In re the Marriage of Teter ( 2018 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 18-0302
Filed December 19, 2018
IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF ANGELA SUE TETER
AND CLARENCE WAYNE TETER
Upon the Petition of
ANGELA SUE TETER,
Petitioner-Appellee,
And Concerning
CLARENCE WAYNE TETER,
Respondent-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Boone County, Steven J. Oeth,
Judge.
Clarence Teter appeals the district court decision denying his motion to
modify spousal support. REVERSED IN PART AND REMANDED.
Jennie L. Wilson-Moore of Wilson Law Firm, Conrad, for appellant.
Chelsey N. Handley-Tomlinson and Larry J. Handley of Handley Law Firm,
P.C., Ankeny, for appellee.
Considered by Tabor, P.J., and Mullins and Bower, JJ.
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BOWER, Judge.
Clarence Teter appeals the district court’s ruling on his petition for
modification of spousal support. We find the spousal support award is traditional,
not reimbursement, and can be modified. We reverse the district court order as to
the spousal support provision and remand for further proceedings.
I. Background Facts & Proceedings
Clarence and Angela Teter were married in 1993 and have five children.
On December 31, 2012, the court entered a decree dissolving the marriage.
During the marriage, Clarence was the primary financial support for the family.
Angela was primary caregiver for their children and earned substantially less than
Clarence when she worked outside the home. The dissolution decree ordered
Clarence to pay Angela $600 per month in spousal support to terminate upon
Angela’s remarriage, the death of either party, or upon Clarence’s sixty-seventh
birthday.
On May 13, 2017, Clarence filed a petition to modify spousal support due
to an injury lowering his income and Angela’s long engagement and financial
support from her fiancé. Angela has been engaged for four years and owns a
house with her fiancé but states she has no interest in remarrying. The court
concluded the spousal support award was “reimbursement alimony” and so could
not be modified. Clarence appeals.
II. Standard of Review
Our review in this equitable action is de novo. Iowa R. App. P. 6.907. We
give weight to the factual findings of the district court, especially when considering
the credibility of witnesses, but are not bound by those findings. Iowa R. App.
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P. 6.904(3)(g). “Precedent is of little value as our determination must depend on
the facts of the particular case.” In re Marriage of Fennelly, 737 N.W.2d 97, 100
(Iowa 2007).
III. Spousal Support
Clarence claims the court wrongly classified the spousal support award as
“reimbursement alimony”; he argues it should be considered rehabilitative because
Angela was capable of becoming self-sufficient.
In the original dissolution hearing, Angela acknowledged her earning
potential would increase if she obtained her certified nursing assistant certification.
She also stated she would be able to work full time by 2018. The court ordered
$600 per month in spousal support in an effort to equalize the parties’ incomes in
light of their adjusted monthly incomes, child support, and projected expenses.
The court did not specifically classify the spousal support award as traditional,
reimbursement, or rehabilitative at that time. The court ruled the spousal support
obligation would end at the earliest of several events: Angela remarrying,
Clarence’s sixty-seventh birthday, Angela’s death, or Clarence’s death. The court
noted as a relevant factor Angela’s liquidation of her retirement funds to pay living
expenses for herself and their children.
Iowa law recognizes three kinds of spousal support: traditional,
rehabilitative, and reimbursement. In re Marriage of Gust, 858 N.W.2d 402, 408
(Iowa 2015). Traditional or permanent spousal support “is to provide the receiving
spouse with support comparable to what he or she would receive if the marriage
continued,” and it “is ordinarily unlimited in duration except upon the remarriage of
the payee spouse, or death of either party. There can, however, be exceptions to
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the general rule.” Id. at 408, 415 (citations omitted). This type of support is often
awarded to a spouse who abandons their career to stay home with the family while
the other concentrates on their career. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Becker, 756
N.W.2d 822, 827 (Iowa 2008).
Rehabilitative spousal support provides support for the economically-
dependent spouse through a limited period of education or retraining. In re
Marriage of Francis, 442 N.W.2d 59, 63 (Iowa 1989).
Reimbursement spousal support “is predicated upon economic sacrifices
made by one spouse during the marriage that directly enhance the future earning
capacity of the other” and is not generally subject to modification or termination
prior to full compensation or death. Id. at 64. In particular, reimbursement spousal
support “is designed to give the ‘supporting’ spouse a stake in the ‘student’
spouse’s future earning capacity, in exchange for recognizable contributions to the
source of that income.” Id. at 63.
In the modification action, the court stated the dissolution court “did not
classify the alimony award as either reimbursement or rehabilitative.” The court
did not consider whether it was a traditional, or permanent, spousal support award.
The court then concluded the spousal support was “reimbursement alimony” and
could not be modified. The court further noted it would not change the award even
if it could because “Angela needs the income. . . . Angela deserves the alimony.”
The dissolution decree specifically mentions Angela “requested permanent
spousal support.” The spousal support award appears reflective of the respective
earning capacities of the parties and their division of marital labor rather than an
attempt to provide Angela a stake in Clarence’s future unrealized earnings. This
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was not a divorce following on the heels of Clarence completing an advanced
degree or other contribution by Angela resulting in greatly increased future
earnings for Clarence. Additionally, the provision terminating the spousal support
on remarriage or Clarence’s sixty-seventh birthday reflects traditional spousal
support rather than reimbursement. See Francis, 442 N.W.2d at 64.
We find the dissolution court considered the spousal support award as
“traditional” or “permanent” spousal support and therefore the court can modify the
amount of spousal support upon the showing of a substantial change in
circumstances. See Iowa Code § 598.21C (2017); In re Marriage of Michael, 839
N.W.2d 630, 635–36 (Iowa 2013).
The court also ruled it would not modify the spousal support award even if
it could but did not make any factual or legal findings whether Angela’s cohabitation
was so economically akin to remarriage to warrant modification or trigger the
decree’s remarriage provision terminating the award. See In re Marriage of Ales,
592 N.W.2d 698, 702–03 (Iowa Ct. App. 1999) (holding cohabitation effects on
spousal support awards are evaluated consistent with the effects of remarriage).
Given the decree provided the spousal support would end on Angela’s remarriage,
the effects of her cohabitation merited the court’s analysis.
We reverse the district court’s order regarding spousal support and remand
for the district court to consider whether a substantial change in circumstances
exists to support a modification.
IV. Appellate Attorney Fees
Angela requests attorney fees for this appeal. “An award of attorney’s fees
is not a matter or right but rests within the discretion of the court.” In re Marriage
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of Benson, 545 N.W.2d 252, 258 (Iowa 1996). We consider the needs of the party
seeking appellate attorney fees, the ability of the other party to pay, and the relative
merits of the appeal. In re Marriage of Sullins, 715 N.W.2d 242, 255 (Iowa 2006).
After considering the relevant circumstances, we decline to award Angela
appellate attorney fees in this case.
REVERSED IN PART AND REMANDED.