Christopher Allen Puccio, Applicant-Appellant v. State of Iowa ( 2016 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 15-1850
Filed November 9, 2016
CHRISTOPHER ALLEN PUCCIO,
Applicant-Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF IOWA,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Dubuque County, Michael J.
Shubatt, Judge.
Appeal from the denial of postconviction relief. AFFIRMED.
Andrew C. Abbott of Abbott Law Office, P.C., Waterloo, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Kevin Cmelik, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee State.
Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Vaitheswaran and McDonald, JJ.
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MCDONALD, Judge.
Christopher Puccio appeals the order denying his application for
postconviction relief. Puccio raises several claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel. First, plea counsel allowed Puccio to enter a guilty plea that was not
knowing and voluntary and failed to file a motion in arrest of judgment raising the
issue. Second, plea counsel allowed Puccio to enter a guilty plea that lacked a
factual basis. Third, plea counsel failed to provide Puccio a copy of the trial
information.
We review claims of ineffective assistance of counsel de novo. See State
v. Liddell, 672 N.W.2d 805, 809 (Iowa 2003). To prove ineffective assistance of
counsel, a defendant must show his trial counsel breached an essential duty and
prejudice resulted. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687–88 (1984).
There is a strong presumption counsel’s performance fell within the range of
reasonable professional assistance. See Wemark v. State, 602 N.W.2d 810, 814
(Iowa 1999). The defendant must show “a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. In the context of a
guilty plea, the defendant must establish that, but for counsel’s breach of duty,
the defendant would not have pleaded guilty and would have gone to trial. See
State v. Straw, 709 N.W.2d 128, 137 (Iowa 2006).
Puccio pleaded guilty to forgery, in violation of Iowa Code section 715A.2
(2011), and delivery of a controlled substance, in violation of Iowa Code section
124.401. With respect to the forgery conviction, during the plea colloquy, Puccio
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admitted he attempted to use an identification card belonging to his brother to
claim gambling winnings of $7525 at a local casino. With respect to the
controlled-substance conviction, during the plea colloquy, Puccio admitted he
met with an undercover law enforcement official and sold that individual ecstasy,
a controlled substance. After pleading guilty to these offenses, Puccio was
placed at a residential treatment facility to await sentencing. The plea agreement
called for consecutive sentences, said sentences to be suspended. However,
Puccio absconded from the facility prior to sentencing. He was arrested shortly
thereafter, and the parties renegotiated the plea agreement. Puccio was
sentenced to concurrent terms of incarceration.
Puccio claims his guilty pleas were not knowing and voluntary.
Specifically, Puccio had various mental health conditions, and the jail failed to
provide him with his medications for the same, which, he alleges, rendered him
unable to understand the nature of the charges against him, the plea
proceedings, and the consequences of his pleas. Due process requires a guilty
plea be knowing and voluntary. State v. Speed, 573 N.W.2d 594, 597 (Iowa
1998). A defendant must be aware of the “constitutional protections that he gives
up by pleading guilty, [and] ‘the nature of the crime with which he is charged’ and
the potential penalties.” State v. Loye, 670 N.W.2d 141, 151 (Iowa 2003)
(citation omitted). Ideally, the court explains the elements of the charge. See
Brainard v. State, 222 N.W.2d 711, 714 (Iowa 1974). However, the court need
not review and explain each element of the crime if it is apparent the defendant
understands the nature of the charge. See Loye, 670 N.W.2d at 151. We look
for substantial compliance—that is, that the defendant be informed of the items
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listed in the rule and understand them. See State v. Victor, 310 N.W.2d 201, 204
(Iowa 1981); State v. Oberbreckling, 235 N.W.2d 121, 122 (Iowa 1975); State v.
Sanders, No. 03-1734, 2004 WL 2169748, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Sept. 29, 2004).
The record reflects Puccio did have several mental health diagnoses at
the time of his guilty pleas. However, none of his stated diagnoses was
presented as rendering him unable to understand the nature of the charges
against him, the plea proceedings, or the consequences of pleading guilty.
Similarly, the lack of medication was not presented as having any effect on
Puccio’s ability to understand the nature of the charges against him, the plea
proceedings, or the consequences of pleading guilty. To the contrary, Puccio
informed the court he was capable of understanding the proceedings and
confident in the information he had discussed with counsel. The plea colloquy
reflects Puccio’s ability to understand the nature of the charges, the nature of the
proceedings, and the consequences for pleading guilty. See Castro v. State, 795
N.W.2d 789, 795–96 (Iowa 2011) (affirming grant of summary judgment where
defendant stated he understood proceedings and guilty plea during colloquy);
Borrego v. State, No. 14-1590, 2015 WL 5577765, at *1, 3–4 (Iowa Ct. App.
Sept. 23, 2015) (affirming denial of postconviction relief where colloquy
demonstrated understanding of charges and consequences). Puccio’s counsel
testified he did not have any difficulty in communicating with Puccio during the
pendency of the criminal proceedings and had no reason to believe Puccio was
unable to understand the proceedings.
Where, as here, “an applicant’s assertions concerning the knowing and
intelligent nature of a guilty plea are directly contradicted by the record, the
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applicant bears a special burden to establish that the record is inaccurate.”
Arnold v. State, 540 N.W.2d 243, 246 (Iowa 1995). Puccio did not carry that
burden. We agree with the district court’s assessment of Puccio’s claim, “This is
a case of buyer’s remorse, one in which Puccio unwisely absconded from
supervision pending sentencing, thereby putting himself in a position where his
sentence would more likely be imposed rather than suspended.” Accordingly, we
conclude counsel did not breach an essential duty in failing to file a meritless
motion in arrest of judgment. See State v. Brubaker, 805 N.W.2d 164, 171 (Iowa
2011) (“We will not find counsel incompetent for failing to pursue a meritless
issue.”).
Puccio next argues there was no factual basis for the guilty pleas. A court
must ensure a guilty plea is supported by a factual basis before accepting that
plea. See Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.8(2)(b); State v. Schminkey, 597 N.W.2d 785, 788
(Iowa 1999). In determining whether a factual basis exists, a court considers “the
entire record before [it] at the guilty plea hearing, including any statements made
by the defendant, facts related by the prosecutor, and the minutes of testimony.”
State v. Keene, 630 N.W.2d 579, 581 (Iowa 2001). The record “need only
demonstrate the facts that support the offense.” State v. Velez, 829 N.W.2d 572,
576 (Iowa 2013). Counsel breaches an essential duty by allowing a defendant to
plead guilty where a factual basis does not exist, and prejudice is inherent. See
Schminkey, 597 N.W.2d at 788.
Here, the record establishes a factual basis for the pleas. Puccio admitted
the elements of each of the offenses. Puccio also admitted that if the witnesses
identified in the minutes testified as set forth in the minutes, then there would be
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sufficient evidence to convict him of the charges. Puccio’s real complaint
appears to be the plea colloquy was brief and the plea court should have asked
more open-ended questions to develop the elements. The argument is without
merit. While that might be better practice, it is not required. Here, the plea court
asked Puccio questions regarding the elements of the offenses, and Puccio
admitted to each of the elements. Nothing more was required. We thus
conclude counsel was not ineffective in failing to challenge the factual basis for
the guilty pleas or the nature of the plea colloquy.
Finally, Puccio argues his counsel failed to provide him with a copy of the
trial information and minutes of testimony. See Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.8(1) (“The
defendant shall be given a copy of the indictment or information before being
called upon to plead.”). We conclude the claim is without merit. Puccio’s trial
counsel testified he met with Puccio on multiple occasions to discuss this case.
It was counsel’s standard practice to provide a copy of the trial information to his
clients, although he could not specifically remember giving a copy to Puccio.
There was no reason why he would not have given Puccio a copy of the trial
information in accord with his standard practice. Evidence of standard office
practices may be sufficient to raise a presumption the act was done on the
occasion in question. See State v. Williams, 445 N.W.2d 408, 411 (Iowa Ct. App.
1989). The district court credited counsel’s testimony. The district court’s finding
is supported by substantial evidence, and we will not disturb it. See Carroll v.
State, 466 N.W.2d 269, 271 (Iowa Ct. App. 1990).
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For the above-stated reasons, we conclude the district court did not err in
dismissing Puccio’s application for postconviction relief. We affirm the judgment
of the district court.
AFFIRMED.