In the Interest of K.A., K.A., and K.A., Minor Children ( 2023 )


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  •                     IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
    No. 22-1829
    Filed March 8, 2023
    IN THE INTEREST OF K.A., K.A., and K.A.,
    Minor Children,
    A.A., Mother,
    Appellant.
    ________________________________________________________________
    Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Iowa County, Russell G. Keast,
    District Associate Judge.
    A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights. AFFIRMED.
    David R. Fiester, Cedar Rapids, for appellant mother.
    Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Michelle R. Becker, Assistant Attorney
    General, for appellee State.
    Alexander S. Momany of Howes Law Firm, P.C., Cedar Rapids, attorney
    and guardian ad litem for minor children.
    Considered by Bower, C.J., and Badding and Buller, JJ.
    2
    BULLER, Judge.
    The mother of K.A., K.A., and K.A. (born in 2009, 2013, and 2017
    respectively), appeals the termination of her parental rights. In her appeal, she
    argues the State failed to prove a statutory ground for termination, termination is
    not in the children’s best interests, and the juvenile court should have applied a
    permissive exception to termination. We reject the mother’s claims and affirm.
    I.     Background Facts and Proceedings
    This family came to the attention of the Iowa Department of Health and
    Human Services (HHS) in March 2015, two years before the third child was born.
    The mother reported that the father put her in a “choke hold” and punched her
    while he was intoxicated. She also described other domestic violence, including
    some committed while she was pregnant, and at least one instance in which the
    father knocked a child to the ground or into furniture.        HHS made several
    recommendations, including inpatient treatment and a mental-health evaluation for
    the father, as well as therapy for the children. No evidence suggests the mother
    or father followed any of these recommendations.
    Alcohol-fueled violence continued inside the home. In December 2018, the
    father—again intoxicated—struck the mother in the face with an open hand, while
    she was holding the then-one-year-old child. A sheriff’s deputy arrested the father,
    who resisted and made several threats, even after he was tased. The father told
    the deputy he planned to return to the house to assault the mother again. Civil
    and criminal no-contact orders were in place at various points following this and
    other incidents.
    3
    Illegal drugs and mental illness also played a role in the father’s violent and
    dangerous behavior. He was civilly committed at least once in the years before
    termination, and HHS reports document his use of multiple controlled substances.
    In August 2019, while under the influence of methamphetamine, the father
    “choked”1 the mother in her bed, in view of two children. The police arrested the
    father again, and three days later, the police received a letter from the mother
    explaining the entire incident was a misunderstanding and an accident. Because
    of these incidents, the children were adjudicated as in need of assistance under
    Iowa Code section 232.2(6)(c)(2) (2019).
    Throughout the life of the case and the underlying proceedings, the mother
    continued to associate with the father, all while denying or minimizing his actions.
    After months of further incidents and resistance to any efforts to help, HHS sought
    removal of the children from both parents’ custody, which the court granted in
    March 2021.    The next day, the court also entered another no-contact order
    between the mother and father. Less than one week later, the court returned
    custody to the mother, so long as the mother engaged in domestic-violence victim
    services and was more forthcoming and honest in further proceedings. The court
    also ordered ongoing therapy for the children, no further contact between the father
    and children, and for the children to reside with their maternal grandparents.
    1 We use the word “choked” because that is the language the mother used when
    reporting the violence to police. However, we note the correct terminology would
    be “strangled.” See Mary Pat Gunderson, Gender and the Language of Judicial
    Opinion Writing, 
    21 Geo. J. Gender & L. 1
    , 11 (2019) (on how language matters
    and noting that describing acts of strangulation as “choking” can minimize or
    mitigate).
    4
    The mother continued to associate with the father, sometimes involving the
    children, and the family failed to progress over the next several months. For
    example, during this time the father attempted suicide, both the mother and father
    used methamphetamine, and the domestic abuse continued. The mother also lied
    to her caseworkers, HHS, and law enforcement about her job status, drug use,
    and whether she was seeing the father.
    Seeing little progress, the juvenile court ordered the mother to complete a
    psychological evaluation, follow through with treatment recommendations, and
    comply with drug testing in July 2021. Several months later, the mother began an
    evaluation with a psychiatrist, but she did not return for a follow-up meeting. With
    the information he had, the psychiatrist diagnosed the mother with a narcissitic
    personality disorder and an anxiety disorder, and the psychiatrist opined that she
    was not ready to end her relationship with the father.
    The State then filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of both
    parents. The juvenile court terminated the father’s parental rights, with all prior
    orders remaining in effect for the mother. The father did not appeal. After trial, the
    mother continued to refuse any mental-health services or drug testing, and visits
    with her children never progressed past fully supervised. She also continued to lie
    about her progress to relevant authorities, associated with the father, associated
    with other known drug users, and rented out her home to transients.
    The State soon filed another petition to terminate the rights of the mother.
    In October 2022, the juvenile court terminated the mother’s parental rights. The
    mother appeals.
    5
    II.    Standard of Review
    We review termination of parental rights de novo. In re P.L., 
    778 N.W.2d 33
    , 40 (Iowa 2010). We place weight on the juvenile court’s findings of fact, but
    we are not bound by them. In re A.S., 
    906 N.W.2d 467
    , 472 (Iowa 2018).
    III.   Discussion
    Appellate review of the termination of parental rights is a three-step
    analysis. In re M.W., 
    876 N.W.2d 212
    , 219 (Iowa 2016). First, we must determine
    whether a ground for termination has been established; then, if a ground has been
    established, we determine whether the best-interests framework supports
    termination; and finally, if we find the framework supports termination, we consider
    whether any exceptions apply to preclude termination. 
    Id.
     at 219–20. The mother
    challenges all three steps.
    A. Statutory Grounds
    The juvenile court terminated the mother’s parental rights under
    section 232.116(1)(f), which allows termination if the court finds all of the following:
    (1) The child is four years of age or older.
    (2) The child has been adjudicated a child in need of
    assistance pursuant to section 232.96.
    (3) The child has been removed from the physical custody of
    the child’s parents for at least twelve of the last eighteen months, or
    for the last twelve consecutive months and any trial period at home
    has been less than thirty days.
    (4) There is clear and convincing evidence that at the present
    time the child cannot be returned to the custody of the child’s parents
    as provided in section 232.102.
    The mother focuses on the fourth element, arguing the children could have been
    safely returned to her care at the time of the termination hearing. See 
    Iowa Code § 232.116
    (1)(f)(4); see also In re D.W., 
    791 N.W.2d 703
    , 707 (Iowa 2010). The
    6
    mother argues that she has reformed herself and—because her domestic abuser,
    the father, is temporarily gone from her life—the children can safely come live with
    her now.
    We reject the mother’s argument, as the evidence shows a reasonable
    probability the children would face harm if returned to the mother. See In re M.M.,
    
    483 N.W.2d 812
    , 814 (Iowa 1992) (holding the State only needs to prove a
    reasonable probability of the children being harmed if returned to the parent). The
    mother has ongoing substance-abuse problems with methamphetamine and
    fentanyl, and there is no evidence these issues have resolved. See In re A.B., 
    815 N.W.2d 764
    , 776 (Iowa 2012) (finding unresolved, severe, and chronic drug
    addiction can render parent unfit to raise children). She has declined to seek help
    for her issues and has resisted HHS at almost every possible step.
    The mother has also declined to meaningfully recognize or engage in
    treatment for her mental-health issues.       She was ordered to complete a
    psychological evaluation, but she failed to complete a diagnostic assessment.
    Based on limited information, the psychiatrist still diagnosed the mother with two
    mental disorders, finding that she was not ready to end her relationship with the
    father. The psychiatrist also strongly recommended against returning the children
    to the mother’s custody “until she has demonstrated abstinence from illegal
    substances, completed an extensive course on domestic violence, maintained
    consistent involvement in individual counseling, and demonstrated an ability to
    honestly provide accurate information to [HHS] in regard to her relationship with
    [the father].”
    7
    These ongoing concerns gave rise to this termination proceeding, and they
    remained at the time of trial. The near-permanence of these issues shows a
    reasonable probability the children would face harm if returned to the mother,
    which fulfills the statutory criterion. See M.M., 
    483 N.W.2d at 814
    .
    B. Best Interests of the Children
    The mother next contends the juvenile court erred in determining
    termination is in the children’s best interests because of the closeness of the bond
    between the children, as well as the closeness of the bond between her and the
    children. This argument conflates the second and third steps of our analysis: the
    provisions of Iowa Code section 232.116(2), in which we assess whether
    termination is in the children’s best interests, and section 232.116(3), in which we
    consider permissive exceptions to termination. We address the steps separately,
    starting with best interests.
    The best interests of the children favor termination.            Iowa Code
    section 232.116(2) outlines the primary factors to consider when assessing
    whether termination would be in the children’s best interests: the children’s safety;
    the best placement for furthering the long-term growth of the children; and the
    physical, mental, and emotional condition and needs of the children. The defining
    elements of this analysis are the children’s safety and a need for a home. In re
    H.S., 
    805 N.W.2d 737
    , 748 (Iowa 2011).
    The mother’s inability to address her mental-health and substance-abuse
    problems undermines her ability to provide adequate care and a safe home for her
    children. See 
    Iowa Code § 232.116
    (2); see also A.B., 
    815 N.W.2d at 776
    . The
    children are in a stable environment with their grandparents, who are the parties
    8
    most likely to adopt them. See 
    Iowa Code § 232.116
    (2)(b) (considering “whether
    the child[ren] ha[ve] become integrated into the foster family . . . and whether the
    foster family is able and willing to permanently integrate the child[ren] into the
    foster family”).   With the grandparents, the children are excelling at school,
    regularly see their therapists, and maintain healthy lives. Terminating the mother’s
    rights and continuing placement with the grandparents is the best option available.
    C. Permissive Exceptions
    We decline to find the juvenile court should have applied a permissive
    exception, as the children’s need for a stable and safe placement overrides the
    bonds between mother and children. See M.W., 
    876 N.W.2d at 225
     (declining to
    find a permissive exception outweighed the best interests of the children). A
    parent’s love is not enough to prevent termination, nor is the mere existence of a
    bond. See In re A.B., 
    956 N.W.2d 162
    , 169–70 (Iowa 2021); D.W., 
    791 N.W.2d at 709
    . For permissive exceptions, the parent claiming the exception has the burden
    to prove it should apply. A.S., 906 N.W.2d at 476.
    The mother has a bond with her children, but she is also unwilling to seek
    help for her ongoing issues. Because these issues persist, the children would
    likely face harm if returned to their mother. See In re S.A., 
    502 N.W.2d 23
    , 25
    (Iowa Ct. App. 1993) (finding a parent’s ongoing mental-health and drug concerns
    made it unsafe to return the child to their care). We find the interests in favor of
    termination outweigh the bonds between the mother and her children, and she has
    failed to carry her burden to invoke a permissive exception. See M.W., 
    876 N.W.2d at 225
    .
    AFFIRMED.