Francis E. Kollasch v. Hormel Foods ( 2014 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 4-066 / 13-1416
Filed April 16, 2014
FRANCIS E. KOLLASCH,
Petitioner-Appellant,
vs.
HORMEL FOODS,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Richard Blane II,
Judge.
Francis E. Kollasch appeals the district court order entering judgment on a
workers’ compensation settlement agreement. AFFIRMED.
Mark Soldat of Soldat & Parrish-Sams, P.L.C., West Des Moines, for
appellant.
Valerie Ann Landis of Hopkins & Huebner, P.C., Des Moines, for appellee.
Considered by Potterfield, P.J., and Doyle and Bower, JJ.
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BOWER, J.
Francis E. Kollasch appeals the district court order entering judgment on a
workers’ compensation settlement agreement. Kollasch claims the district court
failed to convert the language agreed upon by the parties into a judgment and
exceeded its jurisdiction by modifying the language of the agreement. Kollasch
also claims the district court erred by failing to assess court costs. We find the
district court properly construed the language of the agreement. We also affirm
the district court’s decision not to assess court costs to Hormel Foods.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
On January 22, 2013, Francis Kollasch filed a worker’s compensation
settlement agreement for conversion to judgment. Included were two
agreements and a letter incorporated into the second agreement. Kollasch
submitted a proposed order on April 29, 2013, which Hormel requested be set for
a hearing. At the hearing Kollasch objected to the introduction of what he
believed to be extrinsic evidence, consideration of which would take the district
court beyond its ministerial role required by the statute.
In its ruling of August 13, 2013, the court summarized the parties’
positions regarding disagreements about the meaning of several key terms of the
agreement. Specifically, the district court construed the terms regarding
reimbursement due Kollasch for trips to a pharmacy and entered a money
judgment for several previous trips.
Kollasch filed a motion to reconsider objecting to the district court’s
findings of fact. Kollasch claimed the court’s findings were not allowed in this
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type of proceeding and the district court improperly considered parole evidence,
entered a money judgment not sought by Kollasch, failed to tax costs, and failed
to adopt the proposed judgment.
In the ruling on Kollasch’s motion to reconsider, the district court clarified
there was no intention to make findings of fact but instead an attempt to
summarize the positions of the parties. The district court also explained it had
not departed from the language of the settlement, but rather construed the
language as allowed by law. The court additionally rejected Kollasch’s claim
concerning parole evidence, finding the evidence had not been used to modify
the settlement but rather to understand it and render a judgment. Finally, the
district court agreed it had not issued the judgment or assessed costs, finding
Kollasch’s requested judgment would be contrary to the agreement.
II. Standard of Review
We review the district court’s decision to enter a judgment in favor of
Kollasch for errors at law. Snap-On Tools Corp. v. Schadendorf, 757 N.W.2d
339, 341 (Iowa 2008).
III. Discussion
Though presented as one, Kollasch raises four distinct claims regarding
the district court ruling. First, he contends the district court should not have
entered findings of fact. Second, he contends the district court improperly
determined the term “reimburse” and should not have limited reimbursement for
travel expenses to a single pharmacy. Third, he contends the district court
should not have issued a money judgment regarding expenses already incurred
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for travel to the pharmacy. Finally, he contends court costs should have been
assessed.
The outcome of this case centers upon the proper application of section
86.42 of the Iowa Code, a section that has rarely been the subject of discussion
by the appellate courts of this state. Iowa Code § 86.42 (2011). When a party
satisfies all of the requirements in section 86.42, the district court is required to
enter a judgment in that party’s favor. Schadendorf, 757 N.W.2d at 341. There
is no argument Kollasch was entitled to entry of a judgment, but rather the
arguments are based upon the proper role of the district court.
Although a district court may not enter findings of fact in this type of
proceeding, we find no error in the “background” portion of the district court
ruling. See Rethamel v. Havey, 679 N.W.2d 626, 628 (Iowa 2004). The district
court did not, in this portion of the ruling, consider and resolve any factual
disputes. Rather, the court summarized the conflicting positions of the parties
and summarized them to provide context for the analysis that followed. The
district court did not err in explaining the disputes requiring the agreement to be
interpreted elsewhere in the ruling.
A. Construing the Agreement
Kollasch contends the district court erred in determining the meaning of
two terms in the settlement agreements: “the pharmacy” and “reimburse.” Our
supreme court has examined section 86.42 and found district courts must enter a
judgment in conformance with the workers’ compensation award. Id. “The court
has no power to change the award, it cannot review, or reverse or modify the
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award, or construe the statute. In rendering judgment thereon the court can
construe the award.” Id. (citations omitted). The district court’s carefully defined
role is to explain the meaning of the terms of the award without overstepping by
reviewing, reversing, or modifying the award. Where the district court merely
explains what is found in the award as approved by the workers’ compensation
commissioner, but does not alter the terms of the award, there is no error. As
otherwise stated by our supreme court, the district court may construe the award,
but may not expand upon it. Id. at 629. The same is true for settlement
agreements. See Sauter v. Cedar Rapids & I.C. Ry., 214 N.W. 707 (Iowa 1927)
(“This court finds no provision in the Workmen’s Compensation Act . . . which
authorizes the lower court to enter judgment against an employer upon a
memorandum of settlement which is not in strict accordance with the terms and
conditions therein.”).
“According to Black’s Law Dictionary, “construe” means “[t]o analyze and
explain the meaning of (a sentence or passage).” Black’s Law Dictionary 333
(8th ed. 2004). Therefore, the district court’s role in entry of judgment is limited
to analyzing and explaining the meaning of the commissioner’s written award
decision.” Rethamel, 715 N.W.2d at 266. The district court attempted to
construe two portions of the settlement agreement. The agreement states “[f]or
future trips to the pharmacy, Hormel shall continue to reimburse claimant for 17
miles/trip when the travel is incident to work in Algona and 87 miles when the
travel is from claimant’s Bancroft residence.” (Emphasis added). The terms “the
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pharmacy” and “reimburse” are the terms that were explained by the district
court.
Regarding the pharmacy, the district court focused on use of the definitive
article indicating a particular pharmacy was contemplated by the parties.
Although the court relied, in part, upon an attached letter to determine the
particular pharmacy being used, we agree with the ultimate conclusion. The
parties’ decision to define “the pharmacy” as opposed to “a pharmacy” indicates
a particular pharmacy was contemplated by both sides. The court did not
expand upon the agreement, but construed its terms to give them an ordinary
and reasonable meaning.
The situation is similar as to the consideration of the term “reimburse.”
The term can only mean repayment of a cost incurred, as stated by the district
court. Reaching this conclusion is not an addition to the agreement, but an
expression of the meaning of the terms contained within it. The specific mileage
schedule found in the agreement is also reasonably construed as the maximum
possible payout, particularly when considered in conjunction with the
reimbursement language.
B. Money Judgment
Kollasch contends the district court erred in converting already incurred
post-settlement mileage to a money judgment. Kollasch primarily relies upon
Krohn v. State, 420 N.W.2d 463 (Iowa 1998) to support his position. The
reasons for Kollasch’s objections on this point are unclear.
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In Krohn, our supreme court rejected a similar judgment by the district
court where reimbursement could be made to more than one party through more
than one payment device. 420 N.W.2d at 465. This is not such a case. The
reimbursement in this case is for mileage incurred by Kollasch and no one else.
No other party could incur the mileage or be responsible for the cost, except
Kollasch himself. We find the district court did not err in converting this owed
expense to a judgment.
C. Court Costs
Kollasch contends the district court erred by refusing to assess court costs
to Hormel. He cites no authority that would support his position the district court
abused its discretion. We find the district court did not commit error by refusing
to assess court costs to Hormel.
AFFIRMED.