district court separately instructed the jury on the
meaning of “confinement.” See Robinson, 859 N.W.2d at 488. The instruction in
Robinson failed to include two intensifiers required by our precedent on
kidnapping: a “substantial” increase in the risk of harm to the victim or a
“significant” decrease in the risk of detection. Id. (citing State v. Rich, 305
N.W.2d 739, 745 (Iowa 1981)). The special concurrence would have found these
omissions inconsistent with Rich and would have concluded defense counsel
breached an essential duty in failing to object to the instruction, which prejudiced
the defendant “in a factually close case such as this.” Id. at 492.
Assuming without deciding that Houk’s trial attorney breached an essential
duty in failing to object to the absence of the quoted intensifiers, we cannot find
Strickland prejudice. Unlike Robinson, this was not a close case; as we have
already discussed, the evidence was overwhelming. Accordingly, there is no
reasonable probability of a different outcome. See State v. Ronnau, 14-0787,
2016 WL 351314, at *10 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 27, 2016) (finding “no reasonable
probability of a different outcome had counsel objected to the uniform jury
instruction” on confinement).
6
B. Kidnapping Instruction
Houk asserts the kidnapping instruction allowed “the jury to convict without
finding all of the elements as prescribed by Iowa Code [section] 710.2, namely
that the victim was intentionally subjected to sexual abuse as a consequence of
the kidnapping.” He focuses on the last element of the kidnapping instruction,
which required the State to prove, “As a result of the removal and/or confinement
[M.F.] was sexually abused.” In his view, this language is inconsistent with the
statute, which requires proof of a “completed kidnapping” rather than “proof of a
simple confinement or removal.”1 This court addressed and rejected the identical
argument in Ronnau. See id. at *9. The court stated:
[W]hen the phrase “as a result of the confinement or removal” is
read in context, it is clearly referring to the defendant’s kidnapping
of the victim. . . . [I]t is clear that when the marshalling instruction is
read in conjunction with the instruction defining confinement or
removal . . . the jury instructions in this case correctly conveyed the
law and elements of the offense of first-degree kidnapping.
Id. We find this reasoning persuasive. Assuming counsel had a duty to object to
the instruction on the ground that it failed to track the language of section 710.2,
Houk was not prejudiced by the omission because the instructions as a whole
properly conveyed the elements of the crime. See id.
C. “Serious Injury” Instruction
Houk takes issue with the following definition of “serious injury” provided to
the jury:
1
Section 710.2 states, “Kidnapping is kidnapping in the first degree when the person
kidnapped, as a consequence of the kidnapping, suffers serious injury, or is intentionally
subjected to torture or sexual abuse.” (Emphasis added.)
7
A serious injury is a disabling mental illness, a condition which
cripples, incapacitates, weakens or destroys a person’s normal
mental functions, and/or bodily injury which creates a substantial
risk of death or which causes serious permanent disfigurement or
extended loss or impairment of the function of any bodily part or
organ. “Serious injury” includes but is not limited to skull fractures
and rib fractures.
Houk contends the inclusion of “skull fractures and rib fractures” was improper
because “in cases of adults, [these] are [not] per se serious injury.” 2 Houk could
not establish a reasonable probability of a different outcome had the challenged
language been removed. As the district court determined, “at worst, the
language is mere surplusage.” The court concluded, “There was no evidence of
skull or rib fractures with respect to the victim in this case, thus no possibility that
the jury could have determined that such evidence was sufficient to constitute a
serious injury under the sentence.” See State v. Maxwell, 743 N.W.2d 185, 197
(Iowa 2008) (“When the submission of a superfluous jury instruction does not
give rise to a reasonable probability the outcome of the proceeding would have
been different had counsel not erred, in the context of an ineffective-assistance-
of-counsel claim, no prejudice results.” (internal citation omitted)).
D. “Dangerous Weapon” Instruction
Dangerous weapon was defined for the jury as follows:
[A]ny device or instrument designed primarily for use in inflicting
death or injury, and when used in its designed manner is capable of
inflicting death. It is also any sort of instrument or device actually
used in such a way as to indicate the user intended to inflict death
or serious injury, and when so used is capable of inflicting death.
2
Iowa Code section 702.18(2) states, “‘Serious injury’ includes but is not limited to skull
fractures, rib fractures, and metaphyseal fractures of the long bones of children under
the age of four years.”
8
The term appeared in the marshalling instruction on second-degree sexual
abuse.
Houk appears to argue the instruction should not have been given
because there was insufficient evidence to prove second-degree sexual abuse
by use of a dangerous weapon. Houk failed to establish Strickland prejudice
because the jury did not find him guilty of second-degree sexual abuse. As the
district court concluded,
[T]he jury did not consider the offense of sexual abuse in the
second degree because it convicted [Houk] of the greater offense
of first degree kidnapping. [Houk] could not have been prejudiced
by an instruction that the jury would not consider if it followed the
court’s instructions, which it is presumed to have done.
E. Instruction on Third-Degree Kidnapping
Houk challenges an instruction on third-degree kidnapping and,
specifically, the element requiring proof of specific intent to “secretly confine
[M.F.]” He points to the State’s removal of any allegation of secret confinement
as an alternate charging ground. Again, Houk failed to establish Strickland
prejudice. As the district court stated,
[T]he jury did not consider the offense of kidnapping in the third
degree because it convicted [Houk] of the greater offense of first
degree kidnapping. [Houk] could not have been prejudiced by an
instruction that the jury would not consider if it followed the court’s
instructions, which it is presumed to have done.
F. Second-Degree Kidnapping Instruction
Houk claims he “was entitled to a . . . second-degree kidnapping
instruction as the primary lesser included offense as guaranteed by the Iowa
Constitution.” Second-degree kidnapping is “[k]idnapping where the purpose is
to hold the victim for ransom or where the kidnapper is armed with a dangerous
9
weapon.” Iowa Code § 710.3 (2007). In Houk’s view, the State must have
believed a dangerous weapon was involved in light of its request for a
“dangerous weapon” instruction and, if there was substantial evidence of a
dangerous weapon, the second-degree kidnapping instruction was warranted.
The district court concluded second-degree kidnapping was not a lesser
included offense of first-degree kidnapping. The court reasoned as follows: “A
conviction of first degree kidnapping can . . . occur without necessarily including
second degree kidnapping since sexual abuse is not an element of second
degree kidnapping and neither option for the commission of second degree
kidnapping is required for first degree kidnapping.” We agree with this
conclusion. See State v. Bitzan, No. 12-0551, 2013 WL 3273813, at *4 (Iowa Ct.
App. June 26, 2013) (concluding where the State charged first-degree
kidnapping under sexual-abuse alternative, “second-degree kidnapping [was] not
a lesser-included offense” and “defense counsel was not ineffective because
counsel has no duty to pursue a meritless issue”). Counsel did not breach an
essential duty in failing to insist on a second-degree kidnapping instruction.
III. Trial Information
Houk claims the “trial information and subsequent verdicts and judgment
. . . are void due to the lack of sufficient factual specificity.” As the district court
concluded, “The minutes in this case are detailed and clearly support each of the
charges filed.” See State v. Grice, 515 N.W.2d 20, 23 (Iowa 1994) (“Iowa courts
consider both the indictment or information and the minutes filed when
determining the adequacy of the allegations to apprise the accused of the crime
10
charged.”). Counsel did not breach an essential duty in failing to challenge the
trial information.
IV. Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel
Houk claims his appellate attorney was ineffective in failing to raise the
ineffectiveness of trial counsel. We no longer require ineffective-assistance-of-
counsel claims to be raised on direct appeal to preserve them for postconviction
relief. See Iowa Code § 814.7(1) (2016) (“An ineffective assistance of counsel
claim . . . need not be raised on direct appeal . . . in order to preserve the claim
for postconviction relief purposes.”). Accordingly, we conclude appellate counsel
did not breach an essential duty in failing to raise the ineffective-assistance
claims Houk later raised in his postconviction relief application
V. Search Warrants
Houk contends search warrants issued in the case were void. He asserts
that the “search warrant application affidavit” failed to demonstrate “a nexus
between criminal activity and the 2004 red Dodge vehicle that was searched at
[his] residence.”
In determining whether probable cause exists to issue a search warrant,
“[t]he task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, common-sense
decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before [the
magistrate], . . . there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime
will be found in a particular place.” State v. Hoskins, 711 N.W.2d 720, 727 (Iowa
2006) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983)); see also State v.
McNeal, 867 N.W.2d 91, 100 (Iowa 2015) (“[T]he affidavit of probable cause is
11
interpreted in a common sense, rather than a hypertechnical, manner.” (citation
omitted)).
The district court addressed this claim as follows,
[T]he search warrant application recites that the victim and [Houk]
were located leaving [Houk’s] residence when [he] was
apprehended. At that time, according to the search warrant
application, the only vehicle at [Houk’s] residence was the red
Dodge pickup truck. Since his residence was in a rural area, it is
logical to assume that they did not arrive at the residence on foot
and used the pickup truck to get there. The search warrant
application also affirmatively indicates that [Houk] and the victim
drove to [his] residence.
Further, the search warrant application indicates that a red
pickup truck was seen at the area where it was believed that the
victim had been abducted, that this truck left tire tracks, and that the
pickup truck at [Houk’s] residence had tires with tread similar to the
tracks found at the scene of the abduction. The victim’s car had
also been found burning behind the Junction Café in Bedford, some
distance form [Houk’s] residence, further lending support to the
assumption that the pickup truck was the means of transportation
from the scene of the abduction to [Houk’s] residence.
....
[A]n attorney is not incompetent for failing to pursue a
meritless issue. [Houk’s] arguments are wholly without merit and a
motion to suppress would have been denied. There can be no
prejudice to [Houk] for his trial counsel failing to attack the search
warrants . . . .
On our de novo review of the search warrant application, we concur in this
analysis. There is no question the State established a sufficient nexus to support
the search warrant application. Accordingly, counsel did not breach an essential
duty in failing to challenge the search warrant.
VI. Prosecutorial Misconduct
Houk claims “the prosecutor committed misconduct by falsely
characterizing evidence.” He contends the prosecutor misled the jury by
12
“consistently misidentify[ying] a red mark on [M.F.’s] left hand as a bruise” rather
than a “petechial.” The district court stated,
[T]he difference between a bruise and a petechial is one of degree
of subcutaneous bleeding, with a bruise representing a relatively
greater amount of bleeding. Both terms refer to an injury suffered
by the victim and there is no reason to believe based on this record
that referring to the victim’s injury by the correct medical term
instead of the common lay term would have made any difference in
the outcome of this case. The jury had a picture of the victim’s
hand where the injury was located and was free to assess the
significance of that injury without regard to the terminology used to
describe it.
We fully concur in this analysis. Counsel did not breach an essential duty in
failing to challenge the prosecutor’s use of the term “bruise.”
VII. Jury Selection
Houk contends “the district court erred and abused its discretion . . . by
overruling challenges for cause which, forced [him] to use all of his peremptory
strikes and forced incompetent jurors upon him.”
A juror may be removed for cause where “the juror holds such a fixed
opinion on the merits of the case that he or she cannot judge impartially the guilt
or innocence of the defendant.” State v. Neuendorf, 509 N.W.2d 743, 746 (Iowa
1993) (citing State v. Gavin, 360 N.W.2d 817, 819 (Iowa 1985)). The “partiality of
a juror may not be made the basis for reversal in instances in which that juror has
been removed through exercise of a peremptory challenge.” Id. at 747. A
peremptory challenge “serve[s] as a safeguard against an unjust conviction.”
State v. Mootz, 808 N.W.2d 207, 223 (Iowa 2012).
During jury selection, Houk’s attorney challenged juror D.E. for cause.
The district court denied the challenge. We are persuaded D.E. should have
13
been removed for cause. D.E. repeatedly equivocated on whether he could be
fair and impartial. He conceded he made “some pretty strong statements” about
the case when it first arose, essentially commenting on “what they should do with
people that are responsible for basically wrecking a girl’s life.” When asked what
he thought should happen, he stated, “Whoever is responsible for it should not
see daylight again.” While he did not assert Houk was guilty, he stated he did
not “know” whether he could set aside his prior views. These were not the words
of an impartial juror. See Neuendorf, 509 N.W.2d at 745 (concluding juror who
simply stated he would “try” to judge the defendant on what he did or did not do
should have been removed for cause).
Houk’s attorney also challenged juror T.G. for cause. The district court
denied the challenge. Again, we are persuaded T.G. should have been removed
for cause. She stated “when they find a girl that they are looking for at
someone’s house, it is kind of hard not to form some sort of an opinion.” When
asked whether she could put this opinion aside, she responded, “You’ve got to
completely forget everything you heard? Probably not.” She continued, “[I]t
would be harder to presume probably that he is innocent.” When advised she
was required to presume him innocent and asked whether she could do that, she
responded, “I’m not so sure.” These were not the words of an impartial juror.
That said, the failure to have these jurors removed for cause could not be
laid at defense counsel’s doorstep. Because Houk’s attorney challenged both
jurors for cause, Houk failed to establish the breach of an essential duty.
Houk also failed to establish Strickland prejudice. As in Neuendorf, the
prosecutor and Houk’s attorney exercised several peremptory challenges that
14
resulted in the removal of these jurors. They did not decide Houk’s guilt. Cf.
Mootz, 808 N.W.2d at 222 (distinguishing Neuendorf on the ground that the
defendant “was denied the opportunity to exercise a peremptory challenge
against a specific juror”).
Houk next asserts his attorney should have stricken juror J.A. on the basis
of the juror’s disclosure that he was sexually assaulted as a child.
Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.18(5)(m) allows a challenge for cause
where “the juror is a . . . complainant against the defendant or any other person
indicted for a similar offense.” J.A. declined to disclose his childhood abuse by a
“dirty old man” until he was forty-four years old. We surmise, then, that J.A. was
not a complainant in a criminal charge against the man. For that reason,
rule 2.18(5)(m) does not apply.
Additionally, the similarities between J.A.’s experience and that of M.F.
were not “striking.” See State v. Hatter, 381 N.W.2d 370, 372 (Iowa 1985). And,
J.A. unequivocally stated he could be fair and impartial notwithstanding his own
childhood experience. We are persuaded counsel did not breach an essential
duty in failing to challenge this juror for cause or in failing to exercise a
peremptory challenge to remove the juror.
VIII. M.F.’s Medical History
Houk contends his trial attorney was ineffective in failing to “investigate,
interview or call as witnesses any of the medical staff regarding the lack of any
evidence alluding to a sexual assault.” He continues, “[t]here was absolutely no
damaging information in the medical report that would have damaged [his]
defense or trial strategy.” To the contrary, Houk’s trial attorney testified,
15
[T]here was very, very damaging testimony on those medical
records and—and there’s no way to just allow certain portions in
and keep other portions out, because evidence and statements on
the—on those medical records corroborated what she said
happened to her, and they would have been—basically
corroborated her story in regards to what had happened to her, and
it would have been bad for [Houk].
Although a sexual assault nurse examiner conceded there was “no
evidence of injuries found” during her exam of M.F., she stated, “You can’t
assume because there are no injuries that [a sexual assault] did not occur.” She
testified by deposition that “more often than not” a “victim can be subject to
sexual assault without actually . . . sustaining any injuries.” We conclude counsel
did not breach an essential duty in declining to introduce medical evidence.
IX. Alleged Exculpatory Videotape
Houk contends he “was denied effective assistance of trial counsel when
counsel failed to employ video evidence that . . . supported [his] defense.” He
asserts his attorney “had access to video that proved that [he] was in the Locker
Room Bar until 9:49 p.m.” and thus established M.F. “lied about being abducted
after getting off of work at 9:04 p.m.” As the district court explained,
It would appear that his effort here is to discredit the victim’s
version of events. The difficulty here is that it also completely
discredits [Houk’s] version of events as well. He testified at trial
that he left the Locker Room bar at 9 p.m. so that he could make
contact with the victim when she got off work at 9 p.m. He further
testified that he in fact did have contact with the victim at Hy-Vee as
she was leaving work and that he then waited in the Hy-Vee
parking lot until about 10:30 p.m. for the victim to return. He now
argues that the Locker Room videotape conclusively establishes
that he was at the Locker Room bar until 9:49 p.m. and that his trial
counsel should have introduced it at trial. Had trial counsel done
so, he would have conclusively established that [Houk] . . . had lied
under oath at trial. There is absolutely no chance that the “failure”
of trial counsel to introduce the Locker Room videotape was
ineffective assistance of counsel.
16
On our de novo review, we find this analysis supported by the record.
Counsel did not breach an essential duty in failing to introduce a video that would
have undermined Houk’s testimony and impeached his credibility.
X. Double Jeopardy
Houk contends “his multiple sentences of sexual abuse in the third
degree” should be vacated “as they are factually and legally lesser included
offenses of first degree kidnapping.” We need not review this contention under
an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel rubric because an illegal sentence may be
challenged at any time. See State v. Walker, 610 N.W.2d 524, 526 (Iowa 2000)
(“An illegal sentence may be urged as a ground for reversal at any time,
obviating the need to challenge the error in district court in order to preserve the
issue for appeal.”); State v. Halliburton, 539 N.W.2d 339, 343 (Iowa 1995)
(“[I]llegal sentences are not subject to the usual requirements of error
preservation and waiver. . . . [Defendant’s] conduct in the trial court does not
prevent him from claiming on appeal that his sentences violated section 701.9.”).
A merger argument is inapplicable where there are “two separate crimes.”
Walker, 610 N.W.2d at 525; State v. Dittmer, 653 N.W.2d 774, 777-78 (Iowa Ct.
App. 2002). The State charged and proved several separate crimes.
Accordingly, Houk was appropriately sentenced for each of the crimes.
We affirm the district court’s denial of Houk’s postconviction relief
application.
AFFIRMED.