State of Iowa v. Jason Shimar Keys ( 2017 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 15-1991
Filed May 3, 2017
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
JASON SHIMAR KEYS,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Cerro Gordo County, Rustin T.
Davenport, Judge.
Defendant appeals his conviction of delivery of methamphetamine in
violation of Iowa Code section 124.401(1)(c)(6) (2014) following a jury trial and
the district court’s order substituting new State’s exhibits 1, 7, and 8. AFFIRMED
IN PART AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS.
Dylan J. Thomas of Dylan J. Thomas, Attorney at Law, Mason City, for
appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Louis S. Sloven, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.
Considered by Potterfield, P.J., Doyle, J., and Mahan, S.J.*
*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 (2017).
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POTTERFIELD, Presiding Judge.
Jason Keys appeals his conviction of delivery of methamphetamine, in
violation of Iowa Code section 124.401(1)(c)(6) (2014), following a jury trial and
the district court’s order following the State’s motion for bill of exceptions
substituting State’s exhibits 1, 7, and 8. He argues the court erred in multiple
rulings and trial counsel was ineffective. He also argues the court erred in ruling
that the State’s substitute exhibits 1 and 8 were accurate copies of the originals.
We remand for the district court to apply the correct standard in its ruling on the
motion for new trial and preserve his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims for
postconviction relief.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
On December 4, 2014, a confidential informant, Jonathan Hjelle, notified
Frank Hodak, Sheriff’s Deputy and North Central Iowa Drug Task Force
investigator, that he could purchase one gram of methamphetamine from Jason
Keys later that day. Hodak then assembled other members of the task force to
conduct a controlled buy.
In preparation for the buy, Hodak met Hjelle at a predetermined location,
searched him, fitted him with a digital recorder and live audio wire, and provided
him with one hundred and thirty dollars in pre-recorded buy money. Hjelle then
contacted Keys through text messages to confirm the transaction. Hjelle testified
that he walked to the house where Keys was located and met Keys in the back
bedroom. He stated that he sat down, handed Keys the money, and after Keys
commented on an older, crisp fifty-dollar bill, Keys handed the methamphetamine
to him. The members of the task force, including Hodak, surveilled the activities
3
visually through a window and through the live audio wire. During the
transaction, the audio recording revealed that Keys referenced an “old school”
fifty-dollar bill, which was part of the buy money.
After the purchase, Keys and Hjelle went outside to meet two individuals
in a truck. The individuals were interested in trading a stolen bike for
methamphetamine, but no transaction took place. Hodak testified that he
recognized Keys’s distinctive voice on the live audio wire from prior encounters
and he could hear Keys explain to the individuals in the truck that he was
wearing a facemask because he had active warrants. Hodak also testified that
he visually recognized Keys when he exited the building even though Keys was
wearing a half ski mask that partially covered the bottom portion of his face.
Following the purchase, Hjelle returned a small bag of a white, crystal
substance to Hodak. Hodak field-tested the substance, which tested positive for
methamphetamine. Laboratory testing later confirmed the substance was .81
grams of methamphetamine. An arrest warrant was issued for Keys, and in May
2015, he was arrested for delivery of methamphetamine. During a recorded
post-arrest interview, Hodak read Keys his Miranda rights, explained the charge
was related to a controlled buy on December 4, 2014, and indicated that Keys
had “options.” Hodak advised Keys that he was interested “in moving up the
chain” and buying from “other people.” Hodak stated, “We know that you
middled the deal,” and Keys responded affirmatively. Hodak then stated, “We
want to move up the ladder” and would talk to the county attorney to “make the
charges go away” if Keys assisted with controlled buys.
4
On June 2, 2015, the State charged Keys with one count of delivery of
methamphetamine, in violation of Iowa Code section 124.401(1)(c)(6), and as an
habitual felony offender, as defined under section 902.8 and 902.9(1)(c). Keys
filed a motion to suppress evidence arguing, in part, the post-arrest interview
should be excluded from trial under Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.408, as the
interview included the officer discussing working with prosecutors to reduce the
charges. On August 7, 2015, a hearing was held on the issue. In its order, the
district court determined Hodak’s statement “You make some controlled buys for
us and make these charges go away” was a promise of leniency. The court
excluded portions of the post-arrest audio recording following Hodak’s statement
but allowed the preceding conversation between Hodak and Keys to be played
for the jury as State’s exhibit 8.
At trial, Officer Hodak and informant Hjelle identified Keys as the individual
each saw during the controlled buy. Officer Hodak also identified Keys’s voice as
a voice on the tape of the controlled buy. Keys testified he was not the individual
who sold methamphetamine to Hjelle. He stated he never collected one hundred
and thirty dollars from Hjelle nor did he hand anyone a bag of methamphetamine.
He also stated, “I have never been a middle man, acted as a middle man, or
admitted to being a middle man. And it clearly shows that on the [post-arrest
interview] tape.” Keys admitted on cross-examination that he had active
warrants between late September and December 2014.
During closing arguments, the State argued Keys admitted to being a
middle man in the post-arrest interview. The State also said:
5
And the fact is it’s common sense, common sense. Does it look—
Does he sound like a drug dealer, does he look like a drug dealer,
does the case look like—excuse me. Does the case look like a
drug dealer case; and does it look like the evidence shows that he,
in fact, delivered Methamphetamine?
When discussing the role of the confidential informant and the informant’s
relationship with the police, the state explained, “This is dangerous work, folks.
You're dealing with drug dealers. You’re dealing with people that are not, in
essence, the most innocent people, I guess, is a way to put it. These people can
be dangerous.”
The jury returned a verdict finding Keys guilty as charged.
Following the district court’s denial of Keys’s motion for new trial, Keys
appealed. For reasons not disclosed in the record, State’s exhibit 1, a longer
recording containing witness interviews and the full post-arrest interview of Keys,
which was not admitted into evidence; State’s exhibit 7, the recording of the drug
buy; and exhibit 8, the redacted audio recording of the post-arrest interview after
the partial grant of Keys’s motion to suppress evidence, did not arrive to the Iowa
Supreme Court as part of the record. The originals could not be found. The
district court ordered the State to prepare duplicate copies and set a hearing on
the matter. On June 28, 2016, a hearing was held on the issue whether the
substitute exhibits were appropriate to submit to the supreme court as the
corrected record. Keys’s trial counsel stated he believed the substitutes were
accurate copies of the originals. Keys claimed the substitute copies omitted a
statement by the police, “That’s why we’re willing to work with you,” in response
to Keys’s statement, “I don’t do drugs.” In its order, the court concluded the
substitute copies were accurate representations of the State’s exhibits and
6
directed the clerk to forward substitute exhibits 1, 7, and 8 to the supreme court.
Keys appealed the June 28, 2016 district court order. On September 6, 2016,
the supreme court consolidated both appeals. The case was then transferred to
this court.
II. Standards of Review.
Evidentiary rulings are generally reviewed for abuse of discretion. State v.
Buenaventura, 660 N.W.2d 38, 50 (Iowa 2003). Rulings that apply the promise-
of-leniency doctrine are reviewed for errors at law. See State v. Polk, 812
N.W.2d 670, 674 (Iowa 2012).
Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are reviewed de novo. See,
e.g., State v. Liddell, 672 N.W.2d 805, 809 (Iowa 2003).
“Sufficiency of evidence claims are reviewed for a correction of errors at
law.” State v. Sanford, 814 N.W.2d 611, 615 (Iowa 2012).
“[W]e review a claim that the district court failed to apply the proper
standard in ruling on a motion for new trial for errors at law.” State v. Ary, 877
N.W.2d 686, 706 (Iowa 2016).
III. Discussion
A. Evidentiary Issues.
1. Promises of Leniency. Keys argues the district court erred in
admitting those portions of his post-arrest interview which preceded the officer’s
explicit offer of leniency. Specifically, he argues the district court evaluated the
conversation between Keys and Hodak under the promise-of-leniency standard
7
instead of Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.408.1 Under rule 5.408, the entire
conversation was inadmissible if it was part of a compromise or negotiation. To
the extent the court was correct in applying the promise-of-leniency standard,
Keys argues the officer’s “promise of leniency” began when the parties discussed
“options” and law enforcement’s desire to “move up the chain.”
First, we agree with the district court’s analysis of the audio tape under the
promise-of-leniency doctrine. Under the promise-of-leniency rule, statements
made by the defendant are inadmissible “where the prisoner has been influenced
by any threat or promise.” State v. Howard, 825 N.W.2d 32, 40 (Iowa 2012). On
the other hand, rule 5.408 “is ordinarily not applicable in a criminal case, except
in a plea-bargain situation.” State v. Burt, 249 N.W.2d 651, 652 (Iowa 1977)
(emphasis added). During the post-arrest interview, Keys was interviewed by an
officer and not engaged in plea-bargaining with the district attorney. Accordingly,
rule 5.408 is inapplicable to the post-arrest interview.
Second, the district court did not err in admitting the earlier portions of the
post-arrest interview. The standard to determine whether a promise of leniency
was made is “whether the language used amounts to an inducement which is
1
The applicable rule states:
a. Prohibited uses. Evidence of the following is not admissible—on
behalf of any party—to prove the validity or amount of a disputed claim:
(1) Furnishing, promising, or offering—or accepting, promising to
accept, or offering to accept—a valuable consideration in compromising
or attempting to compromise the claim that was disputed on either validity
or amount.
(2) Conduct or a statement made during compromise negotiations
about the claim.
b. Exceptions. The court may admit this evidence for another
purpose, such as proving a witness’s bias or prejudice, negating a
contention of undue delay, or proving an effort to obstruct a criminal
investigation or prosecution.
Iowa R. Evid. 5.408.
8
likely to cause the subject to make a false confession.” Howard, 825 N.W.2d at
40. Generally, the language must reference how the suspect would be helped in
order for the court to find the defendant was promised leniency. See State v.
McCoy, 692 N.W.2d 6, 28 (Iowa 2005) (“The line is crossed if the officer also tells
the suspect what advantage is to be gained or is likely from making a
confession.” (citations omitted)); State v. Bunker, No. 13-0600, 2014 WL 957432,
at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 12, 2014) (“[T]he detective did not cross the line
because she omitted any reference to how Bunker would be helped.”); State v.
Foy, No. 10-1549, 2011 WL 2695308, at *3–4 (Iowa Ct. App. July 13, 2011)
(declining to find promissory leniency where “the investigators did not explain
how they were going to ‘help’ Foy, or what ‘benefit,’ they could provide him”).
Keys was not offered a specific benefit when the officer suggested “we
want to move up the chain.” Hodak advised Keys to think about it and stated he
did not want an answer that day about the possibility of assisting with controlled
buys. In fact, Keys was not offered any benefit until Hodak stated, “You make
some controlled buys for us and make the charges go away.” In its ruling, the
court explained:
Following his arrest, Keys spoke to law enforcement officers.
Initially no promises of leniency were made. Officer Hodak
informed Jason Keys what he was being charged with, Keys
protested and said, “You guys know I don’t sell dope.” Hodak then
explained, “You have some options. Obviously we want to move
up the chain. You could buy some dope from some people.”
Hodak explained that they wanted to move up the ladder, but he
didn’t want an answer today. Hodak wanted Keys to think about it.
At approximately 58 minutes, 55 seconds on the recording,
Hodak told Keys that Hodak would contact the county attorney.
Hodak then said, “You make some controlled buys for us and make
these charges go away.”
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Thereafter, Keys continued his conversation with the officers
regarding how they would proceed, and Keys indicated his
willingness to work with the police regarding what they had
proposed.
The Court finds that when Mr. Hodak made the statement
that, “You make some controlled buys for us and make these
charges go away” at 58 minutes, 55 seconds in the recording, this
was a promise of leniency.
The court suppressed any statements made by Keys after Hodak made the
statement, “You make some controlled buys for us and make these charges go
away.” We agree with the district court’s analysis that the portions of the audio
recording before the statement were admissible. Statements discussing the
potential of Keys conducting a controlled buy did not rise to a promise of leniency
until Keys was informed of the advantage to be gained—making the charges “go
away.” See McCoy, 692 N.W.2d at 28. The district court did not err in applying
the promise of leniency standard.
2. Testimony Related to Fingerprinting. Keys next argues the court
abused its discretion in overruling trial counsel’s objection to lack of foundation
for testimony of Cameron Manson, a Cerro Gordo County Deputy Sheriff,
regarding the ability to fingerprint cellophane bags. He claims the witness was
required to establish that he had expertise in fingerprinting and attempting to
fingerprint cellophane bags. “A witness may testify to a matter only if evidence is
introduced sufficient to support a finding that the witness has personal knowledge
of the matter. Evidence to prove personal knowledge may consist of the
witness’s own testimony.” Iowa R. Evid. 5.602. Here, Manson was asked if he
“ever had success fingerprinting cellophane bags,” to which he responded, “I
don’t remember having any success. I don’t have any recollection of having
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success with getting fingerprints off of baggies.” Manson was testifying about his
personal knowledge of fingerprinting cellophane bags and not giving an expert
opinion. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in overruling Keys’s objection.
3. Hodak’s Controlled Buy Experience and Audio Interpretation.
Keys next argues the court abused its discretion in overruling trial counsel’s
objection to Hodak’s experience conducting controlled buys. At trial, the State
asked Hodak, “[H]ow many controlled buys have you personally been the lead
investigator for?” Keys’s trial counsel objected based on relevance. The court
overruled the objection, and Hodak responded, “Hundreds. I don’t have an exact
number, but in the hundreds range.”
Under Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.602, “A witness may testify to a matter
only if evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that the witness has
personal knowledge of the matter. Evidence to prove personal knowledge may
consist of the witness’s own testimony.” During his testimony, Hodak testified
about the general procedure of controlled buys. Hodak’s testimony about his
controlled buy experience was relevant to his testimony about procedure. See
Iowa R. Evid. 5.602. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in overruling
Keys’s objection.
Keys also claims the court abused its discretion in overruling an objection
to Hodak’s interpretation of the live audio wire and his visual identification of
Keys in the courtroom based on his identification testimony during the playing of
exhibit 7. At trial, the State played the audio recording of the live wire (exhibit 7)
while Hodak testified what he heard on the recording and what he observed
during the controlled buy. For example, the State asked, “And at the 4:50 mark,
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maybe a few seconds before that, did you hear Mr. Keys go into—or what did
you hear?” Hodak responded, “I heard him walk into a door and a door shut.”
After the State played a portion of the audio recording and asked Hodak, “What
do you believe he said,” trial counsel objected stating, “[T]his procedure . . . is
actually not allowing the jury to hear [the contents of the recording] on their own;
but Mr. Hodak is trying to infer what he believes is said, as opposed to allowing
the jury just to hear what is said; and I believe that is improper.”
Under Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.701, a lay witness may testify in the form
of an opinion if it is “rationally based on the witness’s perception.” Hodak
testified that during the controlled buy, he was listening in on the live wire.
“[W]here there is proper factual foundation for a lay witness to testify, it is within
the discretion of a trial court to allow a witness to express an opinion based on
such established foundation facts.” State v. McCarty, 179 N.W.2d 548, 551
(Iowa 1970); see also Iowa R. Evid. 5.701. Accordingly, the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in ruling on the objections to interpretation of the voices and
the visual identification. Keys raises claims of ineffective assistance of counsel
to complain counsel failed to object to Hodak’s voice identification testimony and
to Hodak’s testimony about Keys’s outstanding warrants as part of the
interpretation of Exhibit 7.
B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel.
Keys argues trial counsel was ineffective for failing to (1) object to
evidence of his prior bad acts, (2) impeach State witness Hjelle regarding prior
12
bad acts, (3) object to the text-message evidence, (4) object to voice
identification evidence, and (5) object to prosecutorial misconduct.2
To prove his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, Keys must prove
by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) counsel failed to perform an
essential duty and (2) he suffered prejudice as a result. See State v. Morgan,
877 N.W.2d 133, 136 (Iowa Ct. App. 2016). The claim fails if either prong is not
proved. Id. When a defendant chooses to raise an ineffective-assistance-of-
counsel claim on direct appeal, we may either determine the record is adequate
and decide the claim or find the record is inadequate and preserve the claim for
postconviction proceedings. See State v. Neitzel, 801 N.W.2d 612, 624 (Iowa Ct.
App. 2011).
To prove the first prong of this claim, Keys must show counsel’s
performance fell outside the normal range of competency. See State v. Straw,
709 N.W.2d 128, 133 (Iowa 2006). Starting “with the presumption that the
attorney performed his duties in a competent manner,” “we measure counsel’s
performance against the standard of a reasonably competent practitioner.” State
2
In a recent case, the Iowa Supreme Court cautioned against conflating the terms
prosecutorial misconduct, which generally describes “those statements ‘where a
prosecutor intentionally violates a clear and unambiguous obligation or standard
imposed by law, applicable rule or professional conduct’ as well as ‘those situations
where a prosecutor recklessly disregards a duty to comply with an obligation or
standard,’” and prosecutorial error, which includes situations “‘[w]here the prosecutor
exercises poor judgment’ and ‘where the attorney has made a mistake’ based on
‘excusable human error, despite the attorney’s use of reasonable care.’” State v.
Schlitter, 881 N.W.2d 380, 394 (Iowa 2016) (citations omitted).
We use the term prosecutorial misconduct throughout, as both Keys and the
State did in their appellate briefs. We note that we are to apply the multi-factor test
outlined in State v. Graves, 668 N.W.2d 860, 877–78 (Iowa 2003), either way. See
Schlitter, N.W.2d at 394 (stating the multifactor test set out to evaluate the statements in
determining if there was misconduct and if that was misconduct was prejudicial “easily
translate to an evaluation of prosecutorial error”).
13
v. Maxwell, 743 N.W.2d 185, 195 195–96 (Iowa 2008). Although counsel is not
required to predict changes in the law, counsel must “exercise reasonable
diligence in deciding whether an issue is ‘worth raising.’” State v. Westeen, 591
N.W.2d 203, 210 (Iowa 1999) (quoting State v. Schoelerman, 315 N.W.2d 67, 72
(Iowa 1982)). In accord with these principles, we have held that counsel has no
duty to raise an issue that has no merit. State v. Schaer, 757 N.W.2d 630, 637
(Iowa 2008); State v. Bearse, 748 N.W.2d 211, 215 (Iowa 2008) (“Counsel
cannot fail to perform an essential duty by merely failing to make a meritless
objection.”). Under the second prong, “prejudice is shown when it is ‘reasonably
probable that the result of the proceeding would have been different.’” Schaer,
757 N.W.2d at 638 (quoting State v. Henderson, 537 N.W.2d 763, 765 (Iowa
1995)). “If an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim is raised on direct appeal
from the criminal proceedings, we may decide the record is adequate to decide
the claim or may choose to preserve the claim for postconviction proceedings.”
Straw, 709 N.W.2d at 133. When analyzing the prejudicial effect of several
allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel, we “look to the cumulative effect
of counsel’s errors to determine whether the defendant satisfied the prejudice
prong of the Strickland test.” State v. Clay, 824 N.W.2d 488, 500 (Iowa 2012)
(emphasis added).
Here, Keys raises several ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims.
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1. Prior Bad Acts.3 Keys first argues trial counsel should have objected
under Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.404(b)4 to an audio recording (exhibit 8) where
Keys admitted to “middling” a drug transaction. He also argues trial counsel
should have objected under the same rule to testimony suggesting Keys had
active warrants for his arrest. Under rule 5.404(b), “Evidence of a crime, wrong,
or other act is not admissible to prove a person’s character in order to show that
on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character.”
During the beginning of the post-arrest conversation, before the promise
of leniency, the officer read Keys his Miranda rights, informed him they were
discussing his case, and confirmed the charge of delivery of methamphetamine
from December 4, 2014. While discussing the charged offense and the
controlled buy, Keys stated, “If y’all got me y’all got me. But I’m pretty sure y’all
know, chances are, if that’s the case [he] used me as a middle man.” The officer
then referenced the specific controlled buy, which led to the charged crime, “I’ll
be honest with you, we know that you middled the deal.” Keys responded
affirmatively and explained, “[People] call me and I can get it for you, that’s it.”
Keys also claims trial counsel should have objected to the testimony
regarding his active arrest warrants during the charged crime pursuant to rule
3
Keys claims the court erred in allowing evidence related to his “middling” and arrest
warrants. However, no objection was made at the trial level. Accordingly, these issues
are presented in the context of ineffective assistance of counsel.
4
The rule provides:
b. Crimes, wrongs, or other acts.
(1) Prohibited use. Evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not
admissible to prove a person's character in order to show that on a
particular occasion the person acted in in accordance with the character.
(2) Permitted uses. This evidence may be admissible for another
purpose such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.
Iowa R. Evid. 5.404(b).
15
5.404(b). At trial, Officer Hodak testified about his observations during the
surveillance of the controlled buy, including his interpretation of an audio
recording (exhibit 7) documenting the controlled buy. Without objection, Officer
Hodak stated that, according to Mr. Keys’s statements on the audio recording,
“Mr. Keys had a face mask on, and they were referencing the face mask. And I
don’t know if they [the other individuals at the scene] were freaked out by it or
not, he just said he had it on because he had a warrant.” Officer Hodak then
confirmed that Keys had active warrants at the time of the buy. Another witness
was asked without objection whether Keys had warrants outstanding during the
months surrounding the controlled buy.
2. Testifying Witness Hjelle. Keys next argues that trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to cross-examine State’s witness Jonathan Hjelle about his
alleged counterfeiting charge and his experience with controlled buys unrelated
to this case. Before trial, the State moved in limine to prevent Keys from cross-
examining informant Hjelle about a previous use of counterfeit money and the
informant’s previous experience with controlled buys. The court ruled Keys could
cross-examine Hjelle’s about his controlled buy from Keys but not about his
history of controlled buys unrelated to the current charges. 5 Trial counsel stated
he did not plan to examine Hjelle about the act of passing counterfeit funds.
5
In his brief, Keys also argues the court erred in granting the State’s motion in limine
regarding Hjelle’s history of working as a confidential informant, prior leniencies, and
prior compensation. Because trial counsel did not timely object at trial, error is not
preserved regarding the court’s ruling. See State v. Tangie, 616 N.W.2d 564, 568 (Iowa
2000) (“Ordinarily, error claimed in a court's ruling on a motion in limine is waived unless
a timely objection is made when the evidence is offered at trial.”). We note Keys’s failure
to preserve error does not prevent him from raising the issue under an ineffective-
assistance-of-counsel claim in a postconviction proceeding. See State v. Johnson, 784
N.W.2d 192, 198 (Iowa 2010).
16
At trial, Hjelle was impeached with prior inconsistent statements made
under oath, testimony about a prior felony conviction, and testimony about
ulterior motives to implicate the defendant in order to fulfill an agreement with the
State by which he had a driving while barred charge dismissed. Because there
was no conviction involved with the counterfeiting charge, counsel was left with
rule 5.608, which “permits cross-examination of a witness concerning a specific
instance of conduct by the witness; it does not permit such conduct to be proved
by extrinsic evidence.” State v. Greene, 592 N.W.2d 24, 28 (Iowa 1999). It is
unclear from the record why trial counsel made a decision to omit Hjelle’s
counterfeiting charge during cross-examination.
3. Text Messages. Keys also argues trial counsel was ineffective for
failing to object to text messages for lack of foundation. He claims without the
proper foundation, the text messages do not provide any connection between
Keys and Hjelle. To the extent the text message were admissible, Keys claims
they are hearsay.
Keys claims he was prejudiced “because the jury was encouraged by the
State to consider the text messages as establishing the alleged drug transaction
as being between [Keys] and Hjelle.” The text messages show a conversation
between Hjelle and Keys about how far away Hjelle was from Keys’s location. In
addition to the text messages, Hjelle testified in detail about the controlled buy.
For example, he said, “I was over at [Keys’s] house earlier [the day of the buy],
found out that somebody was coming to town, and I was going to come back
later and buy some meth.” Hjelle also testified that he arranged the purchase
price and amount before contacting Hodak about the controlled buy. He
17
described the transaction, “I sat down, hand[ed] Jason the money, he looked at
the money . . . and they hand[ed] me the bag.” Hjelle was then asked “[W]ho
handed you the drugs.” To which he replied, “Jason [Keys].” Multiple officers
also testified that Keys was the individual involved in the controlled buy. It is
unclear from the record whether trial counsel made a strategic decision to not
challenge the foundation of the text messages based on the additional evidence.
4. Voice Identification. Keys next argues trial counsel was ineffective for
failing to object to Hodak’s identification of Keys’s voice for lack of foundation.
He claims because identification was an issue at trial, he suffered prejudice
because the jury may have accepted the witness’s “identification without giving
fair consideration to any evidence the defense presented questioning the identity
of the voice on the recording.” At trial, the State asked Hodak, “And when you
saw him while also listening to the live wire, did you determine that it was Mr.
Keys prior to talking with anybody else; or was that later?” Hodak stated, “No. It
was during the live wire. He’s got a distinctive voice also.” Keys did not object to
the question.
On the issue of identity, the jury was able to evaluate the defendant’s
voice on its own by comparing the live wire recording, the police interview
recording, and Keys’s testimony. Witnesses also visually identified Keys in
person, including Deputy Hodak’s testimony that he saw the defendant during the
controlled buy, and Hjelle’s testimony about Keys during the controlled buy. It is
unclear from the record whether the other forms of evidence supporting voice
identification factored into trial counsel’s decision not to object to Hodak’s
testimony linking the voice on the audiotape to Keys.
18
5. Prosecutorial Misconduct. Keys next claims trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to object to prosecutorial misconduct. Specifically, Keys
argues the following prosecutor’s statements were inappropriate: “You’re dealing
with drug dealers. You’re dealing with people that are not, in essence, the most
innocent people, I guess, is a way to put it. These people can be dangerous[,]”
and “Does it look—Does he sound like a drug dealer, does he look like a drug
dealer, does the case look like—Excuse me. Does the case look like a drug
dealer case; and does it look like the evidence shows that he, in fact, delivered
methamphetamine?”6 To succeed on an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim
based on prosecutorial misconduct, a defendant must establish: (1) proof of
misconduct; and (2) “the misconduct resulted in prejudice to such an extent that
the defendant was denied a fair trial.” Graves, 668 N.W.2d at 869. “A
defendant’s inability to prove either element is fatal.” See id.The prosecutor’s statements must also be prejudicial to the extent that
“but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have
been different.” State v. Carey, 709 N.W.2d 547, 559 (Iowa 2006). We consider
the following factors: (1) the severity and pervasiveness of the misconduct; (2)
the significance of the misconduct to the central issues in the case; (3) the
strength of the State’s evidence; (4) the use of cautionary instructions or other
curative measures; and (5) the extent to which the defense invited the
misconduct.” Graves, 668 N.W.2d at 877. “To determine if the prejudice
standard has been met, we look to the totality of the evidence, the factual
6
Keys also argues statements regarding his role as a middle man amounted to
misconduct because they misconstrued the discussion in the post-arrest interview.
19
findings that would have been affected by counsel’s errors, and whether the
effect was pervasive, minimal, or isolated.” Nguyen v. State, 707 N.W.2d 317,
324 (Iowa 2005). “The most significant factor is the strength of the State’s
evidence.” State v. Krogmann, 804 N.W.2d 518, 526 (Iowa 2011). It is unclear
from the record why trial counsel did not challenge the prosecutor’s statements
during closing arguments.
The record does not indicate trial counsel’s thinking on Keys’s ineffective
assistance claims, and we are unable to evaluate the cumulative prejudicial
effect. Accordingly, we cannot resolve the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel
claims on direct appeal. See Clay, 824 N.W.2d at 494 (holding ineffective-
assistance claims are ordinarily preserved for postconviction relief proceedings
especially “where the challenged action of counsel implicate trial tactics or
strategy which might be explained in a record fully developed to address those
issues”). Because Keys raises multiple issues that require further development
of the record, we preserve all of the above claims for postconviction relief. See
id. at 501.
C. Sufficiency of the Evidence.7
Keys next claims the court erred in denying his motion for judgment of
acquittal. He argues there was insufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find
him guilty. Specifically, he claims the State failed to prove identity.
7
Keys also claims the district court erred in denying his motion in arrest for judgment.
Keys’s motion for arrest in judgment, however, challenged the sufficiency of the
evidence at the trial level. “A motion in arrest of judgment may not be used to challenge
the sufficiency of the evidence.” See State v. Dallen, 452 N.W.2d 398, 399 (Iowa 1990).
The district court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion in arrest of judgment.
20
“In making determinations on the sufficiency of the evidence, ‘we . . . view
the evidence in the light most favorable to the state, regardless of whether it is
contradicted, and every reasonable inference that may be deduced therefrom
must be considered to supplement that evidence.’” State v. Harris, 891 N.W.2d
182, 186 (Iowa 2017) (quoting State v. Jones, 281 N.W.2d 13, 18 (Iowa 1979)).
“We will uphold a trial court’s denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal if the
record contains substantial evidence supporting the defendant’s conviction.” Id.(citation omitted). “Evidence is substantial if it would convince a rational trier of
fact the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (citation omitted).
Generally, direct eyewitness testimony establishing the elements of the crime are
sufficient to generate a jury question. See State v. Kutcher, No. 14–0602, 2015
WL 4935583, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 19, 2015) (holding officer’s testimony that
he saw defendant commit crime is sufficient to uphold verdict). Even in light of
credibility challenges to a testifying witness, “[t]he jury is free to believe or
disbelieve any testimony as it chooses.” State v. Thornton, 498 N.W.2d 670, 673
(Iowa 1993).
Keys was tried for the charge of delivery of methamphetamine. See Iowa
Code § 124.401(1)(c)(6). The relevant code section provides it is unlawful to
deliver “[f]ive grams or less of methamphetamine.” Id.Here, the State presented direct eyewitness evidence of the defendant’s
identity. While Keys denied he was the one who sold methamphetamine, direct
testimony from a confidential informant is sufficient to establish the elements of
the crime. See State v. Arne, 579 N.W.2d 326, 328 (Iowa 1998) (holding
evidence was sufficient to support delivery-of-a-controlled-substance charge
21
when confidential informant’s testimony of drug transaction was contradicted by
another testifying witness). The jury heard testimony from Hjelle specifically
identifying Keys as the individual who sold him one gram of methamphetamine in
exchange for one hundred and thirty dollars in marked buy money. The jury also
heard testimony from the officers monitoring the controlled buy, and from Keys
himself. The jury was able to hear in the voice from the live wire and compare it
to Keys’s voice from the police interview and his testimony. It is up to the jury to
decide if they believe it is Keys’s voice on the live wire. The evidence was
sufficient on the issue of identity to support the conviction.
D. Motion-for-New-Trial Standard.
Keys claims the district court erroneously applied the sufficiency-of-the-
evidence standard as opposed to the weight-of-the-evidence standard in denying
his motion for new trial. The State concedes the court applied the wrong
standard in its ruling.
When ruling on a motion for new trial, a district court may grant the motion
if the verdict is contrary to the weight of the evidence. Ary, 877 N.W.2d at 706;
see Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.24. “A verdict is contrary to the weight of the evidence
only when ‘a greater amount of credible evidence supports one side of an issue
or cause than the other.’” Ary, 877 N.W.2d at 706 (quoting State v. Shanahan,
712 N.W.2d 121, 135 (Iowa 2006)).
Here, after reviewing arguments from both parties, the district court stated:
The motion for new trial challenges whether there was sufficient
evidence to support the conviction. The Court has sat through the
trial in this matter, finds that there was. And viewing the light—the
evidence most favorably to the State, finds that there was sufficient
evidence in this matter to find the Defendant guilty, or that, in other
22
words, the—a reasonable jury could find guilt on the evidence
beyond a reasonable doubt.
(Emphasis added.) We agree with the parties that the district court erroneously
applied the sufficiency-of-the-evidence standard. Additionally, “[a]ppellate review
of a district court ruling on a motion for new trial asserting the verdict was
contrary to the weight of the evidence ordinarily does not extend to ‘the
underlying question of whether the verdict is against the weight of the evidence.’”
Ary, 877 N.W.2d at 707 (quoting State v. Taylor, 689 N.W.2d 116, 134 (Iowa
2004)). We remand the case to the district court to apply the correct standard in
considering the motion.
E. Substitute Exhibits.
On appeal, State’s exhibits 1, 7, 8—audio recordings of the post-arrest
interview and buy—were lost when the record was submitted to the supreme
court. The district court instructed the State to prepare duplicate copies. After
the parties reviewed the copies, the district court held a hearing on whether the
substitute copies were accurate. Keys’s trial attorney represented at the hearing
the substitute exhibits were correct copies of the original exhibits. Keys’s
appellate attorney, however, argued that after Keys stated, “I don’t sell dope,”
Hodak’s alleged response, “That’s why we’re willing to work with you,” was
omitted from the substitute copies. The district court reviewed the recordings
and held the proposed substitutes are accurate copies. Keys does not complain
about exhibit 1 which was not admitted nor exhibit 7, which documented the
controlled buy. He does argue that exhibit 8, the redacted exhibit of his post-
arrest interview, is inaccurate—an argument that dovetails with his argument
23
none of his post-trial interview should have been admitted because it all contains
promissory lenience. Keys asks this panel to supplement the record on its own
to include the alleged statement from Hodak.
After a careful review of the record, we agree with the district court and
trial counsel Hodak did not respond to Keys’s denial he did not sell drugs by
saying, “That’s why we are willing to work with you.” Assuming the statement
was made by Hodak and omitted from the substituted exhibit 8, we are not
convinced the statement qualifies as a promise of leniency. We affirm the district
court on this issue.
IV. Conclusion.
The trial court did not err in admitting the early portions of the audio
recording of the post-arrest interview. The promise of leniency was triggered
only when Hodak offered a benefit to Keys. Nor did the trial court abuse its
discretion in overruling Keys’s objections to Manson’s testimony about his
experience with fingerprints on cellophane bags, Hodak’s controlled-buy
experience, or Hodak’s testimony interpreting exhibit 7. Testimony from the
confidential informant, officers involved in the controlled buy, and evidence of the
audio recordings were sufficient to support Keys’s conviction. However, the court
applied the wrong standard when ruling on Keys’s motion for new trial. Keys’s
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are preserved for postconviction relief,
as the record is inadequate to resolve the issues on direct appeal and we are
unable to evaluate the cumulative prejudicial effect on Keys. Finally, we affirm
the district court’s ruling to substitute exhibits 1, 7 and 8.
AFFIRMED IN PART AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS.