State of Iowa v. Ashley Nicole Hennings ( 2023 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 22-0337
Filed March 8, 2023
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
ASHLEY NICOLE HENNINGS,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, David Porter, Judge.
A defendant appeals her convictions for vehicular homicide, leaving the
scene of an accident, and eluding; she also challenges the sentencing order.
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED.
Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Robert P. Ranschau (until
withdrawal) and Maria Ruhtenberg, Assistant Appellate Defenders, for appellant.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Israel Kodiaga, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee.
Considered by Tabor, P.J., and Schumacher and Chicchelly, JJ.
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TABOR, Presiding Judge.
Ashley Hennings challenges her convictions for vehicular homicide, leaving
the scene of an accident, and eluding. She raises three issues: (1) Was she
entitled to an alternative jury instruction on causation? (2) Should the district court
have granted her a new trial? And (3) did the court violate the one-homicide rule?
On the first claim, we find the court adequately instructed the jury on causation.
For the second, we find the court properly exercised its discretion in ruling that the
weight of the evidence supported the verdicts. But turning to the third claim, we
remand for entry of a corrected sentencing order.
I. Facts and Prior Proceedings
“Brace for impact,” Erick Richter told his wife Shirlyna as they watched
Hennings’s Chrysler minivan barrel through a major intersection, ram a red sedan,
and come “flying” toward their car. Two police cars were chasing Hennings after
she sped away from a traffic stop initiated by Officer Brian Foster. A second officer,
Alberto Marquez, clocked her speed at ninety miles per hour on Des Moines city
streets.
After ramming the sedan and hitting the Richters’ car, Hennings’s van
flipped over, smashed into a tree, and came to rest on its side, catching fire.
Bystanders pulled Hennings from the smoking wreckage. She then fled on foot.
But she didn’t get far. Witnesses pointed Officer Chase Lohnes in the direction
she had run. And he located her about a block from the crash scene. Seeing her
injuries, Lohnes took her to a nearby fire station. From there, an ambulance
transported her to the hospital where staff drew her blood. It tested positive for
methamphetamine.
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Meanwhile, Officer Foster raced to the crash scene—finding Kieran Stirling
unconscious and struggling to breath inside his badly damaged red sedan. Foster
supported Stirling’s neck while waiting for medics. But Stirling never regained
consciousness and died later at the hospital.
In a four-count trial information, the State charged Hennings with
(1) homicide by vehicle—operating while intoxicated, in violation of Iowa Code
section 707.6A(1) (2021), a class “B” felony; (2) homicide by vehicle—reckless
driving, in violation of section 707.6A(2)(A), a class “C” felony; (3) leaving the
scene of an accident resulting in death, in violation of sections 321.261(4) and
321.263, a class “D” felony; and (4) eluding in violation of section 321.279(3)(A)(3)
and (4), a class “D” felony. After a three-day trial, a jury found Hennings guilty of
all four counts. She now appeals.
II. Scope and Standards of Review
We review the refusal to give a requested jury instruction for the correction
of legal error. State v. Montgomery, 966 N.W.2d 641, 649 (Iowa 2021). We apply
this same standard to review a challenge to a merger decision. State v. Ceretti,
871 N.W.2d 88, 92 (Iowa 2015). By contrast, we review the denial of a new-trial
motion for an abuse of discretion. State v. Linderman, 958 N.W.2d 211, 218 (Iowa
Ct. App. 2021). And on a weight-of-the-evidence claim, we limit our review to the
district court’s exercise of discretion—leaving alone the underlying question
whether the scales tipped against the verdicts. Id.4
III. Analysis
A. Causation Instruction
Up first, Hennings contends that the jury received inadequate instructions
on the causation element of homicide by intoxicated operation. She faults the
district court for rejecting her proposed instruction—borrowed from State v.
Hernandez-Mendoza, No. 18-0083, 2019 WL 1932539, at *5 n.6 (Iowa Ct. App.
May 1, 2019). To assess her contention, we look first to the marshalling
instruction. The second element required the jury to find that Hennings’s act of
operating while having methamphetamine in her system caused Stirling’s death.
Another instruction clarified that causation element.
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But Hennings requested yet another instruction on causation, arguing to the
district court that “the instructions need to reflect that there should be and must be
a substantial causal connection between impairment and Mr. Stirling’s death.”1
The district court rejected Hennings’s request, reasoning that it was “nowhere near
a model instruction.” And that it was “duplicative” of Instructions No. 12 and 17,
which accurately conveyed the causation requirement.
Hennings challenges that rejection. She asserts the jury needed more
guidance on causation. She points to its question during deliberations: “On Count
1, do we need to prove the presence of the substance had any impact on her
driving ability or influence the likelihood of a crash? Does this matter?”2
But Hennings does not explain how the Hernandez-Mendoza instruction
would have answered the jury’s question. The first paragraph of that instruction,
on factual causation—traditionally called but-for causation—was embodied in
Instruction No. 17. See id. at *2; see also State v. Adams, 810 N.W.2d 365, 371
1 Our record does not include a copy of Hennings’s proposed instruction. But here
is the instruction from the Hernandez-Mendoza footnote:
The State must prove a causal connection between the act or
acts of Ramon Hernandez and the death of [Y.A.]. The alleged acts
or conduct of Ramon Hernandez “caused” the death of [Y.A.] when
her death would not have happened except for the acts or
conduct. . . .
The State must also prove that the death of [Y.A.] was within
the scope of Ramon Hernandez’s criminal responsibility. The death
is within the scope of criminal responsibility if that death arises from
the same types of danger created by Ramon Hernandez’s act or
acts. You should consider whether repetition of Ramon Hernandez’s
act or acts would make it more likely that the death of [Y.A.] would
happen. If Ramon Hernandez’s act or acts would not make [Y.A.’s]
death more likely to occur, they are not within the scope of his
criminal responsibility.
2019 WL 1932539, at *5 n.6 (alterations in original).
2 The court instructed the jury to reread the instructions and continue deliberating.
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(Iowa 2012) (interpreting section 707.6A(1) as requiring proof of causal connection
between specific criminal act—“intoxicated driving”—and victim’s death, but not
proof of “a specific causal connection between the defendant’s intoxication and the
victim’s death”). The second paragraph, on scope of criminal responsibility—
traditionally called proximate cause—applies only if the chain of causation is
attenuated. See State v. Tyler, 873 N.W.2d 741, 749 (Iowa 2016), superseded by
statute on other grounds. And even then, Tyler did not settle whether “criminal
causation might still require more than proof of but-for factual causation.” Id.
at 750.3 So with only a passing mention of our supreme court’s civil cases on
scope of liability, Hennings’s brief does not address how her proposed instruction
was proper or necessary on these facts.
Without that advocacy, we are left with the district court’s well-supported
conclusion that the existing instructions tracked Adams and properly conveyed the
concept of causation to the jury. Thus, we find no instructional error.
B. Greater Weight of the Evidence
Hennings next contests the district court’s denial of her motion for a new
trial on the convictions of homicide by intoxicated operation and leaving the scene
of a fatal accident. A new trial is appropriate only when the evidence
preponderates heavily against the jury’s verdicts. State v. Ernst, 954 N.W.2d 50,
60 (Iowa 2021). That standard allows the district court to make its own credibility
3 Tyler cites Adams, 810 N.W.2d at 372 n.7, where our supreme court also declined
to decide whether the proximate cause doctrine had continuing viability in criminal
cases after the supreme court’s embrace of the Restatement (Third) of Torts in
Thompson v. Kaczinski, 774 N.W.2d 829, 839 (Iowa 2009). Tyler, 873 N.W.2d at748–50.
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determinations. Id. The court must decide whether “a greater amount of credible
evidence” suggests the verdicts were a miscarriage of justice. State v. Ellis, 578
N.W.2d 655, 658 (Iowa 1998). We will consider each challenged verdict in turn.
1. Homicide by Intoxicated Operation
To convict Hennings of this offense, the jury had to find two elements:
(1) Hennings operated a motor vehicle while having any amount of a controlled
substance in her body. See Iowa Code § 707.6A(1). And (2) her criminal act
unintentionally caused the death of Kieran Stirling. See id. § 707.6A(1). Hennings
does not dispute that she was operating her van and her blood tested positive for
methamphetamine. Rather, she claims the State “produced no evidence that she
was under the influence of a controlled substance at the time of the accident.”
Her claim fails for two reasons. First, the State was not required to prove
Hennings was “under the influence of a controlled substance” when she was
operating the van. “Iowa’s homicide-by-intoxicated-operation statute makes it a
crime to unintentionally cause someone’s death ‘by operating a motor vehicle while
intoxicated, as prohibited by section 321J.2.’” State v. Johnson, 950 N.W.2d 232,
236 (Iowa 2020). “The definition of ‘intoxicated’ . . . means a person is under the
influence of alcohol or drugs (or some combination of them), has a blood alcohol
content .08 or greater, or has any amount of a controlled substance present as
measured in a blood or urine test.” Id. (emphasis added). The State prosecuted
Hennings using that third definition of intoxication. See Iowa Code § 321J.2(1)(c).
That section criminalizes operating with “any amount of prohibited substances in
one’s body” whether or not those substances impair the operator. See State v.
Childs, 898 N.W.2d 177, 184 (Iowa 2017). So it was enough for the State to prove
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a causal connection between Hennings’s criminal offense—operating with any
controlled substances present in her blood—and Stirling’s death. Contrary to
Hennings’s claim, the State was not required to prove that the methamphetamine
in her system “in any way influenced” her driving. See id. at 183 (reaffirming State
v. Comried, 693 N.W.2d 773, 776 (Iowa 2005)). Indeed, our courts have
interpreted section 321J.2(1)(c) as creating “a per se ban on driving with any
amount of a controlled substance in the body, whether or not [drivers] are under
the influence.” Childs, 898 N.W.2d at 183 (citations and quotations omitted).
Second, if the State needed to prove that Hennings was under the influence
of methamphetamine, the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding
credible evidence to support that she was. Criminalist Justin Grodnitzky testified
that the state crime lab detected 496 nanograms of methamphetamine per one
milliliter of Hennings’s blood. He said that amount fell in the average range for
impairment cases. And he explained that when this drug is prescribed for
conditions such as ADHD, it is at a therapeutic level of twenty nanograms per
milliliter. The district court determined that credible evidence supported the jury’s
verdict: “A reasonable jury could conclude that having twenty-five times the
therapeutic level of methamphetamine in a person’s system may have a negative
impact on that person’s physical condition, including their ability to safely operate
a motor vehicle.” On top of the lab report, the court pointed to Hennings’s erratic
behavior in recorded interactions with Officer Foster.
On this record, we cannot say the district court abused its discretion in
denying Hennings’s motion for a new trial. See Ernst, 954 N.W.2d at 61.
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2. Leaving the Scene of a Fatal Accident
To convict Hennings of this offense, the jury had to find five elements:
(1) Hennings drove a vehicle involved in an accident resulting in Stirling’s death;
(2) she knew about the accident; (3) she knew the accident resulted in injury or
death or knew the accident was “of such a nature” that a reasonable person would
expect that injury or death occurred to another person; (4) Hennings failed to stop
her vehicle at the scene of the accident or as close as possible to the scene or
failed to return to and remain at the scene though able to do so; and (5) after the
accident, Hennings failed to: (a) leave her driver’s license, registration, or other
identification data at the scene of the accident; or (b) promptly report the accident
to law enforcement authorities after leaving the scene. See Iowa Code
§§ 321.261(4), .263.
Hennings takes aim at the State’s proof for elements (4) and (5). On the
fourth element, Hennings recounts the evidence that her van was disabled and
asserts that she was “directed by law enforcement away from her vehicle due to
the explosion risk.”4 On the fifth element, she contends that the State did not offer
evidence that she failed to provide information. Citing State v. Tarbox, she insists
that she did not fail to report the accident because police were already at the scene
when the crash occurred. See 739 N.W.2d 850, 854−55 (Iowa 2007).
4 Hennings cites no part of the record to support that assertion. See Iowa Rs. App.
P. 6.903, .904(4). And on our review, we cannot find that any officer directed her
to run blocks away from the accident scene.
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In response, the State quotes a long passage from the district court’s order
denying the new-trial motion. But the State does not zero in on the elements
challenged by Hennings. Nor does it address Tarbox.
Despite those omissions in the State’s response, we find no abuse of
discretion. The court highlighted Officer Lohnes’s dash cam video, admitted as an
exhibit, to show Hennings’s flight from the crash scene. Indeed, Lohnes saw
someone running at “a dead sprint” away from the accident when he first arrived.
When he learned from witnesses that the runner had been driving the van, he set
out to find her. He circled his patrol car around and, within minutes, found
Hennings in a nearby yard. The district court could rely on that evidence to
conclude that Hennings did not remain at the scene, though she could have, and
that she left without providing anyone with identifying information. See State v.
Sebben, 185 N.W.2d 771, 774 (Iowa 1971) (stating that the “manifest intent” of
section 321.261 was to prevent motorists involved in personal injury accidents from
evading liability, civil or criminal, by escaping before their identify can be
established). The court properly exercised its discretion in finding the jury’s verdict
was supported by the greater weight of the evidence.
C. One-Homicide Rule
Finally, Hennings contends the district court violated the one-homicide rule
by entering judgment on both homicide by intoxicated operation and homicide by
reckless driving. The State agrees. We thus “annul[] and set aside” her conviction
for homicide by reckless driving. See State v. Wissing, 528 N.W.2d 561, 567 (Iowa
1995). And we remand for entry of a new sentencing order reflecting that change.
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED.