In the Interest of K.S., P.S., and N.J., Minor Children ( 2018 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 18-1759
Filed December 19, 2018
IN THE INTEREST OF K.S., P.S., and N.J.,
Minor Children,
A.S., Mother,
Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Adair County, Monty Franklin, District
Associate Judge.
A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights in her three children.
AFFIRMED.
Adam D. Hanson of Hanson Law Office, Winterset, for appellant mother.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Anagha Dixit, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee State.
Julie A. Forsyth of Forsyth Law Office, P.L.L.C., Winterset, guardian ad
litem for minor children.
Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Vaitheswaran and McDonald, JJ.
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McDONALD, Judge.
A mother, Amanda, appeals from an order terminating her parental rights in
her children, K.S., P.S., and N.J., pursuant to Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(e)
and (f) (2018). In this appeal, she challenges the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting termination of her parental rights. The fathers of the children do not
appeal the termination of their respective parental rights.
This court reviews termination proceedings de novo. See In re A.M., 843
N.W.2d 100, 110 (Iowa 2014). The statutory framework authorizing the termination
of a parent-child relationship is well established. See In re A.S., 906 N.W.2d 467,
472-73 (Iowa 2018) (setting forth the statutory framework). The burden is on the
State to prove by clear and convincing evidence (1) the statutory ground or
grounds authorizing the termination of parental rights and (2) termination of
parental rights is in the best interest of the children. See In re E.H., No. 17-0615,
2017 WL 2684420, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. June 21, 2017).
In her first claim of error, Amanda contends there is insufficient evidence
supporting the statutory grounds authorizing termination of her parental rights.
Where, as here, “the juvenile court terminates parental rights on more than one
statutory ground, we may affirm the juvenile court’s order on any ground we find
supported by the record.” In re A.B., 815 N.W.2d 764, 774 (Iowa 2012).
We choose to focus our attention on Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(f).
Amanda concedes the State proved by clear and convincing evidence the first
three elements of section 232.116(1)(f) and limits her to challenge to the fourth
element. The fourth element “require[s] clear and convincing evidence the children
would be exposed to an appreciable risk of adjudicatory harm if returned to the
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parent’s custody at the time of the termination hearing.” E.H., 2017 WL 2684420,
at *1.
On de novo review, we conclude there is clear and convincing evidence
supporting termination of Amanda’s rights pursuant to section 232.116(1)(f). First,
Amanda admitted during the termination hearing the children could not be returned
to her care. When asked, “Would you be able to receive the children back into
your care today?” Amanda replied, “No.” Amanda’s admission is supported by
other evidence. At the time of the termination hearing, Amanda lived with her
federal-parolee paramour, Steve, in a two-bedroom home leased to Steve. Prior
to the termination hearing, Amanda refused to sign a release permitting the Iowa
Department of Human Services (“IDHS”) to contact Steve and conduct a
background investigation. Amanda only acquiesced and presented a signed
release at the termination hearing, but it was too late for IDHS to perform any
investigation. Without the necessary investigation, the children could not be
returned to Amanda’s care while she resided with Steve.
Second, Amanda’s mental-health conditions preclude her from providing
adequate care for her children. Amanda suffers from several mental-health
ailments, including: bipolar-type-one disorder, obsessive-compulsive disorder,
depression, and anxiety. The record reflects these conditions have prevented
Amanda from providing adequate care to and supervision of the children. The
record reflects Amanda has not resolved these concerns. Amanda’s failure to
address these concerns over the life of the case militates in favor of terminating
her parental rights. See In re J.L., No. 18-0324, 2018 WL 1858382, at *2 (Iowa Ct.
App. Apr. 18, 2018) (considering mother’s unresolved mental-health issues as a
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factor supporting termination of her parental rights); In re A.J., No. 17-1796, 2018
WL 437766, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 10, 2018) (concluding mother’s “untreated
mental-health conditions pose[d] a risk of harm” warranting termination); In re T.H.,
No. 17-1558, 2017 WL 6520731, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Dec. 20, 2017) (concluding
mother could not provide adequate supervision and care of her children due to
unaddressed mental-health conditions).
Third, and related to these mental-health concerns, Amanda’s inability to
regulate her emotions and interact with others impedes her ability to provide
adequate care for the children. See In re O.N., No. 17-0918, 2017 WL 3525324,
at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 16, 2017) (finding mother’s inability to regulate her
emotions supported determination that her child could not be returned to her care).
Amanda repeatedly discussed the court proceedings with the children despite
being told not to do so. She encouraged the children to contact the guardian ad
litem and state they wanted to return to Amanda’s care. She offered to purchase
the children pets if they did so. She struggled to manage all three children at the
same time during visitation and acted inappropriately in front of the children. For
example, during one visit, Amanda forgot the food she planned to bring, became
upset, and shouted in front of the children that IDHS had ruined her life and just
wanted her to fail. The children then attempted to comfort Amanda and deescalate
the situation. Amanda remained upset for the remainder the visit, prompting K.S.
to apologize to the supervising family safety, risk, and permanency (“FSRP”)
worker for his mother’s conduct. On another occasion, Amanda became upset
when K.S. refused to attend visitation, complained about it for the duration of her
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visitation with N.J. and P.S., took her frustrations out on the children, and
exclaimed that IDHS was violating her rights.
Fourth, in addition to her mental-health conditions, Amanda’s substance-
abuse problems also inhibit her ability to provide appropriate care for and
supervision of the children. Amanda’s substance abuse, including the use of
methamphetamine, has been ongoing and dates back to her early teens. She
tested positive for methamphetamine in August 2017. Amanda’s substance abuse
presents an appreciable risk of harm to the children. The record shows Amanda
has exposed the children to her illegal behavior. For example, the children have
observed Amanda smoking from a glass pipe. At least one of the children was
also present when Amanda conducted a drug transaction. The record also reflects
Amanda requested her children to pee in a cup for her, presumably for Amanda to
obtain urine in an attempt to circumvent drug testing. Amanda’s ongoing
substance abuse presents an appreciable risk of adjudicatory harm to her children.
See In re A.Z., No. 18-1420, 2018 WL 4909831, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 10, 2018)
(finding children could not be returned to the mother when she did not address her
substance-abuse and mental-health issues); In re A.W., No. 18-0094, 2018 WL
1182618, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 7, 2018) (finding mother’s failure to address
mental-health and substance-abuse issues supported termination of her parental
rights); In re C.E., No. 15-0835, 2015 WL 5578395, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Sept. 23,
2015) (collecting cases finding children could not be returned to parent with
unresolved substance-abuse and mental-health issues).
In her next claim of error, Amanda challenges the State’s reasonable efforts
toward reunification. On appeal, Amanda contends reunification would have been
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more likely had she been provided with additional transportation services. The
FSRP visitation notes indicate Amanda made comments to her social worker
regarding additional transportation services. However, this request was never
brought before the court prior to termination as required. See In re C.H., 652
N.W.2d 144, 148 (Iowa 2002) (“[V]oicing complaints regarding the adequacy of
services to a social worker is not sufficient. A parent must inform the juvenile court
of such challenge.”). This claim is not preserved for appellate review. See In re
A.A.G., 708 N.W.2d 85, 91 (Iowa Ct. App. 2005) (requiring parent request
additional services prior to termination hearing in order to claim State failed to
make reasonable efforts on appeal).
In her last claim of error, Amanda contends termination of her parental rights
is not in the best interest of the children because the children are currently placed
in different homes and there are no plans to reunite them in a single home. She
notes IDHS could not locate a placement able to take all three children due to their
behavioral issues, and she offers she is the only placement willing to do so. When
making a best-interest determination, we “give primary consideration to the
child[ren]’s safety, to the best placement for furthering the long-term nurturing and
growth of the child[ren], and to the physical, mental, and emotional condition and
needs of the child[ren].” Iowa Code § 232.116(2). While there is a recognized
interest in keeping siblings together, this interest does not usurp other
considerations when making a best-interest assessment. See In re T.J.O., 527
N.W.2d 417, 420 (Iowa Ct. App. 1994).
We conclude termination of Amanda’s rights is in the best interest of the
children. As a result of Amanda’s inability to provide a safe home for the children,
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they have spent significant portions of their lives without a sense of permanency
and in out-of-home placement. At the time of termination, thirteen-year-old K.S.,
ten-year-old P.S., and seven-year-old N.J., respectively, spent seventy-two,
seventy-one, and thirty-nine months out of the home. All three children expressed
their approval of the termination of Amanda’s parental rights, and only N.J.
indicated he would like to continue a relationship with Amanda. While the children
are not likely to find themselves in the same home post-termination, we do not find
that fact troubling in the instant case. K.S. and P.S. were initially placed together
but were separated upon the advice of their therapist due to their volatile
relationship. Although separated from his siblings, N.J. finds himself in a pre-
adoptive home where the mother is a teacher and has worked extensively with him
to catch up developmentally. See A.S., 906 N.W.2d at 475 (finding continued
placement in adoptive home was in the child’s best interest). K.S. is also now in a
pre-adoptive home, and P.S. has two promising adoptive prospects. See id. All
three children’s behavioral needs were caused by years of dysfunction in
Amanda’s care; it would be perverse to deny the children chances at stable homes
and to require the children to remain in her care. These children need and deserve
a sense of permanency, which has escaped them until now. See A.B., 815 N.W.2d
at 777.
Finding no merit in Amanda’s challenges, we affirm the termination of her
parental rights in K.S., P.S., and N.J.
AFFIRMED.