Darnell G. Demery, Applicant-Appellant v. State of Iowa ( 2015 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 13-1449
Filed October 14, 2015
DARNELL G. DEMERY,
Applicant-Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF IOWA,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, George L.
Stigler, Judge.
Darnell Demery appeals the denial of his application for postconviction
relief. AFFIRMED.
Thomas M. McIntee, Waterloo, for appellant.
Darnell G. Demery, Fort Madison, appellant pro se.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Benjamin Parrott, Assistant Attorney
General, Thomas Ferguson, County Attorney, and Kimberly Griffith, Assistant
County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by Danilson, C.J., Vogel, J., and Miller, S.J.*
*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 (2015).
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MILLER, Senior Judge
Darnell Demery appeals the denial of his application for postconviction
relief (PCR). He contends the district court abused its discretion in denying his
motion to amend his application. He also contends his trial and PCR counsel
were ineffective. In a pro se brief, Demery also challenges part of his sentence
and the court’s subject matter jurisdiction.
I. BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS.
In July 2009, Demery rear ended a vehicle and fled the scene. Two
drivers followed his vehicle to a restaurant and reported its location to law
enforcement. When officers responded to the report and arrived at the
restaurant, Demery gave one of the officers his identification.
As the officers were investigating, Demery told his girlfriend he was “hot,”
which she understood to mean he was in possession of something he wished to
hide. Demery began to walk away, leading to one of the officers pursuing him on
foot. The officer claims, and a witness corroborates, Demery began firing at the
officer, who fired back. The officer saw Demery fall to the ground. Days later,
Demery was apprehended while seeking treatment for a gunshot wound. Blood
found at the scene matched Demery’s DNA profile.
On the night of the shooting, Demery called two friends and told each he
had been shot. He also informed one that he had been in a “shootout” with
police.
Demery was charged with and convicted of attempt to commit murder,
possession or dominion and control of a firearm by a felon, assault on a peace
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officer by use or display of a dangerous weapon, going armed with intent, and
carrying weapons. This court affirmed his convictions on direct appeal. State v.
Demery, No. 10-1158, 2011 WL 3925714, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Sept. 8, 2011).
On January 10, 2012, Demery filed a pro se PCR application alleging his
trial counsel’s representation was ineffective. Steven Conroy was appointed
Demery’s counsel one week after the action was initiated, but Demery alleges
Conroy never contacted him or performed any work on his case. In March 2013,
Demery filed a pro se request for production of documents, and Conroy failed to
appear at the trial setting conference in April 2013. Also in April 2013, Demery
filed an amended pro se PCR application that added additional claims of
ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Conroy was removed as Demery’s
attorney in June 2013 after failing to contact court administration as directed in a
court order.
John Standafer was appointed to represent Demery after Conroy’s
removal. On August 19, 2013, one week before the PCR trial was scheduled to
be held, Standafer filed a motion for leave to amend the PCR application in order
to raise nine new claims. The court denied the motion as well as a motion to
continue because the matter had been on file for more than a year and a half and
the issues “could have and should have been raised at a much earlier time.” At
the close of the PCR trial, the court denied Demery’s PCR application, noting: “I
cannot imagine a stronger case that ever could be put on against anybody than
the case that was put on against Mr. Demery.”
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II. MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND AND MOTION TO CONTINUE.
Demery first challenges the denial of his motion for leave to amend the
PCR application and motion to continue the PCR trial. Generally, we review
PCR proceedings on error. Ledezma v. State, 626 N.W.2d 134, 141 (Iowa
2001). However, we review the denial of a request for a continuance or to
amend a pleading for an abuse of discretion. See State v. Atzer, 609 N.W.2d
526, 529 (Iowa 2000) (motion to continue); Tomka v. Hoechst Celanese Corp.,
528 N.W.2d 103, 108 (Iowa 1995) (motion to amend). “An abuse of discretion
occurs when the trial court ‘exercises its discretion on grounds clearly untenable
or to an extent clearly unreasonable.’” State v. Greene, 592 N.W.2d 24, 27 (Iowa
1999) (quoting State v. Smith, 522 N.W.2d 591, 593 (Iowa 1994)).
Our rules of civil procedure allow a party to amend a pleading by leave of
court or written consent of the adverse party. Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.402(4). Leave to
amend “shall be freely given when justice so requires.” Id. “Amendments should
be allowed as a general rule and denied only in exceptional cases.” Kitzinger v.
Wesley Lumber Co., 419 N.W.2d 739, 741 (Iowa 1987). The timing of the
request to amend is not the determinative factor; the determinative factor is
whether the amendment substantially changes the issues such that it would
surprise and prejudice the responding party. Id.
A motion for leave to amend may also be denied if the movant was
negligent in asserting the cause. Davis v. Ottumwa Young Men’s Christian
Ass’n, 438 N.W.2d 10, 14 (Iowa 1989). If a party was unaware of a claim or
defense, the failure to raise it earlier is not negligent. See id. at 14-15 (holding
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party was not negligent in failing to raise issue where new legal interpretation
precluded original claim, surprising both parties and effectively denying the
plaintiff any viable theory of recovery). Nor should a party be denied the
opportunity to amend if the motion is made before the case has been made
ready for trial or trial has been scheduled. See Neylan v. Moser, 400 N.W.2d
538, 543 (Iowa 1987) (holding plaintiffs were not negligent in seven-month delay
in asserting their counterclaim where nothing in the record suggested the case
had even been scheduled for trial when the motion to amend was filed). But
where a party is aware of a claim and waits to move for leave to amend until just
before trial, the court’s denial of the motion is not an abuse of discretion. See
Glenn v. Carlstrom, 556 N.W.2d 800, 804 (Iowa 1996) (affirming denial of motion
brought day before deadline to amend pleadings under scheduling order where
record indicated plaintiff knew of the claims more than a year earlier); see also
Allison-Kesley Ag Ctr., Inc. v. Hildebrand, 485 N.W.2d 841, 846 (Iowa 1992)
(“[W]hen the movant seeks to amend based upon trial testimony that the movant
knew or should have known about beforehand, amendments that might well have
otherwise been allowed earlier in the course of the proceedings may properly be
denied by the district court judge.”).
The denial of Demery’s motion to amend was within the court’s discretion.
Standafer filed the motion to amend because he was urged to by Demery—not
because the claims had merit. The motion for leave to amend sought to add nine
new claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and was filed only one week
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before trial was scheduled to begin. These claims were known to Demery well in
advance of trial and could have been brought earlier.1 We affirm on this issue.
III. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL.
Demery contends his trial and PCR counsel were ineffective in several
respects. We review claims of ineffective assistance of counsel de novo. State
v. Williams, 574 N.W.2d 293, 300 (Iowa 1998). “To prove ineffective assistance
of counsel, the appellant must show that (1) counsel failed to perform an
essential duty, and (2) prejudice resulted.” State v. Lane, 726 N.W.2d 371, 393
(Iowa 2007). There is a presumption the attorney acted competently, and
prejudice will not be found unless there is “a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different.” State v. Hopkins, 576 N.W.2d 374, 378 (Iowa 1998).
Demery argues his trial counsel was ineffective in three respects: in failing
to conduct depositions, in failing to secure a ballistics expert, and in failing to
withdraw due to medical issues. Only one of these issues—trial counsel’s failure
to conduct depositions—was considered by the PCR court. Because the other
two claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel were not raised before and
passed upon by the PCR court, we will not consider them for the first time on
appeal. See Lamasters v. State, 821 N.W.2d 856, 862 (Iowa 2012). Although
ineffective assistance of PCR counsel constitutes a sufficient reason for failing to
1
Although Demery asserts Conroy failed to timely amend the petition, the evidence
shows Demery was able and willing to file pro se pleadings when necessary. His initial
PCR application and a request for production of documents filed months earlier were
submitted pro se. Most importantly, Demery had filed a pro se amended PCR
application in April 2013.
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raise an issue of trial counsel’s ineffective assistance in the PCR action, see
State v. Fountain, 786 N.W.2d 260, 263 (Iowa 2010) (“Ineffective-assistance-of-
counsel claims are an exception to the traditional error-preservation rules.”),
Demery does not raise this claim in an ineffective-assistance-of-PCR-counsel
context.2
With regard to the one claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel
properly before us, we conclude Demery has failed to show his trial counsel was
ineffective in failing to conduct depositions because he is unable to show how
conducting depositions would have changed the outcome of his trial. See
Ledezma, 626 N.W.2d at 141 (“If the claim lacks prejudice, it can be decided on
that ground alone without deciding whether the attorney performed deficiently.”).
As the PCR court noted, the evidence of Demery’s guilt “is simply overwhelming.”
See State v. Bayles, 551 N.W.2d 600, 610 (Iowa 1996) (holding no prejudice
could result from counsel’s alleged deficient performance as the evidence of
defendant’s guilt was overwhelming). Demery is unable to articulate how
conducting depositions would have overcome the evidence against him.
For the same reason, his claims of ineffective assistance of PCR counsel
fail. We need not determine whether Standafer failed to perform an essential
duty by agreeing to the trial date and failing to file the motions to amend and
continue earlier, just as it does not matter that the State concedes Conroy failed
to perform the essential duties of consulting with Demery, investigating possible
defenses, amending his PCR application, and attending court hearings; the
2
Even assuming Demery is claiming PCR counsel was ineffective in failing to raise
these issues, his claim must fail based on the analysis that follows.
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overwhelming evidence of Demery’s guilt overshadows any deficient or allegedly
deficient performance by PCR counsel. Concisely stated, no matter how well
PCR counsel had performed their duties, the outcome would not have been
different. Therefore, we affirm on Demery’s claims of ineffective assistance of
trial and PCR counsel.
IV. ILLEGAL SENTENCE.
In his pro se brief, Demery alleges he received an illegal sentence
because he was fined as part of his sentence. He notes Iowa Code section
902.9(2) (2009) does not provide a fine for class “B” felonies.
Although Demery was convicted of a class “B” felony, he was also
convicted of four other crimes, which are punishable by fines. The sentencing
order specifies that Demery was fined $750 on his conviction for possession or
dominion and control of a firearm by a felon, which is a class “D” felony. See
Iowa Code § 724.26. He was also fined $625 on his conviction of carrying
weapons, which an aggravated misdemeanor. See id. § 724.4(1). Fines may be
assessed on both convictions. See Iowa Code §§ 902.9(1) (providing a class “D”
felon “shall be sentenced to a fine of at least seven hundred fifty dollars but not
more than seven thousand five hundred dollars”), 903.1(2) (providing a person
convicted of an aggravated misdemeanor shall be fined “at least six hundred
twenty-five dollars but not to exceed six thousand two hundred fifty dollars”).
Demery’s sentence is not illegal and is affirmed.
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V. JURISDICTION.
Finally, Demery alleges the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.
Although this claim was not previously raised, a challenge to the court’s subject
matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time. State v. Mandicino, 509 N.W.2d
481, 482 (Iowa 1993). However, Demery’s claim relates to alleged deficiencies
in the trial information. Even assuming the trial information was deficient, it did
not deprive the court of subject matter jurisdiction over Demery’s case but rather
impacted the court’s authority to hear the case. See id. (noting subject matter
jurisdiction refers to the court’s power to “hear and determine cases of the
general class to which the proceedings in question belong,” whereas authority
impacts the court’s ability to hear a particular case it has subject matter
jurisdiction over). A challenge to the court’s authority is waived if not raised in a
timely objection before the trial court. Id. at 483. Because Demery raises this
claim for the first time in this appeal, error is not preserved. We affirm on this
issue.
AFFIRMED.