J.F. on behalf of B.A.F. v. K.M. ( 2022 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 21-1464
Filed June 15, 2022
J.F. ON BEHALF OF B.A.F.,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
K.M.,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Hardin County, Paul G. Crawford,
District Associate Judge.
K.M. appeals the imposition of a protective order for relief from sexual abuse
entered under Iowa Code chapter 236A (2021). AFFIRMED.
Laura A. Eilers of Peglow, O’Hare & See, P.L.C., Marshalltown, for
appellant.
Colin Murphy of Gourley Rehkemper & Lindholm, PLC, West Des Moines,
for appellee.
Considered by May, P.J., and Greer and Chicchelly, JJ.
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CHICCHELLY, Judge.
A teenager appeals the imposition of a protective order for relief from sexual
abuse entered under Iowa Code chapter 236A (2021). He challenges the
sufficiency of the evidence supporting a finding of sexual abuse. Because
substantial evidence supports the court’s finding, we affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
Two teenagers, K.M. and B.F., met at the end of the 2020-21 school year.
Over the next few days, they exchanged increasingly flirtatious messages via
social media. Some messages suggested the possibility of a “friends with benefits”
relationship or a casual sexual encounter.
About four days after meeting, K.M. and B.F. went swimming with friends
and shared a brief kiss while alone. As a friend of B.F.’s brother, K.M. planned to
stay overnight in B.F.’s home. K.M., who was in the basement, consumed alcohol
and exchanged more messages with B.F., who was in her bedroom. At one point,
B.F. went to the kitchen for a drink and invited K.M. to come say goodnight to her
in person. According to K.M., the two engaged in more kissing and sexual touching
for around fifteen or twenty minutes before he returned to the basement.
More messages were exchanged. B.F. told K.M. to come to her bedroom.
K.M. did. The encounter ended when B.F.’s mother, J.F., entered the bedroom
and found the two naked, with K.M. on top of B.F. According to J.F., K.M. “froze”
while B.F. curled into a fetal position and cried. K.M. admitted that he had sexual
intercourse with B.F. Repeatedly, B.F. stated that she did not consent while K.M.
insisted she had.
J.F. called law enforcement, but no charges were filed against K.M.
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J.F. petitioned for relief from sexual abuse by K.M. on B.F.’s behalf. After
a hearing, the juvenile court issued a one-year protective order, preventing K.M.
from having any contact with B.F. K.M. appeals.
II. Scope and Standard of Review.
Because the court ruled on objections, the action was tried at law. See
Bacon ex rel. Bacon v. Bacon, 567 N.W.2d 414, 417 (Iowa 1997). Our review is
for correction of errors at law. See Iowa R. App. P. 6.907.
In reviewing K.M.’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the juvenile court’s findings. See Grinnell
Mut. Reins. Co. v. Jungling, 654 N.W.2d 530, 535 (Iowa 2002). We do not weigh
the evidence or pass on witness credibility. See id. The court’s findings are
binding if supported by substantial evidence. See id. Substantial evidence exists
if “one may reasonably infer the finding from the evidence.” Id.III. Discussion.
K.M. challenges the sufficiency of the evidence showing he committed
sexual abuse against B.F. To issue a protective order, the court needed to find by
a preponderance of the evidence that sexual abuse occurred. See Iowa Code
§ 236A.3(2) (“If the factual basis for the alleged sexual abuse is contested, the
court shall issue a protective order based upon a finding of sexual abuse by a
preponderance of the evidence.”). A preponderance
means superiority in weight, influence, or force. The evidence may
preponderate, and yet leave the mind in doubt as to the very truth. In
such cases the evidence does not fairly set the question at rest, but
merely preponderates in favor of that side whereon the doubts have
less weight.
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Walthart v. Bd. of Dirs. of Edgewood-Colesburg Cmty. Sch. Dist., 694 N.W.2d 740,
744 (Iowa 2005) (citation omitted).
Chapter 236A defines “sexual abuse” as “any commission of a crime
defined in chapter 709 or section 726.2 or 728.12.” Id. § 236A.2(5). A person
commits sexual abuse under section 709.4(1)(a) by committing a sex act “by force
or against the will of the other person.” The question is whether there is substantial
evidence supporting the juvenile court’s finding that it is more likely sexual abuse
occurred than did not.
What occurred before K.M. entered B.F.’s bedroom is largely undisputed,
and there is no dispute over what happened after J.F. discovered them. The
question is what took place when K.M. and B.F. were alone in the bedroom. B.F.
and K.M. gave very different accounts.
B.F. testified that she did not remember what happened after she got a drink
in the kitchen and returned to her bedroom. She has prescription medication to
help with headaches and sleep, and she took it on that night. That medication
usually induces sleep within an hour. B.F. remembers asking K.M. to come to her
room, but she does not recall him entering. She testified that she remembers
“waking up and I opened my mouth to speak because he put his hand over my
mouth, but while it was muffled, so I don’t think he really heard it, but I was saying
no and stop repeatedly.”
K.M. testified that he went to B.F.’s room and they resumed kissing. At one
point, he unzipped the onesie B.F. was wearing and they both got up from the bed
to undress. K.M. claims that B.F. never told him no or said that she did not want
to have intercourse with him. He admits that he put his hand “lightly over [B.F.’s]
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mouth” for part of the encounter because she was making moaning noises and he
“wanted to make it obvious that she needed to stay quiet” to avoid being caught.
K.M. testified that at one point, he tried to end the encounter but B.F. insisted he
continue. According to K.M., B.F. did not cry or object until her mother came in to
the room and caught them.
At the end of the hearing, the juvenile court conceded that what occurred in
the bedroom “is in dispute and up for disagreement.” But it found what occurred
after that night was key to determining whether sexual abuse occurred:
[B.F.]’s reactions that her mother talked about indicate to the court a
level of trauma, not a level of embarrassment or shame. Any shame
that [K.M.] could, I guess, attribute to this event is shame of getting
caught. [B.F.]’s behavior after being caught is not consistent with a
shame of being caught. It is consistent with not even
embarrassment. It is trauma from going through an experience, and
her behaviors afterwards of refusing to go into that room. On her
own volition, you know, tossing several hundred dollars’ worth of
bedding because she just couldn’t sleep in that bed after what had
happened to her. Her refusing for a long time to go back into that
room even after the parents had gotten a new mattress, gotten a new
box spring, rearranged the room, tried to make it amenable to her,
she still wasn’t having it. And then the knee-jerk reaction that she
had when her mother reached out to try to console her is retreat,
cower, cry. All of those subsequent behaviors are consistent with
what happened in the bedroom being not with her will or with her
consent but rather being against her will. And it is for a large part
that I am hanging my hat on my decision that, yes, there has been
proof by a preponderance of evidence that sexual abuse has
occurred here.
In arguing for reversal, K.M. outlines inconsistencies in in the record. For
instance, B.F.’s testimony sometimes conflicts with the messages she was sending
to K.M. She omitted some events from her testimony, like a kiss she and K.M.
shared earlier that day, until she was asked about them directly. She denied
knowing what some expressions she used in messages to K.M. meant and testified
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she did not know what she intended in other messages. And although B.F. agreed
that she would wake up if someone tried to rouse her after taking her medication,
she did not remember how her onesie was removed.1 K.M. also argues the
juvenile court ignored the lack of any citation or a delinquency charge being
brought against him, claiming it is “indicative of a lack of probable cause or even
reasonable basis to cite or arrest K.M. for any wrongdoing.” Finally, he argues the
court gave too much credence to B.F.’s behavior after that night in resolving the
conflict in the testimony.
Although K.M.’s arguments have some merit, resolution falls heavily on our
standard of review. Whether we would reach a different conclusion is irrelevant;
the question is not whether the evidence could support a different finding, it is
whether it supports the finding made. See Postell v. Am. Fam. Mut. Ins. Co., 823
N.W.2d 35, 41 (Iowa 2012). “[W]e are required to view the evidence in the light
most favorable to the judgment and liberally construe the court’s findings to uphold,
rather than defeat, the result reached.” Hutchison v. Shull, 878 N.W.2d 221, 230
(Iowa 2016) (citation omitted). And when, as here, the evidence conflicts, it is for
the fact finder to weigh it and decide credibility. See In re D.C.L., 464 N.W.2d 881,
883 (Iowa 1991). Following these precepts, we conclude that a reasonable person
could find it more likely—or less doubtful—that K.M. committed a sexual act
against B.F.’s will. On this basis, we must affirm.
AFFIRMED.
1B.F. agreed that removing the onesie required unzipping it and pulling her arms
and legs free.