State of Iowa v. Jason Jay Bringus ( 2016 )


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  •                     IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
    No. 15-0478
    Filed March 9, 2016
    STATE OF IOWA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    vs.
    JASON JAY BRINGUS,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ________________________________________________________________
    Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Webster County, Michael J. Moon,
    Judge.
    A defendant challenges his guilty plea on the basis of voluntariness.
    AFFIRMED.
    Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Melinda J. Nye, Assistant
    Appellate Defender, for appellant.
    Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Louis S. Sloven, Assistant
    Attorney General, for appellee.
    Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., Doyle, J., and Blane, S.J.*
    *Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 (2015).
    2
    BLANE, Senior Judge.
    Defendant Jason Bringus appeals the district court order denying his
    motion in arrest of judgment following a guilty plea. He has not shown the district
    court abused its discretion in denying the motion in arrest of judgment. We
    affirm.
    I. Background Facts and Proceedings
    Bringus was charged with attempted murder, robbery in the first degree,
    assault while participating in a felony, going armed with intent, and carrying
    weapons. Following two plea hearings at which Bringus decided not to enter his
    plea, a third plea hearing was scheduled for February 23, 2015.
    At that hearing, pursuant to a plea agreement, Bringus entered guilty
    pleas to attempted murder and second-degree robbery. The court, as part of the
    plea colloquy, engaged in the following exchange with Bringus:
    THE COURT: All right. Is it your own decision to plead guilty
    to these two counts?
    DEFENDANT: Yes.
    THE COURT: Is this a voluntary decision on your part?
    DEFENDANT: Yes.
    THE COURT: Are you pleading guilty as a favor to anyone?
    DEFENDANT: No.
    THE COURT: Other than the plea agreement, have there
    been any promises or guarantees of favorable treatment from
    anyone to get you to plead?
    DEFENDANT: No.
    THE COURT: Have there been any threats of harm to you,
    members of your family or any of your friends to get you to plead
    guilty?
    DEFENDANT: No.
    THE COURT: Have there been any unreasonable forces or
    pressures applied to you to induce your plea?
    DEFENDANT: No.
    ….
    THE COURT: Do you believe that you’re thinking clearly
    today?
    3
    DEFENDANT: Yes.
    The court accepted the guilty pleas, finding that they were entered voluntarily.
    Before sentencing, Bringus filed a motion in arrest of judgment, in which he
    contended that he only pled guilty because of a desire to be sentenced and taken
    to the intake center of the Iowa Department of Corrections (Oakdale) for
    treatment of constant pain caused by a hernia. He alleges he was in so much
    pain during the plea hearing he could not think clearly, and therefore his plea was
    involuntary.
    At the hearing on the motion, Bringus testified the hernia began growing
    while he was held in jail pending trial. He stated he had no access to pain
    medication because the jail refused to transport him to an appointment with his
    doctor.   He was seen by two nurses in jail who recommended surgery, but
    otherwise, he contends he received no treatment. He said he hoped to plead
    guilty, have surgery, and then challenge the plea.
    The district court denied the motion in arrest of judgment. Bringus was
    sentenced. He now appeals.
    II. Standard of Review
    We review a district court’s denial of a motion in arrest of judgment for an
    abuse of discretion and will reverse only if the ruling was based on reasons that
    are clearly unreasonable or untenable. State v. Myers, 
    653 N.W.2d 574
    , 581
    (Iowa 2002).
    III. Voluntariness
    An involuntary plea is one basis for the granting of a motion in arrest of
    judgment. See State v. Speed, 
    573 N.W.2d 594
    , 597 (Iowa 1998). The inquiry
    4
    to be made is “whether in the circumstances of this case the inducement for the
    guilty plea was one which necessarily overcame [the defendant’s] ability to make
    a voluntary decision.” State v. Whitehead, 
    163 N.W.2d 899
    , 903 (Iowa 1969).
    The record at a plea hearing presumptively reflects the facts. State v.
    Nosa, 
    738 N.W.2d 658
    , 661 (Iowa Ct. App. 2007).              Where a defendant
    challenges the voluntariness of a plea, but had asserted the plea was voluntary
    at the plea hearing, the defendant must overcome that presumption. 
    Id.
    It is not enough for Bringus to establish that he was ill or under stress; he
    must establish that his plea was unknowing or involuntary.       See Myers, 
    653 N.W.2d at 581
     (holding district court did not abuse its discretion in denying
    motion in arrest of judgment where defendant claimed diminished capacity due to
    depression but record demonstrated defendant understood plea proceedings);
    Speed, 
    573 N.W.2d at 597-98
     (holding district court did not err in denying motion
    in arrest of judgment where defendant claimed he felt pressured to plead guilty);
    State v. Blum, 
    560 N.W.2d 7
    , 9 (Iowa 1997) (declining to find alleged stress and
    pressure from defendant’s long confinement in jail prevented his entering a
    voluntary and intelligent plea). Physical injury that does not result in diminished
    mental capacity does not necessarily result in an unknowing or involuntary plea.
    Trobaugh v. State, No. 09-0350, 
    2010 WL 1875723
    , at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. May 12,
    2010) (concluding defendant did not show by a preponderance of the evidence
    that his head injury impaired his ability to comprehend the charges or the
    consequences of a guilty plea).
    There is nothing in the record to support Bringus’s claim that he was of
    unsound mind or that his plea was otherwise not knowing or voluntary. During
    5
    the colloquy, Bringus was lucid and answered the court’s questions
    appropriately. He acknowledged during the colloquy he understood his rights,
    was waiving his rights, and wanted to plead guilty. The record made at the plea
    hearing was adequate to establish a knowing and voluntary plea. The court had
    the opportunity to observe Bringus at the plea hearing and at the hearing on the
    motion in arrest of judgment and to determine if Bringus appeared to be of
    unsound mind.1     It declined to do so.      We do not find the court abused its
    discretion.
    AFFIRMED.
    1
    The record shows that the same judge that presided over the plea also heard and ruled
    on Bringus’s motion in arrest of judgment.