State of Iowa v. Daniel E. Morrissey ( 2014 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 13-1490
Filed July 16, 2014
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
DANIEL E. MORRISSEY,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, David F.
Staudt, Judge.
The defendant appeals the district court order sentencing him for several
drug-related offenses. AFFIRMED.
Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Dennis D. Hendrickson,
Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Bridget A. Chambers, Assistant
Attorney General, Thomas J. Ferguson, County Attorney, and Brad Walz,
Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., Tabor, J., and Miller, S.J.*
*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 (2013).
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MILLER, S.J.
The defendant appeals the district court order sentencing him for several
drug-related offenses. The court ordered defendant to serve several of his
sentences concurrently but made some sentences consecutive, giving defendant
a total of ninety years in prison. We conclude the court gave adequate reasons
for its overall sentencing plan. We affirm defendant’s convictions and sentences.
I. Background Facts & Proceedings
Based on a trial information filed on August 5, 2011, in FECR177842,
Daniel Morrissey entered a guilty plea to the offenses of possession of
methamphetamine as a third offender and possession of marijuana as a third
offender.
For a trial information filed on December 6, 2011, in FECR180326,
Morrissey entered a guilty plea to possession of methamphetamine with intent to
distribute as a second and habitual offender, and possession of marijuana with
intent to distribute as a second and habitual offender.
Additionally, for a trial information filed on December 16, 2011, in
FECR180437, Morrissey entered a guilty plea to manufacturing or conspiring to
manufacture methamphetamine as a second and habitual offender, possession
of pseudoephedrine or ephedrine with intent to manufacture as a second and
habitual offender, and possession of lithium with intent to manufacture as a
second or habitual offender.
Based on a trial information filed on March 28, 2013, in FECR190164,
Morrissey entered a guilty plea to conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine
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as a second and habitual offender, ongoing criminal conduct, possession of
pseudoephedrine with intent to manufacture as a second and habitual offender,
possession of a simulated controlled substance with intent to deliver as an
habitual offender, possession of methamphetamine as a third offense and
habitual offender, and possession of marijuana as a third offense and habitual
offender.
A combined sentencing hearing for all four cases was held on September
13, 2013. The State requested a total of 135 years in prison. The defendant
recognized he would be going to prison but asked for a sentence of about thirty
to forty years. In FECR177842 the court sentenced Morrissey to five years in
prison on each of the two offenses. In FECR180326, Morrissey was sentenced
to forty-five years in prison on each of the two offenses. In FECR180437 the
court sentenced Morrissey to forty-five years in prison on each of the three
offenses. All of these sentences were to run concurrently. In FECR190164
Morrissey was sentenced to forty-five years, twenty-five years, forty-five years,
fifteen years, fifteen years, and fifteen years respectively on those offenses. The
sentences in FECR190164 were to run concurrently with each other, but
consecutively to the sentences on the other three cases, for a total of a ninety-
year sentence. Morrissey now appeals his sentences.
II. Scope & Standard of Review
The scope of our review of a defendant’s sentence is for the correction of
errors at law. State v. Valin, 724 N.W.2d 440, 444 (Iowa 2006). When the
sentence imposed is within the statutory limits, however, we review to determine
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if the district court abused its discretion. Id. “An abuse of discretion occurs when
the court’s decision is based on a ground or reason that is clearly untenable or
when the court’s discretion is exercised to a clearly unreasonable degree.” State
v. Becker, 818 N.W.2d 135, 140 (Iowa 2012).
III. Merits
Morrissey contends the district court did not give adequate reasons for
imposing consecutive sentences, giving him ninety years in prison, rather than
making all of his sentences concurrent, which would have given him forty-five
years in prison.
Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.23(3)(d) provides, “The court shall
state on the record its reason for selecting the particular sentence.” This rule
requires courts to also give reasons for imposing consecutive or concurrent
sentences. State v. Barnes, 791 N.W.2d 817, 827 (Iowa 2010). The court’s
reasons for imposing consecutive sentences, however, may be found among the
reasons expressed for the overall sentencing plan. Id. at 827-28; State v.
Hennings, 791 N.W.2d 828, 838-39 (Iowa 2010). The court’s reasons for
imposing consecutive sentences “are not required to be specifically tied to the
imposition of consecutive sentences, but may be found from the particular
reasons expressed for the overall sentencing plan.” State v. Delaney, 526
N.W.2d 170, 178 (Iowa Ct. App. 1994).
“Although the reasons need not be detailed, at least a cursory explanation
must be provided to allow appellate review of the trial court’s discretionary
action.” State v. Jacobs, 607 N.W.2d 679, 690 (Iowa 2000). “A statement may
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be sufficient, even if terse and succinct, so long as the brevity of the court’s
statement does not prevent review of the exercise of the trial court’s sentencing
discretion.” Hennings, 791 N.W.2d at 838.
At the sentencing hearing, the district court gave a lengthy statement
concerning its reasons for the overall sentencing plan. The court noted (1)
Morrissey’s history of substance abuse, (2) his history of criminal activity, (3)
others were affected by his criminal activities, (4) his recidivism, (5) his
involvement of others to obtain materials used to manufacture
methamphetamine, (6) he was a drug dealer, not just a user, (7) his child was in
his home when he was engaged in drug-related activities, (8) his lack of success
on probation in the past, (9) he previously absconded from a facility, (10) his
potential risk of harm to the community, and (11) his past failures at drug
treatment.
Like in Hennings, 791 N.W.2d at 838, “[t]he court spoke at length about
the information it considered in making a sentencing determination and
specifically, what factors influenced its ultimate decision.” We conclude the court
gave adequate reasons for its overall sentencing plan. We affirm Morrissey’s
convictions and sentences.
AFFIRMED.