State of Iowa v. Cesar Rodriguez ( 2016 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 15-0724
Filed February 24, 2016
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
CESAR RODRIGUEZ,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Johnson County, Ian K. Thornhill,
Judge.
Cesar Rodriguez appeals his sentence after pleading guilty to sexual
abuse in the third degree and lascivious acts with a child. AFFRIMED.
Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Shellie L. Knipfer, Assistant
Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Louis S. Sloven, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.
Considered by Danilson, C.J., and Vogel and Potterfield, JJ.
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POTTERFIELD, Judge.
Cesar Rodriguez appeals his sentence after pleading guilty to sexual
abuse in the third degree and lascivious acts with a child. He argues the district
court abused its discretion by imposing consecutive sentences rather than
concurrent ones, given that he was a young man with consistent employment
and no prior criminal record beyond driving without a license. We find the district
court did not abuse its discretion and affirm the sentence imposed.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
On August 25, 2014, the State of Iowa filed a trial information charging
Rodriguez with one count of sexual abuse in the second degree, a class “B”
felony, and one count of sexual abuse in the third degree, a class “C” felony.
The charges were based upon allegations Rodriguez, while he was living with a
woman and her two daughters, had repeatedly gone to the girls’ bedroom at
night when he believed they were asleep and touched their genital areas. The
girls were eleven and thirteen years old.
Rodriguez entered into a plea agreement with the State whereby he pled
guilty to count two and to a newly-added third count of lascivious acts with a
child, another class “C” felony. In exchange for the guilty plea on counts two and
three, the State agreed to dismiss count one—the class “B” felony—at
sentencing. The plea agreement allowed the parties to make whatever
recommendations they wished at sentencing.
At sentencing, the State recommended Rodriguez be sentenced to ten
years in prison for both counts, and asked the district court to make Rodriguez
serve those sentences consecutively. The State based its recommendation on
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the nature of the crimes committed and the fact Rodriguez had repeatedly
harmed two different young victims as opposed to just one. Rodriguez asked for
concurrent sentences, citing what his attorney characterized as “an unoffending
life except for these two terrible incidents.”
After considering the recommendations of both sides, the district court
sentenced Rodriguez to two terms of imprisonment not to exceed ten years, to
run consecutively. Regarding its decision to impose consecutive terms of
imprisonment, the court stated:
Having considered all of the relevant materials in this case, I
hereby adjudicate the defendant guilty under count two of the
offense of sexual abuse in the third degree, a class “C” felony;
under count three, the offense of lascivious acts with a child, a
class “C” felony.
As a sanction for each of these offenses, the defendant is
sentenced to be committed for an indeterminate term not to exceed
ten years in prison and fined the minimum amount of $1,000.00.
I’m going to suspend the fines on both counts.
As for the prison terms, the information in this case and the
offenses to which the defendant pled guilty, that he repeatedly, over
a period of time, victimized two separate, young children, and
because of the nature of the conduct, the court finds that the
sentences should be run consecutively or back to back.
That’s the order of the court, that the two indeterminate
terms of ten years will be run consecutively or back to back.
....
In determining this sentence, I’ve considered the entirety of
the presentence investigation report as corrected and amended
here on the record today. I’ve considered the nature and
circumstances of the offenses, the history and characteristics of the
defendant, including his age and his prior confirmed criminal
history, which is minimal. I have not considered any dismissed or
unadjudicated allegations. I’ve considered the recommendations of
both counsel, the recommendation of the presentence report
preparer. I find that the sentence imposed offers the defendant the
maximum opportunity for rehabilitation balanced against the
extreme interest in protecting the community.
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Rodriguez now appeals. He argues the district court abused its discretion
by imposing consecutive sentences because it failed to take into account
mitigating circumstances—his lack of a criminal history beyond driving without a
license, his sincere and extensive apology, his young age of twenty-nine, and his
consistent employment history—that militated against doing so.
II. Standard of Review
When a district court imposes a sentence within statutory limits, we review
its sentencing decisions for an abuse of discretion. See State v. Seats, 865
N.W.2d 545, 553 (Iowa 2015). “[T]he decision of the district court to impose a
particular sentence within the statutory limits is cloaked with a strong
presumption in its favor . . . .” State v. Formaro, 638 N.W.2d 720, 724 (Iowa
2002). Therefore, “our task on appeal is not to second guess the decision made
by the district court, but to determine if it was unreasonable or based on
untenable grounds.” Id. at 725.
III. Analysis
We find the district court did not abuse its discretion by imposing
consecutive sentences upon Rodriguez for the two separate and distinct crimes
to which he pled guilty. The court explained it had considered all information
contained in Rodriguez’s presentence investigation report prior to making its
decision, which included, among other things, his age and minimal criminal
history. The court also gave its reasons for imposing consecutive sentences,
and those reasons were sufficient. See State v. Keopasaeuth, 645 N.W.2d 637,
641–42 (Iowa 2002) (noting that a court’s stated reasons for consecutive
sentences need not be detailed, but must be sufficient to allow for appellate
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review of the discretionary action). The very nature of the sentencing process
grants the district court discretion in choosing between sentencing options. The
district court did not abuse its discretion but rather made a reasoned choice to
impose consecutive sentences rather than concurrent ones.
AFFIRMED.