State of Iowa v. Chad Jay Rouse ( 2014 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 3-1256 / 13-0981
Filed July 16, 2014
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
CHAD JAY ROUSE,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Christopher L.
McDonald, Judge.
A defendant appeals his judgment and sentence for serious injury by
vehicle by reckless driving and operating a motor vehicle while under the
influence. He claims the district court erred in finding that it had no discretion to
suspend his sentence. AFFIRMED.
Timothy McCarthy II of McCarthy & Hamrock, P.C., West Des Moines, for
appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Tyler J. Buller, Assistant Attorney
General, John P. Sarcone, County Attorney, and Kevin Bell, Assistant County
Attorney, for appellee.
Heard by Vaitheswaran, P.J., Mullins, J., and Miller, S.J.* McDonald, J.,
takes no part.
*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 (2013).
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VAITHESWARAN, P.J.
We must decide whether the district court had authority to suspend a
sentence.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
The State charged Chad Rouse with (1) serious injury by vehicle and
(2) operating a motor vehicle while under the influence (OWI). Rouse entered an
Alford1 plea to both charges, which the district court accepted.
The court proceeded to address a motion to adjudicate law points filed by
Rouse on whether the court had authority to suspend the judgment or sentence
on the serious-injury-by-vehicle count. The court found it had no authority to
suspend the sentence.
The court adjudged Rouse guilty and sentenced him to a prison term not
exceeding five years on the first count and one year on the second count, with
the terms to be served concurrently. This appeal followed.
II. Analysis
A. Statutory Analysis
Rouse contends the district court had discretion to suspend his sentence
on the serious-injury-by-vehicle count and the court’s interpretation of the
pertinent statute raises constitutional concerns. Rouse’s contention requires a
close examination of the provisions under which Rouse was charged and
sentenced.
1
See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37 (1970) (holding “express admission of
guilt . . . is not a constitutional requisite to the imposition of [a] criminal penalty”).
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Rouse was charged under Iowa Code section 707.6A(4) (2013), which
states: “A person commits a class ‘D’ felony when the person unintentionally
causes a serious injury, as defined in section 321J.1, by any of the means
described in subsection 1 or 2.” The means described in subsection 1 require
the operation of “a motor vehicle while intoxicated.” Iowa Code § 707.6A(1). The
means described in subsection 2 do not contain this element. The State relied
on the means described in subsection 2 and, specifically, the means set forth in
subsection 2(a): “driving a motor vehicle in a reckless manner with willful or
wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property.” Iowa Code
§ 707.6A(2)(a).
Rouse’s sentence was governed, in part, by section 707.6A(7), which
states:
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 901.5 and 907.3,
the court shall not defer judgment or sentencing, or suspend
execution of any part of the sentence applicable to the defendant
for a violation of subsection 1, or for a violation of subsection 4
involving the operation of a motor vehicle while intoxicated.
Iowa Code § 707.6A(7) (emphasis added). The district court relied on this
provision in declining to suspend his sentence for serious injury by vehicle.
Rouse focuses on the italicized language of section 707.6A(7). He
concedes he entered an Alford plea to a violation of subsection 4 but argues,
because the means by which he committed the violation does not include the
element of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated, the court possessed the
authority to suspend his sentence.
The plain language of section 707.6A(7) undercuts Rouse’s reading. See
State v. Wiederien, 709 N.W.2d 538, 541 (Iowa 2006) (“We determine legislative
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intent from the words chosen by the legislature, not what it should or might have
said.”). The provision disallows suspension of a sentence for a violation of
subsection 4 “involving” operation of a motor vehicle while intoxicated. The term
“involving” is broad, variously meaning “to relate,” “to connect,” and “to entail.”
Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary 604 (1981); See Wiederien, 709 N.W.2d at
541 (“Absent a statutory definition or an established meaning in the law, words in
the statute are given their ordinary and common meaning by considering the
context within which they are used.”). Had the legislature intended to prohibit
suspension of a sentence only where the means of committing serious injury by
vehicle contained the element of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated, the
legislature could have worded section 707.6A(7) as follows: “the court shall not
defer judgment or sentencing, or suspend execution of any part of the sentence
applicable to the defendant . . . for a violation of subsection 4 by the means
described in subsection 1.” See Iowa Code § 707.6A(7). The legislature’s
choice of broader language leads us to conclude that the prohibition of
suspension contained in section 707.6A(7) is not limited to the means set forth in
subsection 1.
Turning to the record, there is no question Rouse’s crime of serious injury
by vehicle “involved” operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated. First, Rouse
was charged with OWI in connection with the same incident as the serious-injury-
by-vehicle count. Second, he entered an Alford plea to OWI at the same time
and in the same proceeding as his plea to serious injury by vehicle. Because his
crime “involved” the operation of a motor vehicle while intoxicated, the district
court lacked authority to suspend his sentence for serious injury by vehicle.
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B. Constitutional Analysis
In the alternative, Rouse argues that Iowa Code section 707.6A(7)
“violates his right to equal protection as applied.” This constitutional challenge
was not raised in the district court. However, the Iowa Supreme Court has held
that challenges to illegal sentences may be raised at any time and those
challenges may include constitutional arguments asserting inherent flaws in the
sentence. See State v. Bruegger, 773 N.W.2d 862, 871 (Iowa 2009) (“[A]
challenge to an illegal sentence includes claims that the court lacked the power
to impose the sentence or that the sentence itself is somehow inherently legally
flawed, including claims that the sentence is outside the statutory bounds or that
the sentence itself is unconstitutional.”). While the court noted that sentencing
challenges grounded in the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments might require
error preservation, the court simultaneously overruled its prior opinion holding
that an equal protection challenge to a sentence was governed by our normal
error preservation rules. Id. (overruling State v. Ceaser, 585 N.W.2d 192, 195
(Iowa 1998)). In light of Breugger, we conclude error preservation is not a
concern. We proceed to the merits of Rouse’s challenge.
“The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article
I, section 6 of the Iowa Constitution provide individuals equal protection under the
law. This principle requires that ‘similarly situated persons be treated alike under
the law.’” State v. Wade, 757 N.W.2d 618, 624 (Iowa 2008) (citation omitted).
Rouse contends section 707.6A(7) violates the equal protection clauses
because a person found guilty of death by reckless driving under section
707.6A(2)(a) may have the sentence suspended, whereas a person convicted of
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serious injury by reckless driving under section 707.6A(4) may not, despite the
fact that death by reckless driving is a higher level crime. As appealing as this
argument may appear, the Iowa Supreme Court has cautioned against focusing
on the criminal classification of an offense in analyzing equal protection claims.
Wade, 757 N.W.2d at 625. The court has insisted that the nature of the offense
is controlling. Id.
In State v. Kolbet, 638 N.W.2d 653, 661 (Iowa 2001), the court addressed
an equal protection challenge to the offenses delineated in section 707.6A.
There, the defendant asserted that section 707.6A unconstitutionally
discriminated “between perpetrators of different acts of homicide embraced with
the statute.” Kolbet, 638 N.W.2d at 661. The court disagreed, citing a Colorado
opinion that pointed to the heightened public safety risk of driving while drunk
versus reckless driving Id. (citing People v. Loeser, 981 P.2d 197, 199 (Colo.
App. 1998)). To the extent Kolbet unequivocally rejected an equal protection
challenge to the entirety of section 707.6, it is controlling. Based on Kolbet, we
conclude section 707.6A(7) does not violate the equal protection clauses of the
federal and state constitutions.
III. Disposition
We affirm the district court’s judgment and sentence.
AFFIRMED.