Kari Ann Atzen v. Angelia Renee Atzen ( 2018 )


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  •                    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
    No. 15-0368
    Filed March 21, 2018
    KARI ANN ATZEN,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    vs.
    ANGELIA RENEE ATZEN,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ________________________________________________________________
    Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Eliza J. Ovrom, Judge.
    Steven Atzen’s current wife appeals jury verdicts in favor of his former wife
    in the former wife’s lawsuit alleging abuse of process, intentional infliction of
    emotional distress, and defamation. AFFIRMED.
    Marcy A. O’Brien of O’Brien Law, P.L.C., Windsor Heights, for appellant.
    Andrea M. Flanagan, Flanagan Law Group, P.L.L.C., Des Moines, for
    appellee.
    Heard by Doyle, P.J., and Tabor and McDonald, JJ.
    2
    TABOR, Judge.
    “I have the cops on speed dial,” Angelia Atzen allegedly warned her
    husband’s former wife, Kari Atzen, after a contentious encounter between the two
    women at a high school gym in November 2011. For the next fifteen months,
    Angelia waged an insidious campaign against Kari that a jury recognized as abuse
    of process, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and defamation. On appeal,
    Angelia argues the jury’s verdicts were not supported by substantial evidence. She
    also contends the damage awards were excessive. Finally, Angelia asserts the
    district court gave two faulty jury instructions. Viewing the evidence in the light
    most favorable to the verdicts, we affirm the jury’s findings and damage awards.
    We also conclude Angelia failed to show prejudice from any instructional error.
    I.     Facts and Prior Proceedings
    Kari and Steven Atzen divorced in April 2009. The decree granted Kari
    physical care of their two children and ordered Steven to pay the mortgage on the
    home Kari shared with the children. Steven made mortgage payments until the
    fall of 2010, when he became engaged to Angelia. Steven and Angelia married in
    December 2010. In February 2011, Kari received a letter from the lender indicating
    the house would be placed in foreclosure. Kari and Steven continued to have
    disagreements about his financial responsibilities. In September 2011, Steven and
    Kari had a verbal argument in her driveway as he dropped off some items for their
    children. Steven and Angelia claim Angelia’s then eight-year-old son was in the
    backseat of Steven’s car and overheard Kari swearing at Steven. Kari contends
    she was trying to discuss their children and her financial situation with Steven and
    3
    was unaware if Angelia’s son was in the car. Shortly after this incident, in early
    October, Steven filed a petition for custody modification.
    The instant case was spurred by a confrontation between Kari and Angelia
    on November 5, 2011. Kari, Steven, and Angelia attended a youth basketball
    game at Southeast Polk High School. Kari approached Steven to discuss their
    children. Angelia was standing next to him and rolled her eyes as Steven and Kari
    began to argue. Kari and Angelia exchanged insults. Angelia claims Kari used
    profanity. Kari claims Angelia accused her of being a “disgrace for a mother,” and
    she replied by telling Steven “that’s exactly why she doesn’t have any friends.”
    Kari then left the gym and joined two other parents in the hallway. Angelia walked
    up behind Kari and said, “You’re a joke for a mother.” Kari told Angelia she was
    afraid of her, and she should stay away. It was at this juncture Angelia warned
    Kari that she had the police “on speed dial.” Angelia then left the high school with
    her son. Kari found the interaction with Angelia to be unsettling and decided to file
    a police report.
    Angelia also reported the encounter to police, though her story of what
    happened was at odds with Kari’s version. Angelia claimed Kari chased her down
    the hallway yelling profanity and tried to position herself between Angelia and her
    son as they moved toward the exit. Angelia also emailed friends and family asking
    for information regarding Kari’s past conduct. In addition, she emailed Steven’s
    family-law attorney to relay her version of events and expressed her opinion Kari
    was not capable of “healthy parenting.” Angelia emailed Polk County Attorney
    John Sarcone requesting assistance. When Angelia received a copy of the police
    report, she was dissatisfied with the level of detail and submitted an additional
    4
    statement. The police recommended Angelia and Kari stay away from each other.
    Angelia emailed more friends a few days later requesting help and sharing her
    account of the Southeast Polk incident.
    The next incident relevant to this lawsuit allegedly occurred on
    December 11, 2011 at the Four Mile Creek Recreation Center, where Kari
    attended a basketball game played by one of her children. Kari did not believe
    Angelia attended the game because she did not recall seeing her in the small gym.
    But Angelia claims she was at the game when Kari walked up and sat directly
    behind her in an “intimidating” fashion.
    On December 23, Kari filed her own custody modification petition. Kari
    alleges, as a form of retaliation, Angelia filed a fabricated police report relaying
    claims about the December 11 incident and requesting criminal charges be filed.
    As a result of Angelia’s report, police issued an arrest warrant for Kari. Kari was
    arrested, strip searched, and held overnight in jail. When released, Kari was
    subject to a no-contact order (NCO) preventing interactions with Angelia.
    Eventually the NCO was modified so both women could attend official school and
    sporting events for Kari’s children, so long as they did not have contact with each
    other.
    In February 2012, Kari’s son participated in a basketball tournament in
    Knoxville, Iowa. Kari took her son to a lunch attended by the parent-coaches and
    other team families between games. After arriving at the restaurant, Kari sat at the
    parents’ table, as far as possible from Angelia. Angelia claims she and Steven
    scheduled the informal luncheon and were surprised when Kari showed up
    because it was not an official team event. Afterward, Angelia contacted the local
    5
    police department to report Kari violated the NCO and provided names of people
    in attendance. As a result, the Marion County prosecutor agreed to file a criminal
    complaint. Angelia alleges she stopped pursuing the Marion County complaint
    once she realized her stepson could be called as a witness. The Polk County
    Attorney dismissed Kari’s harassment charge after the parties participated in the
    Victim Offender Reconciliation Program.
    At various points during her fifteen-month crusade to discredit Kari, Angelia
    contacted friends and family, Angelia’s co-workers, other parents, and elementary
    school officials, to inform them of Kari’s arrest, share Kari’s mug shot, and to assert
    Kari harassed and threatened Angelia and her son.
    Kari eventually initiated an action against Pleasant Hill Police Chief Timothy
    Sittig and Sergeant Matthew Covey, alleging false arrest and a violation of her civil
    rights. The district court dismissed those claims on summary judgment. Kari
    unsuccessfully appealed the summary judgment ruling. See Atzen v. Covey, No.
    14-1958, 
    2016 WL 146343
    (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 13, 2016). Kari also filed this suit
    against Angelia, alleging abuse of process, defamation, malicious prosecution,
    intentional infliction of severe emotional distress, harassment, and fraudulent
    concealment. Angelia filed a motion for summary judgment on all claims, and Kari
    withdrew her claims for fraudulent concealment and malicious prosecution. The
    district court granted summary judgment on the harassment claim but denied
    summary judgment on the remaining claims.
    Kari’s suit went to trial in 2014. Angelia unsuccessfully moved for a directed
    verdict; the jury found in Kari’s favor on all three claims and awarded punitive
    damages. Angelia filed post-trial motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict
    6
    (JNOV) and a new trial. The district court denied the motions for JNOV and new
    trial, but remitted damages for past injury to reputation from $200,000 to $50,000
    and future injury to reputation from $100,000 to $25,000.
    Angelia filed a notice of appeal in February 2015, but the matter was
    automatically stayed when she filed a Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Petition in March
    2015. In March 2016, the federal district court approved a stipulation for relief from
    the automatic stay which permitted this appeal to proceed.
    I.     Scope and Standards of Review
    We review the district court’s denial of Angelia’s summary judgment,
    directed verdict, and JNOV motions for correction of errors at law. See Podraza
    v. City of Carter Lake, 
    524 N.W.2d 198
    , 202 (Iowa 1994). On appeal, we view the
    evidence in the light most favorable to Kari as the non-moving party. See 
    id. We review
    a challenge to the denial of a new trial based on jury awards for an abuse
    of discretion. Ladenburg v. Ray, 
    508 N.W.2d 694
    , 696–97 (Iowa 1993). When the
    motion for a new trial alleges the district court erred as a matter of law, then we
    review for correction of legal error. 
    Id. Challenges to
    jury instructions are also
    reviewed for correction of legal error. State v. Piper, 
    663 N.W.2d 894
    , 914 (Iowa
    2003).
    II.     Analysis
    A. Abuse of Process
    First Angelia argues the district court erred as a matter of law by permitting
    Kari to recover for abuse of process. Abuse of process is “the use of the legal
    process, whether criminal or civil, against another primarily to accomplish a
    purpose for which it was not designed.” Gibson v. ITT Hartford Ins. Co., 621
    
    7 N.W.2d 388
    , 398 (Iowa 2001). Put another way, abuse of process amounts to
    using the legal process to extort some advantage from another not available
    through the legal process itself. See Royce v. Hoening, 
    423 N.W.2d 198
    , 202
    (Iowa 1988). The claim has three elements: 1) use of the legal process, 2) in an
    improper or unauthorized manner, 3) that causes plaintiff to suffer damages as a
    result of the abuse. Fuller v. Local Union No. 106 of United Bhd. of Carpenters &
    Joiners, 
    567 N.W.2d 419
    , 421–22 (Iowa 1997).
    Abuse of process is a commonly confused and rarely used tort. See Philip
    L. Gordon, Defeating Abusive Claims and Counterclaims for Abuse of Process, 
    30 Colo. Law. 47
    , 47 (2001) (describing it as a “once-obscure tort absent from
    practically every law school curriculum”). It developed as a means to provide
    remedies beyond the scope of malicious-prosecution claims.          
    Id. Malicious prosecution
    claims must be based upon a civil or criminal proceeding wrongfully
    initiated and without probable cause. See Ahrens v. Ahrens, 
    386 N.W.2d 536
    , 538
    (Iowa 1986) (describing basis for malicious prosecution claim). But abuse-of-
    process claims permit potential recovery for misuse of a civil or criminal legal
    proceeding brought with probable cause and a proper purpose. Restatement
    (Second) of Torts § 682 cmt. a (Am. Law Inst. 1977). Within the context of an
    abuse-of-process claim, the wrongful conduct occurs after the initiation of a legal
    proceeding. See 
    Ahrens, 386 N.W.2d at 538
    (stating abuse of process occurs
    when “a lawfully used process is perverted to an unlawful use”).
    On appeal, Angelia contests only the first two elements: (1) use of the legal
    process (2) for an improper or unauthorized purpose.
    1. Did Angelia Use the Criminal Legal Process?
    8
    Angelia argues that as a matter of law Kari is unable to prove the first
    element—use of the legal process. See 
    id. Angelia incorrectly
    focuses on her
    conduct before initiation of the criminal charges and NCO on December 30.
    Angelia cites Fuller to argue her conduct cannot amount to use of the legal
    
    process. 567 N.W.2d at 422
    (holding “the mere report to police of possible criminal
    activity does not constitute legal process”). She claims her actions beyond filing a
    report with police, including her follow-up contacts with police, conversations with
    the county attorney’s office, and consultations with various attorneys, illustrate her
    diligent attempts to address her genuine concerns and, even if considered in
    aggregate, do not amount to “use of process.” At first blush, Angelia’s argument
    seems compelling.
    Recently, an Arizona appellate court endorsed Fuller and its conclusion that
    reports to police are not use of the legal process. Fappani v. Bratton, 
    407 P.3d 78
    ,
    82–83 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2017). Expanding on Fuller’s reasoning, the Arizona court
    rejected an argument that a defendant’s repeated demands for a prosecutor to
    pursue reported offenses amounted to use of the legal process. 
    Id. at 83.
    It
    reasoned: “A prosecutor has discretion to prosecute such cases as he or she
    deems appropriate, thus, whether a case is prosecuted is not controlled by the
    victim or anyone else.” 
    Id. The court
    concluded, “[d]emanding that the county
    attorney prosecute a criminal violation of law, without more, does not implicate
    judicial process.”   
    Id. Following this
    reasoning, Angelia’s reports to police,
    entreaties for police to institute criminal charges, consultations with attorneys, and
    communication with the Polk County Attorney’s Office before Kari was criminally
    9
    charged do not amount to use of the legal process. If our inquiry ended here, we
    could not conclude Angelia used the legal process.
    But Angelia’s focus is too narrow; we must consider her later conduct.1
    Abuse of process “is concerned with the improper use of process after it has been
    issued.” Herring v. Citizens Bank & Trust Co., 
    321 A.2d 182
    , 190 (Md. Ct. Spec.
    App. 1974). We must assess Angelia’s actions after initiation of the criminal case
    to determine if she used the legal process. Here process was issued when the
    district court found probable cause supporting a preliminary complaint and issued
    an arrest warrant and NCO. We must examine Angelia’s subsequent conduct to
    determine if she used this legal process.
    Kari had the burden to prove Angelia took some action after the State
    commenced the criminal charges “using legal process empowered by that
    [prosecution] to accomplish an end not within the purview of the [prosecution].”
    See Batten v. Abrams, 
    626 P.2d 984
    , 990 (Wash. Ct. App. 1981). Use of the legal
    1
    Kari’s petition alleged abuse of process based on Angelia’s reports of “false information
    to law enforcement officers for the purpose of instigating a criminal prosecution.” The
    petition also included statements alleging Angelia agreed to work toward the dismissal of
    Kari’s criminal charges if Kari made certain custody concessions. It also alleged Angelia
    tricked Kari into violating the NCO. Because Kari’s petition discussed Angelia’s conduct
    after Kari was criminally charged, we conclude the petition meets notice-pleading
    requirements and permits Angelia’s later conduct to serve as the factual basis for the
    abuse-of-process claim. See Rees v. City of Shenandoah, 
    682 N.W.2d 77
    , 79 (Iowa
    2004).
    In resistance to Angelia’s motion for summary judgment, Kari filed a statement of
    disputed facts including statements about Angelia’s conduct after Kari was criminally
    charged. The district court’s ruling on Angelia’s motion for summary judgment also cited
    to Angelia’s later police report alleging Kari violated the NCO as conduct constituting use
    of process. Although Angelia filed a motion to reconsider the summary judgment ruling
    on the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, she did not contest the district
    court’s reliance on her conduct after the criminal charges and NCO were issued in relation
    to the abuse-of-process claim. By not objecting to the district court and Kari’s reliance on
    Angelia’s later conduct in any form, Angelia waived any argument that Kari’s petition did
    not sufficiently identify the later conduct as the basis for the abuse-of-process claim. See
    Linden v. Green, 
    46 N.W. 1108
    , 1109 (Iowa 1890).
    10
    process may also be described as some “definite act or threat not authorized by
    the process or aimed at an objective not legitimate in the use of the process.” See
    W. Prosser, Law of Torts § 121 (4th ed. 1971).
    Kari satisfied that burden by showing that after the NCO issued, Angelia
    contacted the assistant county attorney assigned to Kari’s prosecution and
    inquired about using the NCO to prevent Kari from contacting Steven regarding
    their custody modification proceedings, worked with Steven to barter their
    cooperation in the criminal proceeding for favorable custody modification terms,
    attempted to use the NCO to prevent Kari from attending the Atzen children’s
    sporting events, and claimed Kari violated the NCO in February. This course of
    conduct represents the kind of perversion of the criminal process after it is
    commenced that fulfills the first element of abuse of process.
    We next inquire into the motivation behind Angelia’s use of process.
    2. Did Angelia Use the Legal Process in an Improper or
    Unauthorized Manner?
    Angelia claims, even if she did use the legal process, as a matter of law,
    she did not use it in an improper or unauthorized manner. See 
    Fuller, 567 N.W.2d at 421
    –22. The improper or unauthorized purpose must be the primary motivation
    for the tortfeasor to use the process. See Pundzak, Inc. v. Cook, 
    500 N.W.2d 424
    ,
    429 (Iowa 1993). Specifically, the jury instructions required Kari to prove Angelia
    used the criminal legal process “primarily for the purpose of assisting Steven Atzen
    in the custody and support action between Steven and Kari Atzen and/or to
    intentionally inflict severe emotional distress on Kari Atzen.”
    11
    Angelia contends if she used the criminal process, she did so for its
    intended purpose. In support of her contention, Angelia repeats her version of
    events to show she had valid reasons for pursuing criminal charges against Kari
    and notes the Polk and Marion County Attorneys shared her interest in going
    forward with the criminal cases. But “an abuse of process can occur even though
    there is probable cause to bring the action.” Palmer v. Tandem Mgmt. Serv., Inc.,
    
    505 N.W.2d 813
    , 817 (Iowa 1993). And a cause of action for abuse of process
    was developed specifically for instances arising from misuse of a legal proceeding
    brought with probable cause and a proper purpose. See Restatement (Second)
    of Torts § 682 cmt. a (Am. Law Inst. 1977).
    We recognize abuse-of-process claims “often fail on the merits because of
    the high burden imposed by the Iowa Supreme Court for this second element.”
    Jensen v. Barlas, 
    438 F. Supp. 2d 988
    , 1002 (N.D. Iowa 2006). As Angelia notes,
    “proof of an improper motive by the person filing the lawsuit for even a malicious
    purpose does not satisfy this element.” 
    Palmer, 505 N.W.2d at 817
    . A person
    cannot be held liable if she “has done no more than carry the process to its
    authorized conclusion, even with bad intentions.” 
    Jensen, 438 F. Supp. 2d at 1003
    (quoting Schmidt v. Wilkinson, 
    340 N.W.2d 282
    , 267 (Iowa 1983)). Abuse of
    process does not occur even when the motivation for using the legal process was
    to intimidate or embarrass the plaintiff. 
    Id. Kari cannot
    prove abuse of process simply by showing Angelia relished
    Kari’s difficulties resulting from the initiation of the legal process. See Pundzak,
    12
    
    Inc., 500 N.W.2d at 430
    . But if Angelia’s immediate purpose was some sort of
    extortion, then an abuse of process occurred.2 See 
    id. Here, the
    improper or unauthorized purposes identified in the jury instruction
    were to influence Steven and Kari’s dissolution modification proceedings and to
    intentionally inflict severe emotional distress. The allegation that Angelia tried to
    influence the modification proceedings qualifies as an improper purpose because
    she sought “some collateral advantage” or influence over the modification
    proceedings. See 
    Palmer, 505 N.W.2d at 817
    . Kari’s family-law attorney testified
    the parties considered the criminal charges during mediation and agreed to work
    toward dismissal, indicating the criminal charges were used as a “bargaining chip.”
    Angelia concedes she communicated with Steven and his attorney during the
    mediation. Likewise, Steven testified he and Angelia worked together to achieve
    their objectives related to Kari. Angelia regularly communicated with Steven’s
    attorney about the modification proceedings and their interplay with the criminal
    charges.    For instance, within the same email thread, Angelia discussed the
    amount of new child support payments between Kari and Steven and the impact
    of the criminal proceedings on the modification proceedings. And Angelia tried to
    use the NCO to prevent Kari and Steven from communicating about the
    modification proceedings.
    The jury could infer Angelia’s desire to influence the modification
    proceedings from the timing of her course of conduct. She emailed Steven’s
    2
    For example, if a party sues another based on a legitimate cause of action but was
    primarily motivated by a desire to financially ruin the other party through costly litigation,
    then the ruined party may sue for abuse of process. See 
    id. 13 attorney
    roughly two and a half weeks after Steven filed his modification petition,
    suggesting specific conditions be included in the amended decree. She reported
    the alleged December 11 incident on December 27, four days after Steven was
    served notice of Kari’s counter-petition to modify their custody arraignment.
    Angelia filed her Marion County complaint shortly before the mediation; she
    reported the claimed NCO violation on February 25 and the mediation addressing
    modification occurred on March 1, less than a week later.
    The jury could also consider Angelia’s use of the criminal proceedings to
    inflict severe emotional distress upon Kari as an improper motive. The infliction of
    emotional distress on Kari was not simply, in Angelia’s view, a happy byproduct of
    the criminal proceedings; it was a primary purpose for Angelia’s conduct. See
    
    Pundzak, 500 N.W.2d at 430
    . The record is replete with evidence indicating
    Angelia used the NCO as a sword against Kari. For instance, Angelia intended
    the NCO to prevent Kari from attending her own children’s events. Angelia also
    shared Kari’s arrest photo with others in the community and told other parents
    about Kari’s arrest to turn them against Kari.
    Angelia asserted her use of the legal process was for the legitimate cause
    of protecting herself and her child from harassment. But the jury rejected her
    version of events. The jury was free to consider the timing of Angelia’s actions in
    relation to the modification proceedings to infer her desire to influence Steven’s
    family-law case through the criminal proceedings. Likewise, the jury was free to
    conclude Angelia used the criminal proceedings to inflict severe emotional harm
    on Kari. Because both interference with the custody modification mediation and
    intentional infliction of severe emotional distress were improper purposes for use
    14
    of the legal system, the court did not err as a matter of law by rejecting Angelia’s
    summary judgment, directed verdict, JNOV, and new trial motions.
    B. Intentional Infliction of Severe Emotional Distress
    Angelia next argues the district court erred as a matter of law by permitting
    Kari to recover for intentional infliction of severe emotional distress. Kari had the
    burden to establish (1) outrageous conduct by Angelia; (2) Angelia intentionally
    caused, or recklessly disregarded the probability of causing, the emotional
    distress; (3) Kari suffered severe or extreme emotional distress; and (4) Angelia’s
    outrageous conduct was the actual and proximate cause of the emotional distress.
    See 
    Fuller, 567 N.W.2d at 423
    . Angelia contends Kari failed to prove elements
    one and three as a matter of law.
    1. Was Angelia’s Conduct Outrageous?
    An award for intentional infliction of emotional distress requires a plaintiff to
    “establish a prima facie case for outrageous conduct.” Smith v. Iowa State Univ.
    of Sci. and Tech., 
    851 N.W.2d 1
    , 26 (Iowa 2014). Then the district court must
    determine if the alleged conduct is outrageous as a matter of law. 
    Id. If reasonable
    people could reach differing conclusions regarding outrageousness, the question
    must be presented to the jury. See 
    id. Conduct is
    outrageous if it goes “beyond
    all possible bounds of decency . . . and [is] utterly intolerable in a civilized
    community.” 
    Id. (quoting Van
    Baale v. City of Des Moines, 
    550 N.W.2d 153
    , 156–
    57 (Iowa 1996)). Typically, a cause of action exists if a factual recitation would
    cause an average person to exclaim, “Outrageous!” 
    Id. Angelia fails
    to acknowledge the sharp contrast between her own narrative
    and Kari’s factual recitation. Instead, Angelia relies solely on her version of events
    15
    to argue her conduct was not outrageous as a matter of law. But when determining
    if Angelia’s conduct was outrageous, the district court necessarily reviewed the
    claims assuming Kari’s version was true. See Bierman v. Weir, 
    826 N.W.2d 436
    ,
    467 (Iowa 2013) (assuming all factual disputes in favor of plaintiff when
    determining if conduct was outrageous). On review we must do the same. See
    
    id. Kari alleged
    Angelia filed exaggerated and false police reports, urged police
    and prosecutors to criminally charge Kari without probable cause, contacted
    people in the community about the allegations including false claims that Kari
    threatened Angelia’s eight-year-old son, tried to intervene in Kari and Steven’s
    custody proceedings, shared Kari’s mug shot in the community, abused the NCO
    in an effort to block Kari from attending her children’s events, and induced Kari to
    violate the NCO at a basketball team lunch.
    Kari offered witnesses to bolster her version of events. See Vaughn v. Ag
    Processing, Inc., 
    459 N.W.2d 627
    , 636 (Iowa 1990) (requiring “substantial
    evidence of such extreme conduct”). She provided testimony from Nicole Williams
    contradicting Angelia’s version of the Southeast Polk incident. Williams testified
    she did not hear Kari shout at Angelia in the gym, found Kari upset in the hallway
    after the game, observed Angelia leave with her son, and did not see Kari follow
    them down the hallway yelling threats or obscenities. Kari also provided testimony
    from Joseph Boord corroborating her version and contradicting Angelia’s version
    of the Southeast Polk incident. Boord testified he saw Kari and Angelia in the
    hallway and stated Kari did not follow Angelia. When he approached Kari after
    Angelia left, Kari was crying and told him Angelia called her a “terrible mother.”
    Kari also offered numerous exhibits to illustrate Angelia’s outrageous conduct, e.g.,
    16
    Angelia’s supplemental statement to police embellishing her original complaint
    regarding the Southeast Polk incident and Angelia’s emails sent to mutual friends
    sharing her allegations against Kari, to Steven’s family-law attorney meddling in
    the custody case, to the Polk County Attorney claiming Kari threatened her and
    her son, to her co-workers claiming Kari harassed her, and to elementary school
    officials claiming Kari threatened and harassed her and her son and sharing Kari’s
    arrest photo.
    While “[e]very unkind and inconsiderate act cannot be compensable,” the
    conduct alleged by Kari goes beyond unkind and inconsiderate. See 
    id. The jury
    could have found from the evidence that Angelia executed a meticulous plan to
    attack Kari in the courtroom of public opinion, as well as in an actual courtroom,
    relying on fabricated events. A reasonable person could hear Kari’s saga and
    justifiably exclaim, “Outrageous!” See 
    Smith, 851 N.W.2d at 26
    .
    2. Did Angelia’s Conduct Cause Kari Severe Emotional Distress?
    Angelia claims Kari provided insufficient evidence showing she suffered
    physical or emotional harm as a result of Angelia’s conduct. To recover for
    emotional distress, Kari was required to exhibit physical symptoms or “a notably
    distressful mental reaction caused by the outrageous conduct.” See 
    id. at 30
    (quoting Steckelberg v. Randolph, 
    448 N.W.2d 458
    , 463 (Iowa 1989)). Kari may
    recover only if the effects of the outrageous conduct are so severe that no
    reasonable person could be expected to endure them.           See 
    id. “Abdominal cramps,
    weight loss, and crying” may be a sufficient manifestation of emotional
    distress to submit the issue to a jury. See 
    id. But “headaches,
    insomnia, and loss
    of appetite” that were not been treated by a doctor and did not result in weight loss
    17
    did not prove a sufficient manifestation of emotional distress to submit the issue to
    a jury. See 
    id. at 31.
    The jury could have decided Kari’s symptoms went beyond temporary
    discomfort. Her former mental-health counselor, Jenny Rainy-Gibson, testified
    Kari would visibly shake in fear when discussing her conflict with Angelia. Kari’s
    current counselor, Crystal Hemeseth, noted Kari began showing signs of post-
    traumatic-stress disorder (PTSD) shortly after treatment started in July 2013.
    Hemeseth determined Kari was suffering from fear, panic attacks, sadness,
    anxiety, intense worry, crying spells, loss of weight, lack of appetite, and inability
    to sleep. These symptoms persisted throughout Kari’s treatment.
    On appeal,3 Angelia argues the jury could not rely on Hemeseth’s testimony
    because the counselor’s conclusions are based on Kari’s own statements during
    treatment. But Angelia does not suggest another, more reliable methodology could
    have been used by Hemeseth to assess Kari’s mental health. Additionally, on
    cross-examination, Angelia exposed Hemeseth’s limited knowledge of Kari’s
    medical history. The jury was free to consider the basis of Hemeseth’s testimony
    and knowledge of Kari’s medical history when concluding Kari suffered emotional
    harm. See Twohey v. Brown, 
    66 N.W.2d 870
    , 872 (Iowa 1954) (noting the jury
    must weigh all evidence presented).
    3
    Angelia’s brief argues in passing that the counselor’s testimony should have been
    excluded. The entirely of her argument is: “Plaintiff’s treating therapists should have been
    excluded for reasons set forth in Defendant’s Motion in Limine.” This reference is
    insufficiently developed for appellate review. See Midwest Auto. III, LLC v. Iowa Dep’t of
    Transp., 
    646 N.W.2d 417
    , 431 n.2 (Iowa 2002) (holding random mention of an issue
    without elaboration or supporting authority fails to preserve the claim).
    18
    Kari’s friends also noticed dramatic changes in Kari’s mental health as a
    result of Angelia’s outrageous conduct. Mary Hermes testified Kari is now more
    withdrawn at the children’s functions and seems embarrassed. Jenny Morgan
    stated the stress “has taken a toll on [Kari]” and indicated Kari is always very
    nervous, tearful, and embarrassed. Morgan also indicated Kari is afraid to walk in
    front of anyone at the children’s events. The change in Kari was so significant she
    “worried for [Kari’s] life and [Kari’s] safety.” The jury could have relied on testimony
    from Rainey-Gibson, Hemesesth, Hermes, and Morgan to conclude Kari suffered
    physical or mental manifestations of emotional distress.
    3. Should the District Court Have Ordered Kari to be Evaluated by
    Angelia’s Expert?
    Angelia also argues the district court erred in denying her request for Kari
    to submit to a psychological evaluation with Angelia’s expert. When a person’s
    mental or physical condition is at issue, a court may order the person be subjected
    to an examination. See Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.515. But the requesting party must show
    good cause for the examination. See 
    id. Before requesting
    Kari be subjected to
    a psychological evaluation, Angelia’s expert had the opportunity to examine Kari’s
    medical and counseling records. He reported he could issue an opinion regarding
    Kari’s emotional distress “within a reasonable degree of medical certainty.”
    Because Angelia’s expert already reached an informed conclusion, Angelia failed
    to show good cause to subject Kari to an examination.
    C. Defamation
    Angelia disputes the defamation award, arguing Kari’s proof was insufficient
    as a matter of law. The jury instructions identified six separate categories of
    19
    defamatory communication: 1) statements to law enforcement agencies regarding
    November 5, 2011; 2) statements to law enforcement agencies regarding
    December 11, 2011; 3) statements to lawyers not representing a party; 4)
    statements to co-workers; 5) statements to friends or family; and 6) statements to
    personnel of the Southeast Polk School District. The jury answered interrogatories
    finding each category was defamatory per se, per quod, and by implication.
    “Defamation includes the twin torts of libel and slander.” Kiesau v. Bantz,
    
    686 N.W.2d 164
    , 174 (Iowa 2004) (citation omitted) (overruled on other grounds
    by Alcala v. Marriott Intern. Inc., 
    880 N.W.2d 699
    (Iowa 2016)). Libel covers written
    statements and slander covers oral statements. 
    Bierman, 828 N.W.2d at 444
    . Per
    se defamation has “a natural tendency to provoke the plaintiff to wrath or expose
    [her] to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule, or to deprive [her] of the benefit of
    public confidence or social intercourse.” 
    Id. (quoting Johnson
    v. Nickerson, 
    542 N.W.2d 506
    , 510 (Iowa 1996)). In actions between a private plaintiff and a non-
    media defendant, per se defamation does not require proof of malice, falsity, or
    damage. See 
    id. Per quod
    defamation requires a third party to “refer to facts or
    circumstances beyond the words actually used to establish defamation.” 
    Johnson, 542 N.W.2d at 510
    (citation omitted). Per quod defamation also requires the
    plaintiff to prove damages. 
    Id. Finally, the
    plaintiff must establish the statement
    was made with malice. See Suntken v. Den Ouden, 
    548 N.W.2d 164
    , 168 (Iowa
    Ct. App. 1996).     Defamation by implication occurs when a “defendant (1)
    juxtaposes a series of facts so as to imply a defamatory connection between them,
    or (2) creates a defamatory implication by omitting facts, [such that] he may be
    held responsible for the defamatory implication, unless it qualifies as an opinion,
    20
    even though the particular facts are correct.” Stevens v. Iowa Newspapers, Inc.,
    
    728 N.W.2d 823
    , 827 (Iowa 2007) (citation omitted).
    1. Did Angelia Defame Kari?
    a. Were Angelia’s Statements to Law Enforcement
    Regarding the November 5, 2011 Incident Defamatory?
    Angelia filed a voluntary statement on November 17, 2011, regarding the
    November 5 confrontation at Southeast Polk High School.          In the statement,
    Angelia asserted she and her second-grade son were followed by Kari who was
    screaming profanity and trying to get between Angelia and her son. Angelia also
    recorded her conversation with Pleasant Hill Police Chief Timothy Sittig and
    Sergeant Matthew Covey where she claimed Kari chased her and her son “from
    the gym to the hallway [and] finished her verbal assault on [Angelia.]”
    The jury found Angelia’s statements to law enforcement regarding the
    November 5 incident to be defamatory per se, per quod, and by implication. We
    agree Angelia’s assertion that Kari chased her and her young child while shouting
    profanity and behaved in a physically threatening manner by trying to position
    herself between mother and son is defamatory per se. We reach this conclusion
    because allegations of such conduct directed at a young child would likely expose
    Kari to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule. See 
    Bierman, 828 N.W.2d at 444
    ; see
    also Rossignol v. Silvernail, 
    586 N.Y.S.2d 343
    , 345 (1992) (upholding defamation
    award when plaintiff was “labeled a child abuser—one of the most loathsome
    labels in society”).   Because she established per se defamation, Kari is not
    required to prove malice, falsity, or damage as to that category. See 
    Bierman, 828 N.W.2d at 444
    .
    21
    Angelia argues her statements cannot be defamatory because “the gist of
    [her] statements made are indisputably true—the parties engaged in a verbal
    altercation.” So long as the “‘gist’ of the defamatory charge is substantially true”
    the plaintiff may not recover for the statement. Wilson v. IBP, Inc., 
    558 N.W.2d 132
    , 140 (Iowa 1996) (quoting Behr v. Meredith Corp., 
    414 N.W.2d 339
    , 342 (Iowa
    1987)). But Angelia forgets “[t]he gist or sting of the defamatory charge . . . is ‘the
    heart of the matter in question—the hurtfulness of the utterance.’” 
    Id. (quoting Behr,
    414 N.W.2d at 342). The confrontation between the women is not the sting
    of Angelia’s claims. The sting rests in her allegation that Kari chased her and her
    child while screaming profanity and tried to separate Angelia from her child.
    Accepting Kari’s version of events as true, as the jury did, Kari never chased
    Angelia or her child, never tried to separate them, and never yelled profanity.
    Angelia is not absolved by the truth.
    b. Were Angelia’s Statements to Law Enforcement
    Regarding the December 11, 2011 Incident Defamatory?
    Angelia contacted Sergeant Covey; claimed Kari sat directly behind her at
    the Four Mile Recreation Center on December 11, 2011; and requested Kari be
    charged with harassment. The jury found Angelia’s statements to Covey regarding
    the December 11 incident to be defamatory per se, per quod, and by implication.
    We do not conclude this statement is defamatory per se because an allegation one
    person sat behind another, without more, will not subject anyone to public hatred,
    contempt, or ridicule. See 
    Bierman, 828 N.W.2d at 444
    . But we believe the jury
    was justified in finding the statement to be defamatory per quod.
    22
    Per quod defamation occurs when a third party may “refer to facts or
    circumstances beyond the words actually used to establish defamation.” 
    Johnson, 542 N.W.2d at 510
    (citation omitted). Covey previously met with Angelia to discuss
    her conflict with Kari. During that conversation, Angelia tried to persuade him and
    Chief Sittig that Kari was harassing her. They told her additional contact by Kari
    could constitute harassment. Given this background, Covey could understand
    Angelia’s statements as accusations of criminal conduct perpetrated by Kari. Kari
    could demonstrate resulting damage by her criminal charges stemming from this
    report.     See Johnson, 542, N.W.2d at 510 (requiring plaintiff show resulting
    damage in per quod claim). And Angelia’s malice was demonstrated by her
    ongoing efforts to ruin Kari’s reputation and emotionally injure Kari. See 
    Suntken, 548 N.W.2d at 167
    (requiring proof of malice).
    c. Did Angelia Defame Kari in her Communication with
    Lawyers not Representing a Party?
    Angelia discussed Kari in an email to Steven’s family-law attorney. She
    stated: “[A]fter she chased my 8 year old son and I from the [Southeast Polk] gym
    las[t] night screaming, using severely repetitive foul language, forcibly placing her
    body between me and my son, and verbally accosting both he and I, I no longer
    believe in or support this individual’s ability to provide healthy parenting.” The jury
    found defamation per se, per quod, and by implication based on this statement.
    As with her similar statements to law enforcement discussed above, substantial
    evidence supported the jury’s finding that Angelia’s allegations that Kari chased
    her and her son while shouting profanity is defamatory per se.
    d. Were Angelia’s Statements to Co-Workers Defamatory?
    23
    Angelia emailed her co-workers and identified Kari by name, stated she was
    charged with third-degree harassment, jailed and released on bond, and a NCO
    prevented Kari from approaching Angelia. The jury found Angelia defamed Kari
    per se, per quod, and by implication through her emails to co-workers.               We
    conclude Angelia’s communication with her co-workers was not defamation per se
    or per quod because she shared substantially accurate information. See 
    Wilson, 558 N.W.2d at 140
    (recognizing substantial truth as a defense to defamation
    claims).
    But Angelia’s email is defamatory by implication because it omits material
    facts to form a technically accurate statement. See Stevens v. Iowa Newspapers,
    Inc., 
    728 N.W.2d 823
    , 828 (Iowa 2007). The entire basis for Kari’s criminal
    charges, arrest, and the NCO was Angelia’s fabricated accounting of events to
    investigators. The false basis for the technically true statements is a material fact
    that may not be omitted from the story without resulting in defamation by
    implication. See Turner v. KTRK Television, Inc., 
    38 S.W.3d 103
    , 115 (Tex. 2000)
    (noting isolated statements may be true but convey a defamatory and false
    impression when material facts are omitted).
    “Just as the substantial truth doctrine precludes liability for a publication that
    correctly conveys a story’s ‘gist’ or ‘sting’ although erring in the details,” defamation
    by implication “permit[s] liability for the publication that gets the details right but
    fails to put them in the proper context and thereby gets the story’s ‘gist’ wrong.” 
    Id. (citation omitted).
    The proper context for Angelia’s statements included disclosure
    of her false and exaggerated statements to law enforcement. Her interactions with
    law enforcement are critical to completing the story; they are the “gist” of the story.
    24
    Without that context, Angelia’s statements to co-workers could reasonably be
    considered defamatory by implication, and we uphold the jury’s verdict on that
    basis.
    e. Were Angelia’s Statements to Family and Friends
    Defamatory?
    Angelia discussed Kari in several emails to family members and friends.
    Some of these communications did no more than express Angelia’s opinion of Kari
    and solicit others to share any negative information they might have about Kari.
    But two emails included Angelia’s claims about the November 5 incident at
    Southeast Polk High School. Again, she accused Kari of verbally attacking her
    and chasing her and her son from the gym. The jury found Angelia’s statements
    to her friends and family defamatory per se, per quod, and by implication. As
    previously discussed in relation to her statements to law enforcement regarding
    the November 5 incident, these statements are defamatory per se.                The
    communications with other parents in particular had a tendency and indeed was
    aimed at damaging Kari’s reputation among peers with whom she regularly
    interacted, depriving her of the benefit of public confidence and social intercourse
    with those parents.
    f. Were Angelia’s Statements to Personnel with the
    Southeast Polk School District Defamatory?
    Angelia exchanged several emails with employees of Southeast Polk
    Schools regarding Kari. Most of the emails expressed Angelia’s view that Kari’s
    attendance at a school music performance may make Angelia’s son feel
    uncomfortable. The expression of her opinion is protected speech. See 
    Bantz, 686 N.W.2d at 177
    . But two emails exchanged with the school principal identify
    25
    Kari’s criminal case and NCO. As noted in the preceding section discussing
    Angelia’s emails to co-workers, these statements are defamatory by implication
    because they fail to disclose the “gist” of the story. The criminal proceeding and
    NCO were based on Angelia’s false statements.
    2. Did Angelia Have a Valid Defamation Defense?
    To avoid liability for the defamation, Angelia asserts three defenses. First,
    she argues her statements were substantially true and therefore cannot be
    defamatory. Substantially true statements convey the “gist” of the situation and
    are not subject to liability. See 
    Wilson, 558 N.W.2d at 140
    . But included within
    each identified category are statements which failed to convey the “gist” of the
    story. See 
    id. Angelia cannot
    avoid liability by relying on substantial truth.
    Second, Angelia contends she cannot be held liable for expressing her
    opinion.   See 
    Bantz, 686 N.W.2d at 177
    .         When considering if a statement
    expresses an opinion we consider 1) the precision and specificity of the statement;
    2) the verifiability of the statement; and 3) the context in which it was made. 
    Id. Each identified
    category of defamation included specific statements which could
    be easily verified and were intended to implicate Kari in wrongdoing. These
    statements were factual assertions, not opinions.
    Third, Angelia argues the district court failed to find she was protected under
    qualified privilege as a matter of law. “[A] qualified privilege constitutes immunity
    from liability for defamation.” Kiray v. Hy-Vee, Inc., 
    716 N.W.2d 193
    , 199 (Iowa Ct.
    App. 2006). A qualified privilege exists when “1) the statement was made in good
    faith; 2) the defendant had an interest to uphold; 3) the scope of the statement was
    limited to the identified interest; and 4) the statement was published on a proper
    26
    occasion, in a proper manner, and to proper partied only.” 
    Id. at 199–200
    (citation
    omitted). Angelia’s statements do not meet the test for qualified privilege because
    the jury was entitled to find she did not make them in good faith. Instead her
    statements were made in furtherance of her campaign to destroy Kari’s reputation
    within their community.
    3.     Angelia Defamed Kari
    Within each of the six identified categories of statements, substantial
    evidence existed to support at least one of the jury’s findings of defamation. The
    verdict forms allowed the jury to make specific findings regarding the type of
    defamation for all six categories. Angelia does not raise an issue on appeal
    concerning the verdict forms.     Accordingly, we find the defamation verdicts
    supported by substantial evidence. See WJLA-TV v. Levin, 
    564 S.E.2d 383
    , 393
    (Vir. 2002) (finding no reversible error where defamation count was “based
    collectively on publications and statements by the same defendant”).
    D. Punitive Damages
    Angelia next argues the record contained no proof of malice supporting
    punitive damages. Punitive damages may only be awarded when a plaintiff proves
    by a preponderance of clear, convincing, and satisfactory evidence, that the
    defendant’s conduct constituted a willful and wanton disregard for the rights of
    another. See Iowa Code § 668A.1(1)(a) (2013). Conduct is willful and wanton
    when done in disregard of an “obvious risk that was so great as to make it highly
    probable that harm would follow, and which thus is usually accompanied by a
    conscious indifference to the consequences.”        Cawthorn v. Catholic Health
    Initiatives Iowa Corp., 
    743 N.W.2d 525
    , 529 (Iowa 2007) (quoting Bantz, 686
    27
    N.W.2d at173). “Punitive damages are only recoverable when the defendant acted
    with actual or legal malice.” 
    Id. Angelia’s argument
    is once again based on the assumption her story was
    true. But accepting Kari’s version of events, as the jury did, we conclude sufficient
    evidence supports an award of punitive damages.            Angelia embellished the
    Southeast Polk incident to create a baseline of alleged wrongdoing by Kari.
    Angelia continued to engage law enforcement and prosecutors to place Kari in
    criminal jeopardy. She did this without regard to the emotional harm Kari would
    suffer from being arrested, strip searched, and detained as a result of Angelia’s
    falsehoods.    And Angelia spread her false narrative throughout their shared
    community—critically damaging Kari’s reputation with fellow parents with whom
    she regularly interacted. The jury could reasonably conclude Angelia’s well-timed
    and persistent conduct was willful and wanton.
    E. New Trial
    Angelia argues she is entitled to a new trial because the verdict was
    “flagrantly excessive, not sustained by sufficient evidence, and failed to administer
    substantial justice.” “[W]e must either grant a new trial or require a remittitur” if a
    verdict is flagrantly excessive, so out of reason it shocks the conscience, lacks
    evidentiary support, is the result of passion or prejudice, or fails to do substantial
    justice. See Spaur v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 510 N.W.2d 854,869 (Iowa
    1994). But we give considerable deference to the district court’s refusal to grant a
    new trial and are reluctant to interfere with jury verdicts. 
    Id. And “we
    only consider
    the evidence favorable to the plaintiff whether contradicted or not.” Reese v.
    28
    O’Malley, 
    461 N.W.2d 833
    , 839 (Iowa 1990) (quoting Olsen v. Drahos, 
    229 N.W.2d 741
    , 742 (Iowa 1975)). We find no cause to grant a new trial in this case.
    1. Past and Future Pain
    Angelia contends the jury’s award of $233,000 for past and future pain and
    suffering is flagrantly excessive, not sustained by sufficient evidence, and fails to
    administer substantial justice. She notes Kari was able to continue to work and
    raise her children. Angelia ignores counselor Hemesath’s testimony that Kari
    suffers from PTSD as a result of Angelia’s conduct and is unlikely to significantly
    recover so long as she has continued interactions with Angelia, the stepmother to
    her children. Angelia also overlooks the mental anguish Kari experienced after
    being arrested and strip searched. Considering Hemesath’s opinion and Kari’s
    own account of her distress, we cannot say the jury’s award was flagrantly
    excessive, not sustained by evidence, or fails to administer substantial justice.
    2. Loss of Reputation
    Angelia also challenges the $75,000 award for past and future loss of
    reputation. Damages may not be awarded based on the defamatory statements
    alone. 
    Id. For the
    jury to determine the extent of the injury, the plaintiff must
    establish a baseline by offering evidence about her reputation before the
    statements were made and the extent of the publication. See 
    id. Witness Lisa
    Brown established a baseline for Kari’s reputation before
    Angelia’s defamation. She describes Kari’s interaction with others, saying she was
    “obviously very nice” and noted Kari “took a lot of pride in her children” as they
    participated in school activities. In addition, Kari’s sister, Pam Fox, described Kari
    as an “amazing mother” and explained that she made friends easily, liked to have
    29
    fun, and was “very outgoing.” Angelia’s defamatory statements diminished Kari’s
    reputation by spreading the false information within their parent peer group and
    suggesting Kari became confrontational with a young child. Angelia admitted she
    reached out to all of the parents at the February luncheon about Kari. Additionally,
    Angelia’s communication with the elementary school sullied Kari’s reputation at the
    school and directly impacted the way the school officials interacted with her.
    The district court already remitted the award for reputational damage from
    $300,000 to $75,000 after reviewing the record. Evidence regarding Kari’s pre-
    defamation reputation and the extent of publication support the remitted amounts.
    See 
    id. 3. Special
    Damages
    Angelia challenges the jury’s award for special damages for past legal fees
    associated with the criminal case, past and future medical expenses, and lost
    income. She challenges the award for Kari’s criminal attorney fees because the
    attorney did not testify. But Kari testified she reviewed her bill and understood the
    highlighted entries to be associated with her criminal case.           Angelia also
    challenges the $10,000 attorney fee award noting the itemized list only amounted
    to $5614. But Kari also testified she paid another attorney between $4000 and
    $5000 for work related to the criminal case. Combining these two values roughly
    equals the jury’s award for attorney fees.
    Angelia next argues $20,000 for lost income is excessive because Kari
    testified her proximate lost income was $7000. Angelia misstates the record. Kari
    testified before her arrest she earned “around $15,000” per year from her Scentsy
    business. Kari estimated that had sales continued on the same trajectory, she
    30
    stood to earn between $25,000 and $30,000 annually. Given the uncertain nature
    of the direct-sales candle business, an extrapolation of Kari’s past earnings is the
    most reliable indicator of her lost income. She testified her lost income could have
    been as high as $15,000 annually for three years. The lost income award was not
    excessive.
    Angelia also challenges the past and future medical expenses award. She
    asserts Hemesath’s testimony should have been excluded because Kari failed to
    designate the therapist as an expert. We find Angelia’s random mention of this
    issue, without supporting analysis, to be inadequate to raise the claim for our
    consideration. See EnviroGas, L.P. v. Cedar Rapids/Linn Cty. Solid Waste Auth.,
    
    641 N.W.2d 776
    , 785 (Iowa 2002). Angelia also complains, without legal authority,
    that it was insufficient for Kari to testify her therapy cost eighty dollars per session
    and she attended fifteen sessions without offering documentation. We conclude
    the jury could rely on Kari’s testimony when awarding damages.
    4. Punitive Damages
    Finally, Angelia argues punitive damages of $450,000 were excessive, not
    supported by the evidence, and failed to administer substantial justice.             To
    evaluate her argument, we consider:
    (1) the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's misconduct; (2)
    the disparity between the actual or potential harm suffered by the
    plaintiff and the punitive damages award; and (3) the difference
    between the punitive damages awarded by the [trier of fact] and the
    civil penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases.
    Wolf v. Wolf, 
    690 N.W.2d 887
    , 894 (Iowa 2005) (quoting State Farm Mut. Auto Ins.
    Co. v. Campbell, 
    538 U.S. 408
    , 418 (2003)). The degree of reprehensibility is
    considered the most significant factor. See 
    id. 31 Angelia
    again cites her version of events to claim her conduct was not
    reprehensible and instead reasonable. As previously stated, we consider Kari’s
    version of events when considering reprehensibility, as the jury did. See 
    Reese, 461 N.W.2d at 839
    . Angelia filed false and misleading reports and advocated for
    Kari’s arrest. She spread her false allegations within their shared community and
    attempted to rally uninvolved parties to her cause. Her wrongful conduct occurred
    over an extended period of time, yet she never wavered in her focus. She carried
    out this campaign with complete disregard of its damaging impact on her
    stepchildren. Her actions were sufficiently reprehensible. See 
    Wolf, 690 N.W.2d at 894
    (considering type of harm caused, physical versus economic, indifference
    for health of others, if conduct was repetitive or isolated, and if harm resulted from
    intentional conduct or mere accident).
    When considering the difference between the punitive award and the
    compensatory damages, we must ensure the amount awarded is proportionate to
    the harm caused and the compensatory damages awarded. 
    Id. at 895.
    In this
    case, punitive damages exceed the total compensatory damages by roughly thirty
    percent.4 But punitive damages are not necessarily excessive simply because
    they exceed the compensatory award. See Wilson v. IBP, Inc., 
    558 N.W.2d 132
    ,
    148 (Iowa 1996) (approving two million dollar punitive award with four thousand
    dollar compensatory award). Given the factual basis supporting punitive damages,
    we cannot conclude the award is excessive.
    F. Jury Instructions
    4
    After remitting the damages for past and future reputational harm, the court awarded Kari
    $343,360 in compensatory damages and $450,000 in punitive damages.
    32
    Angelia first challenges the spoliation instruction. Upon Kari’s request and
    over Angelia’s objection, the district court submitted a spoliation instruction
    regarding a video of the December 11 interaction at the Four Mile Recreation
    Center. Angelia claimed she recorded footage on her cell phone that would show
    both her and Kari at the recreation center but later deleted the video. But she
    argues the spoliation instruction was improper because, had she retained the
    video, it could only vindicate her by showing both women at the recreation center
    and refute Kari’s claim that Angelia didn’t attend the event.
    The submitted spoliation instruction stated:
    Plaintiff claims that defendant has intentionally destroyed
    evidence consisting of a smart phone video recording that placed
    defendant at the Four Mile Recreation Center on December 11,
    2011. You may, but are not required to, conclude that such evidence
    would be unfavorable to defendant.
    Before you can reach this conclusion Plaintiff must prove
    all of the following:
    1. The evidence exists or previously existed.
    2. The evidence is or was within the possession or control
    of Defendant.
    3. Defendant’s interest would call for production of the
    evidence if favorable to that party.
    4. Defendant has intentionally destroyed the evidence
    without satisfactory explanation.
    For you to reach this conclusion, more than the mere
    destruction or non-production of the evidence must be shown. It is
    not sufficient to show that a third person destroyed the evidence
    without the authorization or consent of the defendant.
    To submit a spoliation instruction the proponent must offer substantial
    evidence that: “(1) the evidence was in existence; (2) the evidence was in the
    possession of or under control of the party charged with its destruction; (3) the
    evidence would have been admissible at trial; and (4) the party responsible for its
    destruction did so intentionally.” State v. Hartsfield, 
    681 N.W.2d 626
    , 630 (Iowa
    33
    2004). Angelia agrees the video existed, she had control of the phone containing
    the video, and it would have been admissible at trial. While she does not concede
    she intentionally destroyed the video, she admits she deleted it.
    We find Kari’s request for the spoliation instruction to be illogical, but see
    no prejudice in its submission. The instruction permitted the jury to conclude a
    video showing Angelia and Kari at the recreation center on December 11 existed.
    Its existence would corroborate Angelia’s testimony that she was in attendance
    and made such a recording. While the instruction also permitted the jury to
    conclude the video would not have been favorable to Angelia, it seems any video
    would have shown the women’s proximity to one another, bolstering Angelia’s
    version of events. Even if the court erred by submitting the instruction due to its
    confusing application, its submission only helped Angelia and reversal is not
    required.   See Gore v. Smith, 
    464 N.W.2d 865
    , 868 (Iowa 1991) (noting
    instructional error does not require reversal if the error is not prejudicial).
    Angelia next argues the abuse-of-process instruction incorrectly stated the
    law. The jury was advised:
    To prove abuse of process, plaintiff Kari Atzen must prove all
    of the following propositions:
    1.      On or about December 27, 2011 and/or February 26,
    2012, the defendant, Angelia Atzen, intentionally used the criminal
    legal process.
    2.      The defendant Angelia Atzen used the legal process
    primarily for the purpose of assisting Steven Atzen in the custody and
    support action between Steven and Kari Atzen and/or to intentionally
    inflict severe emotional distress on Kari Atzen, and not for its
    intended use which is explained in Instruction seventeen.
    3.      The defendant’s use of the legal process for the
    improper purpose was a cause of the plaintiff’s damage.
    4.      The amount of damage. . . .
    34
    Angelia focuses on the second element, contending the court erred by
    including the phrase “to intentionally inflict severe emotional distress on Kari Atzen”
    because “it makes no difference if the defendant dislikes the plaintiff or if the
    defendant has an ulterior motive or if the defendant has a malicious intent.”
    Angelia’s short-shrift argument misses the mark. Abuse-of-process claims
    require a “use of process that was not proper in the regular prosecution of the
    proceeding.” Grell v. Poulson, 
    389 N.W.2d 661
    , 664 (Iowa 1986). Angelia’s
    wielding of the harassment charge and corresponding NCO for the primary
    purpose of intentionally inflicting emotional distress upon Kari, presumably to
    wound Angelia’s perceived competition for the affection of the Atzen children, is
    not proper in the regular prosecution of a harassment charge or issuance of a
    NCO. Angelia’s specified challenge does not compel any relief.
    III.   Conclusion
    We affirm the jury’s conclusion that Angelia abused the legal process,
    intentionally inflicted emotional distress upon Kari, and defamed Kari within their
    community. We also share the jury’s view that Angelia’s outrageous conduct
    warranted punitive damages.        The damage awards were supported by the
    evidence. And the challenged jury instructions do not require reversal.
    AFFIRMED.