In the Interest of R.T. Jr., Minor Child, R.T., Father ( 2016 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 15-1754
Filed March 9, 2016
IN THE INTEREST OF R.T. Jr.,
Minor Child,
R.T., Father,
Appellant.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Linn County, Susan Flaherty,
Associate Juvenile Judge.
A father appeals the termination of his parental rights. AFFIRMED.
Michael M. Lindeman of Lindeman Law, Cedar Rapids, for appellant
father.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Kathrine S. Miller-Todd, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee State.
Julie G. Trachta of Linn County Advocate. Inc., Cedar Rapids, attorney
and guardian ad litem for minor child.
Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Doyle and Mullins, JJ.
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DOYLE, Judge.
A father appeals the termination of his parental rights to his child, R.T. Jr. 1
He claims the State failed to prove the statutory grounds for termination, that he
should be granted additional time to work toward reunification, and that
termination is not in the child’s best interests because the bond between father
and child is strong. We affirm the juvenile court’s order.
We review termination-of-parental-rights proceedings de novo. See In re
A.M., 843 N.W.2d 100, 110 (Iowa 2014). The three-step statutory framework
governing the termination of parental rights is well established and need not be
repeated here. See In re P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33, 40-41 (Iowa 2010). The juvenile
court issued a thorough and well-reasoned ruling terminating the father’s parental
rights, and we adopt the findings of fact and conclusions of law in the juvenile
court’s order as our own.
The juvenile court terminated the father’s parental rights pursuant to Iowa
Code section 232.116(1)(h) (2013). To terminate the father’s parental rights
pursuant to section 232.116(1)(h), the State must prove: (1) the child is three
years of age or younger; (2) the child has been adjudicated a child in need of
assistance (CINA); (3) the child has been removed from the physical custody of
the child’s parents for at least six of the last twelve months, or for the last six
consecutive months; and (4) there is clear and convincing evidence that at the
present time the child cannot be returned to the custody the child’s parents as
provided in section 232.102. The first three elements are not in dispute here.
Rather, the father’s claim on appeal implicates the fourth element.
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The child’s mother’s parental rights were also terminated, and she does not appeal.
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In regard to whether the child could be returned to the father’s custody,
the juvenile court found:
[The child] is now two years old and has been in foster family
care the majority of his life. His parents continue on the roller
coaster that is created by addiction and untreated mental health
issues . . . .
[The father] has continued to maintain regular contact with
[the child] and regularly attends his visits. Unfortunately, he has not
been able to stabilize his life so that he could safely resume care of
his child. [The father] has had multiple positive drug tests, although
he has continued to deny using the substances he has tested
positive for. He has acknowledged intermittent use of
hydrocodone, sometimes by prescription, but he does not
acknowledge that his use of prescription narcotic medication is an
issue even with his history of substance abuse. [The father] has
incurred criminal charges related to substance abuse, including the
most recent charge of public intoxication on July 3, 2015. [The
father] reluctantly agreed to return to a substance abuse treatment
program in February of 2015. He attended three sessions and then
refused to return after being confronted with a positive drug test for
marijuana. [The father] testified that just prior to the first hearing on
this petition, he scheduled an appointment with a different
treatment agency, though he has not yet re-engaged in any
treatment. [The father’s] testimony regarding his substance abuse
history, his episodes of use since [the child’s] removal, and his
need for ongoing treatment showed either a tremendous lack of
insight or [a complete lack of] honesty.
[The father’s] housing continues to be through the PUSH
program. His employment is intermittent and he has not
demonstrated the ability to maintain a home without support from
this time-limited community housing program. [The father] has
continued to associate with individuals known to have substance
abuse issues . . . .
The Department of Human Services [(DHS)] has offered
services and assistance to the family throughout the course of the
[CINA] proceedings. The offered services have included parenting
education, family team meetings, mental health services, substance
abuse evaluations, substance abuse treatment, drug testing and
supervised visitation. Additionally, the parents receive services
through the Department of Corrections and housing assistance
through the PUSH program. No sustained progress has been
made in addressing the issues which led to the child’s removal.
The parents have been given more than ample time to address
their adult issues and demonstrate that they could provide a safe,
stable, drug free home for [the child], and neither parent has been
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able to do so. [The child] could not be returned to the care of a
parent at this time or any time in the reasonably-near future without
continuing to be a child in need of supervision and requiring the
oversight of the court and the [DHS] to assure his safety. He would
continue to be at imminent risk of harm to his health, safety, and
welfare if in the care of either his mother or father due to drug use,
untreated mental health issues, criminal activity, unsafe associates
and lack of safe, stable, drug free housing. Nothing in the evidence
indicates that this is likely to change in the foreseeable future.
Having reviewed the record de novo, we agree. The State proved by clear and
convincing evidence that grounds for termination exist under section
232.116(1)(h).
On appeal, the father also argues “[a]n additional period of rehabilitation
should be granted to allow [him] to prove he is capable of caring for [the child].”
He asserts a few more months would give him more time to prove he can provide
for the child and keep him safe, and the child would suffer no ill effects. As we
have stated numerous times, children are not equipped with pause buttons. “The
crucial days of childhood cannot be suspended while parents experiment with
ways to face up to their own problems.” In re A.C., 415 N.W.2d 609, 613 (Iowa
1987). While the law requires a “full measure of patience with troubled parents
who attempt to remedy a lack of parenting skills,” this patience has been built into
the statutory scheme of chapter 232. In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 494 (Iowa
2000). Our supreme court has explained that “the legislature, in cases meeting
the conditions of [the Iowa Code], has made a categorical determination that the
needs of a child are promoted by termination of parental rights.” In re M.W., 458
N.W.2d 847, 850 (Iowa 1990) (discussing then Iowa Code section
232.116(1)(e)). Consequently, “[t]ime is a critical element,” and parents simply
“cannot wait until the eve of termination, after the statutory time periods for
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reunification have expired, to begin to express an interest in parenting.” C.B.,
611 N.W.2d at 495. At some point, as is the case here, the rights and needs of
the child must rise above the rights and needs of the parent. See In re C.S., 776
N.W.2d 297, 300 (Iowa Ct. App. 2009). The public policy of the state having
been legislatively set, we are obligated to heed the statutory time periods for
reunification. As pointed out by the juvenile court, the father has been given
more than ample time to address his adult issues and demonstrate that he could
provide a safe, stable, drug free home for the child, and he was not able to do so.
We agree with the court’s conclusion that “[n]othing in the evidence indicates that
this is likely to change in the foreseeable future.” Any additional time in limbo
would not be in the child’s best interests.
The father also argues that termination is not in the best interests of the
child due to the bond between the child and the father. While the record
discloses a bond between the child and the father, the record indicates
termination is in the child’s best interests. The child has been removed from
parental custody for a significant portion of his young life. He has done well
developmentally and physically in his foster home and is “a happy, healthy,
active toddler.” He is bonded to his foster parents. The child is in need of
permanency and security that adoption can provide him.
As an aside on appeal, the father claims the DHS should have given him
more visits with less supervision. There is nothing in the record to suggest the
father requested additional visitation or modification of the existing visitation
schedule. He has not preserved this claim for review. See In re A.A.G., 708
N.W.2d 85, 91 (Iowa Ct. App. 2005).
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Accordingly, we affirm the juvenile court’s order terminating the father’s
parental rights.
AFFIRMED.