Michael A. Davis, Applicant-Appellant v. State of Iowa ( 2016 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 14-2103
Filed November 9, 2016
MICHAEL A. DAVIS,
Applicant-Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF IOWA,
Respondent-Appellee.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, J. Hobart Darbyshire,
Judge.
Michael Davis appeals from the district court order dismissing his
application for postconviction relief. AFFIRMED.
Christopher M. Soppe of Pioneer Law Office, Dubuque, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Sheryl A. Soich, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee State.
Considered by Danilson, C.J., and Mullins and Bower, JJ.
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DANILSON, Chief Judge.
Michael Davis appeals from the district court order dismissing his
application for postconviction relief (PCR). The hearing on the application was
held on December 1, 2014. Davis was convicted of first-degree kidnapping,
second-degree sexual abuse, and aggravated assault in 1997. Davis filed this
second PCR application on August 25, 2014, asserting the judgment entered
upon his conviction is void because the kidnapping statute is unconstitutionally
vague. The State filed a motion to dismiss the PCR application for failure to file
within the three-year statute of limitations. See Iowa Code § 822.3 (2013). Davis
argued the statute of limitations did not apply because his claims were based on
a new ground of law and could not have been raised within the requisite three-
year period.
Davis’ PCR application asserted Hatter v. Warden, Iowa Men’s
Reformatory, 734 F. Supp. 1505, 1512-13 (N.D. Iowa 1990)—holding the
kidnapping statute was not unconstitutionally vague as interpreted by the Iowa
Supreme Court—“was very new law” at the time of the 1997 trial. Therefore, trial
counsel would not have raised the issue regarding the vagueness of the
kidnapping statute. However, in light of “drastic changes in recent years” to Iowa
criminal law, Davis requested the district court consider whether the kidnapping
statute provisions were unconstitutionally vague. The district court dismissed
Davis’ PCR application, holding:
In both [Davis’] prior direct appeal and his prior postconviction-relief
action constitutional issues were asserted and argued and his
present constitutional claim was available then. No new legal
authority suggests his sentence was in any way illegal or that the
sentencing court lacked ‘inherent power’ to impose the sentence it
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did. No constitutional issue is presented that suggests a new basis
for relief. Nothing in this new postconviction case rises to the level
of a fact or law that could not have been raised within the
applicable time period, and the court concludes there is no genuine
issue of material fact and the State is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.
We agree the PCR application was untimely, and affirm the district court
order dismissing the application.
To the extent Davis now raises arguments on appeal based on the holding
in State v. Robinson, 859 N.W.2d 464 (Iowa 2015), error is not preserved.
Robinson was decided in 2015 and was not raised before or addressed by the
district court. Thus, we will not consider the issue on appeal. See Meier v.
Senecaut, 641 N.W.2d 532, 537 (Iowa 2002) (“It is a fundamental doctrine of
appellate review that issues must ordinarily be both raised and decided by the
district court before we will decide them on appeal.”).
On our review for correction of errors at law, Nguyen v. State, 829 N.W.2d
183, 186 (Iowa 2013), we find the district court did not err in dismissing Davis’
PCR application. We therefore affirm.
AFFIRMED.