Robert Jackson White, Applicant-Appellant v. State of Iowa ( 2017 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 16-0161
Filed April 19, 2017
ROBERT JACKSON WHITE,
Applicant-Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF IOWA,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Robert J. Blink,
Judge.
Robert Jackson White appeals the court’s grant of the State’s motion for
summary judgment on his postconviction-relief application. AFFIRMED.
Matthew C. Moore of Law Offices of Matthew C. Moore, Chariton, for
appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Tyler J. Buller, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee State.
Considered by Mullins, P.J., and Bower and McDonald, JJ.
2
MULLINS, Presiding Judge.
In 2009, Robert Jackson White was convicted of possession with intent to
deliver as an habitual offender following a jury trial. His conviction was upheld on
appeal. See State v. White, No. 09-1463, 2011 WL 227587, at *5 (Iowa Ct. App.
Jan. 20, 2011).1 In October 2015, White filed a postconviction-relief (PCR)
application. The State filed a motion for summary judgment, contending White’s
application was time barred under Iowa Code section 822.3 (2015) (providing all
PCR actions “must be filed within three years from the date the conviction or
decision is final or, in the event of an appeal, from the date the writ of
procedendo is issued”). Following a hearing on the motion, the PCR court
granted the State’s motion and dismissed White’s claims. On appeal, White
pursues only one of the claims he asserted below—that State v. Gaskins, 866
N.W.2d 1 (Iowa 2015) (addressing the search-incident-to-arrest exception to the
warrant requirement), constitutes new law and creates a genuine issue of
material fact for trial on his PCR application.2 Our review is for correction of
errors of law. See Harrington v. State, 659 N.W.2d 509, 519 (Iowa 2003).
White concedes his application is outside of the three-year window
provided by section 822.3. He argues, however, the statute of limitations does
not apply because the Iowa Supreme Court’s holding in Gaskins constitutes “a
1
White claimed the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence
obtained during the search of his vehicle and home, contending probable cause was
lacking because the search warrant contained false information; the district court erred in
instructing the jury on the definition of reasonable doubt; and the district court erred in
overruling his motion in limine to exclude a State’s witness’s testimony about that
witness’s prior delivery of drugs to White. See id. at *2-4.
2
White claims the search of his vehicle was illegal under Gaskins and led to the illegal
seizure of items from his home, and that, without this evidence, the State would have
had no case against him.
3
ground of fact or law that could not have been raised within the applicable time
period.” Iowa Code § 822.3. As to this claim, the PCR court ruled:
[White] also claims that State v. Gaskins is new law and
therefore an exception to the statute of limitations as well.
However, Gaskins specifically dealt with a search incident to arrest.
A review of [White]’s criminal case indicates that the automobile
exception to the warrant requirement for search and seizures would
apply. Gaskins does not provide an exception to the statute of
limitations.
White contends Gaskins substantially altered the landscape of the law
under the Iowa Constitution with regard to searches incident to arrest. Even
assuming we agree with White’s contention, see Dixon v. State, No. 16-0329,
2017 WL 1278294, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 5, 2017) (noting Gaskins “overruled
extant precedent”); see also Nguyen v. State, 829 N.W.2d 183, 188 (Iowa 2013)
(finding the exception applies where a ground of law “had been clearly and
repeatedly rejected by controlling precedent from the court with final decision-
making authority” and thus “could not have been raised” as the claim had no
“possibility of success” and was “viewed as fruitless at the time but became
meritorious later” as a result of the change in law (citation omitted)), White must
still show the new ground of law “would [a]ffect the validity of the conviction,”
State v. Edman, 444 N.W.2d 103, 106 (Iowa Ct. App. 1989); see also Dixon v.
State, No. 12-0499, 2013 WL 3291837, at *2-3 (Iowa Ct. App. June 26, 2013).
In his appeal, White simply contends a genuine issue of material fact
exists as to whether Gaskins applies or could be applied to his case. But White
has not identified a genuine issue of material fact regarding the applicability of
the automobile exception or even argued that it does not apply. Instead, White
asserts a special concurrence written in Gaskin supports that the majority’s ruling
4
in Gaskin might apply not only to searches incident to arrest but also to the
automobile exception. See Gaskins, 866 N.W.2d at 35-38 (Appel, J.,
concurring). Despite this concurrence, the automobile exception remains good
law, and “[w]e are not at liberty to overrule controlling supreme court precedent.”
State v. Beck, 854 N.W.2d 56, 64 (Iowa Ct. App. 2014). As a result, White has
failed to “show[] a nexus between his conviction and the [purported] change in
law, such that it would affect the validity of his conviction.” Dixon, 2013 WL
3291837, at *3.
AFFIRMED.