In the Interest of M.D.W., Minor Child ( 2023 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 22-1768
Filed March 8, 2023
IN THE INTEREST OF M.D.W.,
Minor Child,
M.W., Father,
Appellant.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Webster County, Joseph L. Tofilon,
District Associate Judge.
A father appeals the termination of his parental rights to one child.
AFFIRMED.
Douglas Cook, Jewell, for appellant father.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Ellen Ramsey-Kacena (until
withdrawal) and Mary A. Triick, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellee State.
Mary Margaret Lauver, Lake City, attorney and guardian ad litem for minor
child.
Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Greer and Chicchelly, JJ.
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CHICCHELLY, Judge.
M.W. appeals the termination of his parental rights to one child, M.D.W. He
contends that the statutory grounds are unsatisfied, termination does not serve the
child’s best interests, and a six-month extension should have been granted. Upon
our de novo review, we affirm the termination of his parental rights.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
M.D.W. was born in November 2021 with methamphetamine in his system.
His mother also tested positive for the substance at the hospital. The father
claimed to use marijuana socially but denied methamphetamine use. The parents
voluntarily placed M.D.W. with his paternal grandmother, with whom he has
remained for the duration of the case. The court adjudicated him a child in need
of assistance in January.
Prior to the adjudication, the father refused to participate in a drug test and
reported that he believes a hair test is against his religion. The Iowa Department
of Health and Human Services offered assistance including parent partners, family
treatment court, and early head start, and also directed the parents to engage in
mental-health and substance-abuse treatment. On January 20, the father
acknowledged he would have a positive drug test and did not want his hair cut, so
he agreed to complete an evaluation and set up the recommended treatment. He
did not specify for which substance or substances his test would be positive. The
father shaved his head a few weeks later of his own accord without completing a
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hair test. The parents did not accept the department’s offer to refer them to parent
partners or to family treatment court.
When M.D.W. was hospitalized in April, neither parent came to visit him or
attend his appointments. The father reportedly stayed with the paternal
grandmother for a couple of days at a time and helped with his son around the May
timeframe. The father reported that mental-health counseling and a psychological
evaluation were set up in May, but he never attended them. The father completed
a substance-abuse evaluation in May but denied any substance usage. Therefore,
no treatment was recommended. It was agreed that the father would meet with
the provider anyway, but he never attended those sessions or completed the
secondary evaluation requested by the department. No report or drug test were
provided for the completed evaluation.
The father never allowed the department into the home where he was
residing with his brother, so it was not approved for visits. The father left town
without notifying anyone after his brother was shot in late May. The department
was able to reach the father on June 16 via phone. He asked to meet at his
mother’s house the next day but did not do so, and then his phone was turned off.
Up until this time, the father enjoyed free access to visits under the paternal
grandmother’s supervision since she is M.D.W.’s caretaker. His visits were on and
off but generally averaged once per week or four times every month. The
department determined that this access was no longer appropriate and that the
father needed to make contact and show cooperation first. The department has
not had an address for the father since then. He called the caseworker on August
4 but refused to provide an address and stated that he did not have a phone. He
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indicated that he was going to work out of state and would be gone for a month or
more. There was no further contact achieved with the father until he was arrested
in late August after a physical altercation with M.D.W.’s mother and her paramour.
The county attorney filed a petition to terminate parental rights in August,
and a hearing was held on the matter on October 12. The father was awaiting trial
on his criminal charges and remained in jail at the time of the hearing. The mother
failed to appear for the hearing, her parental rights were terminated, and she does
not appeal. After the court entered an order terminating the father’s rights, he filed
a timely appeal.
II. Review.
Our review of termination proceedings is de novo. See In re C.B., 611
N.W.2d 489, 492 (Iowa 2000). “We will uphold an order terminating parental rights
where there is clear and convincing evidence of the statutory grounds for
termination. Evidence is clear and convincing when there is no serious or
substantial doubt as to the correctness of the conclusions of law drawn from the
evidence.” In re T.S., 868 N.W.2d 425, 431 (Iowa Ct. App. 2015) (internal citation
omitted). We give weight to the juvenile court’s fact findings, especially those
about witness credibility, although they are not binding. See Iowa R. App.
P. 6.904(3)(g); C.B., 611 N.W.2d at 492.
III. Discussion.
The principal concern in termination proceedings is the child’s best
interests. In re L.T., 924 N.W.2d 521, 529 (Iowa 2019). Iowa courts use a three-
step analysis to review the termination of parental rights. In re A.S., 906 N.W.2d
467, 472 (Iowa 2018). Those steps include whether: (1) grounds for termination
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have been established, (2) termination is in the child’s best interests, and (3) we
should exercise any of the permissive exceptions to termination. Id. at 472–73.
A. Grounds for Termination.
Here, the juvenile court found the State proved by clear and convincing
evidence that termination of the father’s parental rights was appropriate under
paragraphs (b) and (e) of Iowa Code section 232.116(1) (2022). We may affirm if
the record supports termination on any one ground. See In re A.B., 815 N.W.2d
764, 774 (Iowa 2012). However, the father’s petition on appeal does not
specifically contest either of the grounds. Therefore, we find the argument waived.
See L.N.S. v. S.W.S., 854 N.W.2d 699, 703 (Iowa 2013) (“Where a party has failed
to present any substantive analysis or argument on an issue, the issue has been
waived.”). Even so, termination would be appropriate because the child has been
removed for at least six consecutive months and the father has not affirmatively
assumed the duties encompassed by the role of being a parent. See Iowa Code
§ 232.116(1)(e). Therefore, we find that termination of his parental rights is
statutorily authorized.
B. Best Interests.
To evaluate the child’s best interests, “the court shall give primary
consideration to the child’s safety, to the best placement for furthering the long
term nurturing and growth of the child, and to the physical, mental, and emotional
condition and needs of the child.” Id. § 232.116(2). The “defining elements” of the
best-interests analysis are the child’s safety and “need for a permanent home.” In
re H.S., 805 N.W.2d 737, 748 (Iowa 2011) (citation omitted).
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The father has not demonstrated he can provide a safe and permanent
home for M.D.W. He has not had a home approved for visits to which he can take
the child. He has no driver’s license or working vehicle. The father testified that
he was not consistent with visitation because he did not have a car, a place to go,
or a steady job. The in-home worker provided transportation to visits on multiple
occasions. The caseworker testified that the father’s last known contact with his
child was May 13. His potential to be a successful parent in the future does not
negate the fact that he has been largely absent from the child’s life for a significant
period of time. “Parenting cannot be turned off and on like a spigot. It must be
constant, responsible, and reliable.” In re L.L., 459 N.W.2d 489, 495 (Iowa 1990).
M.D.W. deserves the permanency and security offered by his familial
placement. See A.S., 906 N.W.2d at 474 (“[I]t is well-settled law that we cannot
deprive a child of permanency after the State has proved a ground for termination
under section 232.116(1) by hoping someday a parent will learn to be a parent and
be able to provide a stable home for the child.” (citation omitted)). Accordingly, we
conclude termination of his father’s parental rights is in M.D.W.’s best interest.
C. Extension of Time.
The father argues that a six-month extension would have provided him
sufficient time to resume custody. Iowa Code section 232.104(2)(b) authorizes
extending a child’s placement for an additional six months if the court identifies
“specific factors, conditions, or expected behavioral changes” that provide a basis
for determining “that the need for removal of the child from the child’s home will no
longer exist at the end of the additional six-month period.” The father maintains
that he was supporting the mother’s efforts to reunify with their child because he
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was having housing issues, but he realized around the six-month mark that she
would not be successful and so it was up to him to gain primary custody.
Unfortunately, he was arrested around that time and remained in jail.
The father acknowledges that he made a mistake in relying on the mother.
However, “in termination of parental rights proceedings[,] each parent’s parental
rights are separate adjudications, both factually and legally.” In re D.G., 704
N.W.2d 454, 459 (Iowa Ct. App. 2005). Reunification with the mother would not
necessarily mean reunification with the father. He needed to independently
demonstrate his ability to parent M.D.W. appropriately. The father failed to engage
in any services but claims that more time will allow him to procure steady
employment and housing. In light of his history, we are not inclined to believe that
his engagement as a full-time parent will improve sufficiently in a reasonable time.
See In re A.M., 843 N.W.2d 100, 112 (Iowa 2014) (“[W]e cannot deprive a child of
permanency after the State has proved a ground for termination under section
232.116(1) by hoping someday a parent will learn to be a parent and be able to
provide a stable home for the child.” (citation omitted)). Accordingly, we deny the
father’s request for more time.
IV. Disposition.
Having considered the father’s arguments concerning the statutory
grounds, the child’s best interests, and an extension of time, we find each without
merit and affirm termination of his parental rights.
AFFIRMED.