Michelle Dunkins v. Rtl Enterprises, L.L.C., and Jamar Jones and Mellisa Jones ( 2015 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 14-1940
Filed October 14, 2015
MICHELLE DUNKINS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
RTL ENTERPRISES, L.L.C.,
Defendant-Appellee,
and
JAMAR JONES and MELLISA JONES,
Defendants.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, George L.
Stigler, Judge.
Michelle Dunkins appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment in
favor of RTL Enterprises, L.L.C. on Dunkins’s claims of premises liability and
negligence. AFFIRMED.
David Hosack and Carter Stevens of Roberts, Stevens, Prendergast
& Guthrie, P.L.L.C., Waterloo, for appellant.
Henry J. Bevell III of Swisher & Cohrt, P.L.C., Waterloo, for appellee.
Considered by Danilson, C.J., and Vaitheswaran and Doyle, JJ.
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VAITHESWARAN, Judge.
Jamar and Melissa Jones owned four dogs, one of which bit Michelle
Dunkins while Dunkins was visiting the Joneses. The Joneses rented their home
from RTL Enterprises, L.L.C. Unbeknownst to RTL, a Jones dog previously bit
someone else.
Dunkins sued the Joneses and RTL, alleging: (1) premises liability against
RTL as landowner, (2) negligence on the part of the Joneses and RTL, and
(3) strict liability against the Joneses as dog owners. The Joneses took no
responsive action. RTL answered and moved for summary judgment. Following
a hearing, the district court granted RTL’s motion on the negligence and
premises liability counts and dismissed RTL as a defendant. Dunkins appealed.
Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue of
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Bierman v. Weier, 826 N.W.2d 436, 443 (Iowa 2013). The material facts are
essentially undisputed. The key question is whether the district court erred in
granting judgment as a matter of law on each of the counts against RTL.
I. Premises Liability
In granting RTL summary judgment on the premises liability count, the
district court partially relied on Allison by Fox v. Page, 545 N.W.2d 281 (Iowa
1996). The issue before the court was whether “a landlord is liable for an injury
inflicted by a tenant’s dog when the landlord knew or had reason to know that the
dog was dangerous.” Allison, 545 N.W.2d at 283. The case was tried under a
premises liability theory. Id. at 282. Though the landlord was aware the tenant
“owned a dog that was allowed to run free in the fenced-in yard” and the dog had
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previously “injured a young girl visiting the tenant,” the court concluded “the
landlords have no liability for the injuries caused by their tenant’s dog.” Id. at
282-83. The court reasoned as follows: “The landlords did not have any right to
control their tenant’s dog. The tenant’s dog, to the extent it can even be
categorized as a condition of the premises, came onto the land after the property
was leased.” Id. at 283. Because the landlords “did not own or harbor the dog
that bit” the plaintiff, the court concluded the case should not have been
submitted to the jury. Id. at 284.
RTL similarly did not own or harbor the dog that bit Dunkins. Although a
tenancy application might have placed RTL on notice that the Joneses owned a
dog, this type of ownership knowledge was not deemed material in Allison.
Nor did the landowner’s knowledge of the dog’s propensity to bite affect
the holding in Allison. See id. at 283-84. As noted, RTL had no knowledge of
the previous dog bite and Dunkins conceded as much in her deposition, as did
her attorney.
Because RTL “did not own or harbor the dog,” RTL “owed no duty to third
persons to protect them from the dog.” See id. Based on Allison, we affirm the
district court’s grant of summary judgment to RTL on the premises liability count.
II. Negligence
Dunkins alleged RTL (1) “[n]egligently allow[ed] the dangerous and vicious
dog to be present and stay in the premises,” (2) “knew or in the exercise of
reasonable care should have known that the vicious animal was on the premises
involved and caused unreasonable risk of injury to a person in [her] position,” and
(3) “failed to take reasonable precautions to protect those lawfully near the
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premises.” This court rejected a similar negligence claim in Patterson v. Rank,
No. 10-0566, 2010 WL 5394623, at *3-6 (Iowa Ct. App. Dec. 22, 2010). As in
Allison, we focused on the landowner’s control of the dog and concluded the law
did not support extension of a duty of reasonable care absent control. Patterson,
2010 WL 5394623, at *5.
Dunkins attempts to distinguish Allison and Patterson on the ground she
lacked a written lease and RTL “retained significant control” over the property.
We find the nature of the lease to be a distinction without a difference. In Allison,
the landlords rented the property to their daughter, arguably giving them more
control over the leased property than if they had rented the premises to an
unknown third party. 545 N.W.2d at 282. The court did not mention this fact as
significant in its analysis. In Patterson, the plaintiff cited certain lease terms in
arguing the landlord exercised control over the rented space, but this court
rejected the assertion. 2010 WL 5394623, at *3-4. We find Patterson
persuasive.
We conclude the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to
RTL on the negligence count.
AFFIRMED.